Fan Ruiping
html June 21 is the 4th anniversary of the death of medical philosopher and bioethicist H. Tristrm Engelhardt, Jr. (1941-2018) [1]. This article reviews Engelhardt's bioethics theory. It not only makes some academic discussions, but also conveys some students' nostalgia. The author[2] will first outline the main characteristics of the two bioethical theories proposed by En, and then recall some interesting stories about his "literary like his person" and trying to practice his theory, and then explore the relationship between his theory and Confucian virtue thought. similarities. 1. Community bioethics theory and social bioethics theory
Engelhardt’s bioethics theory is based on a key distinction: society and community. In his view, society is general and pluralistic, containing many different ethical communities; communities are particular and specific, whose members hold roughly the same moral concepts and/or have a commonly recognized moral authority. . [3] He believes that modern society is not only the product of technological breakthroughs and economic development, but also the result of cultural conflicts and community coexistence. Therefore, he argued that guiding a society morally is different from guiding a community, and requires different ethical theories: it is a community ethical theory that guides a community, and a social ethical theory that guides a society. [4]
Since there are many different ethical communities, of course there are also many different community ethics theories. There are many different theories, each with its own characteristics. Each one believes that it is correct or at least more reasonable than other theories. In the discussion of Western bioethics, we have become accustomed to the theories of liberalism, utilitarianism, , feminism, natural law, and the virtue theory that have emerged in recent years. Enshi himself also developed the Christian Life Theory Ethical theory. These , in his opinion, all belong to specific community ethical theories. Although they are supported by "one's own people", no one can successfully convince people in other communities to accept their own theory. Of course, what many people are more interested in is what kind of social ethics theory Enshi proposed and what is its content? Enshi replied that the theory was content-less. What he means is that social ethics theory can only provide procedural morality, but not substantive morality (that is, morality that contains specific moral standards to guide and judge people's character, actions, and public policies). He believes that substantive morality can only be provided by specific social ethics. Group ethics theory is provided. He insisted that his so-called procedural ethics contained the least moral content, and its core was the "permissibility principle" he proposed, which will be discussed below.
Why can't social ethics theory provide substantive morality? Eunshi replied that it was because there was no rational proof. From a logical point of view, En's argument is that if you want to prove any kind of substantive morality, you will inevitably fall into one of the following three situations and cannot extricate yourself: assuming the argument premise (but others do not accept it), making circular argument (without the strength of the proof) ), leading to infinite retreat (and no conclusion can be drawn). Therefore, any existing specific community ethics theory cannot be rationally proven (because if you want to prove it, you must start from some substantive moral premise, and this will inevitably fall into what he calls three logical traps) . His argument is logically impeccable, despite the reluctance of many scholars. Enshi emphasized that the specific contents of moral concepts are established in the moral tradition and life practices of a group, and they cannot be proved by pure reason, just as they are not created by pure reason.
Enshi certainly understood that this logic brought him to the edge of moral nihilism and relativism , but he stood firm on this edge.Despite repeatedly claiming that the Enlightenment has failed (that is, reason cannot prove a correct moral outlook for people), Enshi still tried his best to preserve the original intention of the Enlightenment: since this movement calls us to resort to reason to understand the truth , then, when we find that reason cannot allow us to understand moral truth (at least it cannot prove moral truth to us), we should still not use force to resolve moral differences; this is because the minimum requirement of morality is to reason rather than use force. Persuade rather than force; what should you do if others don’t agree with what you say? Enshi believes that you still can't force him to agree (as for whether you want to continue to reason with him or stop talking to him, that's your freedom), as long as his actions do not directly harm you. En admits that this is a helpless conclusion, but it is still the closest to "reason": to convince people with reason is to try not to convince people with force; if reason cannot convince people, then everyone should do their own thing, and no one should force anyone; if someone has a big fist, then If you listen to anyone, you will be on the opposite side of morality. This is the basic requirement of his so-called "principle of permission": actions involving others must be done with the permission of others (that is, do not do to others what others do not want you to do to them).
The minimum requirement of morality is to reason rather than use force. This is the logical foundation of En's moral theory: when we find that reason cannot prove the correct moral concept to others, our persistence in morality lies in at least not forcing others to follow our own opinions. Act based on recognized rational conclusions, as long as others do not force or harm others in the first place. Some people may think that sometimes it is rational to use force first - the so-called pre-emptive strike. I think Enshi may not be able to convince this objection, because the latter already use a very different concept of morality. [5] All Enshi can probably say is that his moral concept contains the least content (content-less), that is, it only requires reasoning without first using violence, and does not rely on the motivation and future of actions related to others. speculation about the situation. At the same time, he also sought to make his principles of permissibility as free from any specific culture as possible. In fact, the Permission Principle was called the principle of autonomy in the first edition of his work. He realized that the concept of "autonomy" may have the value characteristics of an individualistic culture that "starts from the individual" or is "individual-centered", so he changed it to "allow" in the second edition, making this principle It appears to be more neutral and becomes a more "by default" requirement.
There are complexities in how the permission principle is applied. There are many reasons for the complexity, including the fact that some human beings (e.g., fetuses, infants, severely mentally retarded people, mentally ill people) are not moral agents in a rational sense, and therefore their informed consent cannot be sought for things to be done. Another reason is that many issues involve the use of public resources: how to allocate public resources so as to comply with the principle of permission and not force others is a very controversial issue. Due to space limitations, here we only give an example of the latter issue. Different communities believe in different "isms" regarding so-called public resources. Enshi believes that the principle of permission reminds society not to follow utilitarian calculations in this regard, but to respect the basic rights of each community and its members. This is particularly evident in some bioethical issues. For example, in recent years, several large companies have been implementing cryonics (cryonics): preserving the bodies of recently deceased people at minus 196 °C in the hope that they can be resurrected and their existing diseases can be cured in the future. The cost of this service ranges from $28,000 to $200,000, and more than 400 bodies have been frozen in this way around the world.According to the moral values of some communities, this approach is very inappropriate: first, changing the normal definition of death (according to their understanding, death is a technically irreversible thing. If it is technically reversible, it means that the person is not Not dead, you are actually freezing the undead person); secondly, there is a lack of any reliable scientific breakthroughs that will make it possible to resurrect corpses in the future; thirdly, if this frozen resurrection technology is really successful in the future, then It is bound to cause huge interpersonal inequality and even ethical chaos (even causing changes in personal identity); fourth, it may induce people to euthanasia early in order to freeze; finally, there is the risk of interrupting freezing (such as war, political unrest, natural disasters, companies Bankruptcy, change of intentions in the future, etc.). On the contrary, according to the moral values of other communities, this approach is obviously reasonable: first, respecting one's last wishes; second, seeking the possibility of longevity (even if the success rate is low, it is a rational choice); third, promoting science Knowledge and technological development; and finally, the huge benefits that will come from achieving human longevity. (Ole Martin Moen, The Case for Cryonics, Journal of Medical Ethics41, 2015: 677-681) It is difficult to imagine that these diverse community views will ever reach consensus. Enshi discussed many bioethical issues during his lifetime, but did not discuss this issue. I speculate that according to his permission principle, he must say that society should not pay to freeze corpses for anyone (because public resources are obtained from every taxpayer, society should not force people to pay to do what they think is unethical thing), but society should not prohibit people from using their own resources to do this (whether private company provides this service or someone accepts this service, they have not improperly harmed the interests of others or violated the fundamental rights of others and thus society has no right to prohibit them from doing). This analysis may also be instructive for the application of the permission principle to other cases.
2. Living with Moral Strangers
Whether it is a substantive community ethics theory or a procedural social ethics theory, bioethicists have a lot of academic research to do. At the same time, scholars who recognize the distinction between Eng's two theories will inevitably involve the issue of how to treat people belonging to different ethical communities morally: that is, the issue of how to treat so-called moral strangers (this of course does not mean that between moral friends There would not be any problem, but the problem among moral strangers would be more difficult). As Enshi's student, I am also his moral stranger because we believe in different theories of community ethics. Looking back on his life and deeds, I feel deeply that his interactions with moral strangers were very unique and enlightening.
First of all, Enshi has great respect for ancient human civilizations, including those that do not belong to the civilizations he believes in. In 1978, he visited China with the American Kennedy Academic Delegation. It was the first high-level American humanities academic delegation to visit China after the "Cultural Revolution". It was valued by Chinese officials and received high standards. He once told me that when he visited Qufu and saw the mess left by the "Cultural Revolution", he secretly shed tears. In this regard, he did not take any chances with Western civilization, but wrote this reflection in the "Kennedy Institute Quarterly": "This reminds me of the disasters suffered by the Roman Empire in its later period. Temples were destroyed, philosophers were slaughtered... How fragile is civilization in our hands, how easily a well-established civilization can degenerate into barbarism! This problem is not unique to China, but is indicative of the general condition of mankind. "I think that respect for ancient civilizations and aversion to the use of violent means to deal with civilized affairs may be the source of his permissive principle deep in his heart.
When I first met him at an academic conference, I found that he was particularly friendly to Chinese people. For example, there was a Chinese scholar who liked to invite everyone to take photos together. After many times, everyone became irritated and pretended not to hear his suggestions. However, Enshi enthusiastically cooperated every time and helped him greet other people.I later learned that he was passionate about helping his students and was able to form close relationships with all students, regardless of their nationality, race, or community. In this regard, he is obviously different from many modern Western professors who are accustomed to "keeping their distance". When I first came to Rice University to study abroad, he must have discovered that my academic skills were poor and my philosophical arguments were poor. He should have criticized me, but he never embarrassed me in class. Even in private discussions, he is considerate and will find your strengths to praise you from time to time. I think he must have made a clear distinction between ignorance and stupidity. He knew that his students, though ignorant, were not stupid. He may think that ignorant people know that they are ignorant and go to seek advice, learn and improve, which actually shows the virtue of honesty; on the contrary, stupid people are narrow-minded and self-centered, turning a blind eye to obvious facts and clear truths. , but acting clever and messing around may be a kind of moral evil. Therefore, ignorant people can learn and grow, accumulate practical wisdom, and become better and better; while stupid people are stubborn and often become thugs to help others do harm, or at most they become villagers who take advantage of opportunities. They have no regard for moral conscience and do not care about the facts. the truth.
When I was working in the bioethics research group of the Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Social Sciences, in the late 1980s, I read some of the latest Western bioethics works. Mr. Qiu Renzong, my master's degree tutor, told me that Enshi supports US$200 (maybe Mr. Qiu said US$300, I can't remember clearly) every year to buy books for the research group. This amount sounds small now, but at that time it was still enough to buy a few books, and those books were at least very helpful to me. Without them, it would have been difficult for me to embark on a research path in bioethics, nor would I have been able to get a scholarship from Rice University to study in the United States. Indeed, Enshi is not stingy with money and is willing to help others. What’s interesting is that he often presents good wine to students and tells you the historical stories of various fine wines like countless treasures. I myself receive several bottles every winter, and every time he half-jokingly says, "Good wine can promote good thoughts." This is quite to my liking as a man from Inner Mongolia, regardless of whether I have good thoughts or not. I think Enshi’s proactive support for moral strangers reflects his expectations and practices for the beautiful aspects of human nature: in a peaceful environment that allows principles to guide people, people can show goodwill and support each other, even if they belong to different ethical community.
However, Enshi is harsh and merciless in academic debates among his colleagues. He does not seem to care whether the other party is male or female, white or black. This seems to be in sharp contrast to his affability to students and friends. Therefore, some people are very unlucky to meet him. I remember one time he took apart a female scholar’s views to analyze and refute them point by point, which made people miserable. Finally, the scholar said helplessly, "fair enough." Most people would definitely stop here, but Enshi wouldn't. He would add another sentence: "You misunderstood: This is not a question of fairness or unfairness, but a question of truth or falsehood!"
In fact, this is the first time I have seen this When I arrived at Enshi, I saw how powerful he was in this area. It was my first time to attend an academic conference abroad in March 1989. It was held in Bad Homburg, a beautiful small town in Germany, and was organized by Hans-Martin Sass, Qiu Renzong and Enshi. An academic symposium between Germany, China and the United States on "The Future of Medicine". At that time, I saw Enshi having a heated argument with another well-known American scholar. With my English proficiency at the time, I could not understand the details of their argument. I only roughly knew that the scholar was defending the "Enlightenment" and rationalism, while Enshi was tit-for-tat exposing the problems and rationality of the "Enlightenment". flaw of doctrine. He pressed forward step by step without giving an inch, until the scholar was blushing, speechless, and completely unable to get off the stage.
Enshi’s super self-confidence and aggressive momentum left a deep impression on me, which I still vividly remember.I remember that the late Mr. Peng Ruicong once sighed: Engelhardt - eloquent! I think Enshi must believe that free exchange/confrontation between different thoughts and opinions is a necessary condition for practicing the principle of permission, because only through free exchange/confrontation can we identify other people's opinions, clarify our own views, and also be able to try to Achieve better results in the process of helping others. Of course, this kind of communication can be more effective and high-quality if both parties have an honest attitude, kind feelings and relevant knowledge. In hindsight, although the willingness to argue and the willingness to help others are both expressed in Enshi, which can be regarded as a polarization phenomenon, it is not actually contradictory, because the helper should not force the possible recipients, and only through free and honest Only through communication can we understand each other's true thoughts.
Indeed, being willing to argue and helping others is not the only polarizing expression of Enshi. His other polarizing expression is: on the one hand, he is extremely serious, and on the other hand, he is very humorous. His prayers are never perfunctory, and his fasting is particularly serious. In normal conversations, if someone randomly says "my God", he will explain to them why this sentence cannot be said casually, which makes people feel a bit pedantic. One year he invited our family to visit Alaska . One day I felt unwell and asked him to give me some analgesics (I know he is also a doctor with prescribing authority). He put a few pills on the table and looked serious. Said: "This doctor only prescribes medicine for myself and my family, and never for other people. But if other people have the opportunity to take my medicine, of course I don't know about it and I will not bear any legal responsibility." Then This seriousness made me laugh. Also, if you ask him a conceptual question in his class, he may start from Latin very seriously and tell you with great interest how important a certain word in Latin is, because in , German, , Where does a certain concept come from; there is a similar concept in Spanish, but there is no word for it in English but another word, etc. It seems that no matter that these knowledge are somewhat out of reach for his students, For me, an Eastern student who only knows a little English, it is almost like playing the piano to an ox. When chatting with students in the office, he would often pull out a Latin work and read a paragraph aloud with relish. No one around him could understand it, and of course no one knew whether he read it correctly or not. He knew this, but he still enjoyed it and did it very seriously.
On the other hand, he is an extremely funny person. At the first conference I attended in Germany, I saw that he always found an opportunity to joke with Sass during the coffee break. For example, he would deliberately say to Chinese scholars in front of Sasse, if there is this or that kind of German delicacy, you must ask Professor Sasse to invite you to taste it, and do not be polite to him. At the same time, he also likes to poke fun at current events. When he visited China for the first time in 1979 (this is what another American scholar who traveled with me later told me), Enshi kept joking all the way, which was refreshing to the officials and scholars at that time who were accustomed to being serious and unsmiling. Feeling surprised.
After Eun's death, a friend mentioned a joke about him, which quite reflected his contentment and contentment with life. It is said that there was a period when he would always walk into a bar at a fixed time, order three large glasses of beer, drink it slowly and then leave. The waiter kindly suggested to him that he could finish one glass and order another, so that the beer would be fresher. Eunshi explained: "Actually, I was drinking with two other friends. We had agreed to have a drink together at this time every day, so I had to order three beers at the same time, one for each of us." One day the waiter found him After only ordering two beers, I said to him: It's a pity that one of your friends is no longer here. I hope you won't be too sad. Enshi replied: "No, no, no, you misunderstood. It was me who gave up drinking."
Enshi also has a set of extreme behaviors: he enjoys daily things that he thinks are beneficial, and always achieves the ultimate goal. ; And if he thinks it is useless, he will firmly reject it and will not be contaminated in the slightest. For example, he likes drinking and will accept all kinds of fine wines.He likes reading, especially classics, and often keeps reading. On the other hand, they have no interest in the fashionable sports in the world, including sports. American football is loved by everyone in the United States and is the most popular in the country, but Enshi dismisses it: he thinks watching these games is a waste of life. I asked him: "When you were an undergraduate and graduate student at the university, what did you do when other people were watching a major game?" He replied: "I went to the library to find the earliest editions of classic books." There were no computer indexes at that time, and you had to flip through paper cards. You can imagine the young Engelhard jumping up and down in an almost empty library, flipping through cards and browsing the bookshelves, looking for Plato , Aristotle , Huo The earliest versions of Booth , Locke , Kant and others are very busy. He feels that reading ancient versions will help to put philosophical theories (and their expressions) into the context of history, and feel their profound charm. This will not only greatly increase the charm of the original book, but also add value to himself. The thought opens up the possibility of winding paths.
Enshi's most astonishing polarizing tendency may be reflected in his deep love for philosophical speculation and his deep immersion in religious tranquility. His philosophy and bioethics are full of complex thinking based on Hegelian philosophy and even some postmodern philosophy, trying to provide a peaceful ideological outlet for this hopelessly pluralistic world. But the bottom line of his philosophical argument may be a Kantian assumption: people have to admit the limitations of reason in order to leave room for faith. I think that an extremely smart person like him may just have the ultimate dual complementarity: both the physical and mental excitement of entering the world, and the tranquility of the years after being born; living clearly in the current secular world, And deeply attached to another completely different mysterious world. As George Santayana said: Human experience has proven Bacon's famous saying again and again: If you know a little philosophy, the human mind is inclined to atheism; if you go deep into philosophy, the human mind will lead to theism. This may be because philosophy finally makes people realize that the prospects shown by religion and the secrets it spreads are pictures of another life world that science can neither tell us nor deny to us. Philosophy and religion are very different approaches. But in Enshi's view, if people want to explore freely and gain spiritual peace, both are indispensable.
On the surface, Eng's polarizing tendencies have nothing to do with his two bioethical theories. He does not show one extreme when dealing with moral friends (such as being serious, devoted to religion, willing to help others, and enjoying all the benefits), but shows another extreme when dealing with moral strangers (such as being witty, devoted to philosophy, and willing to help others). Argument, reject it if it is not helpful), but put the polarization performance between them. However, if you think deeply, the two may be somewhat related. It may be called "the rebirth of disillusionment in moral unity." By this term I want to mean that in Englin moral unity is disillusioned in one sense but reborn in another sense. Since reason cannot prove the truth to us, the cognitive unity of various social ethics must be shattered, and they must compete with each other, and no one can occupy a truly superior rational position; at the same time, reason reminds us that we should respect each other, To live in peace, no one should force others, so when living a moral life recognized by oneself, one should explore various peaceful ways of cooperating with others. In this sense, a kind of practical unity of morality (even a minimal unity) may be born. sex). I call it "rebirth of disillusionment" because it involves a positive development of reason after self-denial. I once called this ideal "Towards Utopia." (Fan Ruiping, "Secular Ethics , Contemporary Utopia", see Engelhardt: Foundations of Bioethics, translated by Fan Ruiping, Peking University Press , 2006, pp. XIII-XXXIII) Because in the face of powerful forces in modern times The reality of an incomparable sovereign state, I really doubt the possibility of it being realized.However, now that I think about it, it is difficult to say whether a moral theory is successful or not, and it is not something that individuals can decide. What an individual can decide is actually how to live according to the theory he believes in. In this sense, Enshi’s polarized performance may be the best testimony to his two bioethical theories: going a little extreme will help you not to follow your hometown wishes; at the same time, he will not be so serious and learn to be more humorous and more thoughtful. A little comedy might help bring peace between moral strangers. [6]
3. Harmonious freedom
Before my teacher was alive, I emphasized to him that the family/family in Confucian civilization may be a special community: regardless of the personal beliefs of family members, everyone accepts behavior Confucian The virtue requirement represented by "filial piety" requires respecting virtues and observing etiquette, and pursuing the ideal of " cultivating oneself, harmonizing the family, governing the country and bringing peace to the world". Therefore, a family in Confucian civilization may be both a moral stranger and a moral friend, but they are not completely separate. However, it now seems that the particularity I emphasized may not mean much. Although the Chinese people are influenced by the three religions of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism (and other thoughts), each religion and every thought (including modern ideology ) has a different impact on each person. As long as family members If their ideological differences do not reach a certain level, they are still "moral friends"; but if their differences reach a certain level, the accurate representation of them can only be "moral strangers". Furthermore, to this day, I see that many couples have very different views on their parents and children. Although they live under the same roof, they either have nothing to say all day long, or they quarrel when they speak. It is difficult to deny that they have become out-and-out quarrels. moral strangers (of course, this does not mean that family members who are moral friends will definitely get along, but there will be less conflict after all). In other words, some families are still moral friends, and some families are moral strangers. This is probably an indisputable fact. The focus is only on the proportion of the two in society. Finally, if you have become a moral stranger, then the "permission principle" proposed by Enshi may be the best guide for them.
I used to think that even though Enshi himself denied it, his social ethics theory centered on the principle of permission was still a theory of individualistic liberalism, while a society dominated by Confucian civilization had obvious relationalist familism. Characteristics may make his theory not applicable to this kind of society. Now it seems that En's theory is very different from the former. On the contrary, it has more in common with Confucian virtue theory. Let’s first talk about the differences between it and liberal theory, taking the concept of personal freedom as an example. Through J. B. Schneewind’s classic work, we can clearly see how the history of Western thought has moved step by step towards Kant’s concept of freedom based on self-rational legislation: “We are self-disciplined subjects who self-formulate formal principles of practical reason. Imposing morality on oneself" (Schneewind, J.B. 1998. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, p.13.) This idea can be called "autonomous freedom" ( autonomous liberty). In this concept, freedom is not to do things according to one's own desires or emotions, but to do things according to universal rationality; at the same time, morality as universal rationality does not come from external rules, but from people's inner formulations. Contemporary liberal ethics recognizes that Kant's formalist universal reason cannot establish substantive and unified moral standards, so it abandons the concept of freedom of universal reason and moves towards comprehensive personal decision-making: freedom is the practice of personal choice or decision , whether it comes from personal desires, emotions or reasons, this is true. At the same time, they retained Kant’s proposition that freedom is “self-legislation”: the essence of freedom lies in self-initiated and self-directing. Contemporary liberalism’s view of freedom can be called “self-determination liberty”.
Enn's theory does not accept the liberal view of (positive) freedom, whether it is the "self-disciplined freedom" of classic liberalism or the "autonomous freedom" of contemporary liberalism. In his view, on the one hand, reason cannot establish "self-disciplined freedom" (as mentioned above); on the other hand, individuals live in an ethical community, and only by joining a good ethical community can they have true positive personal freedom. Not to mention that personal ignorance often leads to wrong decisions, uncontrolled personal desires lead to disasters, and people's emotions are often biased. Even personal well-thought-out reasons may be just common prejudices. Enshi believes that the way a person pursues freedom in community life is to understand, inherit and reflect on the moral tradition of the community, and use the rich moral resources of the community to enrich and improve himself, which makes the essence of freedom no longer the self. initiate or self-direct, but to seek right morality and consciously obey it. In this regard, Enshi does not shy away from saying that the element of luck is inevitable: if he is lucky, a person may get or find a good ethical community and live in it to practice virtue and pursue freedom.
Traditional Confucian civilization does not have the concept of personal freedom, but this does not mean that it does not have the concept of personal freedom. In fact, different conceptions of personal freedom are rooted in different cultural traditions, including the Confucian tradition of virtue ethics. As far as this tradition is concerned, its basic concept and core value are of course not freedom, but virtues (such as benevolence, justice, propriety, wisdom, trust, filial piety, loyalty, forgiveness, and harmony). However, the process of personal learning and practicing virtue is also the process of pursuing and embodying personal freedom: from the perspective of Confucianism, this process is long, and even Confucius did not have full freedom until he was seventy years old ("Do as the heart desires and do not want it"). "Exceeding the rules"). Importantly, Confucians do not believe that obeying and satisfying one's own desires or passions is freedom. It depends on what your desires or passions are; Confucians also do not believe that freedom must be achieved through personal initiation or self-determined principles. On the contrary, Confucianism believes that there are destiny, laws and principles, which reflect the essential conditions and deep structures of all things in the universe, including humans. Human behavior can only be truly free if it responds to and conforms to these conditions and structures. Fortunately, the Confucian classics have revealed to us the destiny and heavenly principles, such as the symbol system of the two rituals, four images, eight trigrams, sixty-four hexagrams and three hundred and eighty-four lines shown in the "Book of Changes"; the Confucian classics have also explained to us the hidden The moral meaning contained in this extensive and profound symbol system is a series of virtue principles and action guidelines provided by the "Yi Zhuan" and the "Four Books". In short, the Confucian concept of freedom is neither the creation and obedience of Kantian pure rationality, nor the personal decision of contemporary liberalism, but the cultivation of practical wisdom through self-cultivation in human relations to achieve the balance between personal emotions, desires and destiny. The harmonious development achieved between the laws and principles of heaven. This view of freedom can be called harmonious liberty. (Fan, Ruiping, Which Confucianism? And What Liberty? In Confucian Political Philosophy, R.A.Carleo III and Y. Huang (eds.), Springer, 2021, pp. 89-99.)
Enshi Theory and the First of Confucianism The one thing they have in common is that they do not accept the value presuppositions of self-legislation and personal decision-making of contemporary liberalism. Someone may object that even if En's theory is indeed consistent with Confucianism in terms of positive liberty, En's principle of permission contains a strong requirement of negative liberty (that is, freedom from interference or coercion by others). freedom), and this is the shortcoming of Confucian virtue theory. I admit that the traditional Confucian virtue theory does not explicitly address this aspect, and sometimes even says the opposite, but I think it is still essentially consistent with En's principle of permission. The reason is that Confucian virtue theory advocates the use of etiquette rather than legality to govern society (please note the difference between traditional "legality" and modern "rule of law"), that is, it does not advocate the official establishment of severe punishments to compulsorily maintain people's morality. Instead, we use civil ritual autonomy to make people "shameful and dignified."In summary, Confucian etiquette has two distinctive features: First, etiquette is folk, spontaneous, and formed from the bottom up (although it is said that "Zhou Gong made etiquette and music", it may mainly eliminate some evil etiquette (such as human It is not a deductive system that derives specific rules from general principles, so it contains rich local characteristics and diversity; furthermore, the normative nature of etiquette relies on people's conscience, public sentiment and public opinion to maintain and abide by it (rather than Enforced by official laws), thus maintaining great flexibility and non-coercion, ultimately leaving it to individuals to make comprehensive weighing and discretionary decisions on whether to “observe etiquette”. Shun "married without telling me" (even though etiquette required that he should have discussed it with his parents and obtained their consent) and "sister-in-law helped him out" (even though etiquette required that uncles and sisters-in-law who lived together in a large family should not fight with each other). ) are all familiar Confucian stories. If my (normative) understanding of Confucian etiquette is correct, then Confucian ethics are not inconsistent with Enshi's principle of permission: because you should not force others to behave according to etiquette. (Fan, Ruiping, Reconstructionist Confucianism: Rethinking Morality after the West, Springer, 2010)
Enshi’s principle of permission also serves as a good reminder for the contemporary Confucian community. This principle is certainly proposed for moral strangers: even if they do not share any substantive morality with each other, they should abide by the permissibility principle. But Enshi did not say that moral friends do not need to abide by this principle. In fact, although it is easy for moral friends to reach the same moral judgment (because they hold the same basic moral beliefs), this is not always the case. They may also make different moral decisions on many issues, and no one is sure that their decision is absolutely correct. Moreover, in today's changing times, moral friends can become moral strangers at any time. Therefore, it is very necessary for a Confucian community to learn not to force each other and to negotiate amicably. Needless to say, there are often situations where communication is poor and things are not said within Confucian families. For example, even on issues related to life and death decisions, many elderly (or even middle-aged) patients are unwilling to communicate about their condition and treatment, leaving everything to their family members, and family members often make decisions out of fear of harming the patient. Doctors are required to conceal their condition from the patient, and the final decision often does not receive the patient's "permission," and it is difficult to prove whether it is really in line with the patient's wishes and interests. In these aspects, the Confucian ethical community needs to learn more about Enshi's principle of permission to better practice Confucian etiquette. In short, although the Confucian ethical community shares many substantive moral standards and etiquette models and does not need to introduce a formal principle of permission to guide its moral practice, it is necessary to deeply understand the similarities between Enshi's principle of permission and Confucian etiquette practice. It is beneficial to mutual respect and effective communication within Confucian ethical communities, especially families.
Finally, some friends may point out: If you understand Confucian ethics as you do, requiring friendly consultation and no coercion, doesn’t this mean letting individuals make the final decision? Isn’t this fundamentally consistent with liberal ethical deontology? In my opinion, it is still inconsistent, and the inconsistencies include at least the following points. First, the standards are different. The ultimate moral standard of Confucianism is the Mandate of Heaven, the Way of Heaven, and the principles of heaven; while that of liberalism is individual autonomy or autonomy. Second, attitudes are different. Confucianism cannot believe that the destiny, way, and principles understood by individuals must be authoritative. Instead, they must respect tradition and learn from others humbly, as Confucius taught: "Fear destiny, fear adults, and fear the words of saints." "The Analects of Confucius·Ji Shi" ; The liberal attitude is that I don't want any "moral intermediary", only my own understanding and knowledge can count. Finally, the format is different. Confucian ethics is relational, especially familial. Confucian etiquette makes it inappropriate for a family member to declare: This is my personal matter and no one else has the right to interfere. On the contrary, family members can effectively support each other and prevent impetuous personal decisions and actions; liberal ethics emphasizes the exclusive decision-making rights of individuals: for example, on clinical issues, family members can only participate if the individual expresses consent.In short, due to these differences, learning the contemporary Confucian ethics of Enshi's permission principle will not turn it into liberal ethics. Instead, it will enable us to better abide by the scriptures and uphold rights, practice virtue, and pursue harmonious freedom.
Conclusion
In this crisis-ridden world, the role of ethics is very limited. It is undeniable that common beliefs in many parts of human history were established by certain communities through force. However, this fact does not justify the use of force. Enshi pointed out the difference between community ethics and social ethics, argued that no one can use reason to prove the correctness of his own moral views, and advocated the use of permissibility principles to guide society. His argument shows that the implications of ethics are profound. Enshi's bioethics is inspiring for us to think deeply about human nature, morality and life medicine issues.
(first draft on April 17, 2022, finalized in Hong Kong on May 9)
[1] The main content of the second part of this article comes from the article entitled "The two poles are connected, but virtue moves the sky - in memory of my teacher Mr. Engelhardt" The original manuscript was read out by Professor Bian Lin at the "Engelhart Memorial Service" (Nanjing) organized by Professor Sun Muyi on August 26, 2018. I would like to express my special thanks to both of you! We are also grateful to Jiang Qing, Ci Jiwei, and Wang Jue for their detailed responses to the first draft of this article, and to the following friends and colleagues for their comments or suggestions: Wang Mingxu, Wang Qingjie, Wang Hongqi, Fang Yao, Wu Jingxian, Zheng Linjuan, Zhang Ying, Huang Yong, Lin Weidong.
[2] Fan Ruiping is a professor of the Department of Public Policy at City University of Hong Kong and a doctor of philosophy at Rice University in the United States, where he studied under Engelhardt.
[3] The community he talks about does not mainly refer to those people living in the same place, but to those people who live in different places but hold the same moral values. He called these people moral friends. In his opinion, those people who have very different values although they live in the same area, belong to the same unit, or even live together under the same roof, all belong to different moral communities. Enshi calls them moral foreign lands. People (moral strangers, or "moral strangers"). Today’s social media makes it easy for people with similar views to get together and form a virtual community. Enshi might call them the moral friends of the online community.
[4] Enshi uses many different descriptions to compare the differences between the two theories: procedural ethics vs. substantive ethics, common framework vs. different content, secular ethics vs. religious ethics, inaction strategy vs. proactive approach, minimal morality and concrete morality, ethics among strangers, ethics among friends, etc. (Engelhardt: Foundations of Bioethics, translated by Fan Ruiping, Peking University Press, 2006.)
[5] For example, some people will say, "The meaning of rationality is to protect one's own safety, strike first and control others later. We If I don’t take action first, I will perish, so of course I should take action first.” Under this moral perspective, whether it is to strike first or strike later, they are just reasonable strategic means and have nothing to do with moral evaluation. Enshi insists that because you cannot use reason to prove that your own moral views are the only correct ones, you should not use violence in the first place to coerce someone who is not using violence. His proposition may be consistent with the Confucian understanding of "doing good to achieve good" (that is, "good purposes cannot be achieved by evil means"). (Jiang Qing, Sheng Hong: "Building Goodness from Goodness: Dialogue between Jiang Qing and Sheng Hong", Fujian Education Press, 2014) Although the lines of argument between the two are different.
[6] Recalling En's polarizing tendencies again, I can't help but think of Confucius's suggestion: "If you don't follow the middle line and follow it, you will be crazy! A crazy person will make progress, and a stubborn person will not do anything." ( "The Analects of Confucius: Zilu"). It can be seen that Confucius had a favorable attitude toward madmen and arrogant people and was willing to interact with them. This may be because, as a very high virtue in Confucianism, "walking in the middle" is actually very difficult to achieve. Some people think they have embarked on the golden mean, but in fact they are just "hometown wishes", and the latter is the "thief of virtue" in Confucius's view ("The Analects of Confucius: Yang Huo"). Enshi's polarized performance may have caused him to play a role that combines a madman and a ruthless person, which coincides with Confucius' suggestion.Perhaps, being a madman or a monstrous person helps an individual avoid becoming a country boy and prevent the "evil of banality".
editor in charge: Huang Xiaofeng
proofreader: Liu Wei
