[Text/Observer.com columnist Chen Feng] At a discussion at the Asia Society on July 6, Campbell, director of Indo-Pacific policy coordination at the U.S. National Security Council, was asked: How much love the United States shows to Taiwan will be too much love. ?

[Text/Observer.com columnist Chen Feng]

At a discussion at the Asia Society on July 6, Campbell, director of Indo-Pacific policy coordination at the U.S. National Security Council, was asked: How much love the United States shows to Taiwan will be too much Love? (how much love is too much)

"Too much love" is an interesting expression in the English context. It means that if you love too much, it will be counterproductive and harm the other person; it can also mean that you are too involved, so that Hurt yourself. Kamble is a senior staffer to national security adviser Sullivan, but he is actually the director of U.S.-China relations. This location is said to be Indo-Pacific, but actually it has "China" written all over it.

Campbell is a senior Asia-Pacific and China expert and served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Obama era. Asia Society is an important think tank in the United States. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd and Campbell's successor Dan Russell are the directors and the main questioners of this discussion.

As soon as Biden came to power, he ordered a comprehensive review of China policy, and Campbell is probably the person in charge. Biden said in February that the review was largely taking shape and should be completed by July, and that time is now.

Biden’s basic policy towards China is to enlist allies to deal with China, avoid confrontation, and focus on extreme competition, but does not rule out cooperation where it is advantageous. Partly because of this theme, and partly because the China policy review has not yet been finalized, the Biden administration has generally continued Trump’s China policy in the early days, whether it is on tariffs, technology and personnel exchanges, freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, U.S.-Taiwan political and military cooperation, etc. This is true in every aspect.

But the China policy review is not just a formality. Campbell is actually announcing Biden's reviewed China policy. During the general election, Biden implemented a strategy of saying less and making fewer mistakes, and achieved success in the election. However, this also kept Biden's China policy vague, especially on the key "One China" issue.

Campbell, Director of Indo-Pacific Policy Coordination at the U.S. National Security Council

At the Asia Society discussion on July 6, Campbell made it clear that the United States adheres to "one China" and opposes Taiwan's independence, but supports the development of strong unofficial relations between the United States and Taiwan. Campbell also made it clear many times that he would answer questions about Taiwan very carefully because the United States "fully recognizes and understands the sensitivity of this issue."

In other words, this is "strategic ambiguity under limited clarity", and it is not an expedient or perfunctory statement, but a well-thought-out statement.

Although the United States has problems with two-party politics, there is a certain continuity in national security policies. The main reason for the change of direction is that the old path no longer works, not the political preferences of the two parties or the personalities of political leaders. Trump's "drunken fist" has some willful elements, and more importantly, it is because the US strategy towards China has reached a dead end in the past.

"If one punch doesn't work, two punches will come." In the late Trump era, the clamor that the U.S. Taiwan policy needs strategic clarity is getting louder and louder, but most of it is ideologically based venting, from the perspective of U.S. national security and Research based on national interests opposes strategic clarity, because the People's Liberation Army's Taiwan strategy is based on US military intervention. Strategic clarity does not change China's strategic calculations, but greatly increases the risk of the United States being dragged into an unwanted war by Taiwan. .

's view against strategic ambiguity is also very clear: since the vague threat of US military intervention is no longer enough to deter the People's Liberation Army's plan to attack Taiwan, only by letting the United States loose its hands and provide military assistance or even directly stationing troops can it be possible to ensure that the People's Liberation Army will not easily take over Taiwan.

Regardless of whether it is clear or vague, the core is to protect Taiwan. But for the United States, it actually no longer matters whether the strategy is ambiguous or clear. The outcome is the same, but the approach is different: Taiwan cannot be saved.

The dilemma of strategic ambiguity is that the People's Liberation Army simply ignores the danger of US military intervention. The dilemma with a clear strategy is that arming Taiwan is useless, and the intervention of the US military is self-defeating. In this case, the strategic basis of the United States can only be to maintain strategic initiative as much as possible instead of being led into a blind corner by the Taiwan issue."Strategic ambiguity with limited clarity" is exactly the choice to maintain maximum flexibility, so that "principles without principles" may become the main line of future US Taiwan policy.

But this does not mean that the US military will give up intervention, but the focus of US military intervention may no longer be to protect Taiwan, but to consume the strength of the People's Liberation Army. This is a bit like the People's Liberation Army's mobile warfare: not obsessed with the gains and losses of one city or one place, not obsessed with pots and pans, and focused on the elimination of viable forces.

In fact, the US strategic community has been studying the issue of retreating to the second island chain a few years ago. This is just a loose line of defense, but it is also a battlefield far away from China's homeland. China's home field advantage has basically disappeared, and the United States' ocean-going advantages can be fully exerted. It must be said that for China, the battle between the first island chain and the second island chain is a much more difficult challenge than fighting within the first island chain.

China has no demands for regaining the first island chain beyond Taiwan. In an ideal world, the war would be over after Taiwan is liberated. If Japan and the Philippines insist on taking the initiative to intervene or provide bases to the US military, the war to liberate Taiwan will have no choice but to expand to relevant areas. But occupying Japan or the Philippines was never the goal.

However, once a war begins, it may not end as desired unless the opponent surrenders or ceases war. Taiwan’s military is not strong enough to fight. The opponent in the Taiwan Strait war is not the Taiwan military, but the US military. Even if the U.S. military's intervention causes a temporary setback for the People's Liberation Army, it will not force the People's Liberation Army to give up attacking Taiwan. Similarly, even if the People's Liberation Army captures Taiwan, the U.S. military may not cease fighting and may continue its war with China in the vast Pacific. For example, relying on Japan and the Philippines, there are also Hawaii, Guam, South Pacific islands, and Australia. China's long-range firepower can launch powerful strikes, but it will not force the United States, Japan, and Australia to withdraw from the war. The Philippines and others are involuntarily. The United States is particularly good at intercepting shipping from China and neutral countries to and from China in distant oceans (including the Indian Ocean), which will harm China's long-term economic interests and development.

Such a protracted war far away from China is in the interest of the United States, but for those abandoned places and jars, it is a broken home. This is the fate of the frontier areas when great powers compete.

Japan understands this very well and is also worried about this. Taiwan is Japan's gateway. Without Taiwan's cover, Japan will run naked in front of China. Based on the buffer zone theory, Japan urgently needs to turn Taiwan into a buffer zone, and it is best to limit the war to Taiwan. If the United States gives up defending Taiwan, Japan will become the frontline.

No wonder Japanese senior officials have recently challenged the bottom line of "One China" one after another. On June 28, Japanese Deputy Defense Minister Taihide Nakayama pointed out at a symposium at the Hudson Institute in the United States that the threats posed by cooperation between China and Russia are increasing day by day, and it is necessary to "awaken" to Beijing's pressure on Taiwan and protect it. "Taiwan is a democratic country." Nakayama Taixiu said that Taiwan "is not a friend, but a brother, and a family." He also publicly questioned the "One China" policy, "Is this right?"

A week before Nakayama Taihide's speech, Japanese Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi also said in a Bloomberg interview that Taiwan's peace and stability are directly related to Japan, and Japan We are paying close attention to the relationship between China and Taiwan, as well as China's military activities.

Former Japan Self-Defense Forces Chief of Staff (equivalent to Chief of General Staff) Katsutoshi Kono attended the "Serious Discussion Meeting" in Nagoya on July 7. He delivered a speech on the topic of "Japan's Security and Future Issues" and believed that Japan stands at the forefront of peace and security. It is in Japan's national interest to support Taiwan when "something goes wrong" in the Taiwan Strait.

On June 9, during a debate between Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and Yukio Edano, leader of the opposition Constitutional Democratic Party, he clearly called Taiwan a "country." On July 5, Japanese Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Taro Aso declared in Tokyo that if mainland China uses force against Taiwan, it is likely to cause an "existential crisis" for Japan. Japan may then exercise its right of collective self-defense to "defend Taiwan" with the United States.

Whether these were slips of the tongue or well-thought-out provocations is not important, nor is the subsequent clarification, because these reflect their true thoughts: Taiwan must be protected to the death to prevent Japan from becoming the front line.The China policy announced by Campbell has been communicated to Japan in advance, which has greatly increased Japan's anxiety. Japan's remarks are a last-ditch effort to pull the United States back to the "right direction." This is "the tail wagging the dog", which is, of course, futile. After the United States set the tone, Japan had no courage or power to continue to attack China's red line, and could only clarify its position insincerely.

The United States has actually tried the "right direction" for a long time. In the Trump era, the United States has frantically violated the "One China" red line without winning any concessions from China. In vain, it has greatly increased the risk of war. The visit of Deputy Secretary of State Krach can only be carried out in the form of a secret trip and a public visit. The US ambassador to the United Nations' visit to Taiwan at the last moment took off and then returned amidst various mysterious claims.

Trump has only proved one thing: the United States can no longer suppress China by relying on one-on-one combat. In addition to continuing the freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, the Biden era has strengthened the interaction between the United States, Japan, India and Australia. It has also made it a point to mention China in its visits to Japan and South Korea and its visits to Europe, in an attempt to build a united front against China. , has achieved limited success. For example, Taiwan was mentioned in the communiqués of the US-Japan and US-ROK summits, and Taiwan was also included in the G7 communiqué. However, in substantive joint actions, it encountered a lot of lip service but no real implementation. Soft nails. The United States can only stop at China's red line.

Campbell co-authored an article with Sullivan in "Foreign Affairs" in 2019, pointing out that the history of the Taiwan Strait is too complicated, and not unilaterally changing the status quo is the best outcome; Taiwan is not only a potential flashpoint, but also the "biggest fuse" in the history of U.S.-China relations. "the greatest unclaimed success." Of course, Campbell and Sullivan are not saying that Taiwan's "concubine's identity is unknown" is the ideal state of the United States, but that this is the best of all possible outcomes, and any other outcome is even more inconsistent with the interests of the United States.

In early July, the Financial Times stated that the United States and Japan were conducting war games on the conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

Almost all demands for maintaining the status quo occurred after a certain incident occurred, but maintaining the status quo can be divided into maintaining the current status (status quo) and returning to The state before the incident (status quo ante). Maintaining the status quo is almost always a helpless move, so there will always be at least one party that will constantly try to "cannibalize" and change the status quo. When the other party counterattacks, it will loudly accuse the other party of destroying the status quo (status quo). At this time, the other party will definitely ask to return to the state before the incident (status quo ante). In reality, it is often only after several rounds of interaction between the two parties that they can discuss maintaining the status quo, and what is the status quo is often the key. Status quo is almost never status quo, but status quo ante. More importantly, whether it is status quo or status quo ante, this is a temporary and transitional state.

For the United States and Taiwan, Taiwan's current "last wire" and "quasi-independence" state is the status quo; for China, it was the status quo when Ye Jianying published the "Letter to Taiwan Compatriots" in 1979, at least in 1992 The era of the “92 Consensus”. China's goal is reunification. Xi Jinping clearly stated in his speech on the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Party: "To resolve the Taiwan issue and achieve the complete reunification of the motherland... resolutely smash any plot for 'Taiwan independence' and create a bright future for national rejuvenation. No one should underestimate China." The people’s strong determination, firm will, and strong ability to defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity!” This is not just a good wish, but an action of the “last wire”.

Therefore, being able to maintain the status quo is indeed America's greatest secret success.

This does not mean that the United States will continue the policy of "limited clarity and strategic ambiguity" for a long time. The decisive factor in changing direction is not the change of the two parties, but whether this policy can achieve the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the United States. But apart from directly challenging China militarily, the United States’ choice space is getting smaller and smaller, and has been almost squeezed out by China.

As for paving the way for the US-China summit, this is just a tactical issue. In the Trump era, the United States cut off official contacts at all levels to put pressure on China, which was of no use. Trump does not admit it, but Biden recognizes the fact that the United States cannot bypass China on many major world events, and is eager to restore official ties with China. When quarreling with China, the other party must quarrel in the same space before the other party can hear it.

But Biden needs to first win over allies, and secondly "balance" Russia before he can confront China "based on strength." The high-profile conflict with China in Anchorage is to inspire confidence among allies, and China must be mentioned at G7, US-EU summits, and NATO summits to rally allies. However, Biden (and his Chinese team, especially Cambour) sadly found that the allies were not strong enough and Russia returned empty-handed, while China could no longer wait.

Washington has sent signals many times, hoping to promote a summit during the G20. Therefore, clarifying China's policies is not only the need of the United States, but also the request of China. China will not hold a summit with the United States whose position is ambiguous and uncertain, because it is simply meaningless. Campbell said he believes both leaders are taking stock and the expectation is that "some kind of contact will be made shortly." Tactically, the United States also needs to put the Taiwan issue on hold for a summit to be possible.

As for how much the United States loves Taiwan, the United States’ true love is only the United States itself. The United States’ only purpose is to maintain its hegemony, so it needs to suppress the rise of China. China can avoid political and military challenges to the United States, but China's economic, social and cultural development has made China's path "another choice", which the United States cannot accept, just like the Pope in the Middle Ages could not accept "another choice". God" exists. The United States calls on its allies to unite to deal with China, just like the Pope calls for a Crusade.

The Crusaders launched nine Eastern Crusades, which lasted for 200 years. The reason for the nine Eastern Expeditions was that each time they gained and lost, the reason why there will be no further Eastern Expeditions is because Europe exhausted its strength and was forced to accept the reality that Jerusalem was controlled by Muslims. During this period, the Crusaders had many great victories, including the capture of King Louis IX of France and the Crusaders' sack of Constantinople. In the end, the Holy See did not benefit from the expansion of Christendom. It was not even able to take back the splintered Orthodox Church, and it allowed the Venetian power in the Mediterranean to grow. Byzantium was lost and regained in the ebb and flow of the Crusades, shrinking from a hegemonic power in the Eastern Mediterranean to an isolated island in the Turkic tsunami. Jerusalem was eventually "lost" to the Muslims.

In the age of the New Crusaders, who are Byzantium, Venice and Jerusalem? Times have changed, the military and technical advantages of the Crusader Knights no longer exist, and the Pope can no longer greet them. Is the United States really determined to launch a new crusade? Campbell's declaration shows that the United States is still unable to make this determination. But Taiwan's fate is locked: it will be reunited with the mainland. The difference is only whether it will be a peaceful unification that returns intact to Zhao, or a military unification that will be smashed and reorganized.

As for China, Campbell’s declaration will not change China’s course. China will continue to do whatever it has to do, but it may be relatively less disturbed by the United States’ irrational collision with “One China” in the near future. China is not afraid of interference, and it will not be afraid of Trump 2.0 or 3.0, but it is always better to have less interference.

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