But in today's America, this is not easy to do. When democratic ideals seem to be gaining momentum abroad, people have reason to ask whether we have lost this wealth in the homeland of democracy.

Author | Michael J. Sandel (Michael J. Sandel)

Chair professor of the Department of Government at Harvard University and philosopher

Questions The era of repeated questions prompts us to recall the ideals we live by. But in today's America, this is not easy to do. When democratic ideals seem to be gaining momentum abroad, people have reason to ask whether we have lost this wealth in the homeland of democracy. Our public life is rife with discontent. Americans feel they have little say in how they are governed and do not trust the government to do the right thing. Despite the extraordinary achievements of the second half of the 20th century—the victory in World War II, unprecedented affluence, a more just society for women and minorities, the end of the Cold War—our politics is beset by anxiety and frustration.

At the same time, political parties are unable to explain our situation. The main issues of national debate - the appropriate scope of the welfare state, the range of rights and entitlements, the appropriate degree of government regulation - had taken these forms early on. These issues are not unimportant, but they do not touch upon two concerns that lie at the heart of democratic dissatisfaction: the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that shape our lives; and the sense that the moral foundation of the communities around us, from families to neighborhoods to nations, is unraveling. These two concerns, the loss of self-government and the erosion of community, together defined the anxieties of the era. The current dominant political agenda cannot respond to, let alone address, this anxiety.

Why is American politics so incapable of alleviating the discontent that is now devouring it? The answer lies beyond the political debates of our time and lies within the public philosophies that inspired them. The so-called public philosophy refers to the political theory implicit in our practice and the conceptual assumptions about citizenship and freedom that shape our public life. The inability of contemporary American politics to speak confidently about autonomy and community has something to do with the public philosophy by which we live our lives.

Public philosophy is an elusive thing because it is always right under our noses. It forms an often unreflective backdrop to our political discourse and political pursuits. In ordinary times, public philosophy can easily escape the attention of those who live by it. But times of distress force some clarification on the issue; they force first principles to the surface and thus provide opportunities for critical reflection.

Liberalism and Republicanism Freedom

The public philosophy by which we live is some version of libertarian political theory. Its core idea is that the state should remain neutral with respect to the moral and religious views held by its citizens. Since people have different opinions on the best way to live, the government should not legally support any particular view of the good life. Instead, government should provide a framework of rights that respects people as free and independent selves capable of choosing their own values ​​and purposes. Since liberalism claims that fair procedures take precedence over specific purposes, the public life it shapes can be called the "procedural republic."

In describing currently popular political philosophy as a version of liberal political theory, it is necessary to first distinguish between two different meanings of liberalism. In the usual parlance of American politics , liberalism is the opposite of conservatism and is the advocacy of those who want a more generous welfare state and more social and economic equality. However, liberalism has a different, broader meaning in the history of political theory.In this historical sense, liberalism describes the intellectual tradition that respects individual rights and emphasizes tolerance from Locke, Kant, John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. The public philosophy of contemporary American politics is a version of this liberal intellectual tradition, and most of our debates are conducted in its terms.

The idea that freedom consists in our ability to choose our ends is evident in our politics and laws. Its scope is not limited to those who are called liberals in American politics, but also includes those who are called conservatives, and it can be seen across the entire political spectrum . For example, sometimes Republicans argue that taxing the rich to pay for welfare programs forces benevolence on the rich and infringes on people's freedom to choose what to do with their money. Sometimes Democrats argue that those who are limited by the necessities of life do not really have the freedom to choose in other areas, and therefore the government should ensure that all citizens have decent incomes, housing, and health. Although both sides disagree on how government should respect individual choices, both sides assume that freedom consists in people's ability to choose their values ​​and ends.

This view of freedom is so familiar that it seems like a timeless feature of America's political and constitutional tradition. But Americans haven’t always understood freedom this way. As the dominant public philosophy, the version of liberalism that shapes our current political debate is relatively recent, that is, it has developed only in the last forty or fifty years. Contrast this liberalism with the public philosophy it gradually replaced, and its unique characteristics become clear. The competing public philosophy is some version of republican political theory.

Central to republican theory is the idea that freedom depends on sharing in self-government. This view is not in itself incompatible with liberal freedom. Participation in politics can be a way in which people choose to pursue their own ends. According to republican political theory, however, shared autonomy involves something more: it means negotiating the common good with fellow citizens and working to shape the destiny of the political community. Full negotiation of the common good requires not only the ability to choose one's own ends and respect for the rights of others to do the same, but also knowledge of public affairs, a sense of belonging, concern for the collective, and a moral connection to a community with which one's destiny is shared. Therefore, shared autonomy requires citizens to possess or gradually acquire certain qualities of character or civic virtues. And this means that republican politics cannot remain neutral to the values ​​and purposes to which its citizens subscribe. Unlike the liberal conception of freedom, the republican conception of freedom requires a formative politics, that is, a politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities necessary for self-government.

Both the liberal view of freedom and the republican view of freedom run through the entire American political experience, but they are not the same in degree and relative importance. Broadly speaking, republicanism was dominant in the early stages of American history, liberalism in more recent stages. In recent decades, the civic or formative side of our political life has largely given way to a liberalism that envisions people as free and independent selves, unfettered by moral or civic ties they have not chosen.

This shift clearly illustrates our current political dilemma. While the libertarian view of freedom is attractive, it lacks the civic resources to sustain self-government. This flaw makes it difficult to deal with the sense of powerlessness that plagues our public lives. The public philosophy by which we live cannot preserve the freedoms it promises because it fails to inspire the sense of community and civic engagement necessary for freedom.

How libertarian conceptions of citizenship and liberty came to crowd out republican ideas involves two overlapping narratives: one traces the arrival of the procedural republic, from the dawn of American constitutionalism to recent debates over religious liberty, free speech, and privacy; the other traces the decline of the civic line in American political discourse, from Thomas Jefferson to the present day.

Taken together, these two narratives can clarify the self-image that inspires—and sometimes undermines—our public life. These two narratives do not capture the golden years of American democracy in all its glory. The republican tradition coexisted with slavery, the exclusion of women from public life, property qualifications for suffrage, and nativist hostility to immigrants; indeed it sometimes provided justification for these practices.

Yet despite these dark episodes, the republican tradition, with its emphasis on community and autonomy, may offer a corrective to our impoverished civic lives. Recalling republicanism as a liberal conception of self-government can prompt us to ask questions we have forgotten how to ask: What economic arrangements are compatible with self-government? How can our political discourse confront, rather than avoid, people bringing their moral and religious beliefs into the public sphere? How can public life in a pluralistic society foster the expanded self-understanding necessary for citizens to gain civic engagement? If our public philosophy today leaves a little room for civic reflection, republicanism can help us recall how early Americans debated these issues before procedural republics took over. But to determine the relevant lines of this story, we need to articulate more fully the version of liberalism that shapes our politics today.

The Desire for Neutrality

The idea that government should be neutral with respect to issues of the good life is unique to modern political thought. Ancient political theory believed that the purpose of politics was to cultivate virtue or moral excellence. Aristotle believes that all social unions are to achieve some kind of good, and the city-state or political union is to achieve the highest and most comprehensive good: "Any city-state worthy of the name, not just a city-state in name, must be committed to the purpose of promoting good. Otherwise, the political union degenerates into an alliance, but is only spatially different from other forms of alliance where the members live in distant places. Otherwise, the law becomes just a contract, or [in the words of the wise Lycoph] ron) is only a 'guarantee that people do not infringe on each other's rights', rather than, as it should be, a rule of life that will make the members of the city-state kinder and more just. "

According to Aristotle, political community is not just "a union formed because of living in the same place, nor just a union formed to prevent mutual injustice or to facilitate transactions." Although these are necessary conditions for political community, they are not the purpose or final reason for political community. "The ultimate purpose of the city-state is good life, and the system of social life is only a tool for this purpose." Only as participants in a political union can we realize our essence and accomplish our highest goals.

Unlike ancient ideas, liberal political theory does not believe that political life is concerned with the highest human purposes and the moral excellence of citizens. Rather than promoting a particular conception of the good life, liberal political theory insists on tolerance, fair process, and respect for individual rights—the freedom of people to choose their own values. But this raises a dilemma: If liberal ideals cannot be defended in the name of the highest human good, where is the moral basis for these ideals?

It is sometimes thought that the principles of liberalism can be defended by simple moral relativism.Government should not "make moral decrees" because all morality is subjective and a matter of subjective preference - it does not have to resort to argument or rational debate. "Who decides what is elegant and what is dirty? Is that a value judgment, and whose evaluation should count?" Relativism is usually expressed not as an assertion, but as a question: "Who will judge?" The same question can also be asked about the values ​​defended by liberals. Tolerance, liberty, and fairness are also values, and they cannot be defended by the claim that no value can be defended. Therefore, it is certainly wrong to argue that all values ​​are subjective affirmations of liberal values. A defense of liberalism in terms of relativism is no defense at all.

Utilitarianism and Kantian Liberalism

So, what arguments does liberalism cite to defend neutrality? Recent political philosophy mainly provides two options-one is utilitarianism, and the other is Kantian philosophy. The utilitarian perspective follows John Stuart Mill in defending liberal principles in the name of maximizing welfare for all. Governments should not impose preferred lifestyles on citizens, even for their own benefit; because doing so would reduce the sum of human happiness, at least in the long run. It's best for people to choose for themselves, even if sometimes their choices are wrong.

Mill wrote in "On Liberty": "The only freedom worthy of the name of freedom is to pursue our own good in our own way, so long as we do not deprive others of doing so, nor prevent others from doing so." He further said that his argument does not rely on any abstract view of rights, but is based only on the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. "I think utility is the ultimate appeal of all ethical issues, but it must be utility in the greatest sense, that is, based on the long-term interests of human beings as a constantly improving existence."

Utilitarianism (Utilitarianism) as a universal moral philosophy has encountered many objections. Some question the notion of utility of and the assumption that and all human goods are in principle commensurable. Others object to reducing all values ​​to preferences and desires. Utilitarians cannot recognize the qualitative difference in value and cannot distinguish noble pursuits from basic desires. But recent debate has focused on whether utilitarianism provides a convincing basis for liberal principles, including respect for individual rights.

At first glance, utilitarianism suits libertarian purposes well. Seeking to maximize overall happiness does not require judging people's values, it only requires adding up the happiness of everyone; moreover, not judging values, but just adding up preferences, this calculation reflects the spirit of tolerance, and can even be said to be a democratic spirit. When people walk to the polls, we count their votes, no matter who they are.

However, utilitarian calculations are not always as forgiving as they first appear. If enough happy Romans went to the arena to watch lions mauling Christians, the Romans' collective pleasure would surely outweigh the Christians' suffering, however intense it was. Or if a large majority faced a small religion and demanded its ban, the balance of preferences would favor oppression over tolerance. Utilitarians sometimes defend individual rights on the grounds that respecting them now will benefit long-term utility, but this calculation is unstable and contingent. This hardly guarantees a liberal commitment not to impose other people's values ​​on some people.

The most powerful argument against utilitarianism was put forward by Immanuel Kant. Empirical principles such as utility, he said, were unsuitable as a basis for morality. An entirely instrumental defense of freedom and rights not only makes rights fragile, but also fails to respect the inherent dignity of human beings.Utilitarian calculations treat people as means to the happiness of others, rather than as ends in themselves and worthy of respect in their own right.

Contemporary liberals have extended Kant's argument to claim that utilitarianism fails to take human differences seriously. In seeking first to maximize the welfare of all, utilitarians treat society as a whole as if it were an individual person; utilitarianism combines many of our different desires into a single desire system, arguing that it does not matter how utility is distributed among people unless it affects the total welfare of the whole. However, this fails to respect our diversity and uniqueness. This treats some people as means to the happiness of all, and therefore fails to respect each person as an end in himself.

In the view of modern Kantians, certain rights are fundamental, and even the welfare of the whole cannot override these rights. As Rawls wrote in " A Theory of Justice ": "Every person has an inviolability derived from justice, not even the welfare of society as a whole can override it...the rights maintained by justice do not depend on political negotiations or calculations of social interests."

Therefore, Kantian liberals need an explanation of rights that is not based on utility considerations. Furthermore, they want an explanation that does not depend on any particular conception of the good and does not presuppose the superiority of one way of life over others. Only a defense of neutrality between ends can sustain the liberal solution, which does not favor any particular end or impose a preferred way of life on its citizens. However, what kind of defense would this be? How can we affirm that certain freedoms and rights are basic without having to believe in a certain view of good life and without acknowledging the primacy of certain purposes over others?

The solution proposed by Kantian liberals is to distinguish between "rights" and "goods"—between a framework of basic rights and freedoms and notions of the kinds of goods that people can choose to pursue within that framework. They argue that it is one thing for the state to support a framework of justice and another to affirm certain purposes. For example, it is one thing to uphold free speech so that people are free to form their own opinions and choose their own ends, but quite another to support free speech on the basis that a life of participation in political discussion is more valuable than a life of disinterest in public affairs, or on the basis that free speech will enhance the general welfare. From a Kantian perspective, only the first defense is appropriate because it rests on the ideal of a neutral framework.

Now, a commitment to an end-neutral framework can also be seen as a value - in the sense that Kantian liberalism is not relativism - but its value consists in its refusal to affirm a superior way of life or idea of ​​the good. For liberals, the right is prior to the good in two senses: first, individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the general good; second, the principles of justice that define these rights cannot be premised on any particular conception of the good life. The justification for rights is not that these rights maximize general welfare, nor that these rights promote the good, but that these rights constitute a framework of justice within which individuals and groups are able to choose their own values ​​and ends and are compatible with the same freedom of others.

The assertion that rights take precedence over good is connected with the ideal of neutrality in which individual rights are primary. For Kantian liberals, rights are “the trump cards held by individuals.” Rights protect individuals against policies—even democratically formulated policies—that impose a preferred conception of the good and thereby fail to respect people's freedom to choose their own conception.

Of course, proponents of liberal ethics are deeply divided over which rights are fundamental and what political arrangements the idea of ​​a neutral framework requires. Egalitarian liberals support the welfare state and a civil rights framework with certain social and economic rights—rights such as welfare, education, and health care. They advocate respect for people pursuing their own purposes and require the government to guarantee minimum conditions for a dignified life. Libertarian liberals (often called "conservatives" in contemporary political science) defend the market economy and claim that redistribution policies violate people's rights. They argue that respect for persons requires ensuring that the fruits of each person's labor belong to him, and therefore they support a framework of civil liberties coupled with a strict regime of private property rights. Whether egalitarian or libertarian, Kantian liberals begin with the assertion that we are separate, individual beings, each with our own goals, interests, and notions of the good life. It seeks a framework of rights that enables us to realize our capabilities as free moral agents that is compatible with the same freedoms enjoyed by others.

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This article is edited from "Democratic Discontent: America's Search for a Public Philosophy"