General World War II military enthusiasts and scholars studying German military will think that Rommel, Manstein, and Guderian are the best military generals in Nazi Germany. Manstein is also known as the "Earl of Lightning", a military genius. , Strategist. Guderian is optimistic about him as the best person to be commander-in-chief of the army, and he himself wants to be the military leader of the Eastern Front of the Third Reich. Based on historical records such as war history and the memoirs of the parties involved, this article tries to calmly and objectively talk about people and restore the truth of the battle myth of the "Earl of Lightning"-the "first Nazi general".
One. Manstein once brilliant military achievements.
In the Polish campaign in September 1939, Manstein played mainly the role of a staff officer. He served as the chief of staff of the Army Group South that invaded Poland. During the battle, he made some very reasonable suggestions. For example, Manstein’s southern army group continued to encircle and wipe out the main force of the Polish army. It is said that the commander at the time adopted Manstein’s suggestion. After the Germans encircled Warsaw, Manstein suggested that the Germans should use artillery and air force bombing, water and food and other means to attack Warsaw in order to force Poland to surrender and avoid tragic urban street fighting. On September 28, the desperate Polish army finally surrendered across the board.
After the Battle of Poland, Manstein developed the famous "Manstein Plan" to invade France. On February 1, 1940, Manstein became the commander of the 38th Army of the German Army. According to the "yellow plan", the German army concentrated its armored forces through the Ardennes Forest, and then quickly occupied the bridgehead of the Maas River, and attacked eastward and bypassed the Maginot Line, quickly cutting off the French army in the north. "It was defeated in just one month. The rapid victory in the Battle of France is undoubtedly due in part to the surprising victory of the "Manstein Plan".
In February 1941, Manstein was appointed as commander of the newly formed 56th Panzer Corps, preparing to invade the Soviet Union. From June 22 to 26, 1941, after the Soviet-German War broke out, the armored force under the command of Manstein advanced 320 kilometers into the Soviet territory. After capturing the bridge on the Dona River, it almost rushed into Leningrad. , Which earned him the title of "Earl of Lightning".
In September, Manstein was appointed as the commander of the 11th German Army on the Southern Front (Crimea), under the command of the German Army Southern Army Group under the command of Marshal Rondstedt. He commanded the 11th Army to successfully push southward to attack Crimea, capturing 430,000 Soviet soldiers. By November 16, it had completely occupied the entire Crimea except for the Sevastopol Fortress. When winter came, Manstein withstood the Soviet counterattack and continued to advance south. On July 1, 1942, Manstein’s forces occupied the fortress of Sevastopol. In his memoirs, he claimed that he had captured 100,000 Soviet prisoners in Sevastopol. According to information from the Soviet Union after the war, many were captured. The captured were not real soldiers.
Manstein was promoted to German field marshal because of his outstanding merits. In late July, the 11th Army was transferred to the Northern Front and joined the Northern Army Group. In August 1942, Manstein was in charge of commanding the German attack on Leningrad. During this period, Manstein's military merits can be described as "brilliant".
Military academics, Manstein was the first to propose the idea of establishing an independent assault artillery. Later, Nazi Germany formed some independent assault artillery units. This armored mobile artillery group can certainly effectively support the outnumbered German infantry. It is only technically flawed and affected by factors such as too few numbers. The assault artillery group cannot be determined. The role of war. In truth, Manstein’s "Manstein Plan" is a model of military strategists, and he did a good job in Leningrad, Crimea, and Kharkov! He also wrote a good military history book-"Lost Victory".
2. Mistakes made in the decisive battle to determine the national movement:
first. Mistakes in the Battle of Stalingrad.
When the German Sixth Army fell into the trap of the Soviet army in Stalingrad, Hitler was very contradictory. He could not accept the fact of the retreat emotionally. There is no "retreat" in the Germanic soldiers' dictionary. In two words, it is hard to explain why a second-class nation like Russia has forced the best German soldiers to flee in embarrassment. But Hitler was well aware of the consequences of being surrounded. First, he only asked General Zeitzler to tell Paulus to stand by, and at one point Hitler was prepared to sign the order for Paulus to break through.
But the opinions of two people at that time influenced Hitler's decision. The first was Air Marshal Goering. Goering assured Hitler that his air force would fully support the 6th Army and was fully capable of guaranteeing the formation of the 6th Army; the second influence Hitler’s decision was Mansch, who was very favored by the head of state at the time. Marshal Tanin. Hitler listened to Marshal Manstein's opinion before making the decision and asked him if he was sure to rescue the 6th Army. Manstein said he could be rescued. The latest revealed information shows that Manstein also believes that if the 6th Army breaks through, even if it succeeds, it will be defeated by the pursuing Soviet army. The hundreds of thousands of the 6th Army will be useless to stabilize the Eastern Front. The stragglers are brave, so he euphemistically expressed his disapproval of breaking through. So Hitler eliminated all interference and resolutely ordered Paulus to stand by for help, losing the best time to break through.
Manstein served as the commander of the newly formed German Army Group Don, under the command of the 4th Armored Army of General Howth, the 6th Army of General Paulus and the 3rd Romanian Army, of which the entire 6th Army and Part of the forces of the 4th Panzer Army has been surrounded in Stalingrad. Marshal Manstein was ambivalent at the time. At the headquarters of General Wicks, when Wicks worriedly told him about the danger of the Sixth Army, he interrupted Wicks confidently, "Don't worry, I will try my best." And then personally sent a telegram to Paulus, asking Paulus to stand by for help. This is the famous "Don't give up, I will come to save you, Manstein." However, on January 8, 1943, when General Hubie told Manstein that this sentence had become the most popular sentence among the 6th Army in the encirclement, Manstein, who could not fulfill his promise, denied it and said that he Never made such a promise, someone (alluding to the Supreme Commander Keitel and others) vilified his reputation out of nothing.
Even three weeks after the formation of the encirclement, Hitler still hesitated, wondering if his decision to let Admiral Paulus stick to it was wrong. But at this time the head of state could only bet on Manstein with good wishes.
Manstein’s mission is to rescue these trapped troops. On November 28th, the German Army Group Don had actually discovered 143 Soviet units, and the Army Group Don under Manstein launched an offensive on December 12. By December 24, the rescued German troops were only 50 kilometers away from Stalingrad. But then the Soviet army formulated a careful and vicious combat plan and invested a strong counterattack force. Manstein’s Don Army group was mercilessly blocked and forced to retreat 200 kilometers.
The 6th Army has run out of ammunition and food, and the camp is full of wounded soldiers. The end is approaching, and Manstein cannot do what he promised. When the soldiers were in desperate situation, Manstein wanted Paulus to break through with him, knowing it was impossible. Therefore, a major named Eichmann (Chief of Intelligence) was sent insincerely to contact Paulus, not the Chief of Staff of the Don Army Group or a certain general under his command. It is about the decision of the fate of hundreds of thousands of troops. Responsibilities cannot be assumed by a small major. Manstein obviously didn't really want the 6th Army to break through with him, he was just performing the last formality before retreating. Then in his memoirs, on the grounds that Paulus refused to break through, the responsibility for Stalingrad's failure to relieve the siege was removed.
On the Stalingrad issue, Manstein is very different from Hitler. Once Hitler has a firm belief, he will not change it; Manstein will constantly revise his position according to the actual situation. Let’s look at Manstein’s performance on the Stalingrad issue. Some of his contradictory reasons lie. However, Manstein has influenced the German decision on whether to stick to or to withdraw.
To sum up, Marshal Manstein and Goering both bear unshirkable responsibility for the Stalingrad tragedy. After the war, people counted all the responsibility for Stalingrad's failure on Hitler's tyranny, dictatorship, and intervention, which showed that it was unfair.
second. Important mistake in the battle of Kurtsk. The battle of Kurzsk was an offensive that should not have been worth the loss. Manstein wanted to repeat the glory of the 41-year Kiev battle. He was the only German general who urged Hitler to launch the battle many times.
In March 1943, the German army was paying hugeAfter his sacrifice, he defeated the Soviet army and occupied Belgorod. Manstein took it for granted that Germany had the military power to wipe out the Soviet army from the Kurtsk Bulge. He suggested that the Southern Army Group and the Central Army Group should eliminate the Soviet Army Group in Kurtsk to shorten the long front. , The "fortress battle plan."
Manstein’s plan was opposed by the vast majority of German generals. The opponents included the famous Guderian, Model and others; Marshal Kluge, commander of the Central Army Group, also expressed his views on Manstein’s Planning the Central Army Group is helpless.
It is unrealistic to carry out this battle even in the spring of 1943. The 18 armored divisions of the Eastern German Army have only 495 tanks left. The troops have been fighting for more than 10 months without rotation and rest, and they are very tired.
The continuous spring rain made the road muddy, and waiting for new equipment completely lost the fighter. In the memoirs, Manstein defended himself, claiming that he had also suggested canceling the Battle of Kurtsk. Unfortunately, his change of attitude was basically confirmed by the memoirs of those involved. In fact, the reasons he declared for recommending the cancellation of the Battle of Kurtsk were not the reason for the cancellation of the battle, but the reasons for hoping to get reinforcements from the two divisions and urging the launch of the battle as soon as possible. Manstein's request was coldly rejected by Hitler. Manstein has always been an active advocate and instigator of the Battle of Kurtsk.
In the battle of Kurtsk, facing the Soviet army, which was ready and disparity in power, the attacking German army suffered catastrophic losses. The offensive direction of the Central Army Group on the North Road was judged by the Soviet army as the main offensive direction. After the armored force suffered heavy casualties, it turned to defense at the insistence of Moder. And Manstein, because of the strong forces of the South Luthers, the Soviet defense was relatively weak, so the offensive of the South Luthers was slightly better than the northern one. He was supposed to end up as soon as he saw it, but because Manstein didn't have a strategic view of the overall situation, he focused on the gains and losses of one city and one place, thinking that victory was already at hand.
"Sun Tzu Art of War" is called a general, must know "cautious warfare", in fact, the past and the present are the same both at home and abroad. Marshal Moder urged Hitler to stop the Battle of Kurzsk many times, but Manstein insisted on the opposite and continued to attack, and invested in the 24th Panzer Corps (the 23rd Panzer Division, Viking Grenadiers under its jurisdiction). Division) about 150 tanks. Hitler believed in Manstein with his own gains and losses. Hitler's decision was based entirely on his infinite trust in Manstein and his infinite desire for victory. Manstein’s continued offensive was unable to defeat the Soviet reserve armored forces. The situation forced Hitler to finally make a decision and reassign Manstein’s armored divisions, and the battle of Kurzsk ended in a cliche. Z1z
Facts and information prove that there is absolutely no possibility of victory in the Battle of Kurtsk in Germany. From July 5th to 23rd, the southern battlefield commanded by Manstein annihilated 14,395 Soviet troops, but he lost 54,000 men and 900 tanks and self-propelled artillery. He only temporarily occupied some irrelevant lands without any combat or battle. Strategic value. Manstein's insistence on attacking can only toss all the last point of German armor in the hands of Russians who occupy favorable terrain and are good at defensive. The German armored force (2400 tanks or self-propelled artillery) was stretched before the Great Counterattack of the Red Army (7900) shortly after, and remained passive for the remaining years of the war.
After the Battle of Kurtsk, the Soviet army began a major counterattack. Model had already taken precautions and led the Germans on the northern front to fight and retreat; the Germans on the southern front of Manstein were on offensive positions that were not conducive to defense and suffered. The losses that should have been avoided, withdraw from the occupied positions at a high cost. Manstein's poor defense contributed to the defeat of Nazi Germany.
three. The contribution analogy highlights Manstein’s lack of military capabilities. Manstein played his talents in the defenses of Kharkov, Dnieper, and other defensive battles, and made up for it many times to stabilize the fragile Eastern Front. However, it is obviously inaccurate to evaluate his talent based solely on his autobiography "Lost Victory". Konev mentioned in his memoirs Manstein’s method of exaggerating the Soviet military’s strength. The most obvious fallacy was in the battle of Kharkov. He said that the ratio of the number of German and Soviet divisions was 1:8. All Soviet tank corps (only the designation, and the actual strength is less than one division) are counted as the size of the German army. As a field commander, his intelligence cannot be so inaccurate. There is only one explanation to exaggerate 194The arduousness of the Kharkov counterattack in three years.
Manstein is good at organizing well-planned offensive warfare, but in the defensive war he wasted too much force and made more serious mistakes. Hitler once accused Manstein of wasting a lot of troops because he was responsible for the bad situation of the Army Group in the South. Analyzing from Hitler's perspective: Manstein frequently asked for reinforcements, but he was in a mess. No matter how much troops were allocated to him, it was not enough for him to fill the black hole. In addition to objective reasons such as the tragic events on the eastern front and the strong offensive power of the Soviet army, Manstein's command did exist inadequate. The victory achieved by
in the face of obvious advantages is far from being able to command the army to defeat the strong under the disadvantages, which can better reflect the value of a general. It is not that some people narrowly believe that "the army and the navy are not comparable", and their contributions to the Third Reich's national movement are comparable. For example, Deniz is known as the "originator of submarine tactics" in World War II. His military role is a "person who could have changed the course of World War II." Despite the small number of submarines in Germany, Denitz still created a dazzling record. He creatively put forward "our submarines must be in groups, in groups, in order to break the British escort system!" brand new submarine tactics.
From June to November 1940, German submarines lost only 6 submarines. A total of 272 ships of the Allied Powers were sunk, totaling 1,395,000 tons. The "wolves" released by Dunnitz ravaged the Atlantic and Mediterranean, almost ruining the fate of the British Empire. British Prime Minister Churchill still lingered in his post-war memoirs: "During the war, the only thing that made me really afraid was the threat of German submarines!" After 1943, the powerful economic and military potential of the Allies began to play a decisive role, using Merchant ships converted nearly a hundred dedicated escort aircraft carriers, and three-dimensional anti-submarine instead of plane anti-submarine. Denitz’s submarines were insufficient in number and lack of air support, but still held back the allies’ naval and air forces at an absolute disadvantage, delaying the opening of the second battlefield.
Manstein often sacrificed his brother forces, such as the Central Army Group or the Northern Army Group, at the cost of stabilizing his southern front. In the German army, there are not no outstanding generals who do both offense and defense. Rommel is the most outstanding representative of them. First of all, Rommel's "Infantry in Attack" is a more academic work. Rommel performed better than Manstein in World War I. Rommel has twice Wounded and won the medal of military service four times. In Africa, Rommel led his troops forward more than 350 kilometers in less than six weeks of fighting, captured Tobruk, and conquered Cyrenaica. At the cost of more than 2,000 casualties, about 97,000 enemy troops, 485 tanks, 4,000 trucks, and hundreds of artillery were captured. The Allies called it the "Desert Fox" and even dubbed it the "Hannibal of the Twentieth Century". Although Manstein had some victories on the Eastern Front, he never won the respect of the Soviets. In terms of defense, Rommel was at an absolute disadvantage, facing the offensive of the British "Crusade Expedition" and successfully transferred the African army to Port Brega. Rommel also successfully organized a thousand-mile retreat. Unfortunately, the code was deciphered by the allies, Rommel's final counterattack failed, and a generation of owls will end their "African mythology" sadly. The African Legion, led by the mediocre General Aeonim, finally entered the tomb of destruction. After Rommel was re-opened in 1944, the "Atlantic Barrier" was successfully organized and constructed. Unfortunately, the project was not completed when Normandy landed. Z1z
Model is another "defensive expert" in the German Army. In fact, Model is equally good on offense. More importantly, Mordel was a general who was good at leading the German army to success at a disadvantage. On the offensive side, Moder participated in many battles against Poland and the Soviet Union, as well as the Kursk battle, the Ardennes offensive battle, etc.; on the defensive side, Moder won the Battle of Erzhev, the Battle of Mars, and the Battle of Kutuzov. , Leningrad defensive battle, Bagration Action defensive battle "Market Garden" defensive battle success. The concept of "battle group" proposed by Mordel, "shield and sword" strategy is a more practical military theory than Manstein's assault artillery theory.
Hitler's evaluation of Manstein, "Manstein may be an outstanding talent cultivated by the General Staff, but he can only command a complete new division, but he will not command the remnant defeated like me. I can't help it. Formed for himA brand new combat-capable force, so there is no point in appointing him. "Z1z
4. Interpersonal relationship has become the reef of Manshuai's official career.
Manstein was born in a Prussian nobleman and a military family. It is said that he has relatives with Hindenburg. He is more intelligent and has developed a competitive personality since childhood. He likes to be brave. This also makes his relationship with Halder, Keitel, Yordel and others of the Supreme Command very bad; he also has a relationship with General Hubi, one of the survivors of Stalingrad. Very bad.
People’s positive comments on Marshal Manstein are said to be mostly based on the generals or marshals who worked with Marshal Manstein before the visit. The more famous ones include Guderian, Melinzin and others. But the fact that the generals and marshals of the German High Command (including Hitler himself) are not very optimistic about Manstein is rarely taken seriously. After all, it is the supreme commander who comes into contact with Marshal Manstein’s strategic thinking. The personnel of the Ministry, not Manstein’s subordinates or Guderian and others who had little contact with him. Unfortunately, those who hold a negative attitude towards Manstein, such as Hitler, Keitel, Hubie, etc., or Died in the war, or executed as a war criminal after the war. There is no memoir. We can only look at the leopard from the side from the memories of the staff around them.
in Crimea, Manstein The shooting of a general named Hipponik is questionable. Manstein seldom looks at the war situation from the interests of the entire Third Reich, and always emphasizes the interests of the group. In his memoirs, he took the lost victory Blaming Hitler’s intervention in the command is unmannered and persuasive. You must know that during his favor, “Whenever Hitler finished speaking, Field Marshal Manstein would be the first to jump up and shout:'The Führer ordered. We obey! 'Z1z
and Manstein often put forward some unrealistic suggestions and requests, and some also deeply angered Hitler and cast a shadow over his career. For example, he once raised the issue of supreme military leadership to Hitler and suggested the establishment of a commander-in-chief of the Eastern Front, but Hitler refused. "Z1z
5. The ending of Marshal Manstein
Manstein was the chief officer of the German army. His mistake occurred in the major battle that determined the life and death of the Third Reich. Hitler wanted to dismiss him and enter the cold palace. It was too wrong. And the collapse of the German Southern Army Group in the Ukrainian battlefield, the encirclement of the 1st Panzer Army was the direct cause of Manstein’s dismissal. At that time, Manstein ignored the lack of tools for crossing the river and considered it. The stability of the entire line of defense ordered Hubi to break through to the west. Hubi proceeded from the safety of the group army and advocated a breakthrough to the south. The two sides had a fierce quarrel. Hitler finally supported Manstein's opinion after several waverings. As a result, Hubi really did. Encircled by the Russian army, although the breakout was successful, most of the equipment and heavy weapons were lost. The 1st Armored Army as an armored regiment is dead in name. The reason
abandoned Manstein is explained in Hitler's words. Because the era of large-scale armored offensives on the Eastern Front has passed, the German army will shift from strategic offensive to strategic defense. This shows from one side that Manstein was a general who was not good at defensive. Since then, Manstein was fired by Hitler. , Was never activated again.
Manstein used Hitler's bonus and a monthly salary of 4,000 marks to buy a manor in East Prussia for retirement. When the Soviet army approached East Prussia, he fled to the Western Front. 1945 In 1949, Manstein was captured and imprisoned by the British in Linz. In 1949, he was tried in the British Military Court in Hamburg and sentenced to 18 years in prison. At the same time, he was transferred to Weier Prison for execution. In May 1953, Manstein was pardoned. In 1954, when the West German army was founded, most of the Nazi generals became the backbone of the West German army, and Manstein served as an advisor. He devoted more energy to recalling and summarizing, and wrote "The Lost Victory". Book. Manstein died of illness in Bavaria (Munich) on June 11, 1973, at the age of 86.
