The logic of stock trading and war is the same. Study the history of war, understand the principles of war from it, and guide our shareholders' investment. That's what it means. That is to say, you should not be careless and lack vision in investment strategies. You need to see dozens of steps when taking action, and you cannot only see one or two steps, otherwise it is very dangerous to invest in the stock market. These are beneficial to our investors and investors. OK, please read the following. After the defeat of the Linqu Battle of Nanma, on August 4, 1947, Tan Zhenlin, deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army, wrote a 2,000-word criticism letter to Su Yu . Tan Zhenlin gave the letter to Chen Yi first. Chen Yi agreed with Tan Zhenlin's opinion in his letter and handed it over to Su Yu. The full text of the letter is as follows;
Comrade Su Yu:
After more than a year of working together, I am more familiar with you. I was just heard of it in the past, especially when someone said that you were not easy to speak. In order to facilitate you to express more opinions and play your due role, I rarely spoke, which can be said to be something that has not helped you. Since more than a year of self-defense war, I feel that I must give you some help, so I should say it boldly.
East China Field Army is the largest main force in the country, accounting for 30% of the entire field army. It has a great responsibility to the Chinese people. In the past year, it has been gloriously responsible. Among the 1.22 million enemies in a year, the Chinese Field Army accounted for more than 400,000, accounting for 40%. This is the vanguard of any People's Liberation Army in the country. Of course, it must be calculated here that the Northeast, northern Shaanxi, Shanxi, Hebei and Chapo officially joined the battle this year.
For more than 20 years, our party has been training in the continuous war training, and there are very few genius commanders who have been truly cultivated. During the eight years of the War of Resistance Against Japan, there were scattered guerrilla warfare and intermittent sweeping and anti-sweeping wars. It is still difficult to judge the talents of military generals. Today's self-defense war is a modern and large-scale battle. Especially the importance of commanding geniuses, from Huangqiao decisive battle , Tianmushan self-defense war, Suzhong Seven Battles and Seven Wins . Subei, Shandong and South Luzhong Battle showed that you were a genius. The Party Central Committee held great hopes for you. The past Central China Branch and today's East China Bureau fully supported you. They all hope that you will become a special emerging military general and make outstanding achievements for the people. After the seven battles and seven battles and seven battles in the middle of the Soviet Union, I wrote a letter to Zhang, Deng and Zeng, which stated that we should protect the first and sixth divisions with the spirit of the Central Soviet Area in the Soviet Union. Since then we have decided to cultivate you to become a special military talent. Of course, your humility, care, thoughtfulness, and courage and determination to command the battle are all things I admire, and it is also an important condition for getting closer to a talented commander.
To this day, we must further ask questions. This is not only a matter of victory or defeat in the entire people's war, but also a matter of your continued rapid progress and continued rise. Your progress is not your personal problem, but a matter of the interests of the whole party. If it is just a matter of your personal honor, it is a very small thing. Your progress must be regarded as the cause of the party, the interests of the party, and the glory of the party. This is a big event. I asked the question from this standpoint.
You were very careful, but you are often careless and lack vision in military affairs. A genius military command must be able to see dozens of steps by taking action, and you often only see one or two steps. It is dangerous to not see far if the command of hundreds of thousands of troops is not visible. This is why there are too many suggestions below. Although we can try our best to explain, we must never go through a deep review.
Take the seven battles and seven victories in the Soviet Union. The demarcation battle can be pre-arranged with an expected encounter, but we have not studied it, so the time is longer and the casualties are increasing. It would be unfair to criticize the Sixth Column only for this matter. The losses in the second Lianshui Battle were avoidable. It was estimated that the enemy would advance from the two rivers in advance. The Sixth Column was another person who was not good at defensive warfare. Let's try it out. This is a lack of vision.
In the battle of southern Shandong, the second and sixth columns should be transferred to the battle against Feng Zhi'an. If you fight hard in , Shuyang , you can't do anything by just increasing casualties. At that time, the vitality of the second and sixth lunar calendars has been damaged, so he shouldn't be asked to take risks again. The battle of Linmeng Road should have three columns of 2, 7, 8 and 8 to annihilate the 83rd Division, and fight the 74th Division, but end up empty at both ends.
When fighting the 74th Division, the fourth column could take over the task of the first column and the eighth column could take over the task of the sixth column. At that time, the enemy was trapped in the narrow area of Menglianggu, and no matter what, five columns could be used. However, the 1 and 6th columns started to fight the 25th Division on the 15th, and the results were likely to expand. But you only criticize the following for being too slow and not reviewing the guidance. These facts all show careless battle command. You, who were originally very humble, have now made the problem of not humbly reviewing and researching. Of course, this statement seems to be a bit too high, but it is beneficial to be too high today. We have learned a lot of lessons after playing
. However, apart from general summary, we have not yet reviewed and guided issues in depth. In terms of campaign guidance, what lessons have been learned in the battle process?
For example, Suzhong Seven Battles and Seven Wins , starting from the other side, we are paying attention to us. Then the superiors were cautious and the subordinates were afraid. We were unprepared in the battle of Xuantai. In addition, the enemy had left the original defense site or were preparing to set out, which further led to the conditions for attacking them. Ru Nan Battle still underestimates our army, while Wang Tiehan is hesitating and afraid. The Battle of Libao is the result of the enemy's despise us and Wang Tiehan for self-interest. The Battle of Dingyan and Linzi is the result of the enemy's fear of being in a busy and chaotic movement and continuous defeats. The battles of Dividing and Attracting are the result of the fear of Li Mo'an and Zhu Zhixi's troops.
Underestimation of the enemy pride refers to Linqu Battle . It's absolutely okay to not hit or just hit one side. Linqu City can be prevented from being occupied by the enemy. It would be much better to put the enemy east of the river and fight in the wild anyway. After the start, he was unwilling to report to the central government and headquarters. He had to wait until he won before reporting. What was this idea? The battle in Teng County should not be fought in the end. Ye Tao should go northwest to Qu Tang. This is the central government has made enlightenment but has not paid much attention to the research.
Of course, these shortcomings refer to all of you. This is not to say that I can be irresponsible or have no shortcomings. I have always been quick-resolute, rough, not careful, or serious, and sometimes I am very boasted, but I have learned a lesson and pay attention to correcting it at any time, but I have not completely corrected it yet.
Optimism I think it is not a bad thing. Today, it should be optimistic. It should be the same for the situation and war. Chiang Kai-shek has not been supported for a long time. Of course, we should make long-term plans in the guidance of the campaign strategy work and work arrangement. After the victory of Lunnan Battle, what I was most worried about was that this kind of optimism would come to Linyi . At that time, I talked with Liu Xiansheng. When I arrived at Nosense, I wanted to talk about it, but later I was afraid that it would be easy to manage the matter, so I didn't talk about it. If we review the main reasons for not fighting the five battles to optimise the point of reviewing, we cannot completely clarify the problem and cannot convince the comrades below. Therefore, we have suffered these setbacks, which can only give Chiang Kai-shek a little breath, and it cannot save his death. We can rest for a month or two with patience, make up for the losses and improve the tactics one step. In the future, we will not only be a tiger, but also be like a tiger. What else did Chiang Kai-shek do? So we cannot draw a great conclusion from Chiang Kai-shek. Of course, it is not necessary to despise him, these are my simple words.
Tan Zhenlin
8-4 (1947)
note; Chen Yi was the commander and political commissar of the East China Field Army at the time, Tan Zhenlin was the deputy political commissar of the East China Field Army at the time, and Su Yu was the deputy commander of the East China Field Army at the time.
Tan Zhenlin
Above picture; Huaihai Battle General Front Committee, from left: Su Yu, Deng Xiaoping, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Tan Zhenlin.
