Many history enthusiasts have heard this statement, saying that Chiang Kai-shek could have completely eliminated Red Army in Jiangxi or Hunan, but at that time, local warlords such as Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan were not controlled by Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang Kai-shek "deliberately letting go" and letting the Red Army run to Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan and other places. Kuomintang Central Army chased after him all the way, using the excuse of "suppressing the Communist Party", the real purpose was to control Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan. A friend asked me: Lao Feng, is this statement valid? Is it true in history?
The answer is this: fake. Lies you.
The so-called "Chang Kai-shek lets go of water" is a widely circulated historical rumor . The real history is that is just the opposite : Chiang Kai-shek was very excited to eliminate the Red Army in Jiangxi and Hunan. When the Red Army broke through to Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan, Chiang Kai-shek was very annoyed by . There was no such thing as "deliberate release of water" and taking the opportunity to control Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan.
For this, the archives and documents left behind in the Republic of China have sufficient evidence . Below, Lao Feng will take a look with you. Several of the key evidences:
The first evidence was the "Outline of the Plan for Suppressing the Communist Bandits in the Area West of the Hunan River" formulated by Chiang Kai-shek and his staff on November 17, 1934. The original text is like this. Pay attention to the words and sentences in Tu Hong: "... Check the Jiangxi bandits are running all over the place, and our army is chasing each other. period will destroy bandits in the area east of the Xiangshui River. Only if one bandit or escapes the net, , and suddenly rushes to the west of Hunan and Lishui River, it is impossible to make an annihilation of plan to defeat bandit suppression plan in the area west of Hunan and Lishui River. (1) Policy: To prevent a bandit or its remnants from rushing west of Hunan and Lishui River, should not allow the bandits to drive into Guizhou and , join the Sichuan bandits and spread Xiangxi , and join the purpose of joining He and Xiao to encircle the bandits in Liping , Jinping and Qianyang, Qianyang, Wugang , Baoqingh To the south of tml2, west of Yongzhou and Guilin, and north of Longsheng and Hongzhou, the areas south of Longsheng and Hongzhou were eliminated. (II) Program (1) Before the bandits crossed the Hunan and Lishui, they should build fortifications on the Yong, Bao, Wu, Qian, Jin, Li, Hong, Sheng and Gui lines, and first select important towns to form strongholds, and then gradually strengthen and increase density. (2) In the above areas, prepare for the solid walls and clear the fields, so that the bandits would go through without plunder when they cross the Xiang River. (3) Before the above areas, strictly organize the people and set up a detective network, and the Hunan, Gui, and Gui army will be distributed on the above fortification lines, and the powerful troops will be controlled briefly, and the garrison sites will be prescribed. (4) Once the bandits crossed the west of Hunan and Lishui, each army will quickly reach the designated area, and the camera blocked the hindered the above fortification lines. 1. (5) The original pursuing troops, that is, where the poor bandits arrived, chased and plagiarized , and jointly defeated with the garrison troops ..."
This outline of the Communist Party of China clearly shows his following command:
command one of the commands: Chiang Kai-shek hopes to eliminate all the Red Army to the east of the Xiangjiang River, that is, the eastern part of Hunan Province. Meaning: Chiang Kai-shek didn't want to see the Red Army heading west into Guizhou, Sichuan and other places .
Command 2: Chiang Kai-shek's order, if the Red Army accidentally breaks through the Xiangjiang River and heads west, then , no matter what, the Red Army cannot enter Guizhou and Sichuan.
Command 3: Once the Red Army breaks through the Xiangjiang River, each army must immediately pursue and intercept , and try its best to wipe out the Red Army east of Guizhou and Guangxi.
This is the policy formulated by Chiang Kai-shek at that time .
is very clear: the so-called "deliberate release of water" and deliberately let the Red Army enter Guizhou, Sichuan, and Yunnan to give the Central Army an excuse to enter and control the southwest. This statement, and historical archival evidence, is completely opposite and is a matter that cannot be established.
The second evidence is a telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek to He Jian and Bai Chongxi on November 28, 1934. In this telegram, Chiang Kai-shek criticized He Jian and Bai Chongxi for failing to suppress the Communist Party and asked the Red Army to go west (directions of Guizhou and Sichuan) to run . The original text of this telegram is like this, pay attention to the red sentence: "… ...According to Huixian ( Liu Jianxu ), the bandits had crossed the river in Goupai Mountain, Shantou and Shangmitou for two days. Diedian defended the river and blocked the bandits' crossing. Why did there be no guards along the line from Xianshui in the whole province? It was a mistake to let the bandits cross the river calmly. After crossing, I didn't hear what I was going to do with the teams, and I still didn't assemble troops to intercept the attack. The bandits had crossed the river, but they didn't make any moves. The bandits had crossed the river, but they didn't know what they were going to attack and attack. The bandits had crossed the river, but they didn't know what they were waiting for. I didn't know what they were waiting for? I sighed for Hao. For the sake of the plan, I can only face the bandits crossing the river, and quickly wiped out the method discussed by Huixian and Jiansheng (Bai Chongxi) and wiped out the method. ; on the one hand, the bandits were still half crossed, so that the subsequent bandits could not cross the river, and follow the plan planned by Zhiqiao (He Jian) to quickly suppress the bandits. The bandits were unpredictable, and slack the bandits' actions with , so that our pursuers could pursue and suppress them. In short, some bandits escaped from the net, which was a mistake, and they still hoped that the efforts of each army would be the main force of the bandits to be wiped out in the east of Lishui and the area west of the four passes. The plan to suppress bandits in the west of Xiangshui was issued, and a part of the bandits had fled west, and it was expected that they would be implemented in sequence according to the plan. tml2 Don’t let the long drive west or north to rush …”
From this telegram, we can interpret Chiang Kai-shek’s anger and the following dissatisfaction:
One of the dissatisfactions: Chiang Kai-shek criticized why there were no troops arranged to block the Red Army from the county town of Quanzhou, Guangxi to Xianshui Town, and let the Red Army run away from here alive.
dissatisfaction: Chiang Kai-shek criticized that after the Red Army crossed the river near Quanzhou County , why did the local Kuomintang defenders not pursue in time?
dissatisfaction: Chiang Kai-shek asked He Jian, Bai Chongxi and other troops to make up for the loss. It is necessary to eliminate the Red Army in the east of to the east of to the east of , , , must not let the Red Army enter Guizhou westward and Sichuan northward and , , and Chiang Kai-shek also criticized He Jian and Bai Chongxi, , complained that they made mistakes in the war and allowed the remaining Red Army to cross the Xiangjiang River .
We can see from Chiang Kai-shek's telegram criticizing He Jian and Bai Chongxi that Chiang Kai-shek really hopes to eliminate all the Red Army in the east, and he does not want the Red Army to continue to run west to Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan and other places . Therefore, the so-called Chiang Kai-shek's "deliberate release of water" cannot be established, and it is completely contradictory to these serious historical materials.
3 The third evidence was a telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek to Xue Yue on November 26, 1934. The original text is as follows: "... The pursuit of the bandits must not be suspected of being ineffective, as long as I do my duty. If the bandits cannot be eliminated on the border between Hunan and Guangxi, the central government should continue to pursue and enter the hinterland of Guizhou and Sichuan. He did not hesitate and prepared to enter Guizhou for the purpose of..."
This telegram from Chiang Kai-shek to Xue Yue also showed Chiang Kai-shek's three meanings:
The first meaning: Chiang Kai-shek asked Xue Yue to to pursue and suppress the Red Army. He should not be neglected and the Red Army should not be allowed to advance westward.
The second meaning: Chiang Kai-shek hopes that Xue Yue will try his best to eliminate the Red Army at Hunan-Guangxi border .
The third meaning: Chiang Kai-shek asked Xue Yue: If the Red Army accidentally lets the Red Army enter Guizhou, then even if the Central Army chases Guizhou , "it will not refuse" . What does it mean? That is to say, the Central Army did not originally plan to enter Guizhou by , but the Central Army would enter Guizhou if the Red Army failed and caused the Red Army to enter Guizhou.
We can see from Chiang Kai-shek's telegram that Chiang Kai-shek had no meaning of "deliberate release of water" or "deliberate release of the Red Army into Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan" .
The fourth evidence was on October 31, 1934. Chiang Kai-shek sent Chen Jitang , He Jian, Gu Zhutong . Chiang Kai-shek said: "...... Please rush the bandits' troops west to the area east of the Xiangjiang River, do not let the network escape . If the blocking is not effective, let the bandits be on their defense line in the future If you escape inside and harm your neighbors, it will cause great harm to the party and the country. No matter what the situation is, should be used to conquer the bandits. If you order the law to follow, you will never be lenient..."
This telegram also shows: Chiang Kai-shek ordered Chen Jitang, He Jian and Gu Zhutong to strictly destroy the Red Army east of the Xiangjiang River. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek's tone was very strict. He said that if you violate the order, "conquer the bandits" . Obviously, this telegram is completely inconsistent with the so-called "deliberate release of water" statement .
The fifth evidence was a telegram sent by Chiang Kai-shek to He Jian on November 14, 1934. Chiang Kai-shek said: "...Now the bandit has crossed the first and second lines (i.e. the first and second blockade lines). If you miss the third line in the future, it will be even more difficult for to destroy , which will harm the country unimaginable. Brother Xi Yunqiao ordered the two Li troops, the army, militia , and jointly with the Guangdong and Guangxi armies to deploy properly, closely to chase and block the enemy respectively. , , should annihilate the bandits east of the Xiangshui River ; pay special attention not to make detours to Guangdong and Guangxi, as it is even more difficult to suppress them. The Guangdong and Guangxi armies must also strictly prevent the blocking of the south and impose the areas north of the Chenshui River and gather and annihilate them. The most advantageous..."
This historical material once again shows: Chiang Kai-shek really hopes to completely eliminate the Red Army in the areas east of the Xiangjiang River and north of the Chenshui River. There is no plan to "deliberately let the Red Army enter Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan" .
OK, serious historical information, Lao Feng and you listed five copies, I think it's enough.
Corresponding to these serious historical materials is Chiang Kai-shek's actual actions. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek's actual actions at that time are also completely contradictory to the so-called "deliberate release of water". Lao Feng gave you a few examples:
The first example: In the Xiangjiang Battle at the end of November 1934, more than 60,000 Red Army combat troops were found in the Xiangjiang Battle at the end of November 1934, more than 60,000 Red Army combat troops were found in the Xiangjiang Battle at the end of November 1934, more than 60,000 Red Army combat troops. Crossing the Xiangjiang River, he was sieged by the Kuomintang troops by on the edge of the Xiangjiang River. The Red Army lost more than 30,000 people. , and reduced his personnel by half, and the blood flowed into a river. The water of the Xiangjiang River was dyed red. If it weren't for the Red Army's troops, half of the troops would break through the siege, I'm afraid the entire army would be wiped out by the Xiangjiang River. Let me ask, if Chiang Kai-shek "deliberately letting water out" the Red Army, why did kill the Red Army on the edge of the Xiangjiang River, and was furious because the remaining Red Army crossed the river and broke through the siege?
Second example: In early 1935, the Red Army was in Guizhou and planned to cross the Yangtze River and enter Sichuan, but the Kuomintang troops arranged heavy troops on the south bank of the Yangtze River, prevented the Red Army from crossing the Yangtze River from the north. The Red Army was forced to circumnavigate on both sides of the Chishui River ( four crossings of Chishui ) , and went through all the troubles. Let me ask: If Chiang Kai-shek "deliberately releases water" and "take the opportunity to control Sichuan", then why did he prevent the Red Army from crossing the Yangtze River to enter Sichuan ? On the contrary, Chiang Kai-shek wrote in his diary on March 14, 1935: "The day the bandits of Zhu have not yet escaped from the east of the Chishui River, and are still in the process of encirclement and suppression. If God gave me China to liberation, it can still be . " can be seen Chiang Kai-shek was very eager to capture the Red Army in one place near the Chishui River, and he had no idea of letting the Red Army enter the Sichuan boundary .
The third example: In real history, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his troops to go from Jiangxi to Northern Guangdong, to Hunan, to Guangxi, along the way, he set up many blockade lines of , stationed heavy troops to guard, and surrounded and blocked everywhere. All of them were to kill the Red Army. Every time the Red Army successfully broke through the barriers and continued to march westward, Chiang Kai-shek immediately sent a telegram , criticizing and scolding the generals of the Kuomintang troops who were "decided" in various ways. Let me ask, if Chiang Kai-shek "deliberately let the water go", why should he spend these efforts?
Finally, let’s talk about one thing. In Chiang Kai-shek’s eyes at that time, was it important to “suppress the Communist Party” or “control Guizhou, Sichuan and Yunnan”? The answer is: is more important to suppress the communist . During that time, Chiang Kai-shek wrote more than once in Chiang Kai-shek's Diary: "Today, it is still about suppressing the Communist Party." , and later history also proved that Chiang Kai-shek's country was thrown in the hands of the Red Army, not in the hands of the warlords in Guizhou, Sichuan. This also indirectly shows that , the southwestern warlords and the Red Army, who is Chiang Kai-shek's most dangerous enemy? In fact, Chiang Kai-shek was very clear about . Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek's "deliberate release of water" to the Red Army was not only completely unreasonable, but also completely in line with historical logic. Speaking of this, we can see that the so-called "deliberate release of water" theory of Chiang Kai-shek not only conflicts with historical materials and historical facts, but also with common sense. It is a historical rumor, or to be more polite, a historical rumor, which is not in line with the facts and is not trustworthy.
