The Battle of Ming Dynasty and Ribi Tieguan was an important battle during the Wanli Korean War (1592-1598). It had a profound impact on the subsequent war trends. However, it is worth noting that after the war, as two hostile parties, China and Japan actually said that their armies were defeated. The Chinese commented that the Ming general Li Rusong was "Qisuo" ("History of the Ming Dynasty·Li Rusong", meaning frustrated and discouraged) after this battle, and therefore had no intention of fighting again; while various Japanese historical materials recorded that the Japanese army in this battle The losses were heavy, and the participating generals accused each other of not trying their best. They even feared the Ming army and had the intention of retreating ("The Story of Riha Shoyu", "Tsukushiki" and "Mongmaogong Korean Army Gomonogatari").
We know that due to different combat purposes and evaluation standards, as well as the need to gain military merit and boost morale, it is generally easy for both armies to declare themselves the victor after a battle. However, it is very rare for both parties to consider themselves losers. So, this small-unit encounter gradually developed into a large-scale battle involving tens of thousands of people. Will the Ming army or the Japanese army win? The author combined the relevant historical materials from China, Japan and North Korea to try to make an analysis.
Picture above_ February 1593 The Battle of Bi Tie Guan
- The battle After
comprehensive historical records, people now have a clearer understanding of the ins and outs of the Battle of Bi Tie Guan, and there is little controversy. The battle began on the 26th of the first lunar month in the 21st year of Wanli in the Ming Dynasty (1593). Li Rusong, the chief general to aid Korea, ordered Deputy General Cha Dashou to lead 500 elite cavalry to Wangjing, North Korea (today's Seoul) to reconnoiter the Japanese army's situation, and ordered Zu Cheng Xun, Li Ning, Sun Shoulian, Gao Sheng and other generals led 3,000 troops as support for Cha Da's troops. In the early morning of the next day, Zha Damou, who arrived near Wangjing, encountered the Japanese army Tachibana Munemobu. Zha Damou and others who arrived later joined forces to re-establish the Hua Army.
At this time, the Japanese army, which was in turmoil due to the defeat of Pyongyang, heard that the Ming army was coming and thought that the Ming army was going to attack Wang Jing, so they gathered soldiers and horses to defend the city and swarmed out. Zha Damou and others knew that they were outmatched, so they fought and fled, and were finally surrounded by the Japanese army at Biti Pavilion (a post house on a hill fifteen kilometers north of Wangjing).
Picture above_ Scenes of the Battle of Pyongyang
After Li Rusong learned that Cha Dashou was seriously injured and founded the Hua Army, he and deputy commander Yang Yuan and others led 2,000 soldiers and horses to Wangjing to survey the terrain. They picked up Cha Dashou by the way, and did not want to hear about it on the way. Zha Da was surrounded. Without knowing the specific strength and layout of the Japanese army, Li Rusong took 1,000 men to the rescue and ordered Yang Yuan to lead another 1,000 men to follow up. Li Rusong went to Biti Hall to rescue Cha Dashou, but he was unable to break out of the Japanese siege and he was also surrounded. It was all thanks to the concerted fighting of the Ming army that the Japanese army was unable to defeat the Ming army despite its superior strength.
Both sides fought for a whole night, and both suffered heavy casualties. The next day when Yang Yuan's troops arrived, the Japanese army was exhausted from a long battle and was frightened by the strong combat power of the Ming army. They expected that they would not be able to win, so they had to withdraw their troops. Li Rusong and others escaped from danger and returned to Pazhou.
Pictured above_ Battle of Biti Hall
- Achievement of campaign objectives
We know that when evaluating who wins and who loses in a battle, one of the main indicators is to see who achieved the combat objective and who did not. The reason why the previous article uses a long length to retell the battle of Bokutokwan is to help us analyze who between the Ming and Japanese armies achieved the purpose of the battle.
Through the review of the battle, it is not difficult to know that the cause of the battle was that the chief general of the Ming army (note that the chief general was not the commander, the commander of the Ming army was Song Yingchang) ordered Cha Dashou and others to go to Wangjing to "spot the road to Wangjing in order to advance troops" Ambush and capture" ("Essentials for Restoring the Nation").However, when Zha Damou and others were performing this mission, they encountered the Tachibana Munegebe who was on sentry duty near Wangjing. The two sides met on a narrow road and started fighting. The original mission could only be suspended and switched to the mission of defeating the opponent. As the Japanese army "had more than a hundred people killed in the battle for ten consecutive hours, Tachibana Munege's army fell into a bitter battle" ("Japanese War History·Korea Campaign"), the Koreans also recorded that "(Zha Dashou) sent his troops to cover up the attack, and the thieves were invincible and scattered." Go" ("Pun Yi Lu"). It can be seen that in the first round of confrontation between the two sides, the Ming army undoubtedly won.
Above picture_ Schematic diagram of the Battle of Biti Hall
After that, Wang Jing’s Japanese troops swarmed out and besieged Cha Dashou and others. Li Rusong and others rushed to join the battle after hearing the news, but were also besieged. From this, the second round of the confrontation between the two sides became the Japanese army wanting to encircle and annihilate the Ming army, while the Ming army wanted to break out of the encirclement. This contest between encirclement and counter-encirclement also became the main battle between the two armies in this battle. In this round of confrontation, the Japanese army still failed to eliminate the Ming army in the encirclement. Although the Ming army failed to break out of the encirclement, they defeated the Japanese army's attempts with tenacious fighting, and finally persisted until reinforcements arrived and the Japanese army retreated. From the perspective of the fighting situation, after the Ming reinforcements led by Yang Yuan arrived, the Japanese army hurriedly withdrew without engaging Yang Yuan. It can be seen that they must have been very passive on the scene, otherwise there would be no need to flee after seeing only 1,000 people. The Japanese army's encirclement and annihilation attempt was not realized, but the Ming army's desire to break out was successfully realized. This round was undoubtedly won by the Ming army.
In summary, we can know that in the two stages of the battle, the Ming army achieved an undisputed victory in the first stage, and the Japanese army's goal was not achieved in the second stage, although the Ming army did not successfully break through. But he escaped smoothly, so he still won tomorrow and lost every day.
picture above_ Ming army
- Comparison of military strength and casualties
In the Battle of Bitiguan, the strength of the Ming army participating in the battle was very clear. According to records, there are 2,500 reconnaissance troops from Cha Dashou, 3,000 successor troops led by Zu Chengxun, Li Ning, Sun Shoulian, Gao Sheng, etc., plus 2,000 reinforcements from Li Rusong and Yang Yuan, a total of more than 5,500 people. This is nothing. dispute.
As for the number of Japanese soldiers who participated in the war, various historical data vary greatly. Considering that the more authoritative Japanese official war history "Japanese War History Korean Campaign" and the first-hand war history "Korea Crossing Diary" written by the party involved, Shimose Yorinao, recorded that the total strength of Wang Jing's Japanese army at that time was about 40,000, and During the war, about 10,000 people including Konishi Yukinaga and other troops refused to patrol because they suffered heavy losses from the Ming army. Therefore, the actual number of Japanese troops participating in the war should be 30,000. With 30,000 fighting against 5,500, the Japanese army had a strength advantage of nearly 6 times. Considering that the 1,000 reinforcements led by Yang Yuan did not actually fight the Japanese army, and the actual number of Ming troops participating in the war was only 4,500, the Japanese army's strength advantage was more than 6 times.
Above picture_ "Economic Strategy and Restoration of the Nation"
So, when the strength ratio of tomorrow and Japan is 1:6, what about the casualties on both sides?
According to Li Rusong's post-war report included in "Essentials for Restoring the Nation", 264 Ming troops were killed and 49 wounded in this battle. For various reasons, the Ming army should have reduced the battle losses and concealed them. According to the Korean official historical record "Records of King Seonjo Sokyung", the number of Ming army casualties should be between five and six hundred. In the "Tachibana Family Documents" commemorating the life of Tachibana Munemo, it is mentioned that the Ming army suffered hundreds of losses in the Byokudokwan, which is similar to Korean documents. Considering that the Japanese army controlled the battlefield after the war, its statistics on the number of Ming army casualties should be more credible. Therefore, the actual number of Ming army casualties should be around 500. If the number of injured is calculated based on the normal casualty ratio of 2:1, it would be around 1,000.
Pictured above_ Li Rusong (1549-May 8, 1598), courtesy name Zimao, nickname Yangcheng
Let’s look at the Japanese army again. There have always been different opinions about the losses of the Japanese army, and the relevant historical records are also very confusing. However, Japan's official war history "History of the Japanese War·Korean Campaign" mentions that the troops of Tachibana Muneshige and Takahashi Tongzhi alone lost 1,800 troops, and based on the fact that the Japanese army did not dare to fight again after seeing Yang Yuan's reinforcements of more than 1,000 men, it can be seen that the Japanese army The overall casualties must be considerable, otherwise there would be no reason to withdraw the troops and withdraw from the siege.In addition, "Chikushiki" states that after taking over from the Tachibana Army, the Kobayakawa Army was defeated as soon as it fought the Ming Army. From this, it is not difficult to know that its casualties were no less than those of the Tachibana Army. As a result, the Japanese army's losses were more than 3,000 people with only Tachibana and Kobayakawa. Therefore, contemporary scholars generally believe that the Japanese army's battle losses in the Battle of Bitiguan should be 4,000-5,000 people, of which 1,000-1,500 were killed.
With an absolute advantage of 6 times that of the Ming army, the Japanese army surrounded the Ming army but failed to capture it. An originally planned annihilation battle was eventually forced to end with an active withdrawal from the siege. The Japanese army also paid at least three times more than the Ming army. Opponent's casualties. It can be seen that even the Japanese army that has been baptized by the so-called "Warring States Period" still has very low technical and tactical levels.
Above picture_ Tachibana Muneshige (September 20, 1567 - January 15, 1643)
Through the above analysis, we can make this conclusion: The Battle of Hokutokan was originally an unexpected encounter war. While performing their mission, Zha Damou's reconnaissance unit encountered Tachibana Munemao's troops who were leading the Japanese army. After Zha Damou and others defeated Tachibana Muneshige, Wang Jing's Japanese army almost all mobilized out of fear and besieged Zha Damou and others in Bokuto Pavilion.
Li Rusong, who came to pick up Zha Damou, heard that Zha Damou was besieged while traveling, and immediately rushed to Biti Pavilion for rescue. This led to the climax of the Battle of Biti Pavilion: the siege of the Japanese army and the counter-siege of the Ming army. The Japanese army attacked more than 4,500 Ming troops with an absolute advantage of 30,000 troops. However, most of the Ming army generals and troops, including Li Rusong and Zha Damou, escaped, but the Japanese army paid three times the cost of casualties as the Ming army.
After the war, the two armies returned to their pre-war status, and neither occupied an inch of the opponent's land. Taking into account the troop input, battle losses, combat objectives, control areas, etc., the Ming army undoubtedly won the victory, at least it cannot be said to have lost.
Picture above_ "Punishment Record"
As for Li Rusong's "Qisong" after the war, he not only gave up Paju, but also left only a small number of troops to garrison Kaesong, and the rest all withdrew to Pyongyang, completely losing the will to continue fighting. This was not so much the psychological blow brought about by the Battle of Bokutokwan, but rather the logistical reasons that forced him to act this way. Because the peninsula was being plundered wildly by the Japanese army at that time, “the four mountains were burned to the ground, leaving not a single blade of grass behind” ("Pun Yi Lu"), "the places we passed before and after were so brutally burned and brutally slaughtered and looted that no one could compare to other thieves." "("Miscellaneous Records in Chaos"), because the Ming army could not raise food on the spot, all supplies could only be transferred from China. At that time, the peninsula was freezing cold and the mountains were blocked by heavy snow. In the era of agricultural society, the transportation method of relying on people on back and horseback was extremely inefficient and could not meet the needs of the front line. Unfavorable logistics resulted in a large non-combat attrition of the Ming army, many of the horses died of illness, and the remaining ones were too thin to be driven.
In addition, at that time, the Japanese Second Army led by Kato Kiyomasa and Nabeshima Naoshige was operating in Hamgyong Province, located behind the Ming army. Once they killed the Ming army from behind and attacked Pyongyang, the Ming army would lose its footing. Therefore, under this situation, it was not only reasonable but also necessary for Li Rusong to give up the aggressive strategy and instead shrink his troops, shorten the front, stabilize the rear, and stick to the attitude of avoiding war.
picture above_ Ukita Hideie (1573-December 17, 1655), also known as Ukita Hideie , Ukita Hideie
In contrast, according to the Japanese army, Japanese historical data records that after this battle, "everyone in the Japanese army thought that their fate was at stake" ("Jingozaemon Yoshino's Book"), so that Japanese leaders such as Ukita Hideie, Ishida Mitsunari had to write a letter to Feng Hideyoshi Hideyoshi requested a strike. Flores, a Portuguese missionary in the Japanese camp, also wrote in his "History of Japan" that the Japanese army believed after the war that "the Ming army was far from what they expected and was very powerful, so they began to attack the Ming army." The army was frightened... and decided to conclude an (armistice) agreement." It can be seen that after the battle at Biti Hall, the Japanese army was completely frightened by the Ming army's powerful combat effectiveness.
Not only that, the sophisticated equipment of the Ming army also gave the Japanese army a considerable impact."Togawa Chronicle" records that Kunifugenemon, a subordinate of the Ukita Hideie family, slashed the armor of a Ming soldier three times with a sword during the war, but it was bounced back three times; "Tachibana Family Documents" mentioned that Tachibana Munesege He told his brother Takahashi Tongzeng more than once that he must try to get the Ming cavalry's powerful horses.
Above picture_Japanese armor
By analyzing historical data, we can prove with ironclad facts: In the Battle of Bitiguan, the officers and soldiers of the Ming Army used a small number to attack the large numbers and retreated with a small number, while the Japanese army used a large number to attack the small numbers. Return without success. More importantly, this battle made both sides realize that the war could not be ended by military means in the short term, so they both hoped to negotiate a peace and cease the war. From this perspective, the Battle of Bitiguan can be regarded as an important turning point in the Wanli Korean War.
Author: Lin Sen Correction/editing: Lilith
Reference:
［1］《 "The Complete History of the Wanli Korean War" written by Zhu Erdan
[2] "The Deadly Conflicts in the History of China and Japan" written by Wang Hao
[3] "History of the Ming Dynasty·Biography of Li Rusong" "Manuscript of the History of the Ming Dynasty·Biography of Li Rusong" "Jinglue Rejuvenation" "Main Edition" "The Chronicles of the Ming Dynasty·Volume 62·Aid to Korea"
[4] "Records of Punishments", "Records of King Seonjo Sokyung", "Revised Records of King Seonjo Sokyung", "Reconstruction of the feudal states", "Rebellion" Zhongzalu》
1 [5] "The Story of Riha Shoyu", "Tsukushiki", "The Story of Somogong's Korean Army", "The Tachibana Family Documents", "Japanese War History - Korean Campaign", "Joseon Crossing Diary"
The text was created by the team of the University of History , the picture comes from the Internet and the copyright belongs to the original author
