Text | Xiao Xiaosheng understands economic columnist
Abstract: In July 2018, the first batch of 6 strategic placement funds was established, and the total amount of raised was about 105.1 billion, each of which exceeded 10 billion. . Now that the three-year closed period is about to expire, the performance of these six funds is far from satisfactory, far from meeting investors' expectations.
In July 2018, the first batch of strategic placement funds was established by six domestic leading fund companies : China Universal Fund, Harvest Fund , China Merchants Fund , E Fund, Southern Fund and China AMC ; The six matching funds raised a total scale of about 105.1 billion, each of which exceeded 10 billion.
These six funds have set basically the same performance benchmark , namely: CSI 300 Index yield 60% + ChinaBond Total Index yield 40% ; and in the fund's prospectus, it is also clear investment target : Under the premise of strictly controlling risks, pursues investment returns that exceed performance benchmarks, and strives to achieve long-term steady appreciation of fund assets.
is also based on the trust in these top fund companies and is attracted by the promotion of the products. Therefore, despite the bad stock market in 2018, there are still more than 3 million people who have purchased these six funds. It is said to carry the dreams of many people, hoping to obtain excess returns by investing in strategic placement funds.
However, the 3-year closed period is about to expire. How about the performance of these six funds? As of June 1, the net yield of these six strategic placement funds was between 12% and 28%. China Universal Strategic Placement (501188) with the highest yield reached 27.07%; the lowest yield was Huaxia Strategic Placement (501186), only 12.09%.
As can be seen from the table below, the scale of investment promotion strategic placement (161728) and E Fund strategic placement (161131) both exceed 24 billion, and the scale of the other four is between 11 billion and 19 billion, and the yield has no obvious relationship with the scale. Funds that were popular at the beginning of the year are not going to do better. This also reminds us not to easily chase hot funds and hot funds.
The return rate of these six funds is divided into three echelons. The first echelon is China Universal Strategic Allotment (501188) and Harvest Strategic Allotment (501189), the rate of return exceeds 23%, and the annualized rate of return exceeds 7.5%; The echelons are China Merchants Strategic Allotment (161728), Southern Strategic Allotment (160142) and E Fund Strategic Allotment (161131), with a rate of return of 16%-17% and an annualized rate of return of 5.4-5.8%, which is far from the first echelon. There is already a gap of more than 6% points; the third tier is Huaxia Strategic Allotment (501186), which is a flat fund with a gap of more than 4.5% from the second tier, with an annualized return of only 4%. Ordinary debt bases can't keep up, and they are even sorry for the words "strategic placement".
For these six funds, just look at the yield, which is similar to the yield of bond funds, without losing money to investors, it seems to be unsatisfactory. But it is too simple to judge by the above evaluation. Let's take a look at and .With a total size of more than 100 billion strategic placement funds, I decided to look at more information and compare its performance compared to similar products and the CSI 300 index . However, if you don't know, you will be shocked! In the same period, the average income of similar products was 85.23%, and the CSI 300 increased by 59.51%; the performance of these six funds significantly underperformed the average returns of the same kind and the CSI 300 index, among which China Universal, the best performing strategic placement (501188) underperformed the average by 58.16% and the CSI 300 Index by 32.44%.Considering that their performance benchmarks are the CSI 300 index yield of 60% + ChinaBond total index yield of 40%, I have compared them, and the returns of these six funds, , have significantly underperformed the performance benchmarks, and they are even farther away. There is still a big gap between the 60% of the CSI 300 Index and the average 16.76% lower than the CSI 300 Index*60%, which surprised me a bit! Is the performance comparison benchmark set casually? Is it a decoration? Is the investment target just empty words without credibility? Can we still trust performance benchmarks and investment targets in the future?
Does the fund company only charge management fees and not be responsible for the work? So I compared and calculated, how much management fees can be charged for six fund products in 3 years, and I was shocked again! Although the management fee is reduced to 0.1% for one year, due to the large scale, the subscription fee and management fee charged by the six funds total about 1.034 billion yuan, even if part of the fee needs to be allocated to the sales channel, even if 50% of the scale flows into the fund The company's pocket, 500 million yuan is also not a small amount!
Could it be said that the fund manager configured by the fund company is not good enough? Don't fund companies get money without good fund managers? I decided to test my idea again and see how the management level of the fund managers of the six funds is?
In addition to the Huaxia strategic placement (501186), the six funds are all equipped with more than 2 fund managers, basically at least one debt-based fund manager and one stock-based fund manager. According to the stock-to-debt ratio of the performance benchmark, 60% of the stock Compared with 40% of bonds, it is more fair to use the arithmetic average return of the fund manager. compared the data on the annualized rate of return of the fund managers since their employment as of June 1, and found that, without exception, the annualized rate of return of the six strategic placement funds was lower than the average annualized rate of return of the fund manager. Underperformed by an average of 3.43%; Among them, Yang Wei, who is in the strategic placement of China Universal (501188), has an average annual return of 31.18%, which is already a rare existence among fund managers; Harvest strategic placement (501189) fund managers Tan Li, Nanfang Strategy (160142) fund manager Mao Wei has an average annual return of more than 20%. This performance level already belongs to the top 5% of the industry. These three are fund managers with outstanding performance, but they are also underperforming. The fund with the highest average annualized rate of return of the fund manager; the fund managers of the other three funds, although there are also big bulls in debt-based, but in terms of absolute returns, their performance is mediocre and commendable.
The two biggest reasons may be:
(1) Some fund managers are already in a flat state, or the risk appetite of the fund has been greatly reduced. Huaxia Strategic Allotment (501186) only holds positions in Zhantou stocks, and other stocks are not allocated. E Fund strategic placement (161131) allocated a small amount of white horse shares, but the proportion is very small.
The picture above shows the position of China AMC Strategic Allotment (501186)
The picture above shows the position of E Fund Strategic Allotment (161131)
(2) The fund manager of manages too many funds and cannot fully take care of the strategic placement fund.For example, Mao Wei, the fund manager of Southern Strategic Allotment (160142), manages up to 17 funds at the same time, many of which were established relatively late but with far better performance than Southern Strategic Allotment (160142), such as Southern High-end Equipment Flexible Allocation Mixed A (202028) ), with a profit of about 80% since February 2020! As the only fund manager of China AMC Strategic Allotment (501186), Zhang Chengyuan also manages 8 other funds at the same time, which makes me a little emotional, is the fund manager's ability so strong? Is it okay to take good care of the strategic placement fund of more than 10 billion yuan?
The picture above shows the fund managed by Zhang Chengyuan, the manager of China AMC Strategic Allotment Fund.
The picture above shows the fund managed by Mao Wei, the manager of the Southern Strategic Allotment Fund.
After analyzing so much, let’s summarize the conclusion. It is particularly disappointing. It is far from meeting the performance benchmarks, nor the preset investment goals, nor the expectations of , , and . recommends that fund companies pay more attention to the scolding of the fund exchange community.
The picture above is E Fund's strategic placement fund community A tool for companies to make money, most fund managers of fund companies manage multiple funds at the same time, and there may be no way to focus on the management of strategic placement funds. Now looking back at the propaganda of the fund company at the beginning, how funny it was! It was too naive at the time to believe their nonsense.
Thirdly, it is recommended that Christians do not listen to the bragging of fund companies or fund sellers and buy them, or buy their own funds for new funds that will be sold later, funds that are greatly affected by policies, and funds that have raised more than 10 billion yuan. Products from trusted fund managers.
Fourth, it is recommended that fund companies openly conduct a detailed briefing on the three-year closed performance of these funds to prove that you have managed the funds with due diligence. It has been flowing all the time. For fund companies and fund managers who manage them carefully, time will give them rich rewards!
I wish you all the foundation of Changhong!
(Note: the relevant data in this article is as of 2021/6/1)
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