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今天小編為大家帶來的是最新錢報（六十四），
具體為文獻推文（期刊論文）的精讀
《A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate》
歡迎您的用心訪問！
本期推文閱讀時長大約9分鐘，請您耐心閱讀。
Share interest, spread happiness, increase knowledge, leave beautiful.
Dear you,
This is LearingYard Academy!
Today Xiaobian brings you the latest money report (64),
Specifically for the intensive reading of literature tweets (journal papers)
A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates
Welcome your heart visit!
Thistweetwilltakeabout9minutes to read, please be patient.
今天小編分享一篇期刊論文《A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate》的分散決策部分，小編將從思維導圖、精讀內容、知識補充三個板塊來介紹這一部分內容，請讀者跟小編一起學習一下吧！
Today Xiaobian shares the decentralized decision-making part of A journal paper "A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates". Xiaobian will introduce this part of the content from the mind map, intensive reading content, knowledge supplement three plates, please readers to learn with Xiaobian!
1.思維導圖
該篇文獻的分散決策的思維導圖部分如下圖所示：
The mind map of decentralized decision-making in this paper is shown in the figure below:
2.精讀內容
學者分散決策部分研究的是製造商主導下的情況，其中製造商是供應鏈中的主導者，因此製造商在定價決策中具有優先權。零售商在觀察製造商的定價決策後，以自身利益最大化為目的做出最優定價決策。學者所採用的求解方法為逆向歸納法。首先對零售商的利潤判斷凹凸性，判斷是否有最大值（二次求導後小餘0為凹函數，二階海塞矩陣計算大於0為凹函數）。然後直接令一階導等於0直接求解或聯立求解即可得到決策變數的最優反應函數。再者，將決策變數的最優函數再帶到製造商利潤函數中，再對製造商利潤函數中的決策變數求二次導判斷其凹凸性，判斷出滿足凹函數的條件，接著再令決策變數的一次導等於0，聯立求解得出製造商函數中決策變數的最優解。接著，再將最優解帶入先前求出的最優反應函數中，即可求得所有參數的最優解。最後，將最優解帶入需求函數、利潤函數中即可。
In the part of decentralized decision-making, scholars study the situation dominated by the manufacturer, in which the manufacturer is the dominant player in the supply chain, so the manufacturer has the priority in the pricing decision. After observing the manufacturer's pricing decision, the retailer makes the optimal pricing decision for the purpose of maximizing its own interests. The solution method adopted by scholars is backward induction. First, judge the concavity of the retailer's profit to determine whether there is a maximum value (small residual 0 after quadratic derivative is a concave function, and the second order Hesse matrix calculation greater than 0 is a concave function). Then directly set the first derivative equal to 0 to solve directly or simultaneously to get the optimal reaction function of the decision variable. Furthermore, the optimal function of the decision variable is introduced into the manufacturer's profit function, and then the second derivative of the decision variable in the manufacturer's profit function is calculated to judge its convexity, and the condition of meeting the concave function is determined. Then the first derivative of the decision variable is set equal to 0, and the optimal solution of the decision variable in the manufacturer's function is obtained simultaneously. Then, the optimal solution can be obtained by substituting it into the optimal reaction function previously obtained. Finally, the optimal solution into the demand function, profit function can be.
學者這一部分中一共得出兩個結論：
Two conclusions are drawn from the scholars' part:
結論1：在製造商和零售商都提供回扣時，求出製造商的最優批發價格、最優在線產品價格和最優線下零售價格，從求解結果中可發現在線評論中得到製造商的批發價、在線直銷價和零售商的價格與返利和在線評價的感知價值均相關。
Conclusion 1: When both the manufacturer and the retailer provide rebates, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online product price and the optimal offline retail price are obtained. From the solution results, it can be found that the manufacturer's wholesale price, the online direct selling price and the retailer's price obtained from the online review are correlated with the perceived value of the rebate and the online evaluation.
結論2：在分散決策下，當製造商和零售商都提供返利時，製造商的批發價格與在線評論的感知價值正相關。當消費者對在在線評價的感知價值與交叉價格彈性係數滿足一定條件時，製造商批發價與返利正相關，否則負相關。
Conclusion 2: Under decentralized decisions, when both manufacturers and retailers offer rebates, manufacturers' wholesale prices are positively correlated with the perceived value of online reviews. When consumers' perceived value of online evaluation and cross-price elasticity coefficient meet certain conditions, the wholesale price of manufacturers is positively correlated with rebates, otherwise it is negatively correlated.
在一定條件下，製造商的批發價格會隨著返利的增加而上升。這是因為當零售商的價格隨著返利而上漲時，製造商為了獲得更多的利潤，也會提高批發價。此外，製造商的批發價格上升，因為感知在線評論的價值提高了，因為在線評論的感知價值通過影響製造商的在線價格來影響其批發價格。
Under certain conditions, manufacturers' wholesale prices will rise with the increase of rebates. This is because when retailers' prices go up with rebates, manufacturers also raise wholesale prices in order to make more profit. In addition, wholesale prices for manufacturers go up because the perceived value of online reviews goes up because the perceived value of online reviews influences wholesale prices for manufacturers by influencing their online prices.
從需求函數的結果來看，我們發現製造商的線下需求與返利有關，而與在線評論中感知價值無關。然而，製造商的在線需求與返利和在線評論的感知價值均有關。
From the results of the demand function, we find that manufacturers' offline demand is related to rebates, but not to perceived value in online reviews. However, manufacturers' online demand is related to both rebates and the perceived value of online reviews.
學者在這部分求解的思路清晰，其求解過程與結果都不算複雜。但小編髮現，學者考慮的在線評價和返利兩個因素是相互影響的兩個因素，製造商通過返利引導消費者進行在線評價，即在線評價中製造商要付出的成本即是返利。同時，製造商所考慮的返利是在線評價後即可獲得的。
Scholars have a clear idea of solving this part, and its solving process and results are not complicated. However, Xiaobian found that the two factors considered by scholars, online evaluation and rebate, are two factors that influence each other. Manufacturers guide consumers to conduct online evaluation through rebates, that is, the cost to be paid by manufacturers in online evaluation is rebate. At the same time, manufacturers consider rebates that are available after online reviews.
3.知識補充
1.什麼是需求函數？模型中需求函數的構建類型？具體怎麼建立？
1. What is the demand function? What types of requirements functions are built in the model? How do you set it up?
需求函數：是用來表示一種商品的需求數量和影響該需求數量的各種因素之間的關係。
Demand function: It is used to represent the relationship between the demand quantity of a commodity and the various factors that affect the demand quantity.
需求函數分為線性需求函數與通過效用函數建立的需求函數。
Demand function is divided into linear demand function and demand function established by utility function.
需求函數的構建有兩種類型。一是線性需求函數，二是通過效用函數構建需求函數。
There are two types of requirements function construction. One is linear demand function, and the other is to construct demand function through utility function.
需求函數模型1：從效用函數構建，分為直接構建與間接構建
Demand function model 1: From utility function construction, it can be divided into direct construction and indirect construction
（1）直接構建：
(1) Direct construction:
預算約束為：
The budget constraints are:
在預算約束下使效用函數最大，運用拉格朗日函數進行求解。
In order to maximize the utility function under the budget constraint, Lagrange function is used to solve.
（2）間接構建：
(2) Indirect construction:
利用下圖進行求解：
Use the following figure to solve:
需求函數模型2：線性需求函數
Demand function Model 2: linear demand function
論文中常見的需求函數為：D=a-b*p (a>0,b>0）,a為市場容量，b為需求對價格的敏感係數，再根據具體因素進行添加
The common demand function in this paper is: D= A-b *p (a>0,b>0), where a is the market capacity and b is the sensitivity coefficient of demand to price, which is then added according to specific factors
2.什麼是序列博弈？在分散決策中製造商與零售商分別主導的思路？
2. What is a sequential game? Manufacturers and retailers lead the way in decentralized decision-making?
序列博弈：博弈者在選擇行動時可能佔據一定優勢進而行動有先後順序或某些對局者可能率先行動。
Sequential game: Players may have an advantage in choosing their actions and then move in sequence or some opponents may move first.
若製造商主導即為製造商先行，零售商主導即為零售商先行。即製造商主導時，製造商先決策，零售商後決定；零售商主導時，零售商先決定，製造商後決定。
If the manufacturer leads, the manufacturer leads, and the retailer leads. That is, when the manufacturer dominates, the manufacturer makes the decision first, and the retailer makes the decision later. When the retailer dominates, the retailer decides first and the manufacturer decides later.
3.什麼是逆向歸納法的求解
3. What is the solution of backward induction
逆向歸納法是求解動態博弈均衡的方法。即博弈參與人存在先後行動的次序,並且後行動的參與人能夠觀察到前面的行動。
Backward induction is a method to solve dynamic game equilibrium. That is, there is a sequence of actions, and the later player can observe the previous actions.
逆向歸納法思路是從動態博弈中的最後一步步往回推（倒推的過程）， 以求解動態博弈的均衡結果。
The idea of backward induction is to calculate the equilibrium result of the dynamic game by pushing back the last step in the dynamic game.
今天的分享就到這裡了。
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祝您今天過得開心快樂！
That's it for today's sharing.
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Welcome to leave us a message,
Let us meet tomorrow,
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參考資料：有道翻譯
參考文獻：[1] Xia Z, Liu Y, Zhang Q. A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate[J]. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 2022, 21(3): 321-331.
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