Author: Ama
The performance of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in Russia and Ukraine is surprising. Of course, there are a series of reasons such as strategy, command, soldiers, equipment, intelligence, etc., but whether the Russian battalion-level combat group is suitable for modern warfare is also a topic worth discussing.
Russian military reform
Starting from Gulf War , the form of modern warfare has been constantly changing. Faced with this situation, major military countries in the world are actively studying future war models and reforming their own military power composition. The very eye-catching thing here is the Russian military reform.
Gulf War
In 2008, the Russian army combined its own situation and learned from the experience in the Russian-German War and began to implement a series of military reforms such as the radical "new look of military reform". The goal is to optimize the combat effectiveness of the troops while saving military expenditure. The contents of military reform such as "New Look" mainly include the merger and reorganization of military regions, reform of military education, carrying out professional construction, laying off the number of officers, converting all troops into standing troops, carrying out division-to-brigade reform, etc., and investing a lot of money in the upgrading of weapons and equipment and personnel organization adjustments.
During the military reform, Russia abolished six major military regions including Moscow , Leningrad, North Caucasus , Volga coastal Ural, Siberian and Far East , and formed four major military regions including the west, the south, the central and the eastern part, corresponding to the four strategic directions. At the same time, a joint strategic command was established to uniformly command the troops of all military branches within the jurisdiction of the military region.
Putin Army Reform
4 Military Region is under the jurisdiction of 8 army headquarters, 9 army headquarters, 47 artillery brigades, 4 large-caliber artillery brigades, 7 airborne brigades, 26 tank brigades, 54 motorcycle infantry brigades, 8 special forces brigades, 23 combat tactical missile brigades, 19 anti-tank brigades, 28 surface-to-air missile brigades, 20 combat helicopter regiments, 8 assault transport helicopter regiments, 6 helicopter training regiments and other combat units.
On December 31, 2020, the military reform of the "New Look" ended. The "New Look" military reform has made drastic moves. Although it has been repeated, it has achieved certain results, and once became the learning goal of military reform in some countries. These military reforms have streamlined the redundant Russian troops, optimized their force structure, and modernized the equipment system, and improved the combat effectiveness and mental outlook of the Russian army. Especially in the recovery of Crimea in 2014 and participating in the Syrian War on Terrorism in 2015, the Russian army showed a new combat effectiveness.
Syrian Civil War
battalion-level battle group
One of the major contents of the Russian military reform is to abolish the Army's "Second-Gang" organization and change it to a synthetic brigade. Such reform is to combine multiple weapons into a smaller force structure, form a synthetic force composed of multiple arms, and further improve the response speed of the troops.
During the reform of the Russian army, the original 26 division (or division level) units and 12 brigades were reorganized into 40 brigades, plus 3 airborne assault brigades. In 2012, a battalion-level combat group (BTG) was established based on the synthetic brigade, becoming the main combat force of the Russian Army. At present, the Russian army currently has about 168 "battalion-level combat groups".
synthetic battalion-level combat group
battalion-level combat group As a synthetic mobile combat force, it usually has artillery as the core and has multiple companies under its jurisdiction. It is generally composed of 1-2 tank companies, 1-2 motorcycle companies, 2 howitzer company, 1 rocket launcher company, 1 air defense company, 1 reconnaissance company, 1 electronic warfare company, 1 chemical defense company, 1 engineering company , 1 communication company, 1 logistics company, 1 sanitation company, 1 command company, etc. It is integrated with command, tank, air defense , artillery, engineering and logistics support equipment.
Each battalion-level combat group of the Russian army is about 1,200 people, with professional soldiers as the backbone, with 30-50% more people than Western battalion-level combat units, and smaller than Western regiment-level combat units.
The Russian army's battalion-class combat group is approximately equipped with 10-20 T-80/90 series main battle tanks, 10-20 BMP-2/3 infantry fighting vehicles, 12-18 2S3 type 152mm self-propelled howitzers, 6-12 doors, 16-barrel 220mm "Hurricane" self-propelled rocket launcher system, 6 "Armor-S" air defense system , and several armored communication command vehicles.
T-90 Tank
battalion-level combat group effectively improved the combat effectiveness of the Russian army when using less funds. Compared with the poor performance of the Russian army during the two Chechnya Wars, the Russian army performed well in the Battle of Donbas in 2014 and in the Battle of Syrian . The combat capabilities displayed by the battalion-level combat group have been greatly improved, and the Russian army has therefore expressed its intention to promote the battalion-level combat group model. The problems exposed by
The Russian military camp-level combat group, which was in full swing, suffered a lot of problems in this Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The poor advancement of the battalion-level combat group on the Ukrainian battlefield forced the Russian army to adjust its strategic deployment many times, and the situation on the battlefield has not improved. During the battle, the Russian army's battalion-level combat group exposed problems such as serious shortage of infantry personnel, poor battlefield perception ability, inability to use heavy firepower in a concentrated manner, poor training level, and weak combat will. This is completely different from what everyone originally thought of the Russian army.
Russian military battalion-level combat group
In the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian military's battalion-level combat group exposed the following main problems:
First, the lack of infantry soldiers. After the military reform, the number of some Russian military brigades was less than 500 infantrymen. During this special military operation, the Russian army only arranged professional soldiers to participate in the war, which aggravated the serious shortage of troops. The number of Russian army that can invest in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is less than 200,000, and the total number of infantrymen here does not exceed 40,000. It is impossible to form an overwhelming advantage on the Ukrainian army when facing a front of thousands of kilometers.
In specific operations, the battalion-level combat group lacks infantry combat, and tanks and armored vehicles cannot get effective support from infantry. In the city's tough battles and tug-of-wars, tanks and armored vehicles suffered heavy losses. Once a battalion-level combat group suffers casualties, its combat effectiveness will be significantly reduced and it will not be able to play a role.
The second is the lack of coordinated operations. The battalion-level combat group is small in structure, the commander level is low, and it is difficult to coordinate the command and control. These low-level commanders are unable to organize effective coordinated operations between various combat groups and various military branches. This shows that during the Russian army, high-level officers have repeatedly experienced battles in which high-level officers descended for coordinated command and suffered major casualties.
Third, it is impossible to organize concentrated assault on lifting firepower. The battalion-level combat group incorporates a variety of weapons and equipment into the marshalling, which enhances combat flexibility and modernization of equipment, but also has the disadvantage of heavy firepower dispersion. This makes it impossible for the Russian army's heavy firepower to be used in a concentrated manner, especially in the attack and combat, which makes the heavy firepower to be concentrated, and the fire strike effect is reduced.
4 is the logistics support. The Russian army's offensive surface was too large, the "battalion-level combat group" broke out too fast in the early stage, the logistics support front was too long, and there were great problems with logistics support and equipment maintenance. Some Russian military equipment was discarded at will due to lack of oil, and the emergency repair capabilities of the battalion-level combat group were limited. The main combat equipment such as tanks, armored vehicles, self-propelled artillery, and that were damaged could not be quickly repaired, and it had to be discarded, causing significant losses.
5 is the power composition is not suitable for traditional combat. The main consideration of the power composition of the Russian barracks-level combat group is to focus on lightweight and fast reversal. In the Syrian battlefield, the Russian battalion-level combat group relies on the support of the Aerospace Forces and the assistance of the Syrian government forces to carry out asymmetric strikes. In this Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian army fought a traditional large-scale war, and it is understandable that the role of the Russian army's battalion-level combat group was not good. This is also an important reason why the Russian army performed very differently in Syrian War and the Russian-Ukrainian War.Do you want
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is subject to national strength. The most important purpose of Russian military reform is to save funds to the greatest extent on the basis of improving the combat effectiveness of the army, and while maintaining strategic deterrence, maintain a force that can fight against the United States and NATO .
Behind the Russian military reform is the reflection of its continuous decline in national strength. Russia's current economic development mainly relies on oil and gas exports, and many resources are monopolized by oligopoly. The level of industrialization is low and the industrial advantages have been lost. Under such circumstances, the reform of the Russian army can be said to be difficult step by step.
battalion-level combat group can only work closely with other troops and can achieve good results in combat in a manner suitable for its combat characteristics. During the Russian-Ukrainian War, many problems were exposed by the Russian-Bay-level combat group, but it cannot be said that the reform of the Russian-Bay-level combat group was a failure.
Russia-Ukraine conflict is quite special. The Russian army is actually fighting the entire NATO. In this case, it is inevitable that the Russian barracks-level combat group will expose problems, and there is no need to make a complete denial. The Russian army's performance was lower than expected, and there were many reasons, which were indeed worth pondering and discussing, but this will also promote the Russian army to learn from lessons and adjust and improve the battalion-level combat group.
Russian army's Strategic weapons
From the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and Russian army reform, there are several points worth our attention.
First, the role of the army in future wars cannot be ignored. In future wars, the role of naval and air force, special operations, electromagnetic operations and cyber operations has been greatly improved, but the role of the army is still important when facing some combat tasks. Therefore, we cannot blindly pursue the pace of the US military. We must base ourselves on national conditions and always maintain the combat effectiveness of the army while vigorously developing the navy and air force.
Second, it is still important to maintain a certain scale of military strength. Russia is subject to the national economic strength and has significantly reduced its military posts. In 1991, the Russian Army's post was 2.6 million, but now it has been reduced to 250,000, which is a serious shortage of strength.
Third, the army's forces need to be diversified. The future war will have diverse forms, and the army of the same organization cannot undertake diversified combat tasks. A combat unit that is too small cannot complete the relevant tasks. Only when performing different combat tasks can the reasonable force be organized successfully.
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