The relationship between the various theaters and factions of the Kuomintang army is not so close, and in many cases there is basically no coordinated operation at all. Although Fu Zuoyi was a great official in Xinjiang, he was essentially a warlord of Suiyuan, with more than 200,000 direct troops. Some friends may ask, if this is the case, why does Chiang Kai-shek not want to weaken the strength of the Fu family, but instead named him the commander-in-chief of the suppression, and even sent an additional 300,000 Central Army troops? It’s funny to say that the 300,000 Central Army was used to restrict Fu Jiajun’s actions, and Li Wen, the commander of the 4th Corps of the Central Army in North China, had nothing to do with Fu Zuoyi. During the civil war, on the one hand, Lao Jiang needed to focus on the opponent's People's Liberation Army, and did not have enough ability to completely tame the Suiyuan line; on the other hand, he also relied on Fu Zuoyi's military command to suppress our army in North China, and simply win over a nominally high position.
The direct line of troops is the lifeline of the warlords of all parties and the biggest capital in the game with the central government. Not only Fu Zuoyi, but Yan Xishan in Shanxi, Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi in Guangxi are even more obvious. During the War of Liberation, have you ever seen Yan Xishan's Jin army fought in Shanxi? The Gui family even avoided life-and-death battles like the Huaihai Battle. Bai Chongxi resolutely refused to let the Zhang Gan Corps rescue Huang Baitao, which were all living examples. Under this background, the Wei Lihuang Group was in a dangerous situation in the Northeast during the Liaoshen Campaign. Is it possible for Fu Zuoyi to voluntarily allocate two to three million troops to the Northeast? Obviously delusion. As for Hou Jingru's 17th Corps, which was eventually sent to the east, it was actually not Fu Zuoyi's personnel. It was just attached to his Central Army troops. Fu Zuoyi could not restrain himself, so he let Old Jiang be transferred to the northeast. For the entire Liaoshen Campaign, Fu Zuoyi did not send a single soldier, but did not resist the Nanjing side's order to dispatch troops to the North China Central Faction.
In other words, even if Fu Zuoyi is willing to spend his money and is willing to take part of his "seven and a half" to rescue the Northeast, he may not be able to actually make the trip. In 1948, the size advantage of the national army in the north had been significantly reduced, and the total strength of our army was only a few hundred thousand, which was incomparable with the beginning of the Liberation War. In addition, there are many cities occupied by the national army, and they all need to be guarded by the army. Although North China has more than 600,000 troops, it occupies an important area in Pingjin, surrounded by 3 corps and more than 300,000 North China Field Army troops. Fu Zuoyi can reinforce it. The troops in the Northeast are also very few. In addition, although Fu definitely excels in the use of troops, his strategic vision is not so long-term. In fact, with the northern occupation in the second half of 48 years, once the Northeast region is lost, the North China Kuomintang army is at stake. The lips are dead and the teeth are cold. In fact, the devastating consequences of the entry of the millions of troops from the East and the Wild to Fu Zuoyi's army were confirmed in just a few months.
