text/Mao Yonghuai Mao 未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未分未This is a photo of Mao Zedong and some members. The first on the left in the front row is Su Yu
Su Yu (1907-1984), a colleague from Hunan Hui, Dong ethnic group , an outstanding military strategist, strategist and revolutionary in modern China. Although he is not a marshal, he is an outstanding general of ethnic minority who grew up during the Long March of the Red Army. He is the commander of the front army that Mao Zedong relied heavily on. He has been repeatedly entrusted with the important task of conquering wars. He can be regarded as the "trump card" for competing for the world with Chiang Kai-shek and is known as the "contemporary Bai Qi ".
According to Yang Shangkun's recollection, after seven battles and seven victories, Mao Zedong praised Su Yu for his good at commanding large corps operations. Regarding some important battles, "Chairman Mao often said that he would send a telegram to solicit Su Yu's opinions."
learns lessons from failure
In early July 1934, Central Red Army was forced to withdraw from Central Revolutionary Base , and implemented a strategic transfer. More than three months before the 25,000-mile Long March, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission decided to reorganize the Seventh Corps of the First Front Army, which was fighting on the eastern front of the Central Soviet Area, to form the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army North Anti-Japanese Advance Team (referred to as the "Anti-Japanese Advance Team"), and still form a legion. After the formation of the anti-Japanese advance team, it was ordered to set off from Ruijin on the evening of July 6. Under the leadership of the army commander Xun Huaizhou, political commissar Le Shaohua, chief of staff Su Yu, director of the political department Liu Ying, and the representative of the army central government Zeng Hongyi (later rebel), they advanced eastward to Fujian and then headed north.
This northbound operation lasted for more than six months and had a journey of more than 2,300 kilometers. More than 30 important battles such as Zhanghuban, Fuzhou, and Tanjiaqiao were carried out, which once shocked Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Huizhou , Wuhu and even Nanjing. It played a positive role in promoting the CCP’s anti-Japanese propositions, promoting the development of the anti-Japanese movement, expanding the influence of the party and the Red Army, and supporting the strategic shift of the central Red Army. The vast majority of commanders and fighters traveled long distances under extremely arduous conditions, fighting alone, and wrote a majestic epic of the people's revolution with a fearless revolutionary spirit. In November, the advance team and Fang Zhimin's troops formed the Red Tenth Army. However, with Chiang Kai-shek mobilizing a large army to surround and intercept it continuously, this march was still difficult to get rid of the passive situation, which eventually led to the failure of Huaiyushan , and Fang Zhimin, chairman of the Military and Political Committee of the Red Tenth Army, was arrested.
47 years later, Su Yu looked back on this history, felt deeply moved, and wrote an article "Review of the Red Army's Northward Anti-Japanese Advance Team" (hereinafter referred to as "Review").
Su Yu believes that such a unit with many non-combatants, poor weapons and equipment and heavy loads must not only carry out the task of attracting the Kuomintang's "part of the Central Army to return to aid" and cooperating with the strategic transfer of the main Red Army, but also undertake the tasks of going deep behind enemy lines, "developing guerrilla war to the highest extent", and "establishing a new Soviet base", which is completely a "uniform imagination".
As for "going north to fight against Japan", it only stays in "propaganda" and has no practical actions. Su Yu said, "At that time, there was no direct situation of fighting against Japan in Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangxi and Anhui regions." However, the Central Committee added instructions to the Red Seventh Army on September 4, 1934, saying: "Every place you go, you should carry out extensive political propaganda among the residents. If possible, you should establish a trade union poor peasant league and a revolutionary committee. You should mobilize employees and peasants to participate in the Seventh Army and organize local guerrillas. In order to develop guerrilla warfare, the confiscated property of landlords and reactionary merchants should be distributed to the workers and peasants." According to this, wherever the advance team went, nominally "going north to fight against Japan", but what they implemented was still the policies of the land revolution.
In the article "Review", Su Yu studied and summarized the lessons of the failure of northward anti-Japanese advance team : "The reason for failure is objectively the temporary strength of the enemy's strength, and the subjectively and main reason is that it is due to the wrong leadership of Wang Ming 'left' adventurism. It gives us extremely profound and painful lessons, which deserve serious research and memory."
Su Yu made Suzhou-China combat summary report
Everything starts from reality, not only the top, only the reality
When recalling the combat experience of the Anti-Japanese Advance Team, Su Yu wrote: "At that time, there was another very practical problem, that is, there was no base or guerrilla area as a support. Sometimes even with fighter opportunities, he would not dare to fight a bigger battle. There are reactionary forces everywhere, without a mass base, and after a war, the wounded cannot be resettled. It is very difficult to carry the wounded to march to war. A wounded person needs two soldiers to carry, and one soldier needs to replace him. If he lifts him from a long distance, the combat effectiveness of the troops will be weakened. "When advancing north, the original guerrilla bases or guerrilla areas should be used as the support as much as possible and closely cooperate with the local party and guerrilla armed forces. On the one hand, support and develop guerrilla wars there, and on the other hand, rest and replenish troops, place wounded people, and reduce the difficulties caused by no rear combat. Then the camera continues to jump forward. "
It is precisely based on this lesson of failure that Su Yu did not agree with the view of leaving the back. He dared to speak out to Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission at the turning point of the Liberation War strategy and fought hard.
In the second half of 1947, Mao Zedong deployed Liu (Bocheng) Deng (Xiaoping) and the army advanced to Dabie Mountains , Chen (Yi) Su (Yu) East China Field Army attacked from the outside to enter Henan, Anhui and Jiangsu , Chen (Geng) Xie (Fuzhi) Taiyue Corps switched to , western Henan and borders of Henan and Shaanxi, and formed a "product"-shaped strategic development in the Central Plains. However, the Kuomintang army in the Central Plains had an advantage in terms of quantity and technical equipment, and was able to concentrate its forces to launch a campaign attack on areas with the focus on the Dabie Mountains. The two sides formed a tug-of-war. At this time, Mao Zedong had imagined that Liu Deng, Chen Su, and Chen Xie would cooperate in order to break the deadlock by fighting a medium-scale annihilation war.
Dabie Mountains bordered the south of Yangtze River , north of Huaihe , east of Chaohu and Hefei, the Pinghan Railway, west of which, spanning the three provinces of Hubei, Henan and Anhui, has a very strong strategic position. . The strategic task given by Mao Zedong to Liu and Deng's army was to establish a base here. However, Liu and Deng's army had no rear combat for a long time, and logistics support difficulties led to a large reduction in troops and morale was greatly affected. In January 1948, Mao Zedong felt that "the most tense battlefield on the southern line is the Dabie Mountains, and the question of whether the area can stand firm has not been resolved." At the end of February, the main force of Liu and Deng's army withdrew from the Dabie Mountains and gradually established bases in Huaibei, Jianghan , and Tongbai.
Su Yu recalled: "Under such a situation, what strategic actions should our army take to change the situation in the Central Plains and continue to develop strategic offensives? This was a very important issue that needs to be solved in strategic guidance at that time. ”
In order to break the deadlock in the Central Plains and develop strategic offensives, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission decided to establish the Southeast Field Army, requiring Su Yu to lead three columns to cross the river in advance and fight to Kuotong District. On January 27, 1948, Mao Zedong called Su Yu: "After you lead the three columns to cross the river, you will inevitably force the enemy to change its deployment, which may attract 20 to 30 enemy brigades to return to defense of the south of the Yangtze River. "And instructed: "You should go to Jiangnan with 70,000 or 80,000 troops, and first travel in Hunan and Jiangxi provinces for half a year to a year. If you go around in circles along the way, you should make more rest time than marching and combat time, and reach Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi in several stages through leap forward, so that the enemy can be completely in a passive position, unable to defend, and exhausted. ”
Su Yu also thought deeply about breaking the deadlock in the Central Plains and developing strategic offensive, but formed different opinions from Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission.On April 18, Su Yu proposed to Mao Zedong, the Central Military Commission and the East China Bureau that the three columns of Huaye will not cross the river south for the time being: "With Liu Deng, Chen Xie and Huaye's main force, relying on the rear (north of Longhai Road) to fight in order to obtain enough shells, explosives, and grenades (the new area cannot be produced due to circumstances) to give full play to the role of existing equipment (the existing enemy is in the Central Plains with convenient transportation, and it is difficult to annihilate if there is no considerable artillery fire). He annihilated the enemy in large quantities, and seeks to be in the Central Plains area before the rainy season and summer harvest (the main battlefield should be in Henan, Jiangsu and Anhui and Huaibei Road East Road West) Fighting several large annihilation wars so that the people in this area can get a relatively stable summer harvest, so that our army can then provide food and other supplies and get active support from the people. "For the near-rear of the enemy, it is recommended to "send several powerful guerrilla regiments to go through extensive guerrillas and cooperate with the frontal main force to fight." For the far-reaching rear of the enemy, it is recommended to "send multiple strong expeditionary guerrillas to match the horn to take the guerrillas. Procure a wide range of guerrillas."
In terms of strategic purpose and means to achieve strategic purpose, the reason why Su Yu concluded that three columns crossed the river and could not pose a major threat to the enemy, and the reason why he judged that the enemy's main force would not return to defend Jiangnan was because the dispatch of the anti-Japanese advance team did not achieve the goal of "tuning the enemy" back to aid as mentioned at the time.
After careful research, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission agreed to the suggestion that Su Yu's three columns would not cross the river south for the time being, and made the decision that "the current task of Su Yu's Corps (1, 4, and 6th Columns) is not to cross the river immediately, but to open up a road to cross the river." From June 17 to July 6, Su Yu commanded the East China Field Army to defeat Kaifeng first, and then annihilated the enemy's Seventh Corps in Suiqi area, and annihilated part of the enemy reinforcements, killing more than 90,000 enemies, achieving a great victory in Eastern Henan Battle . As a result, the strategic situation in the Central Plains battlefield and the East China battlefield was changed, especially in the Central Plains battlefield, where the Kuomintang army completely lost the ability to launch a combat offensive.
Practice has proved that Su Yu's subjective strategic intention of annihilation of large numbers of enemies in Jiangbei was in line with the objective actual situation of the Central Plains battlefield at that time. In the past, if Su Yu had not been based on reality and only had the best, the consequences would have been unimaginable.
1950, some leaders of the Third Field Army took a photo in Hangzhou
timely changed their military strategy, was mobile and flexible, and won by surprise
In October 1934, the anti-Japanese advance team was ordered to enter Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi Soviet Area and joined forces with the Red Ten Army led by Fang Zhimin. On November 4, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an order to combine the Red Seventh Army, the Red Ten Army and the newly upgraded local armed forces into the Red Ten Army, with Liu Chouxi and as the commander of the legion and Le Shaohua as the political commissar of the legion. At the same time, Fang Zhimin was appointed as the commander of the Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi Military Region, Zeng Hongyi was appointed as the political commissar of the military region, and Su Yu was appointed as the chief of staff of the military region. It is stipulated that the Red Tenth Army and the Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi Military Regions will accept the leadership of the Central Military Region headed by Xiang Ying (established when the main Red Army was transferred). The Central Military Region decided that Fang Zhimin, Liu Chouxi, Le Shaohua, Nie Hongjun and Liu Ying would form the Military and Political Committee of the Red Tenth Army, with Fang Zhimin as chairman, and Su Yu was transferred to the Chief of Staff of the Red Tenth Army.
On December 14, the Red Tenth Army set up an ambush in Tanjiaqiao, attempting to encircle and annihilate the enemy's pursuers. Due to reasons such as "not good at regular combat", the initial battle failed. During the battle, the commander of the 19th Division, Xun Huaizhou, was seriously injured and later died. In January 1935, the army leaders did not listen to the suggestions of splitting troops to fight guerrillas and decided to return to the Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi Soviet Area. On the way back, he was surrounded by heavy enemy troops in the Huaiyu Mountain area. After the bloody battle, the Red Tenth Army was almost wiped out, Fang Zhimin, Liu Chouxi and others were captured, and Liu Ying and Su Yu successfully broke through with a few people and returned to Soviet area .
At the end of January and early February, 1935, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China instructed the remnants of the Red Tenth Army entering the Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi areas as the basic force to form the advancing division. The mission of advancing the division is to enter Zhejiang, carry out guerrilla wars, and create Soviet bases; use active combat operations to attack, attract and restrain the enemy, defend the basic areas of Fujian, Zhejiang and Jiangxi Province and neighboring bases; and strategically cooperate with the actions of the main Red Army.
In the article "Review", Su Yu concluded: "Under the situation at that time, the Red Ten Army and local armed forces who were good at fighting guerrillas were formed, and the Red Ten Army and local armed forces who were good at fighting guerrillas were gathered together to carry out large-scale corps activities and attempt to fight big battles. This was another major mistake in strategic guidance, which laid the root of disaster for the setbacks and failures of the Red Ten Army later." In December 1973, Zhu De commented on the co-editing of this joint editing point out: "If a legion is formed, it will not be broken, and a regular battle cannot be fought, and guerrilla warfare cannot be fought. Experience still needs to turn the regular army into a guerrilla." The lessons of the failure of
had an important impact on Su Yu. After accepting the new task, he carefully studied and analyzed the situation at that time, believing that although the Central Soviet Area had been lost, the main force of the Kuomintang army was heading north to "pursuing and suppressing" the main Red Army. Relatively speaking, the enemy's troops in Zhejiang are relatively empty. If you fight guerrillas in Zhejiang, you can cooperate and support each other with several surrounding old Soviet areas. More importantly, Su Yu believed that the anti-Japanese advance team had switched to Zhejiang and had a certain mass base. The reason why I failed to gain a foothold here is mainly because I did not realize the need to disperse the guerrilla attacks. Therefore, Su Yu learned his lesson and established the strategic idea of "turning regular troops into guerrillas and fighting guerrilla warfare without formal warfare." This is a decisive shift.
From 1935 to 1937, under the leadership of Su Yu, Liu Ying and others, the Admiral Division mobilized and relied on the masses, established contacts with the Soviet area in northern Fujian, and established a guerrilla base in southern Zhejiang, and the team continued to grow and grow. Due to the enemy's attack, the radio station was destroyed. For a long time, Su Yu and others lost contact with the central and superior party organizations, faced the enemy's heavy "encirclement and suppression" and carried out arduous struggles until the arrival of the national war of resistance.
During this period, Su Yu and others led their troops to establish several open, semi-public, and secret guerrilla bases, which became the rear of the advance division. Su Yu recalled: "The troops fought and were tired. They marched quickly for one night and then moved to the guerrilla base point. The masses here belonged to us. If you block the news, you can stay and rest for three or five days, reconnaissance the enemy situation, plan the operation and deployment, then jump out, attack the enemy, and carry out work... In this way, we are like fish in water, and our activities are much more comfortable than the previous stage."
Su Yu accepted the lessons of the failure of the anti-Japanese advance team, and realized that the military strategy and combat policy should be changed in time according to changes in the situation, and resolutely turned the regular army into guerrillas. The combat policy was changed from regular war to guerrilla warfare, so that we could establish a foothold in , southern Zhejiang, for three years and successfully established a guerrilla base in southern Zhejiang.
concentrates superior forces, fights and decides quickly, strives to completely wipe out
Su Yu's use of troops, and is well aware of the importance and necessity of concentrating superior forces. This is because the experience of the anti-Japanese advance team being surrounded and intercepted by the enemy's superior forces has made him never forget it.
On December 10, 1934, after the establishment of the Military and Political Committee of the Red Tenth Army, the various departments of the Anti-Japanese Advance Team left , the northeastern Jiangxi Soviet Area, . After that, the advance team headquarters, the 20th Division, the 21st Division and the 19th Division arrived in Tangkou Town, She County, Anhui Province one after another. After the anti-Japanese advance team met in Tangkou, they immediately crossed Huangshan and arrived at Guzhuxi on the northern foot of the river, preparing to camp in Tanjiaqiao in Taiping County. At this time, the Kuomintang army mobilized 5 regular divisions, 2 independent brigades, and 4 security regiments and used 7 times my troops to encircle and block. The anti-Japanese advance team suffered major casualties in Tanjiaqiao. After that, the anti-Japanese advance team was surrounded by heavy enemy troops in Huaiyu Mountain and almost wiped out the entire army.
Learn from one mistake and gain wisdom. In the early days of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, when the enemy's troops had an absolute advantage overall, Su Yu paid more attention to tactical victory with more and less. In each battle, he would inevitably concentrate several times the enemy's troops to form an overwhelming advantage in the local area, and fight quickly with a rush to defeat the enemy. In the Battle of Suzhong , although Su Yu lost 120,000 to 120,000, which was at a disadvantage in each battle, Su Yu carefully deployed to ensure an absolute advantage in personnel comparison.Suzhong first battle in Xuantai. Su Yu aimed to reorganize the 83rd Division and quickly concentrated his troops six times the enemy's strength. In just 3 days, he annihilated more than 3,000 enemies, setting a precedent for eliminating the US-based equipment Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops. When he fought bloody battles in Meng Lianggu, Su Yu concentrated five columns and more than 100,000 superior troops, surrounded more than 30,000 people in Zhang Lingfu reorganized more than 30,000 people. It took only three days to wipe out Chiang Kai-shek's five main forces before the arrival of the Kuomintang reinforcements. Menglianggu Battle is Su Yu's classic work. In May 1948, when Mao Zedong met Su Yu at Xibaipo , he said: "There are two people who did not expect that they can annihilate the 74th Division, one is Chiang Kai-shek and the other is me Mao Zedong himself."
Su Yu has followed Mao Zedong and Zhu De since the Jinggangshan period and learned about war. In later war practice, he experienced many battles, was diligent in learning and good at research. He not only learned from victory, but also learned from failure. He finally became an outstanding minority general and a generation of "war god" who shocked the enemy.
Editor: Wang Yu
Editor: Zheng Guowei
Production: Wang Yu
This article is original "Party History Expo"
Reprinting, excerpting, etc. without permission. Infringement will be pursued.
