Welcome everyone to [follow] me and let’s talk about the past and the present together, and discuss the general trend of the world. After the outbreak of the Pacific War, although the China Theater was established, China did not send representatives to the US-UK Joint Chiefs of S

I am Tangdi, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me and let’s talk about the past and the present together, and discuss the general trend of the world. A gentleman lives his life just to learn and make friends!

1942 was an extremely serious year in the anti-fascist war. The Axis powers' offensive is aggressive, and all major anti-fascist battlefields are under tremendous pressure, and the war crisis is still deepening.

The newly established Sino-US military cooperation relationship not only faces various problems caused by the tight global war situation and the inherent flaws of the alliance system, but is also deeply affected by the different positions and opinions of China and the United States on established policies and military cooperation relations. The impact has exposed various potential problems in Sino-US relations.

The First Burma Campaign

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, although the China Theater was established, China did not send representatives to the US-UK Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference, and the US and UK did not discuss the strategic command and deployment issues of mainland China in detail. The allies also have no ground troops fighting in China. China still basically fights independently. The main stage for military cooperation between China and its allies is the battlefield in Myanmar.

The Burma Campaign was the first military operation carried out after the alliance between China and the United States (including China and the United Kingdom). It was also the first test that the nascent Sino-US alliance withstood. The complex relationships throughout it and its consequences were the key to the wartime relations between the allies in Asia. A microcosm.

After the Pearl Harbor incident, the Japanese army took advantage of the residual power of the successful Pearl Harbor surprise attack and launched an all-out attack from the Indian Ocean to the Southwest Pacific. The British defense line was frequently in danger.

In mid-January 1942, the main force of the Japanese army attacked Burma from Thailand, starting the first Burma Campaign.

The Japanese army's attack on Burma aimed to cut off the transportation line from Yangon to Kunming, militarily seize Burma, a southwest strategic hub from Southeast Asia to the southwest Pacific and central Pacific defense lines, and politically force the Chongqing government to surrender, and attack India Strong military and political pressure formed, causing the British defense line in the Far East to completely collapse.

The Japanese army was invincible along the way. On March 8, the Japanese army occupied Yangon and continued to invade the north in an attempt to seize the entire territory of Myanmar.

Myanmar is an area where the interests of China, the United States and the United Kingdom intersect. Because it involves the chokepoint of external aid to China, China is particularly concerned about the safety of Myanmar. Therefore, as early as the Chongqing Military Conference in December 1941, Chiang Kai-shek officially expressed his willingness to send troops to Wavell .

The United States and the United Kingdom are also concerned about Myanmar's safety, but their starting points are different.

The United States’ thinking on Myanmar’s defense is more based on considerations of China policy. In Roosevelt 's view, preserving Burma is an important aspect that reflects the political goals of the United States' China policy.

Roosevelt believes that the colonial era is gone forever. For its own security, the Western world must abandon the practice of treating Asians as inferior nations, and treating China equally is to prevent "a fundamental rift between the East and the West in the future." The best way.

From a military perspective, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that in order to support China's war of resistance, Burma must be defended and aid channels to China kept open. However, Britain was mainly fighting to maintain the status quo of colonial rule.

Due to different war goals, the strategy is bound to be affected. The center of attention of the United States is China, and the center of attention of the United Kingdom is Singapore . Fundamentally speaking, it is India. This disagreement between the two sides persisted throughout the war.

However, the United States has no overall strategic plan for the war in Myanmar, nor has it sent ground troops to Myanmar. Only 100 P40 old-fashioned fighter jets and more than 100 volunteer members of the American Volunteer Air Force led by Chennault participated in the battle.

The origins of the Hump Route and the Stilwell Highway

The role of the United States in the Burma Campaign, given that decisions regarding the Burma Campaign required consensus among Britain, China and the United States, and that Australia's attitude and response had to be considered. It is not mainly reflected in killing enemies on the front line, but in being responsible for the supply of arms and coordinating various relationships.

Foreseeing the possible fall of Yangon, as a countermeasure, the US military proposed to launch two major projects, namely opening a route over the Himalayas and building a China-India highway .

When the Japanese army captured Moulmein on January 30 and Rangoon was in danger, Roosevelt proposed a plan to open an air transportation line and a land supply line at a cabinet meeting in order to boost China's morale and maintain the lifeline of China's war of resistance. , and ordered Harriman to hold detailed discussions with Chinese Foreign Minister Song Ziwen who was stationed in the United States at the time.

Song Ziwen is more inclined to open air routes. This route is from Sadiya , which has the highest terrain in Assam, northeastern India, to Kunming, China, a total distance of 700 miles. He estimated that 100 DC-3 transport aircraft can transport 12,000 tons of leased materials to China every month. The leased materials can be landed in Kolkata and then transported north to Assam via railway. Harriman expressed his agreement with Soong's suggestion, but was a little worried about the difficulties caused by the route flying over the Himalayas, known as the "Roof of the World", but the president assured that any purely logistical problems could be "solved" quickly.

In early February, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Arnold suggested to the President that in view of the critical situation in Yangon, Myanmar's main port, it was necessary to open a new air transport route from India into China. Roosevelt lost no time in promoting it and assured Chiang Kai-shek on February 9, "We are increasing the aircraft ferry routes to China via Africa and India. Regardless of whether Rangoon is captured or not, the route via India to China will remain open." .

The Nationalist Government has the most urgent request for opening up Sino-Indian routes and building Sino-Indian highways.

From February 9 to 21, 1942, one of the purposes of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, accompanied by the British Ambassador to China Carr, was to strengthen cooperation between China and Britain in the joint war against Japan, and to win over the British and Indian authorities to open up China. The approval and support of India’s land and air transportation lines.

China and the British and Indian authorities reached an agreement in April of the same year:

The British government agreed to Chinese airlines opening a route between Chongqing and Calcutta, and the Chinese government agreed to resume the route between Kunming and Yangon when circumstances permit.

With the joint efforts of China, the United States and the United Kingdom, in May 1942, the "Hump" air strategic transportation line from Assam, India, over the Himalayas to Kunming, Yunnan, China, was officially opened, thus implementing the world The longest and largest strategic airlift operation in aviation history to date.

The plan to open a land channel and China-India highway will also be launched soon. Long before the Japanese army invaded Myanmar, China foresaw that the Lower Myanmar area might be lost, so on January 1, 1942, China made a request to build a road using leased materials.

The highway is expected to start from Lido in Assam, India, pass through the mountains, forests and rivers of northern Myanmar, and connect to Longling, a town on the Burma Highway in China. It has to go through a route that has never been traveled by vehicles. It is a more difficult project than opening an air route.

Although U.S. engineering experts estimated it would take two and a half years to build the road, the Office of War Plans classified it as an "urgent military need." Therefore, before Stilwell arrived in China or Burma, the plan to build what became known as the Stilwell Road had already been approved by all parties involved. But whether this road can be opened ultimately depends on the progress of the war in Myanmar.

Which war zone should Myanmar be designated?

While the Japanese army was pressing down on the border, the allies were caught in conflicts and disputes over Myanmar's defense issues. The first was the issue of Chinese troops entering Myanmar to fight.

Out of the mentality of underestimating the enemy and underestimating the combat effectiveness of the Chinese military, and especially to guard against China's influence on Asian nationalism, the United Kingdom has resisted and blocked China's request to send troops. When the Japanese army captured Dawei on the Myanmar-Thailand border on January 19, 1942, despite being forced by the war situation, Wavell agreed to allow the 93rd Division and 49th Division of the Chinese Sixth Army to enter Myanmar on the 19th and 21st respectively. reinforcements, but still refused to let the rest of the Chinese Fifth Army and Sixth Army stationed on the China-Myanmar border.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that there were no political or administrative difficulties sufficient to prevent the Chinese army from participating in the defense of Burma. Roosevelt personally intervened, consulting directly with Churchill . At that time, the British defense lines were in critical condition. Churchill immediately responded to Roosevelt's intervention and urged Wavell to allow the main force of China to enter Burma to participate in the war. Wavell reluctantly agreed, and China ordered the remaining three divisions of the Sixth Army and the 3rd Division on February 3. The fifth army entered Myanmar.

How to coordinate the Allied forces, especially the conflict between Britain and China on the issue of command authority of the Allied forces in Burma, is also a thorny issue facing the United States at this time.

Considering that China’s only international passage passes through Myanmar, the United States once suggested that Myanmar be placed within the scope of the Chinese theater. Marshall’s proposed plan included northwest Myanmar within the scope of the Chinese theater, but Wavell hoped to place Myanmar’s defense within the scope of the Chinese theater. Take it into your own hands and propose that the Myanmar issue can be better handled from the perspective of the Indian Defense Zone.

In the end, after a compromise, Burma was placed in Wavell's American, British, Dutch and Australian theater, rather than his Indian defense zone, in order to emphasize the strategic cooperative relationship with China.

However, the rapid advance of the Japanese army challenged the British-American joint command system established at the Acadia Conference. Wavell's American-British-Dutch-Australian Theater Command was disbanded on February 25.

On March 8, the US-UK Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting decided to adjust the theater and divide strategic responsibilities into three:

The entire Pacific region, including China, will be under the command of the United States. Tactical operations in China will be jointly responsible for the United States and China. The United States Decisions will be made on large strategic issues, including an offensive to the northwest from American bases and an attack on Japan from mainland China; from Singapore to the Middle East (including the Middle East) will fall under the British area of ​​responsibility, and the United States will continue Lend-Lease support is provided; the Atlantic theater will be a joint Anglo-American area of ​​responsibility, and coordinated operations in these areas will continue to be studied and recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to this adjustment, Wavell is now the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Defense Area, and Myanmar was assigned to Wavell's Indian Defense Area based on the authorization of the US-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference.

The troubles caused by the division of war zones

Stilwell's military operations in India or Burma were all under the command of Wavell. Soon thereafter Alexander succeeded Wavell as commander of Burma.

This division of responsibilities sows the seeds of trouble in Myanmar.

First of all, the above arrangements included that Chiang Kai-shek would implement local tactical operations under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference without consulting Chiang Kai-shek. In particular, the arrangement of letting the British commander command the war in Burma made Chiang Kai-shek very angry.

This is not only a disregard for Chiang Kai-shek as the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Theater and China's status as a great power, but it is also unreasonable. At that time, the number of Chinese troops participating in the war in Myanmar far exceeded the number of British troops. As a result, China sent troops and the troops were under British command. Chiang Kai-shek strongly opposed the British commanding the Chinese army and advocated that Stilwell should command the war in Burma.

html On March 9, Chiang Kai-shek called Foreign Minister Soong Ziwen and asked him to convey to President Roosevelt that since the British army only had two divisions in Burma and China had more than four times the strength of the British army, he strongly requested that Stilwell command the allied forces in Burma. Army, hoping that Roosevelt would directly negotiate with the British government on the matter, and later proposed that northern Burma be included in the Chinese theater.

A related issue is the division of authority between Stilwell and Alexander, the new Burmese commander.

One of Stilwell’s important missions to China was to command operations in Burma, but the British were not happy to see Stilwell appear in Burma. Alexander hoped to command the Chinese army, and in his opinion, Stilwell had neither a staff nor a staff , and are not familiar with the local conditions.

Churchill added that the British prepared supply facilities for the Chinese army and established a division-level liaison system. Alexander proposed to the president that Stilwell must be under Alexander's command.

Regarding the dispute between China and Britain over the command authority in Myanmar, the United States’ position is to adhere to the decision of the United States-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting and at the same time try its best to coordinate the conflicts between China and Britain. Regarding Chiang Kai-shek's strong request for Stilwell to command the war in Burma, Roosevelt declined on the grounds that the matter was extremely sensitive, but he believed that Stilwell would handle it appropriately.

As for the British request for Stilwell to be under their control, Roosevelt and Marshall also agreed and promised Churchill that Stilwell would cooperate with Alexander on the issue of command authority until Chiang Kai-shek agreed.

At the same time, Stilwell was also actively committed to resolving the dispute over command of the Burmese War between China and Britain, and tried his best to persuade the British to satisfy Chiang Kai-shek as much as possible on the issue of equipping the Chinese army in exchange for his cooperation.

With Stilwell's efforts, the British army agreed to solve the supply problem. As for the issue of command authority, it was temporarily resolved by Stilwell and Alexander reaching an agreement to cooperate closely. On March 27, Alexander visited Chongqing to meet with Chiang Kai-shek. China finally agreed to temporarily hand over the highest command of the Burma operation to Alexander.

Straightening out various relations in China and effectively commanding the Chinese army to enter Myanmar was also an important issue faced by the United States in implementing its China policy during this period.

The Conflict between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek

The situation that Stilwell faced after arriving in China was very different from what he expected. Due to various reasons, the U.S. military mission in China did not have a functioning staff organization for him to take over, so Stilwell used members of the military mission in China and a group of people he brought to form a commander. Department was established in Chongqing on March 4.

The first meeting between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek was held in Chongqing on the 6th.

What Stilwell was most eager to understand was the command authority Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to grant him over the Chinese army and Chiang Kai-shek's strategic plan.

Although Stilwell soon got his wish, he was appointed chief of staff of the China Theater and commanded the troops entering Burma (Fifth and Sixth Army). Chiang Kai-shek also told Stilwell that he had ordered his soldiers to listen only to Stilwell. Powerful command.

However, according to some American scholars, Chiang Kai-shek's command of the Chinese army changed several times. At first, it was "given to Stilwell, then taken back, and then given to him again."

On the issue of Burma's defense, Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell had even greater differences.

In Stilwell’s view, the war in Burma was not only to achieve the important military goal of preserving Burma and keeping China’s external channels open, but also to maintain China’s confidence in the war of resistance.

Stilwell's plan was that if Rangoon fell (the Japanese army attacked Rangoon on March 7, the day he formulated the plan), he planned to use the Chinese army and the British army to launch a powerful counterattack to recapture Rangoon. . If the counterattack fails, the Allied forces will retreat to the highlands east of Mandalay , posing a threat to the Japanese flanks advancing north and controlling the upper Burma area.

html In the conversation between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek on the 210th, Stilwell said that Burma was more important to China than to Britain, because Britain only defended Burma to defend India, but if China lost Burma, it would be cut off. lines of communication with the outside world.

Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Chinese Fifth Army and the Sixth Army "the purpose of entering Myanmar was to defend Yangon. Now that Yangon has been lost, the purpose of our army's entry into Myanmar no longer exists."

He was worried that the enemy might take advantage of China's entry into Myanmar and attack Yunnan from Vietnam . "If this move succeeds, Yunnan Province will be in dire straits and the overall situation will be unimaginable. Therefore, the troops will be transferred back to Myanmar to consolidate the defense of Yunnan Province and the Yangtze River Basin. This is indeed a matter of due consideration.”

If it is necessary to stay in Myanmar, it is to regain Yangon, which is beyond the capabilities of the Chinese army. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly emphasized that the Fifth Army and the Sixth Army were China's elite troops and could only win but not lose.

It can be seen that Stilwell was bent on holding Burma and preserving a channel between China and the outside world; while Chiang Kai-shek had no intention of fighting anymore after the fall of Yangon and hoped to retain his elite troops and return to defend his homeland.

I am Tangdi, a history buff. Welcome everyone to [follow] me and let’s talk about the past and the present together, and discuss the general trend of the world. A gentleman lives his life just to learn and make friends!

1942 was an extremely serious year in the anti-fascist war. The Axis powers' offensive is aggressive, and all major anti-fascist battlefields are under tremendous pressure, and the war crisis is still deepening.

The newly established Sino-US military cooperation relationship not only faces various problems caused by the tight global war situation and the inherent flaws of the alliance system, but is also deeply affected by the different positions and opinions of China and the United States on established policies and military cooperation relations. The impact has exposed various potential problems in Sino-US relations.

The First Burma Campaign

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, although the China Theater was established, China did not send representatives to the US-UK Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference, and the US and UK did not discuss the strategic command and deployment issues of mainland China in detail. The allies also have no ground troops fighting in China. China still basically fights independently. The main stage for military cooperation between China and its allies is the battlefield in Myanmar.

The Burma Campaign was the first military operation carried out after the alliance between China and the United States (including China and the United Kingdom). It was also the first test that the nascent Sino-US alliance withstood. The complex relationships throughout it and its consequences were the key to the wartime relations between the allies in Asia. A microcosm.

After the Pearl Harbor incident, the Japanese army took advantage of the residual power of the successful Pearl Harbor surprise attack and launched an all-out attack from the Indian Ocean to the Southwest Pacific. The British defense line was frequently in danger.

In mid-January 1942, the main force of the Japanese army attacked Burma from Thailand, starting the first Burma Campaign.

The Japanese army's attack on Burma aimed to cut off the transportation line from Yangon to Kunming, militarily seize Burma, a southwest strategic hub from Southeast Asia to the southwest Pacific and central Pacific defense lines, and politically force the Chongqing government to surrender, and attack India Strong military and political pressure formed, causing the British defense line in the Far East to completely collapse.

The Japanese army was invincible along the way. On March 8, the Japanese army occupied Yangon and continued to invade the north in an attempt to seize the entire territory of Myanmar.

Myanmar is an area where the interests of China, the United States and the United Kingdom intersect. Because it involves the chokepoint of external aid to China, China is particularly concerned about the safety of Myanmar. Therefore, as early as the Chongqing Military Conference in December 1941, Chiang Kai-shek officially expressed his willingness to send troops to Wavell .

The United States and the United Kingdom are also concerned about Myanmar's safety, but their starting points are different.

The United States’ thinking on Myanmar’s defense is more based on considerations of China policy. In Roosevelt 's view, preserving Burma is an important aspect that reflects the political goals of the United States' China policy.

Roosevelt believes that the colonial era is gone forever. For its own security, the Western world must abandon the practice of treating Asians as inferior nations, and treating China equally is to prevent "a fundamental rift between the East and the West in the future." The best way.

From a military perspective, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that in order to support China's war of resistance, Burma must be defended and aid channels to China kept open. However, Britain was mainly fighting to maintain the status quo of colonial rule.

Due to different war goals, the strategy is bound to be affected. The center of attention of the United States is China, and the center of attention of the United Kingdom is Singapore . Fundamentally speaking, it is India. This disagreement between the two sides persisted throughout the war.

However, the United States has no overall strategic plan for the war in Myanmar, nor has it sent ground troops to Myanmar. Only 100 P40 old-fashioned fighter jets and more than 100 volunteer members of the American Volunteer Air Force led by Chennault participated in the battle.

The origins of the Hump Route and the Stilwell Highway

The role of the United States in the Burma Campaign, given that decisions regarding the Burma Campaign required consensus among Britain, China and the United States, and that Australia's attitude and response had to be considered. It is not mainly reflected in killing enemies on the front line, but in being responsible for the supply of arms and coordinating various relationships.

Foreseeing the possible fall of Yangon, as a countermeasure, the US military proposed to launch two major projects, namely opening a route over the Himalayas and building a China-India highway .

When the Japanese army captured Moulmein on January 30 and Rangoon was in danger, Roosevelt proposed a plan to open an air transportation line and a land supply line at a cabinet meeting in order to boost China's morale and maintain the lifeline of China's war of resistance. , and ordered Harriman to hold detailed discussions with Chinese Foreign Minister Song Ziwen who was stationed in the United States at the time.

Song Ziwen is more inclined to open air routes. This route is from Sadiya , which has the highest terrain in Assam, northeastern India, to Kunming, China, a total distance of 700 miles. He estimated that 100 DC-3 transport aircraft can transport 12,000 tons of leased materials to China every month. The leased materials can be landed in Kolkata and then transported north to Assam via railway. Harriman expressed his agreement with Soong's suggestion, but was a little worried about the difficulties caused by the route flying over the Himalayas, known as the "Roof of the World", but the president assured that any purely logistical problems could be "solved" quickly.

In early February, Chief of Staff of the Air Force Arnold suggested to the President that in view of the critical situation in Yangon, Myanmar's main port, it was necessary to open a new air transport route from India into China. Roosevelt lost no time in promoting it and assured Chiang Kai-shek on February 9, "We are increasing the aircraft ferry routes to China via Africa and India. Regardless of whether Rangoon is captured or not, the route via India to China will remain open." .

The Nationalist Government has the most urgent request for opening up Sino-Indian routes and building Sino-Indian highways.

From February 9 to 21, 1942, one of the purposes of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, accompanied by the British Ambassador to China Carr, was to strengthen cooperation between China and Britain in the joint war against Japan, and to win over the British and Indian authorities to open up China. The approval and support of India’s land and air transportation lines.

China and the British and Indian authorities reached an agreement in April of the same year:

The British government agreed to Chinese airlines opening a route between Chongqing and Calcutta, and the Chinese government agreed to resume the route between Kunming and Yangon when circumstances permit.

With the joint efforts of China, the United States and the United Kingdom, in May 1942, the "Hump" air strategic transportation line from Assam, India, over the Himalayas to Kunming, Yunnan, China, was officially opened, thus implementing the world The longest and largest strategic airlift operation in aviation history to date.

The plan to open a land channel and China-India highway will also be launched soon. Long before the Japanese army invaded Myanmar, China foresaw that the Lower Myanmar area might be lost, so on January 1, 1942, China made a request to build a road using leased materials.

The highway is expected to start from Lido in Assam, India, pass through the mountains, forests and rivers of northern Myanmar, and connect to Longling, a town on the Burma Highway in China. It has to go through a route that has never been traveled by vehicles. It is a more difficult project than opening an air route.

Although U.S. engineering experts estimated it would take two and a half years to build the road, the Office of War Plans classified it as an "urgent military need." Therefore, before Stilwell arrived in China or Burma, the plan to build what became known as the Stilwell Road had already been approved by all parties involved. But whether this road can be opened ultimately depends on the progress of the war in Myanmar.

Which war zone should Myanmar be designated?

While the Japanese army was pressing down on the border, the allies were caught in conflicts and disputes over Myanmar's defense issues. The first was the issue of Chinese troops entering Myanmar to fight.

Out of the mentality of underestimating the enemy and underestimating the combat effectiveness of the Chinese military, and especially to guard against China's influence on Asian nationalism, the United Kingdom has resisted and blocked China's request to send troops. When the Japanese army captured Dawei on the Myanmar-Thailand border on January 19, 1942, despite being forced by the war situation, Wavell agreed to allow the 93rd Division and 49th Division of the Chinese Sixth Army to enter Myanmar on the 19th and 21st respectively. reinforcements, but still refused to let the rest of the Chinese Fifth Army and Sixth Army stationed on the China-Myanmar border.

The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that there were no political or administrative difficulties sufficient to prevent the Chinese army from participating in the defense of Burma. Roosevelt personally intervened, consulting directly with Churchill . At that time, the British defense lines were in critical condition. Churchill immediately responded to Roosevelt's intervention and urged Wavell to allow the main force of China to enter Burma to participate in the war. Wavell reluctantly agreed, and China ordered the remaining three divisions of the Sixth Army and the 3rd Division on February 3. The fifth army entered Myanmar.

How to coordinate the Allied forces, especially the conflict between Britain and China on the issue of command authority of the Allied forces in Burma, is also a thorny issue facing the United States at this time.

Considering that China’s only international passage passes through Myanmar, the United States once suggested that Myanmar be placed within the scope of the Chinese theater. Marshall’s proposed plan included northwest Myanmar within the scope of the Chinese theater, but Wavell hoped to place Myanmar’s defense within the scope of the Chinese theater. Take it into your own hands and propose that the Myanmar issue can be better handled from the perspective of the Indian Defense Zone.

In the end, after a compromise, Burma was placed in Wavell's American, British, Dutch and Australian theater, rather than his Indian defense zone, in order to emphasize the strategic cooperative relationship with China.

However, the rapid advance of the Japanese army challenged the British-American joint command system established at the Acadia Conference. Wavell's American-British-Dutch-Australian Theater Command was disbanded on February 25.

On March 8, the US-UK Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting decided to adjust the theater and divide strategic responsibilities into three:

The entire Pacific region, including China, will be under the command of the United States. Tactical operations in China will be jointly responsible for the United States and China. The United States Decisions will be made on large strategic issues, including an offensive to the northwest from American bases and an attack on Japan from mainland China; from Singapore to the Middle East (including the Middle East) will fall under the British area of ​​responsibility, and the United States will continue Lend-Lease support is provided; the Atlantic theater will be a joint Anglo-American area of ​​responsibility, and coordinated operations in these areas will continue to be studied and recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

According to this adjustment, Wavell is now the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Defense Area, and Myanmar was assigned to Wavell's Indian Defense Area based on the authorization of the US-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference.

The troubles caused by the division of war zones

Stilwell's military operations in India or Burma were all under the command of Wavell. Soon thereafter Alexander succeeded Wavell as commander of Burma.

This division of responsibilities sows the seeds of trouble in Myanmar.

First of all, the above arrangements included that Chiang Kai-shek would implement local tactical operations under the guidance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Conference without consulting Chiang Kai-shek. In particular, the arrangement of letting the British commander command the war in Burma made Chiang Kai-shek very angry.

This is not only a disregard for Chiang Kai-shek as the Chief of Staff of the Chinese Theater and China's status as a great power, but it is also unreasonable. At that time, the number of Chinese troops participating in the war in Myanmar far exceeded the number of British troops. As a result, China sent troops and the troops were under British command. Chiang Kai-shek strongly opposed the British commanding the Chinese army and advocated that Stilwell should command the war in Burma.

html On March 9, Chiang Kai-shek called Foreign Minister Soong Ziwen and asked him to convey to President Roosevelt that since the British army only had two divisions in Burma and China had more than four times the strength of the British army, he strongly requested that Stilwell command the allied forces in Burma. Army, hoping that Roosevelt would directly negotiate with the British government on the matter, and later proposed that northern Burma be included in the Chinese theater.

A related issue is the division of authority between Stilwell and Alexander, the new Burmese commander.

One of Stilwell’s important missions to China was to command operations in Burma, but the British were not happy to see Stilwell appear in Burma. Alexander hoped to command the Chinese army, and in his opinion, Stilwell had neither a staff nor a staff , and are not familiar with the local conditions.

Churchill added that the British prepared supply facilities for the Chinese army and established a division-level liaison system. Alexander proposed to the president that Stilwell must be under Alexander's command.

Regarding the dispute between China and Britain over the command authority in Myanmar, the United States’ position is to adhere to the decision of the United States-British Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting and at the same time try its best to coordinate the conflicts between China and Britain. Regarding Chiang Kai-shek's strong request for Stilwell to command the war in Burma, Roosevelt declined on the grounds that the matter was extremely sensitive, but he believed that Stilwell would handle it appropriately.

As for the British request for Stilwell to be under their control, Roosevelt and Marshall also agreed and promised Churchill that Stilwell would cooperate with Alexander on the issue of command authority until Chiang Kai-shek agreed.

At the same time, Stilwell was also actively committed to resolving the dispute over command of the Burmese War between China and Britain, and tried his best to persuade the British to satisfy Chiang Kai-shek as much as possible on the issue of equipping the Chinese army in exchange for his cooperation.

With Stilwell's efforts, the British army agreed to solve the supply problem. As for the issue of command authority, it was temporarily resolved by Stilwell and Alexander reaching an agreement to cooperate closely. On March 27, Alexander visited Chongqing to meet with Chiang Kai-shek. China finally agreed to temporarily hand over the highest command of the Burma operation to Alexander.

Straightening out various relations in China and effectively commanding the Chinese army to enter Myanmar was also an important issue faced by the United States in implementing its China policy during this period.

The Conflict between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek

The situation that Stilwell faced after arriving in China was very different from what he expected. Due to various reasons, the U.S. military mission in China did not have a functioning staff organization for him to take over, so Stilwell used members of the military mission in China and a group of people he brought to form a commander. Department was established in Chongqing on March 4.

The first meeting between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek was held in Chongqing on the 6th.

What Stilwell was most eager to understand was the command authority Chiang Kai-shek was prepared to grant him over the Chinese army and Chiang Kai-shek's strategic plan.

Although Stilwell soon got his wish, he was appointed chief of staff of the China Theater and commanded the troops entering Burma (Fifth and Sixth Army). Chiang Kai-shek also told Stilwell that he had ordered his soldiers to listen only to Stilwell. Powerful command.

However, according to some American scholars, Chiang Kai-shek's command of the Chinese army changed several times. At first, it was "given to Stilwell, then taken back, and then given to him again."

On the issue of Burma's defense, Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell had even greater differences.

In Stilwell’s view, the war in Burma was not only to achieve the important military goal of preserving Burma and keeping China’s external channels open, but also to maintain China’s confidence in the war of resistance.

Stilwell's plan was that if Rangoon fell (the Japanese army attacked Rangoon on March 7, the day he formulated the plan), he planned to use the Chinese army and the British army to launch a powerful counterattack to recapture Rangoon. . If the counterattack fails, the Allied forces will retreat to the highlands east of Mandalay , posing a threat to the Japanese flanks advancing north and controlling the upper Burma area.

html In the conversation between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek on the 210th, Stilwell said that Burma was more important to China than to Britain, because Britain only defended Burma to defend India, but if China lost Burma, it would be cut off. lines of communication with the outside world.

Chiang Kai-shek believed that the Chinese Fifth Army and the Sixth Army "the purpose of entering Myanmar was to defend Yangon. Now that Yangon has been lost, the purpose of our army's entry into Myanmar no longer exists."

He was worried that the enemy might take advantage of China's entry into Myanmar and attack Yunnan from Vietnam . "If this move succeeds, Yunnan Province will be in dire straits and the overall situation will be unimaginable. Therefore, the troops will be transferred back to Myanmar to consolidate the defense of Yunnan Province and the Yangtze River Basin. This is indeed a matter of due consideration.”

If it is necessary to stay in Myanmar, it is to regain Yangon, which is beyond the capabilities of the Chinese army. Moreover, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly emphasized that the Fifth Army and the Sixth Army were China's elite troops and could only win but not lose.

It can be seen that Stilwell was bent on holding Burma and preserving a channel between China and the outside world; while Chiang Kai-shek had no intention of fighting anymore after the fall of Yangon and hoped to retain his elite troops and return to defend his homeland.

Due to the constant disputes between the allies on the issue of defending Myanmar, the Allies struggled in command and tactical coordination during the defense battle in northern Myanmar. March 11, Stilwell entered Burma to command operations. During this period, Stilwell and Chiang Kai-shek continued to have disputes, and the Chinese army and the British army accused each other.

The disastrous consequences of

In this case, the Burma Defense War that began in March 1942 was almost catastrophic. The disorganized, defeatist British troops and the Chinese troops with failed command were no match for the well-equipped, well-trained Japanese troops with clear goals.

The rare success was on April 16. At that time, the British troops stationed in Burma were besieged by enemy forces on the west route in the area north of Yan'an Qiang . The Chinese army rushed to the rescue and rescued the British troops including the British commander General Alexander. There are 7,000 soldiers and more than 5,000 American missionaries and journalists.

This was the fiercest battle in the Burma Campaign, showing that Stilwell always believed that the Chinese army can perform well as long as it has strong and resolute leadership.

Although the Chinese army lost a lot of cars, mortars , field guns and anti-aircraft guns , with 20% casualties, their heroic combat not only saved the First Division of the Burmese Army, but also saved its east side. The Seventeenth Indian Division.

Another highlight worth mentioning was the outstanding performance of the American Volunteer Air Corps led by Chennault. According to April statistics, the American Volunteer Air Force fought fiercely with enemy aircraft over Myanmar and destroyed 33 Japanese aircraft. Another 10 Japanese aircraft may have been destroyed. The American Volunteer Air Force only lost one aircraft and nine were damaged. During the artillery attack, one pilot was injured.

But all these cannot restore the decline of the entire battlefield.

On April 29, the Japanese army on the east route captured Lashio, cut off the Burma Highway, and captured the place on May 8. At the same time, the Japanese army on the west route invaded the northern border of Myanmar and India.

The Chinese army braved the heavy rain, crossed the deep mountains and dense forests, and broke through the Japanese interception. After going through untold hardships, some of them retreated to Yunnan Province, and some of them retreated to India under the leadership of Stilwell.

A greater crisis

The failure of the Burma Campaign had a great impact on Sino-US relations in 1942. It not only caused resentment between Shi and Chiang Kai-shek, but also made Chiang Kai-shek's counterattack in Burma, Stilwell's command and cooperation with the British full of difficulties. The resistance, and more importantly, it highlighted the urgency and difficulty of "keeping China in the war". The dispute between China and the United States on how to reverse the crisis continued to ferment and escalate, and finally became the first issue in Sino-US relations. crisis.

After the fall of Burma, China not only had its land and sea transportation with the outside world cut off, but also faced the military threat of a large-scale Japanese attack on southwest China. In the capital Chongqing, the belief that had always supported the Kuomintang's resistance seemed to be shaken.

Soong Meiling wrote to Curie , director of the Lend-Lease Materials Administration, on May 23, saying that China's morale "has never been as low as it is now" and the chairman of the Generalissimo also felt pessimistic "for the first time".

html On May 27, Chiang Kai-shek pointed out in a letter to Roosevelt that after the fall of the Burma Road, Japan immediately expanded its offensive in the southern, central and northwest defense areas that were crucial to China. The situation was critical, and the United Nations was in the Pacific and Asia. The reality of the mainland's continuous setbacks and the lack of determination to counterattack is frustrating. China's war of resistance has entered a decisive stage that it has never experienced.

Magruder even believed that the Japanese army might launch an attack in Yunnan and occupy Kunming, which would cause the Chongqing government to be completely shaken. Therefore, he suggested that consideration should be given to preparing for the evacuation of US military personnel stationed in China.

Regarding the current situation in China, on May 8, Ambassador Goss sent two telegrams to Secretary of State Hull, analyzing the repercussions of the fall of Burma and the current unfavorable military situation in China.

Gauss believes that the United States should respond calmly.

In his opinion, the Japanese army will not launch a major offensive against Kunming immediately; Chiang Kai-shek will continue to resist; no one can defeat Chiang Kai-shek to make peace with the Japanese; Chiang Kai-shek is still the relying force for the allies to finally defeat the Japanese.

Therefore, the United States must stabilize its position in China. "As long as the Chongqing government continues to exist and continues to implement the anti-Japanese policy, it cannot take any measures that cause the Chinese people to lack confidence." Hull and Marshall agreed with Gauss's judgment.

html On May 9, Marshall issued instructions to the U.S. military delegation in China, ordering all U.S. military officers stationed in China to "continue to remain calm and optimistic about China's future." People feel that the United States believes that "the situation is hopeless" and the movement of personnel must be strictly restricted to avoid being mistakenly thought that the Americans are retreating.

It can be seen that after the fall of Myanmar, maintaining China's continued resistance to war became the central issue of the United States' China policy.

The Asia strategy that the United States can envision under the strategy of Europe first, Asia second, is to support China in continuing to fight Japan in order to contain the Japanese army to the maximum extent, and provide bases for air strikes on Japanese sea routes and bombing of Japan's mainland for the final counterattack.

Due to the fall of Myanmar, all available land and sea channels that can transport personnel, weapons, and supplies into China have been cut off. The only way for China to obtain any assistance from the outside is through "hump" air transport. This route over the roof of the world is the most dangerous transportation line in the world.

Air transport is carried out at an altitude of more than 7,000 meters. The weather conditions are harsh (the rainy season in the tropics and the ice and snow on the roof of the world). The aircraft may also be attacked by the Japanese army. In addition, the available transport aircraft are limited. At the beginning, the monthly air transportation of supplies was not enough A few dozen tons is really a drop in the bucket for such a vast Chinese battlefield.

Roosevelt was extremely worried about China's withdrawal from the war and always insisted on cheering Chiang Kai-shek up.

On April 28, Roosevelt once again issued a public statement saying:

"Japan may cut off the road to Burma, but I want to tell the brave Chinese people that no matter what kind of attack Japan takes, we will always find a way to deliver aircraft to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek's army. With arms and ammunition."

html On May 5, he asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Arnold, to "study all possible ways" to airlift supplies to China because "no matter how difficult it is, we must keep the routes open."

In response to the difficult situation of China's battlefield being isolated from the outside world, the U.S. Department of the Army's Operations Division submitted an important document titled "Keeping China at War" to Marshall on May 26.

The Operations Department analyzed the situation on the Chinese battlefield and believed that air transport could not provide sufficient supplies to China. "It is extremely important to restart the transportation of arms to China via Yangon." "If no measures are taken to reopen the land route to China, channel, the U.S. commitment to aid China would be meaningless," and the policy of "keeping China in the war" would be difficult to achieve.

Marshall recommended that Stilwell be put in charge of the Burma counteroffensive, which was approved by the president.

Stilwell's transformation

Stilwell's first consideration was for the United States to directly send ground troops to relieve the siege of China.

In a telegram sent to the War Department on May 25, he reiterated his original request, hoping to send one or two American divisions for allied military operations in the South China Sea . If American combat troops were sent to India, he planned to add these American troops to the retrained and equipped Chinese troops who had fought in Burma, use this army to retake Burma, drive the Japanese out of Thailand, and then Invading the triangle area of ​​ Hanoi -Hainan-Guangdong from China.

However, under the strategy of Europe first and Asia second, Marshall wanted to open a second battlefield in Europe and had no intention of transferring any troops to the Asian battlefield. Therefore, Marshall only agreed to reassign the Tenth Air Force to Stilwell's command.

Training, equipping, and reforming the Chinese military are Stilwell’s fundamental solution to China’s predicament. In Stilwell's view, China's existing political and military organization is in fact hopeless. Military victory can only be achieved by relying on a group of Chinese soldiers who have been retrained, equipped and commanded in the "New Army" .

Stilwell planned to form two new armies.A force was established in India, consisting of the remnants of the Chinese army which he had led in retreat from Burma, and was supplemented by new recruits. Another larger corps of 30 divisions will be mobilized in western Yunnan Province, China. These two corps will be commanded by Chinese officers themselves under the guidance of the Americans. After being retrained and equipped, they will leave Burma and reopen the land route to China with the assistance of the British army.

Based on the above assumptions, Stilwell proposed a plan to transform the Chinese army on May 26. The key points are:

1. Streamline and integrate the establishment of each division to make its strength substantial and balanced, and evenly distribute weapons and equipment;

2 .Resolutely eliminate incompetent senior officers;

3. Choose a commander with full power and unrestricted authority to overall direct future military operations, etc.

If this plan is implemented, it will definitely disrupt the long-established factions of the Kuomintang army. Not only will it encounter desperate resistance from these factions, but it may also fundamentally touch the foundation of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Chiang Kai-shek's lukewarm reaction to this is understandable.

After reading Stilwell's report, Soong Meiling's evaluation was that it did not go beyond the previous suggestions made by German consultants. She said in a meeting 20 days later that the radical reform plan suggested by Stilwell was not feasible. "If the head is chopped off, nothing else will be left."

From May 26 to August 1, Stilwell also proposed many similar plans, as many as 13 memos, 10 of which did not receive any reply. But in order to appease the United States, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to train a small Chinese armed force in India.

(End of text)

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Therefore, the United States must stabilize its position in China. "As long as the Chongqing government continues to exist and continues to implement the anti-Japanese policy, it cannot take any measures that cause the Chinese people to lack confidence." Hull and Marshall agreed with Gauss's judgment.

html On May 9, Marshall issued instructions to the U.S. military delegation in China, ordering all U.S. military officers stationed in China to "continue to remain calm and optimistic about China's future." People feel that the United States believes that "the situation is hopeless" and the movement of personnel must be strictly restricted to avoid being mistakenly thought that the Americans are retreating.

It can be seen that after the fall of Myanmar, maintaining China's continued resistance to war became the central issue of the United States' China policy.

The Asia strategy that the United States can envision under the strategy of Europe first, Asia second, is to support China in continuing to fight Japan in order to contain the Japanese army to the maximum extent, and provide bases for air strikes on Japanese sea routes and bombing of Japan's mainland for the final counterattack.

Due to the fall of Myanmar, all available land and sea channels that can transport personnel, weapons, and supplies into China have been cut off. The only way for China to obtain any assistance from the outside is through "hump" air transport. This route over the roof of the world is the most dangerous transportation line in the world.

Air transport is carried out at an altitude of more than 7,000 meters. The weather conditions are harsh (the rainy season in the tropics and the ice and snow on the roof of the world). The aircraft may also be attacked by the Japanese army. In addition, the available transport aircraft are limited. At the beginning, the monthly air transportation of supplies was not enough A few dozen tons is really a drop in the bucket for such a vast Chinese battlefield.

Roosevelt was extremely worried about China's withdrawal from the war and always insisted on cheering Chiang Kai-shek up.

On April 28, Roosevelt once again issued a public statement saying:

"Japan may cut off the road to Burma, but I want to tell the brave Chinese people that no matter what kind of attack Japan takes, we will always find a way to deliver aircraft to Chairman Chiang Kai-shek's army. With arms and ammunition."

html On May 5, he asked the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Arnold, to "study all possible ways" to airlift supplies to China because "no matter how difficult it is, we must keep the routes open."

In response to the difficult situation of China's battlefield being isolated from the outside world, the U.S. Department of the Army's Operations Division submitted an important document titled "Keeping China at War" to Marshall on May 26.

The Operations Department analyzed the situation on the Chinese battlefield and believed that air transport could not provide sufficient supplies to China. "It is extremely important to restart the transportation of arms to China via Yangon." "If no measures are taken to reopen the land route to China, channel, the U.S. commitment to aid China would be meaningless," and the policy of "keeping China in the war" would be difficult to achieve.

Marshall recommended that Stilwell be put in charge of the Burma counteroffensive, which was approved by the president.

Stilwell's transformation

Stilwell's first consideration was for the United States to directly send ground troops to relieve the siege of China.

In a telegram sent to the War Department on May 25, he reiterated his original request, hoping to send one or two American divisions for allied military operations in the South China Sea . If American combat troops were sent to India, he planned to add these American troops to the retrained and equipped Chinese troops who had fought in Burma, use this army to retake Burma, drive the Japanese out of Thailand, and then Invading the triangle area of ​​ Hanoi -Hainan-Guangdong from China.

However, under the strategy of Europe first and Asia second, Marshall wanted to open a second battlefield in Europe and had no intention of transferring any troops to the Asian battlefield. Therefore, Marshall only agreed to reassign the Tenth Air Force to Stilwell's command.

Training, equipping, and reforming the Chinese military are Stilwell’s fundamental solution to China’s predicament. In Stilwell's view, China's existing political and military organization is in fact hopeless. Military victory can only be achieved by relying on a group of Chinese soldiers who have been retrained, equipped and commanded in the "New Army" .

Stilwell planned to form two new armies.A force was established in India, consisting of the remnants of the Chinese army which he had led in retreat from Burma, and was supplemented by new recruits. Another larger corps of 30 divisions will be mobilized in western Yunnan Province, China. These two corps will be commanded by Chinese officers themselves under the guidance of the Americans. After being retrained and equipped, they will leave Burma and reopen the land route to China with the assistance of the British army.

Based on the above assumptions, Stilwell proposed a plan to transform the Chinese army on May 26. The key points are:

1. Streamline and integrate the establishment of each division to make its strength substantial and balanced, and evenly distribute weapons and equipment;

2 .Resolutely eliminate incompetent senior officers;

3. Choose a commander with full power and unrestricted authority to overall direct future military operations, etc.

If this plan is implemented, it will definitely disrupt the long-established factions of the Kuomintang army. Not only will it encounter desperate resistance from these factions, but it may also fundamentally touch the foundation of Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Chiang Kai-shek's lukewarm reaction to this is understandable.

After reading Stilwell's report, Soong Meiling's evaluation was that it did not go beyond the previous suggestions made by German consultants. She said in a meeting 20 days later that the radical reform plan suggested by Stilwell was not feasible. "If the head is chopped off, nothing else will be left."

From May 26 to August 1, Stilwell also proposed many similar plans, as many as 13 memos, 10 of which did not receive any reply. But in order to appease the United States, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to train a small Chinese armed force in India.

(End of text)

If you have other topics or opinions about the field of history, you can [Follow] me for a private chat, or you can leave a message in the comment area below and I will reply as soon as possible.