On August 8, 2008, the Russian army deployed elite combat troops to launch a large-scale attack on Georgia. The main force of the Russian army participating in the war was the Russian 58th Army, and its opponent was the Georgian army supported by the United States and NATO. After less than a week of fierce fighting, on August 13, 2008, the Russian government and the Georgian authorities reached a ceasefire. On August 18, the Russian army withdrew its troops from the combat area.
The Russo-Georgian War was an information-based joint operation of various services and arms in the 21st century that can be called a "textbook combat". The strong strength of the Russian army in the Russo-Georgian War is worthy of praise. Its performance is no less than that of the US military during the 1991 Gulf War. According to official battle reports, 74 Russian soldiers died, 171 were injured, and 19 were missing. However, the Russian army annihilated more than 1,600 Georgian troops, which dealt a heavy blow to the arrogance of the Georgian army.
So, why was the Russian army able to achieve a brilliant victory over the Georgian army supported by the United States and NATO in less than a week with only one army group, the 58th Army?
Picture above_ Georgia and Russia
First, Georgia was overconfident and hastily started the war, underestimating Russia's determination to counterattack and its war potential, which paved the way for the failure of the Georgian army.
The total strength of the Georgian army is more than 21,000, of which the total strength of the army is more than 17,000. The United States conducted rigorous training for the Georgian army before the war, which improved the combat effectiveness of the Georgian army to a certain extent. Coupled with the fact that the Georgian army is equipped with modern weapons such as T72 tanks , BMP1/2 infantry fighting vehicles, Dana self-propelled artillery and Su-25 attack aircraft, the Georgian army dared to attack the local army in South Ossetia. In the early days of the war, the Georgian army's offensive was quite smooth. It took only 13 hours to occupy Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and killed many officers and soldiers of the Russian peacekeeping force. The offensive arrogance reached its peak.
However, the victory in the early stages of the war does not mean that the Georgian army will win the entire war. Since the Georgian army's attack on South Ossetia directly touched Russia's national interests, the then Russian President Medvedev quickly convened an emergency meeting to make the decision to send troops to counterattack. The Russian 58th Group Army was dispatched to the war zone in an organized form. Hundreds of Russian Air Force fighter jets, bombers, and attack aircraft took off in an organized form to bomb the front and rear of the Georgian army. Georgia thinks that it has the support of the United States and believes that Russia does not dare to attack Georgian troops in South Ossetia. However, the judgment of the Georgian authorities was in complete contrast with the Russian army's counterattack after the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war. The Russian army not only counterattacked, but also defeated the Georgian army and returned with a disastrous defeat.
From a historical perspective, Germany during World War II was defeated in the Defense of Moscow because of neglecting the war potential of the Soviet Union, and was unable to make a comeback after the Battle of Stalingrad. Georgia, like Germany in World War II, ignored the war potential of Russia, the successor of the Soviet Union, and did not believe that the Russian army would send large-scale troops to counterattack the Georgian army. Its defeat will inevitably follow the old path of Germany in World War II.
Above picture_ Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev
Second, the Russian 58th Army was fully prepared and responded quickly, fully reflecting the results of Russia's military reform. The 58th Group Army's quick response and rapid participation in the battle became an important reason for the Russian army to quickly defeat the Georgian army.
htmlOn August 8, the then Russian President Medvedev made a major decision: to send troops to South Ossetia to defeat the Georgian army. After the president issued the combat order, the 58th Army responded quickly. Let’s take a look at the reaction speed of the Russian 58th Group Army through a timetable:
html At around 15:00 on August 8, Russian President Medvedev summoned to make a decision to send troops.
html At 115:20, the armored transport convoy of the Russian army's leading troops entered South Ossetia.
5:50, the Russian armored force entered Tskhinvali.
7:20, the main force of the Russian 58th Army rushed to Tskhinvali to support the Russian peacekeeping troops stationed here.
From 15:20 to 17:20, in 2 hours, the Russian 58th Army fully entered Tskhinvali, gaining valuable time for the Russian army to win the next battle. The high speed of soldiers is very obvious here in the Russian 58th Army.
According to subsequent statistics, the Russian 58th Army completed various preliminary combat tasks within 2 hours and 20 minutes after receiving the presidential order, including the supply of ammunition and logistics, and the army’s cross-border operations.
And the rapid actions of the Russian 58th Group Army are inseparable from President Putin President's military reforms. In 2005, the Russian military launched a new combat plan to achieve the control of military leaders and the president on theater troops in various emergencies. Dispatch and ensure that the unified command orders for the troops in the theater to participate in the war are prohibited. The formulation of the Russian army's combat plan is detailed down to how company-level combat units will act. From high-level to company-level combat units at the grassroots level, the Russian army has formulated a unified and correspondingly hierarchical military action plan, laying a solid foundation for the Russian army's rapid response.
Picture above_ Russia, Georgia, South Ossetia
Ironically, Georgia has "unfair intentions" towards South Ossetia, and the Russian army's exercises are aimed at the Georgian army's "unreasonable intentions". In 2008, troops of the Russian North Caucasus Military District held military exercises, and the imaginary enemy in the exercise was the provocation of the Georgian army. The exercise subjects include rapid counterattack, urban combat and other subjects, and the Georgian army's all-out attack happens to be within the Russian army's exercise subjects. Hesperling, an American military expert, said that the Russian military exercises are like a dress rehearsal for the Russia-Georgia war. This fully shows that the Russian army has been prepared for the provocation against Georgia, not only in terms of military reform, but also in preparation for military exercises and training. The entire operation was carried out in accordance with the established plan of the Russian army's exercise, and the Russian army knew exactly how to deal with the Georgian army's attack.
The 58th Army of the Russian Army has rich war experience and participated in the Chechen War. It has the 42nd Motorized Infantry Division, the 40th Motorized Infantry Division, the 131st Motorized Infantry Brigade, the 33rd Independent Mountain Infantry Brigade, the 34th Independent Mountain Infantry Brigade and other units (established in 2007). In terms of organization, the The 58th Group Army has both motorized infantry divisions suitable for urban offensives and infantry brigades suitable for mountain warfare, and can carry out diversified combat missions. It is a powerful force in the Russian army that cannot be underestimated.
Picture above_ Chechen War
Third, the Russian 58th Group Army's urban offensive has made great progress compared with the Chechen War.
During the Chechen War, the Russian army was in a "precarious state" after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The new recruits lacked combat experience, coupled with the underestimation of the enemy and problems with the coordination of various services and arms, etc., which resulted in the Russian army paying a heavy price for its attack on Grozny. In the urban battle in South Ossetia , the Russian army's offensive operations appeared extremely mature.
After encircling the outer area of Tskhinvali, the 58th Army, which was responsible for the frontal attack, launched a large-scale attack from the north, east and west. Russian Su-25 and Su-24 aircraft violently bombarded the Georgian army positions. The artillery of the 58th Group Army opened fire quickly, covering the Georgian army positions with artillery fire. Through firepower consumption and suppression, the Russian infantry, with the cooperation of T72 tanks, launched a city assault battle. The entire city assault battle was fought with ease, and the cooperation between infantry and tanks reached a level of proficiency. Tanks provide fire support to infantry and eliminate enemy fire points. The infantry uses melee weapons to cover the tanks and prevent the enemy from blowing up the tanks. With the support of this perfect infant-tank coordinated combat tactic, the Russian army fought very smoothly in the city offensive. In just one day, the Russian army captured most of Tskhinvali.
In addition to sending its main force to fight street battles with the Georgian army in Tskhinvali, part of the Russian army also cooperated with the main offensive force participating in the urban battle to attack the eastern suburbs of Gori, cutting off the east-west highway in Georgia and cutting off Georgia's The main highway was cut in half, cutting off the support road for the Georgian army. This move by the Russian army also further threatens Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.
Above picture_ The Georgian self-propelled artillery Dana in the Russian-Georgian conflict
Fourth, The Russian Air Force killed the chicken with a knife and staged a perfect air raid. The Russian cyber warfare team used hacker attacks to attack the computers of the Georgian central government, giving the Russia-Georgia war a strong color of information warfare.
The Russian Air Force dispatched the 4th Air Force Army in the North Caucasus region and dispatched more than 200 combat aircraft of various types to carry out large-scale bombing of targets in Georgia. The models of the Russian army participating in the war include the Tu-22M bomber , the Su-24 fighter-bomber and the Su-25 attack aircraft, and the Su-27 fighter . These were the main models of the Russian Air Force at the time.
The 4th Air Force Army has 459 aircraft. The more than 200 aircraft dispatched by the Russian army account for 50% of the total number of aircraft in the 4th Air Force Army. At the beginning of the war, the Russian army seized air superiority over Georgia and launched large-scale bombings of important military targets such as radar stations, airport runways, bridges and ports in Georgia. The Russian army fired too many precision-guided munitions, resulting in fewer casualties among Georgian civilians and gaining the initiative in public opinion.
Before the Russian-Georgian war broke out, the Russian cyber warfare team attacked computers in Georgia. After the outbreak of the Russia-Georgia war, computers in Georgia were once again attacked by the Russian army. Media and social networking sites were attacked by the Russian army's hacker force , which directly affected Georgia's war mobilization capabilities.
The participation of the 4th Air Force Group Army in the war proves that the Air Force plays a role in reversing the war situation in high-tech information warfare. It is of great significance to weaken the enemy's war potential, shorten the war time and reduce the casualties of our own troops.
Picture above_ Russian tank troops in the Russo-Georgian War
Fifth, the Russian navy and airborne troops cooperated closely to implement operations in other directions and cooperated with the 58th Army of the Army.
The Russian navy imposed a blockade on Georgian waters, cutting off Western military assistance to Georgia. On August 10, the Russian navy sank a Georgian missile boat.
The Russian 74th Airborne Division gave full play to the sharp role of the airborne troops and surrounded more than 1,000 people from the Georgian Special Operations Brigade in the Kodori Canyon area. After fierce fighting, the 74th Airborne Division drove the Georgian army out of the Kodori Gorge. This prevents the Georgian army in Abkhazia from supporting the Georgian army in South Ossetia, which helps support the operations of the Russian 58th Group Army.
Picture above_ The destroyed Georgian T-72S tank
In short, the Russian army sent a group army to achieve the effect of defeating Georgia within a week. This is inseparable from the professional and skillful fighting and the spirit of unafraid of sacrifice of the officers and soldiers of the 58th Group. It would also be inseparable from the cooperation of the Russian Air Force, Navy Black Sea Fleet and the officers and soldiers of the 74th Airborne Division.
The victory of the Russian army in the Russo-Georgian War fully proved that information warfare is a war in which the army responds quickly and attacks quickly, and it is also an action in which the navy, air force, rocket force and network warfare forces cooperate with each other and conduct joint operations. The air force and cyber warfare forces are of extremely important value in information warfare, and the performance of the Russian air force and cyber warfare forces proves this value.
Author: Sun Yi Correction/editing: Lilith
Reference:
[1] "The Russo-Georgian War that Kills Chickens with a Bull's Sword" "China National Defense News" December 12, 2019
[2] "Heavy Review of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War: The Russian military issue is worthy of China’s deep thought." "Liberation Army Daily" August 8, 2014
The text was created by the team of the University of History, and the illustrations are from the Internet. The copyright belongs to the original author
