[Editor's note] This article is authorized by the author Yin Shuaijun . "Qin'an Strategy" is exclusively published on the Toutiao platform. It is reprinted from the public account "Yin Shuaijun". There are many exciting contents. Welcome to pay attention.
In recent days, the most exciting thing for military fans is undoubtedly the launch of the No. 03 aircraft carrier Fujian. Not only military fans are paying attention to this matter, but many people who care about national affairs are also discussing it.
Today we talk about some things related to the No. 03 aircraft carrier and the US Navy. Let’s talk about the United States, which has been the only one in the world for more than 30 years. How has it developed in the past 30 years?
At the same time, we also want to talk about the imperial problems of the US military and the US Navy. Can the US military continue to maintain a global naval force that dominates the world?
Contents
1. The first stage of the absolute superiority of the U.S. Navy, the dividends of the Cold War , the foundation of the Reagan administration
2. The second stage of the absolute superiority of the U.S. Navy, strategic ambiguity and development stagnation, the decline of the shipbuilding industry
3. The situation in chaos The development of the U.S. Navy
4. Ambitious plans and the water content of the U.S. Navy’s total tonnage
5. Possible options beyond the dilemma - the transition from all-sided attack to strategic defense
6. The U.S. Navy will try its best to avoid war and war during the adjustment period China's direct military conflict
7. Strategic deception and strategic adjustment. The U.S. Navy needs a period of strategic stability to make internal adjustments
1. The first stage of the U.S. Navy's absolute superiority, the dividends of the Cold War, the foundation of the Reagan administration
1991~1999, this is A period when the U.S. naval power and even the country's overall strength are at an absolute advantage. The strength of the U.S. Navy can be said to be unparalleled in the world. At that time, the US military could fight whoever it wanted. Without saying anything, the fight started.
However, this is not actually a sudden explosion of US military strength, but mainly due to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the Soviet navy power.
With the loss of reciprocal checks and balances, the US military is alone in the world. The U.S. Navy, which has lost its rivals, controls the world's major maritime economic waterways.
In addition, we need to note that the advanced ships of the U.S. Navy during this period were mainly derived from the naval shipbuilding plan to fight the Soviet Union from 1980 to 1992. The main implementer of
was the Reagan administration. That is the actor-turned-President Ronald Reagan. But this actor is better than Zelensky in Ukraine . Although they are both actors, they are all directed by forces behind the scenes.
The naval shipbuilding plan was supported by the U.S. economic and manufacturing base at that time. The shipbuilding plan launched at this stage has actually supported the United States' main combat force since the end of the Cold War to the present.
The Nimitz-class aircraft carriers
were originally planned to be built in the first batch of 3 ships. The Reagan administration's 1980 shipbuilding plan continued to build them.
The actual large-scale manufacturing time was 1980, and the main shipbuilding plan was completed in 1992.
Ticongadro-class theater air defense cruiser
A shipbuilding plan formulated by the Reagan administration in 1980 and construction began in the same year.
was manufactured on a large scale in 1980, and the main shipbuilding plan was completed in 1992.
Arleigh Burke I-class comprehensive destroyer
The shipbuilding plan formulated by the Reagan administration in 1980 and construction began in 1989.
was built at the end of 1989, and the first batch of shipbuilding plans was completed in 1997.
Los Angeles-class attack nuclear submarines
were originally planned to serve in small batches. The Reagan administration's shipbuilding plan in 1980 decided to continue construction on a large scale.
The 1980 shipbuilding plan decided to continue to increase construction, and the entire shipbuilding plan was completed in 1996.
In other words, the U.S. Navy from 1991 to 1999 completely accepted the legacy of the naval shipbuilding plan implemented during the Reagan administration.This batch of naval ships is not only large in tonnage and advanced in performance, but also in a state of just service, which is the most intact period.
But we also have to see the other side of the coin. Because it lost its corresponding opponents, the subsequent US government did not formulate a huge naval shipbuilding plan like the Reagan period.
The U.S. Navy, which lost its strategic rival, did not consider subsequent development despite gaining a comprehensive advantage. This created a transitional vacuum in its strategic planning.
All advanced equipment and weapons will become aging and relatively backward as time goes by, and in the following time, there will be a series of changes.
2. The second stage of the U.S. Navy’s absolute superiority, strategic ambiguity, stagnant development, and the decline of the shipbuilding industry
If 1991~1999 is regarded as the first stage of the U.S. Navy’s absolute advantage, then 2000~2013 is regarded as the second stage.
Although during this period, the various types of warships received by the U.S. Navy in the 1980s and 1990s are still in service, and the subsequent construction projects and plans of the Arabian K-II destroyers and Virginia-class nuclear submarines are still underway.
However, compared with the peak of shipbuilding in the Cold War, the US military has added 50 Arleigh Burke II destroyers and their improved versions and 16 Virginia-class attack nuclear submarines in these fourteen years; but at the same time, in these fourteen years, the US military has However, it has retired a large number of ships that were in overdue service during the Cold War period, that is, in the 1960s and 1970s. The number of new combat ships received year-on-year is far less than the number of retired naval vacancies.
This is due to the fact that the U.S. Navy has almost absolute superiority in the world, is invincible, and lacks opponents, resulting in a lack of motivation for subsequent construction plans.
However, the deeper reason is that due to the financial crisis that swept the United States in 2008, the U.S. economy experienced a severe recession, which led to repeated cuts in original U.S. Navy orders.
The economic recession has seriously affected the shipbuilding foundation on which the U.S. Navy relies, and privatized shipbuilding and dockyard factories have been severely affected. In the context of a lack of sufficient commercial orders, a relatively small number of military shipbuilding orders alone cannot sustain the company's peak operations.
American shipbuilding companies were forced to lay off a large number of employees, close and dismantle a large number of shipyards during the peak of the Cold War. The construction of new ships and the maintenance and renovation of old ships require dock berths. Without adequate dockyards, it becomes difficult to build new ships and maintain old ones. At the same time, supporting industries and manufacturing companies have withdrawn from the United States in large numbers, which has repeatedly increased the cost and cost of ship manufacturing.
For example, the cost of ships of the same level between China and the United States has maintained a gap of 3 to 5 times for a long time.
Let’s think about it, is there such a big price gap between mobile phones and cars of the same level between China and the United States? Why is there no such price difference for cars, but such a high price difference for Chinese and American warships?
Under the high cost pressure, the navy's follow-up replacement ships in the original plan have been continuously deleted, and the original ship maintenance and upkeep has also been continuously reduced at the same time.
For example, the key equipment of the shipbuilding plan during the Reagan administration, The Nimitz aircraft carrier and the Ticongardro-class cruiser only underwent a small amount of overhaul, and were not even modified or upgraded.
The Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is the core of the U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier battle group. The first ship, the USS Nimitz, entered service in the early 1970s and is currently nearly 50 years old. At the end of the Cold War, the ship was still able to receive a good maintenance and upgrade plan. However, after the end of the Cold War, especially in the 21st century, with the severe recession of the U.S. economy and manufacturing industry, the ship was not effectively maintained. It only received an overhaul and upgrade due to policy adjustments during the Obama administration. However, this This kind of maintenance and upgrade of infrastructure alone cannot change the fact that its hull and power structure are seriously aging.
In addition, the Ford-class aircraft carrier and Zumwalt-class destroyer that were launched in the early 21st century, their more than ten years of construction period and numerous failures can also indirectly reflect this. The lack of effective US military main ships Maintenance and equipment upgrades.
What determines the strength of the U.S. Navy is not the number of naval ships, but the shipyard manufacturing, maintenance and upgrade capabilities behind it. Changes in the comparison between ship size and shipyard manufacturing capabilities and maintenance support capabilities reflect the changing trend of the United States' comprehensive national power.
3. The development of the U.S. Navy in chaos
When the time entered the Trump administration and the Biden administration, the above problems became more prominent.
Because the number of shipyards in the United States is limited, whether to use existing shipyards to build new ships or to renovate and maintain old ships has become an extremely difficult decision. Not only is it difficult to have both, it even becomes difficult to achieve both!
On the one hand, most of the naval ships accumulated by the U.S. Navy at the end of the Cold War are more than thirty years old, and half of the ships have exceeded their original design life. The resource and capital costs of upgrade and maintenance are huge. These ships that have exceeded their design life are faced with the choice of either decommissioning or maintaining and updating them. To maintain and renovate, dock berths are needed. And the United States does not have enough shipyards.
Let’s compare the design life of each ship:
The design life of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier is 45 years; the first one has been in service for 47 years. Both the first and second batches have been in service for more than 30 years, and the relatively young third batch was mostly completed in the 1990s.
The design life of the Arleigh Burke I/IA/II destroyers is 35 years; the service life of the Arleigh Burke IIA is 40 years; they have basically been in service for more than 30 years, and their combat hulls and electronic equipment have been seriously aged. , and lacks upgrade protection and maintenance. Currently, it is basically parked in the port, and the hull condition is worrying. However, as the quantitative guarantee of the U.S. Navy's strength, it is still in service overdue.
The Ticongardro-class theater air defense cruiser has a design life of 35 years; its current service life has exceeded thirty years.
A large number of these ships have expired. With the rapid development of equipment technology and military means, the original advanced technical level and combat means will also be worn away as time goes by.
With so many old ships, maintaining and refurbishing them has become a big problem.
On the other hand, in order to maintain the profits of shipbuilding companies, the U.S. government tends to compromise with the private enterprise Group, ordering new naval ships to stimulate the industry, hoping that high-value military orders will stimulate manufacturing companies. , causing the original supporting manufacturing industry to return to the local area. However, the construction time and quantity of new ships are far from meeting the needs of the US military's huge fleet.
Under the above-mentioned dual pressure, the development of the U.S. Navy became a chaos of difficult choices. The quantity and quality of large ships are difficult to guarantee.
4. Ambitious plans and the total tonnage of the U.S. Navy
The U.S. military has proposed many advanced and fancy concepts, such as global strike, conquering the world in one hour, etc.
However, no matter how novel the concept is, no matter how each U.S. president writes his naval development plan, one must face the most basic fact:
The U.S. Navy’s new warships have not been able to enter service and have combat effectiveness. The construction cycle of ships has become extremely long; and the number of domestic shipyard berths in the United States has shrunk significantly.
This is why many seemingly advanced concepts and ambitious plans of the US military have almost remained on paper designs in the past ten years or so, but cannot be truly implemented.
Under the current situation, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. think tank place too much emphasis on future naval technology concepts and technical features, and its symbolic significance is often greater than its actual significance.Until the contradiction between actual combat power and the foundation of national power cannot be resolved, any seemingly advanced technological concepts and changes in military combat methods will have no practical significance.
’s excessive emphasis and publicity on this signal is most likely just a strategic smoke that acts as a psychological deterrent, creating the illusion that the United States’ military strength is overwhelming.
Many people believe that American think tanks and American officials have scientific basis for making plans. But in fact, many reports from American think tanks are just rhetoric, without scientific and technological foundations, and are divorced from the true strength of the U.S. Navy.
It’s not their fault. They need to maintain this on-paper deterrence, on-paper intimidation.
But if this kind of deterrence on paper is to be implemented globally, this is an extremely difficult problem for the empire to solve.
Politically and diplomatically, the United States must maintain a fleet whose total tonnage far exceeds that of other countries. However, if the actual situation of the Navy is followed and the ships that have overdue service are cut and dismantled, the total tonnage of the U.S. Navy will rapidly drop by more than half. This will cause the US military to lose its original deterrence and influence. Therefore, the U.S. Navy must maintain a fairly large total naval tonnage on paper.
At the same time, the existing limited number of naval maintenance dock manufacturing resources will never be used in large quantities for the maintenance and upgrade of old warships, because ships that have been in service for a long time have lost the value of upgrades. Ship maintenance will only focus on relatively new ships. Old ships will only exist for calculation of total tonnage deterrence, but will not receive effective resource maintenance.
5. Possible options beyond the dilemma - the transition from attacking on all sides to strategic defense
In the context of the resource allocation crisis for large surface ships in the U.S. Navy, we should not ignore another important force of the U.S. Navy, nuclear submarines .
Under the predicament of the US Navy's shrinking allocable resources, the nuclear-powered submarine force has received the most complete resource allocation.
The original Ohio-class and Los Angeles-class nuclear submarines receive resource maintenance and support all year round to maintain their combat effectiveness.
The Virginia-class attack nuclear submarine has not only completed manufacturing, but has also received the most stringent maintenance and technical upgrades.
At the same time, the new Columbia-class nuclear submarine has not only received the Navy's highest priority resource allocation, but its construction has also begun rapidly, becoming the Navy's highest priority project.
The Ohio-class
has been in service for more than 30 years. Even though it has reached its retirement age, it still receives effective maintenance and resource allocation, and its equipment has been comprehensively upgraded and modified. It can continue to serve for more than 10 years.
Los Angeles class
Most of the second batch built during the Reagan administration are still in service and have been well maintained and upgraded. They are still the backbone of the US Navy's underwater submarine force.
Virginia-class
have all been manufactured. With advanced technology and relatively new equipment integrity, resource guarantees and equipment upgrades are constantly being carried out.
Columbia-class
construction resources have received the highest priority resource allocation by the U.S. Navy. Construction has fully begun and accelerated construction
. The above situation shows that in the context of declining national power, the U.S. Navy is unable to guarantee the maintenance of surface ships and the construction speed is slow. In fact, it is following the development model of the former Soviet Navy; with limited resources, the focus of resources is gradually adjusted to focus on the construction of underwater nuclear submarines to make up for the situation faced by the current decline in national power.
In the actual confrontation between big powers, due to the reciprocal long-range precision strikes and firepower damage from both sides, large surface ships face great existential threats. The existing national strength cannot continue to build new ships and cannot maintain the effective combat power of surface ships. Under the realistic dilemma of size and scale, it has become a very correct choice in reality to concentrate on using resources to focus on building a nuclear submarine force with quantity, quality, and high combat effectiveness. The underwater stealth of nuclear submarines, the ability to launch long-distance deep strike firepower and anti-ship missiles in future naval battles, will become an extremely important component in building the actual combat capabilities of the U.S. Navy in the future.
At the same time, against the backdrop of the urgent need to replace existing large surface ships, the U.S. Navy proposed the FFG-X plan to return frigates to the U.S. Navy's order of battle. For decades before that, the U.S. Navy had no frigates. Compared with other main battleships, frigates are relatively cheap, can be built quickly in large numbers, and can be deployed quickly.
can be summarized as, under the double decline of national strength and economic strength, the US Navy will eventually further reduce the number of actual combat effectiveness of large capital ships. The force will gradually be adjusted to a naval force with nuclear submarines and surface frigates as the main modes.
This adjustment in force structure can be assessed as the U.S. Navy’s strategic offensive capabilities will continue to weaken and gradually adjust to a strategic defense posture.
6. The U.S. Navy will try its best to avoid direct military conflict with China during the adjustment period.
Behind the huge tonnage of the U.S. Navy, it is a maritime force that is strong on the outside and capable on the inside. The core combat power that can be actually used is limited to a relatively small number of main ships with the USS Reagan and USS Bush as the core.
After gradually adjusting to nuclear-powered submarines and relatively cheap frigates as the main naval force, the U.S. Navy is likely to gradually rely on the second island chain system, using the concealment of submarines based on the depth of the ocean and the complexity of natural conditions. nature and relative technological advantages to form a maritime defense zone in depth.
In this current period when the number of forces appears to be large and the actual internal resources are severely limited, the actual available mobile force of the U.S. Navy only accounts for an extremely small part of its total naval tonnage. And this actual available force is facing an increasingly large number of And in front of the well-equipped Chinese navy, it can actually only have a minimal deterrent effect. Regardless of the actual number of available troops and weapons, or the actual quality of equipment maintenance, the U.S. Navy's existing troops and weapons are facing difficulties.
The Reagan, as the actual naval strategic support of the United States overseas, cannot be easily involved in military battles between major powers. It can only take limited deterrent actions to show the military influence of the United States, and this behavior is as a political It is a statement rather than an act of military warfare. In the current actual comparison of the effectiveness of available troops and weapons, the U.S. Navy will implement political deterrence rather than military conflict against China. In hot-spot areas with high incidence of military conflicts, the U.S. Navy will try its best to avoid direct military conflicts with the Chinese navy and Chinese military forces. .
In the future, the U.S. Navy, which is constantly adjusting its force and weapon structure, will use submarines in the depths of the ocean to use the natural conditions of the deep sea as cover to form a new response method and use a unique combat method of strategic defense to offset the gradual growth of the Chinese Navy. Naval power, this unique response mode will be the strategic defense method for the US Navy to maintain its hegemonic system in the face of China's increasingly powerful military power.
7. Strategic deception and strategic adjustment. The U.S. Navy needs a period of strategic stability to make internal adjustments.
The national strength and economic conditions of the United States cannot be improved in the short term, and a large-scale economic crisis may even erupt. Against this background, the revitalization of the U.S. shipbuilding industry is also difficult to predict.
Against this background, more and more ships built in the last century will become obsolete and gradually lose their once advanced combat effectiveness.In this context, how should the U.S. Navy demonstrate its strategic deterrence and maintain its hegemony?
It is expected that the US Navy will use a small number of ships to carry out long-term patrols in intercontinental hotspots as a means of strategic cover and strategic confusion.
The military power of the United States, especially the naval power of the United States, is the foundation for the construction of American global hegemony. Its strength and decline will determine the fate of American hegemony and even its own country.
Faced with the reality that its naval strength is constantly declining, in order to cover up this actual situation, both the US government and think tanks will make the simplest response method, using a relatively small number of intact ships, in extremely small formations or even single It has continuously intervened in hot spots of international conflicts and US hegemony and security, and conducted non-combat cruises. This shows the deterrent effect of the US military power and shows to the outside world and other major powers that it is still very powerful.
The real purpose of the implementation of this strategic method is to cover up the reality that its navy is weak and weak, and to buy more strategic time for the United States itself to deal with domestic crises.
We often see this kind of situation near the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea . A single US Navy ship and aircraft appear in the nearby area. The appearance of US warships and aircraft caused major public opinion in China.
The author estimates that the Biden administration will try its best to avoid direct military conflict with China, and hopes to use strategically confusing military deterrence to buy the United States and the US military time for internal adjustments.
Because the US Navy and even the United States need a period of strategic stability to make internal adjustments.
If we say that in the past development, compared with the national power of the United States, China needs stable development time. So now, in the face of the reality of the internal hollowing out of national power and the shrinking industrial base. U.S. naval power and even U.S. military power, in turn, require a period of strategic stability for internal adjustments. This adjustment cycle may last as long as ten years.
8. Suggested countermeasures (strategies)
