On the last day of 1999, the Russian President Yeltsin suddenly announced two things to the world: one was that he decided to resign as president, and the other was that he appointed Putin to take his place. When Yeltsin stepped down, Russia's national economic life was almost completely affected by , president of United Bank, , Berezovsky, president of Bridge Bank, Gusinsky, president of International Commercial Bank Vinogradov, and Capital Savings. Smolensky, president of the bank, Friedman, president of Alpha Bank, Khodorkovsky, president of Menatep Bank, and Markin, president of Russian Credit Commercial Bank.
These seven oligarchs, together with President Chubais of Unified Power Corporation, control Russia's oil and gas, power, metallurgy, and financial industries. At the same time, the oligarchs also began to intervene in the political life of the country-in fact, even Putin's coming to power had solicited the opinions of these people in advance. The influence of these people in Russia at the time can be seen from this. After Putin came to power, in fact, he was not particularly disgusted with the oligopoly of the Russian economy. If the oligarchs can make a fortune with peace of mind, Putin will not move them.
But if someone tries to intervene in the political trend or even openly oppose Putin's policies, Putin will attack them. After some purge, Gusinski went away to Israel, Berezovsky fled to London to apply for political asylum, Khodorkovsky spent time in the prison of Siberia because of economic crimes He was sentenced to nine years in prison. Putin's actions to purge the chaebols are in sharp contrast with the South Korean chaebol group's overhead of the country's political life. Why didn't the Russian oligarch learn the methods of the South Korean chaebol to deal with Putin?
On the surface, Russian oligarchs and South Korean chaebols do have huge political and economic influence in their country.However, the origins of Russian oligarchs and South Korean chaebols are different: Russia’s oligarchy is essentially a monopoly and privileged group formed through the possession of state wealth in the late Soviet era and Yeltsin era. In 1992, Russia hurriedly launched the shock therapy to revitalize the economy under the flick of the Western countries led by the United States. However, contrary to expectations, the shock therapy almost completely shocked the Russian economy.
January 2, 1992, the first and most important step of shock therapy. The liberalization of prices began to be officially implemented: Russia has lifted 80% of wholesale prices and 90% of retail prices across the country National control. Within one month after the Yeltsin government liberalized prices, the retail prices of Russian goods increased by 3.5 times and the ex-factory prices increased by 5 times. With the advancement of market liberalization, a large-scale influx of better-quality Western products into Russia, and Russian national enterprises have been hit hard in the process.
At the same time, the restrictions on income growth have been removed: the salary of public officials has increased by 90%, the pension for retirees has been increased to 900 rubles per month, and family subsidies and unemployment benefits have also risen accordingly. The price liberalization is not without benefits: the long shopping queues are gone, the shelves are full of goods, and the Russians who are used to the long queues by ticket supply seem to see the benefits of reform. But it didn't take long for prices to soar like a kite with a broken line: the prices of consumer goods in April 1992 rose 65 times compared to December 1991.
The government originally wanted to stabilize prices through state-run stores. Unexpectedly, black market vendors and state-run store employees rushed to resell the goods for huge profits, and the market order became chaotic. Due to the premature liberalization of fuel and raw material prices, the production costs of enterprises have risen sharply. By June, the wholesale price of industrial products has increased by 14 times. Such high prices have daunted buyers. The consumer market has continued to be sluggish, and weak demand has restrained supply. Production is compressed, and market supply and demand have entered an endless loop. At this time, shock therapy took the second move: fiscal reform and large-scale privatization were carried out at the same time.
In the fiscal reform, the fiscal and monetary "double tightening" policies and price reforms were introduced almost simultaneously. However, this time the Yeltsin government miscalculated again: due to the heavy tax burden, enterprise production shrank further, the number of unemployed people increased sharply, the government had to increase relief subsidies and direct investment, and the fiscal deficit rose instead of falling. The tightening of credit has caused a serious shortage of corporate liquidity, and companies defaulted on each other. The triangle debt has become more and more serious. The government was forced to relax the money supply . In 1992, an additional currency of 18 trillion rubles was issued, which was 20 times the amount issued in 1991.
The additional currency issuance further led to a decline in the value of the ruble and a rise in prices. Residents’ deposits began to shrink sharply. It was during this period that many Russian families lost their savings for a half-life of their previous struggles, and the shrinking of corporate production resulted in layoffs. It became a common method for companies to get rid of the crisis, and for a time the unemployment population in Russia surged. Due to the shrinkage of previous savings and the loss of their source of livelihood after unemployment, more and more Russian families are in a difficult life. The failure of shock therapy caused Russia's GDP to almost halve.
In the Soviet era, the world's second GDP total after the United States became only 1/10 of the United States and was surpassed by Japan, Germany, Britain, France and other countries. Because foreign investment is unwilling to enter Russia, the total amount of foreign investment absorbed by Russia is only 11.5 billion U.S. dollars. The overall reduction in Russian science and technology development expenditure has led to insufficient investment, and insufficient emphasis on innovation has made Russia less and less competitive in price and quality in the international market (especially Russian products that are squeezed out by foreign competitors in the civilian science and technology product market). Accounted for less than 1% of the share).
The proud military industry in the Soviet era also had to abandon its martial arts due to lack of sufficient research and development funds: a total of nine aircraft carriers were built in the Soviet era.However, Russia eventually retained only the "Kuznetsov" ship. The living standards of Russian families facing the double blow of shrinking savings and unemployment have plummeted: By 2000, Russians had less than 10% of Americans’ total monetary income, and their health status and average life expectancy were also declining. In fact, the failure of shock therapy has a profound impact on the Russian economic system and even the social system much longer than its implementation.
The most significant of the remaining problems caused by shock therapy is the spread of the shadow economy phenomenon-the so-called shadow economy can be divided into three parts: one is the gray economy-which refers to conformity in form Economic activities regulated by law are nothing more than the production of products and services that are not included in official statistics in order to evade taxation and supervision; the second is the brown economy-this refers to false reports related to the acquisition and transfer of "black money" , Embezzlement, theft, speculation and various forms of fraud; the third is the black economy-which refers to various types of economic crimes strictly prohibited by law.
It is in this process that Russian oligarchs have risen and grown through gray, brown or even black means such as embezzlement of state assets and short selling. While the oligarchs are making economic benefits for themselves, they also control Russia's key industries such as oil and gas, electricity, and finance, which are related to the lifeline of 's national economy. With this kind of capital, they can not only upset the economy, but at the same time they also try to manipulate public opinion and interfere in politics. Former Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gydar even said: "They can even replace the prime minister as they like when they are at their best."
Russia’s oligarchs essentially encroach on the country’s wealth and use Russia’s national wealth to feed themselves-this is a typical national asshole. In contrast, the development of South Korea’s chaebolism to this day is indeed a big tail, and it has indeed aroused considerable opposition from the Korean government and the public. In fact, South Korea’s " Han River miracle " is essentially a typical chaebol economy.Therefore, South Korea’s chaebol forces contributed a lot to the country at the beginning of South Korea’s economic rise. Although the South Korean chaebols have grown to the point where they can be proud of themselves, it cannot be denied that they were indeed South Korean national heroes.
One is a moth and the other is a hero. This has led to completely different reputations in their respective countries: it can be said that Russians hate oligarchs, because when the Russian economy was the most difficult period, ordinary people suffered from shrinking deposits and soaring prices. At the same time, oligarchs have grown through the possession of social public resources, so can you say that the Russian people can not hate them? In contrast, South Koreans actually love and hate their country’s chaebol.
On the one hand, the power of the South Korean chaebol has grown to the point where it cannot be dropped. This will inevitably infringe some of the interests of the people at the bottom, and it also poses a certain challenge to the authority of the South Korean government. In the cases of Zhang Ziyeon and Lee Shengli The South Korean public opinion reflected to a certain extent represents people’s hatred of the chaebol power; however, at the same time, Koreans actually have a feeling of envy for the chaebol power-in fact, the goal of many Koreans in life is to enter Samsung, Hyundai and other chaebol groups work because here you can reach the core elites of this country.
Putin cheered the Russians when he cracked down on the oligarchs; if the South Korean government wants to crack down on the chaebol forces in the country, it would be a major event that will affect the whole body. The Russian oligarchs only began to appear in the late Soviet era, and did not really develop and grow in the Yeltsin era. In fact, when Putin came to power, the Russian oligarchs really had only a few years to call the wind and rain. This is incomparable to the entrenched South Korean chaebol that has formed since the 1960s. When Putin came to power, Russia’s oligarchy seemed to be powerful, but in fact it is far from deep-rooted.
Russia’s oligarchs influence the direction of Russia’s political arena by exerting influence on the Yeltsin government.Their power has not penetrated into every aspect of the country's social life like the Korean chaebol. The Russian oligarchs who have become rich in just a few years are far less sophisticated and mature than the American consortium , which controls the entire Wall Street finance and the huge military industry group, and the Korean chaebol who controls the entire political, economic and social life of South Korea. They lack sufficient political foresight and the ability to deal with danger.
In the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, and Western European countries, the typical political feature of countries that practice Western-style government is "small government": the executive power of the government is separated from the legislative power of the Congress and the judicial power of the courts. Parallel. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Russia also introduced this Western-style political organization structure, but Russia’s own traditions have actually led to the formation of a “strong president, weak parliament, and small government” national power structure. The powers of the Russian president are far greater than those of the presidents of Western countries.
The Russian president’s decision to a large extent influences the historical process and direction of the country’s development. To a certain extent, the president’s political position determines the status and role of the corresponding social and political forces in the country’s political life. As the most authoritative commander-in-chief of the state apparatus, the president holds the comprehensive resources of Russia's law, administration, and military. Even the seemingly powerful oligarchs are eggs and stones in front of such a powerful state apparatus, not to mention that Russia's oligarchy is not monolithic.
Oligopoly is profit-only: they not only squeeze out Russia’s national wealth, but they also compete with each other. This naturally provides Putin with an opportunity to divide and break each other. In the process of fighting oligarchs, Putin has always paid attention to uniting the majority to fight against individual cross-borders. When Putin was elected president in 2000, he met with the powerful oligarchs of the Yeltsin era: he promised that as long as he did not interfere in politics, he would not be held accountable for their original sins, and at the same time would protect their future economic interests.
The vast majority of small and medium oligarchs choose to stop interfering in politics as Putin said.But the seven oligarchs who are accustomed to the wind and rain are not so easy to talk. In this situation, Putin has established a strategy of uniting small and medium oligarchs to focus their energy on fighting the seven oligarchs. Even after clarifying the strategy of focusing on fighting the seven oligarchs, Putin still pays attention to splitting the seven oligarchs: Putin did not attack the seven oligarchs at the same time, but purge them one by one. Putin was the first to attack the media tycoon Gusinski.
When Putin participated in the presidential election, the Gutsins base station team went to Putin's opponents: an independent television station under Gusinski reported a bunch of information that vilified Putin during the election. After Putin was elected, Gusinski still antagonized Putin everywhere. On June 12, 2000, the Russian Federal Prosecutor's Office arrested Gusinski on suspicion of embezzling huge amounts of state assets, but he was released on bail only three days later. In 2001, Gusinski, a Jew , immigrated to Israel and became an unclear problem between Israel and Russia.
The second oligarch to be purged after Gusinsky is Berezovsky. During Yeltsin's time, Berezovsky and Yeltsin's daughter realized a combination of power and money. When Yeltsin consulted the seven oligarchs about choosing Putin as his successor, Berezovsky expressed his approval. It is these backgrounds that make Berezovsky claim to be Putin's superior hero. In 2000, Berezovsky was charged with multiple crimes of financial fraud and corruption. Berezovsky immigrated to the UK in 2001 and sought political asylum. Since then, he has been a wanted object by the Russian police.
In October 2003, Russia’s largest oil company Yukos President Khodorkovsky was arrested. The arrest of Khodorkovsky was like an anti-terrorist operation: Khodorkov's plane was surrounded by dozens of military vehicles as soon as it landed. When Khodorkovsky stepped down the cabin, all he saw were black hole muzzles. Yukos even paid a lot of money to assassinate Putin because of the boss's arrest.Putin, who was born in the KGB, has long had rich experience in anti-tracking and anti-assassination, so under strict security measures, the assassination of Yukos was able to succeed.
Khodorkovsky’s Yukos is not the only counterattack against Putin: after Berezovsky fled to the UK, he also declared that he would launch a coup to overthrow Putin. During the 2004 Russian election, Berezovsky threw a billion dollars to support Putin’s opposition. Berezovsky even established a "Free Russia Party" against Putin's government. In 2006, Berezovsky was involved in the poisoning of the Russian defecting agent Alexander Litvinenko . Berezovsky's attack on the Russian government by this incident once caused tension in the relationship between Britain and Russia.
Although Khodorkovsky and Berezovsky planned some actions against Putin, it seems that these actions have actually not achieved their expected results. Friedman among the seven oligarchs turned to Putin when he saw this situation. Putin didn't look at Friedman because he was still cooperating. Today Friedman is still the top entrepreneur in Russia. Malkin, one of the seven oligarchs, also ran to open a casino after retiring from the political circle. Smolensky and Vinogradov went bankrupt in the 1998 financial crisis.
So far, the seven oligarchs of Russia that used to be troubled by the wind and rain can no longer pose a threat to Putin's government. After this purge, the Russian oligarchs have not disappeared: the current Chelsea boss and Russian oil tycoon Abramovich is a typical financial oligarch in the Putin era. The biggest difference between the Putin era oligarchs and Yeltsin’s era is that they have basically made money at ease and will no longer intervene in politics. In fact, this is one of the reasons why Putin has succeeded in purging oligarchs.
Putin has not completely eliminated all the oligarchs in Russia.Putin has greatly reduced his opposition by cultivating a group of obedient new oligarchs to crack down on the behavior of the old oligarchs. Putin’s attitude towards the new oligarchs is now clear: As long as they do not interfere with the direction of Russian national politics, their economic privileges will still be protected. The old oligarchs were beaten down, and new oligarchs emerged. In 2012, the old oligarch Berezovsky even went to court in London with the upstart Abramovich of the Putin era.
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