Yin Fatang participated in the Battle of Changdu in October 1950 and served as deputy political commissar of the 52nd Division of the 18th Army. In 1951, he led the main force of the 52nd Division into Tibet with deputy division commander Chen Zizhi, and served as secretary of th

Yin Fatang participated in the Battle of Changdu in October 1950 and served as deputy political commissar of the 52nd Division of the 18th Army. In 1951, he led the main force of the 52nd Division to Tibet with deputy division commander Chen Zizhi, and served as secretary of the branch committee of the Tibet Working Committee of the Communist Party of China; in 1959, he served as political commissar of the Jiangzi Military Sub-district of the Tibet Military Region and secretary of the Jiangzi Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party of China; in 1962, he served as political commissar of the Tibetan 419 unit; in 1963, he served as director of the Political Department of the Tibet Military Region; in 1980, he served as first secretary of the Party Committee of the Tibet Autonomous Region, deputy political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region and first political commissar of the Tibet Military Region; in 1986, he served as deputy political commissar of the Second Artillery Corps; in 1988, he was awarded the rank of lieutenant general.

Tibetan words 419 The whole process of the formation of the troops

Wei: You are "old Tibet". From the Battle of Chamdo in 1950 to 1985, six years after the reform and opening up, Tibet has undergone tremendous changes, and many major historical events with far-reaching influence have occurred, you have experienced them. As a historical researcher, I have too many questions to ask you. Given the time constraints, I will talk about one issue this time - the whole story of the formation of the Tibetan 419 unit.

Yin: Tibetan word 419 troops were not originally a unit, but a command center code name, called the Tibet Military Region Forward Command. This command was formed in June 1962. At that time, the Tibet Military Region had only three regiments of field forces, and 419 commanded these three regiments to prepare for the armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border. Later, the command headquarters and its troops under their jurisdiction participated in the Sino-Indian border self-defense counterattack operation as troops equivalent to one division. By the time the code name "Tiangzi 419 Force" was cancelled in June 1963, it existed for about a year. It can be said that the "Tiangzi 419 Unit" was temporarily formed to deal with the escalating armed conflict on the Sino-Indian border.

Wei: Please talk about the situation during the establishment.

Yin: In early June 1962, the Tibet Military Region (that the time was the Great Military Region) notified me to go to Lhasa for a meeting and accept the task. At that time, I was the Secretary of the Jiangzi Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party of China Tibet Working Committee and the Political Commissar of the Jiangzi Military Sub-district. After receiving the notice, I guessed that I might have to send me to the Western Front to negotiate with India. At that time, Nehru implemented a "forward policy", and the Indian army continued to advance towards the Chinese border areas, eroding our territory, and having armed conflicts with our border troops. The area with the most intense conflict was Aksaichin on the Western Front. In the early days of entering Tibet, I had dealing with India, so I had this idea.

Wei: Did you think you would fight the Indian army on the Eastern Front in four months?

Yin: I didn’t expect that there was no preparation for fighting the Indian army at that time. On June 11, the Tibet Military Region formed a Forward Command, code-named Tibet 419 Unit. The task originally assigned to us by the Central Military Commission was to be prepared to cooperate with the fight against encroachment in the western section. At that time, the focus of our army's anti-encroachment struggle was the western section, and the Xinjiang Military Region was responsible for it, and the Kangxiwa Command Post was established. He Jiachan, deputy commander of the 54th Army, was appointed commander and political commissar of the "Kangzhi". Since 1959, especially in the first half of 1962, the situation in the Western Section has been very tense and armed conflicts have continued.

Wei: Many netizens have a question: The Indian army's erosion activities have begun long ago. For example, the Chinese territory between the illegal "McMahon Line" and the traditional customary line was occupied by the Indian army between 1950 and 1954. Why did our army's anti-erosion struggle not begin until 1962?

Yin: The Sino-Indian border dispute is divided into three regions: the western section, the middle section and the eastern section. The situation is different and very complicated. Take the eastern section for example. First, because the McMahon Line issue is a historical issue, we hope to resolve it; second, when the Indian army invaded a large area south of the "McMahon Line", it was the early stage of our march to Tibet. Everyone knows the great historical background. It was during the Chinese War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. We used the whole country to support the Volunteer Army in North Korea to compete with the United Nations Army led by the United States.

Wei: While resisting U.S. aggressing Korea, did our 18th Army troops entering Tibet compete with the invading Indian army in the Himalayas?

Yin: At that time, our main task was to gain a foothold in Tibet. Although the central government reached a "Seventeen-Article Agreement" with the Tibetan local government in 1951, it is very difficult to implement these agreements. The upper reactionaries in Tibet oppose the People's Liberation Army's entry into Tibet and try every means to drive our army away.In order to win over the Dalai Lama and other upper-class people, we have taken many tolerant and appease policies, and minimized the garrison to avoid stimulating the Dalai Lama and others. The 18th Army troops actually entered Lhasa and the areas south of it had very few troops, and in fact there were only two regiments. Most of the troops were built and built highways and airports under the command of the rear command of the 18th Army to ensure the troops in front. Of course, whether to fight or not is one thing, whether or not has strength is another thing. As long as we need it, we have a way.

Wei: In June and July 1962, Chairman Mao proposed a special policy to fight against erosion: "Never give in, strive to avoid bleeding; intertwined canines and teeth, and live together with armed forces for a long time." It can be seen that until this time, we have no plans to fight a war with India.

Yin: Yes, I was just preparing at that time. From June to September, the 419 troops entered intense military training while politically mobilizing. From individual soldiers' actions to tactical training of squads, platoons, and companies, to live-fire exercises of battalions and regiments. The troops were "eliminated the weak and strong" and adjusted one-third of the cadres, and transferred the old, weak, sick and disabled cadres and soldiers from the combat troops. Qiao Xueting was studying in a mainland college at that time, so we transferred him back to be the political commissar of the League. Some talents have also been transferred from the mainland military region, such as a group of excellent 40 bazookamen from the Wuhan Military Region, with people and equipment; the Beijing Military Region has supported a batch of communication equipment, with people and equipment; more than 100 Tibetan, English and Hindi translations have been transferred from the mainland.

Wei: Before September 1962, the Indian army's focus was on the Western Front. Our army on the Western Front adopted measures such as "top, force, encircle, and block" to effectively curb the expansion of the Indian army. Therefore, starting from September, Nehru shifted the focus of the erosion to the Eastern Front. He believed that the Indian army's military strength and supply conditions were dominant in this direction.

Yin: The McMahon Line is originally illegal, and we never admit that the Indian army had long occupied 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory south of the "Mito Line" in the 1950s. Nehru was not satisfied yet and actually ordered to cross the "Mit Line" to continue to "advance" towards Chinese territory. In order to find out the situation of the Indian army's invasion of the area north of the Mai Line, the Tibet Military Region sent a company reconnaissance team from the Shannan Military Sub-district to the Kejielang area, and set up a checkpoint on the north bank of the Kejielang River to confront the Indian army across the river on the south bank. The Indian army lied about military information, saying that more than 600 Chinese soldiers surrounded their outposts. The Indian military used this as an excuse to make their so-called "Ace" 7th Brigade advance within 48 hours and use "force to expel" our army on the North Bank. Nehru was visiting the UK at that time, and he ordered the cabinet that "you must not give in a single inch on the McMahon Line."

Wei: "McMahon Line" is a line drawn by British McMahon on the map. In fact, the Kejielang River area is north of the "Mai Line". In order to get more places, Nehru insisted that McMahon was wrong in drawing this place. He used despicable means to modify the map, moved the "Mi Line" north, and drew the Kejielang area north of the "Mi Line" south of the "Mi Line", and then sent troops to invade the place.

negative: Then the bridge selection incident occurred. The Indian army fired at the border guards who guarded me, and killed five of my border guards. This is a bloody incident planned by the Indian army. More than 4,000 people from all walks of life in Lhasa gathered to angrily denounce the atrocities of the Indian army. The 419th Unit also seized this incident for education and mobilization. It is true that the tree wants to be quiet but the wind does not stop. We love peace, but the invaders insist on imposing war on us. The commanders and fighters gritted their teeth at the Indian reactionaries and asked for a fight. On October 10, the Indian army caused a new bloodshed on the Zebao Bridge, and our army died and 11 people were injured. After this incident, everyone saw more clearly that restraint and tolerance cannot solve the problem, and a military battle with India is inevitable.

gJelang Battle

Wei: From this time on, did the central government make up the determination to fight a war with India?

Yin: I can't say that, I can only say that I have made up my mind to fight back against the Indian invading army. As for the scale of the counterattack, it cannot be said to reach the level of war. I think it still belongs to the level of armed conflict. The expansion of the scale of the combat was later.When we had to carry out a self-defense counterattack, Commander Zhang Guohua of the Tibet Military Region was still recuperating in the mainland! It was also at this time that Chairman Mao urgently summoned him, and the leaders of the Central Committee and the Military Commission explained to him the task of the self-defense counterattack in person, with the purpose of attacking the arrogance of the Indian reactionaries and creating conditions for peaceful negotiations. On October 12, Nehru publicly claimed that he would "clear" the Chinese army from the Kjelang area. Indian Defense Minister Menon openly shouted: "We will shoot to the last man and the last gun, and we must drive the Chinese out." On October 17, the Indian army launched an attack on our army at the same time on the Eastern and Western fronts. On the 18th, Indian Ministry of Defense officials declared that they had achieved a unique Napoleon victory. It can be seen from time to time that it is the arrogance of the Indian authorities that pushed the scale of armed conflict step by step into war. On October 12, the same day when Nehru claimed to "clear the Chinese army", Zhang Guohua returned to Lhasa. On October 17, the Central Military Commission issued the "Combat Order to Annihilate the Invading Indian Army." On October 18, the Central Military Commission issued another instruction: "This battle against the Indian reactionaries is related to the national prestige and military prestige. We must win the first battle. We can only fight well, not defeat it." The combat mission issued by the General Staff was originally to annihilate a battalion of the Indian army that invaded the Kejielang area of ​​the North Kerang area of ​​the "Mai Line".

Wei: The Battle of Kejielang actually annihilated a brigade of the Indian army. What's going on?

Yin: After Commander Zhang Guohua returned to Tibet, he held a meeting in Lhasa to convey the instructions of the Central Committee and the Military Commission, and then arrived at Mama in Shannan. He listened to the analysis of the situation mastered by relevant departments of the military region and our combat opinions, and decisively proposed a bold plan to attack the Indian army's left and right wings at the same time and annihilate a brigade of the Indian army. After reporting this plan, the General Staff, the Military Commission, and several old coaches disagreed, for fear that our appetite would be too big and we would not be able to eat the Indian army's ace brigade. Chairman Mao was still brave enough. He said, "If you let them fight, it will be hard to start over!" This is how the scale of the Battle of Kejielang was later.

Wei: After Zhang Guohua returned to Tibet, he formed a front-line command of the Tibet Military Region. What is the relationship between this and the front-line of the Tibet Military Region established in June?

Yin: On the same day when Commander Zhang Guohua arrived in Lhasa, the 419 troops set off from Linzhi , Baheqiao, Lhasa, Qushui and other places, and assembled to the Kejielang front line. On the 14th, Commander Zhang arrived in Mama, Shannan and formed a new front-line commander of the military region. Zhang Guohua served as commander, Deng Shaodong, Chen Mingyi and Zhao Wenjin served as deputy commanders, and Lu Yishan served as deputy political commissar. The original military region's front reference and its subordinate troops, namely the Tibetan 419 unit, was put into combat in units equivalent to the division.

Wei: I heard that before the Battle of Kejielang, the leader of the 419 unit, especially you, made good suggestions on the decision-making of the battle. Please talk about this situation.

Yin: The front-line commander should not mechanically execute the orders of his superiors. He should follow the spirit of the Gutian Conference, put forward his own opinions based on actual conditions, and dare to give opinions. This is also the old tradition of our People's Liberation Army, especially the 18th Army. As mentioned earlier, Commander Zhang Guohua put forward suggestions on the General Staff’s combat plan to change it is a glorious example. At that time, the deployment of the 7th Indian Brigade in the Kejielang area was like a short-legged "T" character, with wide front and shallow depth, and close distance between each stronghold. To annihilate one of his battalions, the rest of the troops could come to aid and escape. Besides, we had the ability to eat it, so it was better to make plans to wipe out a brigade. It’s also a fight to fight a battalion, and it’s also a fight to fight a brigade. It’s more troublesome to fight a battalion, so it’s better to make up your mind to fight a brigade. In fact, during this battle, commanders at all levels made good suggestions. For example, the military region pointed out that the task of the 155th Regiment of the main attack regiment was to first annihilate the enemy in the Kalong stronghold, and then annihilate the enemy in the Killing Dong and Rong's stronghold. Given that the Caron is very close to the gun, the 155th Regiment will be attacked by enemies such as guns. They believed that they had the ability to destroy these two strongholds at the same time, so they took the initiative to make suggestions to their superiors. Chai Hongquan and Shi Banqiao (the former deputy chief of staff of the military region) went to inspect the 155th Regiment. The regiment commander Liu Guangtong and political commissar Qiao Xueting made this suggestion to them. Chai and Shi did not agree. Later I went to the 155th Regiment and they suggested to me that I think it makes sense and can be adopted.I asked Chai Hongquan that Chai did not express his opinion. He asked Shi Pai, but Shi was not easy to say. I will report to Commander Zhang Guohua directly. Commander Zhang attached great importance to it and called me directly to ask me if I was sure to fight the two strongholds together? I know a lot about the situation of this army, so I answered that there is no problem and I am sure. Commander Zhang made a decisive decision and approved the 155th Regiment's suggestion. There are also examples like this.

Wei: Please introduce the forces of the two sides participating in the battle of Kejielang.

Yin: The Indian army deployed in the Kejielang area is their so-called 7th Ace Brigade, which is also affiliated with the 5th Battalion of the Assam Infantry and the artillery, engineers and other units, with a force of more than 3,000 people. The 1st Battalion of the 9th Gurkha United under the 7th Brigade made great contributions on the Italian battlefield in 1944. The Gurkha people are famous for their bravery and good at fighting, and have a tradition of martial arts. They were the main source of British mercenaries more than 100 years ago; the 2nd Battalion of the Lagaput United and the 9th Battalion of the Punjab United have participated in World War II and are the elite troops of the Indian army. The history of these three battalions is more than 100 years. Our troops participating in the battle were: all 419 units, the 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Regiment of the 11th Division, part one of the Shannan Military Sub-district, and part one of the artillery and engineering soldiers, with a total of 10,300 people. The comparison between the enemy and our troops is 1:3, and I am three times that of the enemy. Commander Zhang Guohua authorized the 419th troops to command the above-mentioned troops participating in the war. The front of the Tibet Military Region is located in Mama, and the 419 command center is located in Xuebo Cave.

Wei: What is the comparison between enemy and us in the entire Eastern Front?

Yin: In addition to more than 3,000 people in the Kejielang area, the Indian army deployed 2,700 people in the Bangshankou to Dawang area, and 8 battalions were deployed in Luoyu and Xiachayu areas. The entire Eastern Front of the Indian army had a force of about 22,000. In addition to the 419th Unit and the 11th Division on the Eastern Front, our army also has troops from the Shannan, Linzhi and Changdu Military Sub-districts, with a total strength of more than 20,000, which is equivalent to the Indian Army. But we concentrated our absolute superior forces in the direction of Kjelang and carried out feint attacks in other directions to restrain the enemy in front of us.

Wei: Please talk about the process of the Battle of Kejielang.

Yin: The Battle of Kejielang is the first battle of self-defense counterattack on the Sino-Indian border, and it is also the most intense and arduous battle. Before the war, commanders at all levels conducted repeated reconnaissances on the enemy situation and terrain in person, and studied and formulated very detailed combat plans based on actual conditions. After the Indian army launched continuous attacks on us, our army launched a self-defense counterattack in the early morning of October 20. Our army adopted the tactic of night raiding, interspersed under the cover of night, detoured to the enemy's flanks and behind, and stood in the attack starting point. The mission to attack the right wing of the Indian army was basically carried out separately by the 154th Regiment. The 155th Regiment, which attacked the left-wing carons, guns, etc. of the Indian Army, launched an attack on the two Indian Army strongholds at 7:30 am with the cooperation of the 157th Regiment, the first battalion of the 32nd Regiment of the 11th Division, and the Shannan Military Sub-district. To be honest, the Indian army is still very good at fighting. They were elites of the Indian army and were deceived and propaganda, believing that our army invaded Indian territory. In addition, they did not understand our army's particularly brave fighting style and prisoner policy, so they simply resisted and defended the bunker to death. In many battles, they were beaten to death than they were captured. For example, there are 143 Indian troops at the Caron stronghold, of which 92 were shot dead by our army, and only 51 were captured, many of which were captured due to injuries. Our army also suffered heavy casualties in the battle to conquer Karon, with 21 people killed and 29 people injured.

Wei: The brave ones win when two strong men meet. It should be said that our army's tenacity overwhelms the Indian army.

Yin: This is a good thing. The Indian army's fortifications were mainly bunkers. For example, the 143 Indian army members built 64 bunkers at the Caron stronghold. Our army attacked one by one bunker by one, which was really a close fight! The famous "Yangting Anban" emerged in this battle. There were 8 people in this squad. The squad leader died, and the second squad leader continued to command; the second squad leader died, and the deputy squad leader immediately took the lead; the deputy squad leader died, and the old soldier immediately took the lead, and finally 7 people were sacrificed, leaving only one new recruit. The new recruit took the initiative to join another squad to continue fighting, and he really went on one after another. With the cooperation of another squad, this squad conquered 27 bunkers and annihilated 55 enemies. After the war, it was awarded the honorary title by the Ministry of National Defense. Where have the Indian army seen such a powerful army? We did overwhelm them in momentum. The original three-day attack mission was completed in just one day.At that time, most of the 7th Brigade of the Indian Army was annihilated, and the remaining troops were scattered in the jungle. Soon after, we cleared them out, and finally the entire brigade was annihilated. In the subsequent battles, the morale of the Indian army was completely disintegrated, and our army was really ruined!

Wei: After the 7th Indian brigade in the Kejielang area was eliminated, the Tactical Command of the 4th Division of the Indian Army and the 4th Artillery Brigade and other units fled southwards. At this time, the Central Military Commission ordered our army to not be restricted by the "McMahon Line", cross the "McMahon Line" and pursue southwards.

Yin: The Central Military Commission’s order on crossing the “Mit Line” was issued at 21:00 on October 20. The order given to us by the military region was at 16:55 on the 21st. This order was to allow us to seize Longbu, Qiusanmou, Jimitang and other places, and create conditions for the next step of seizing Dawang. After receiving the order, we quickly commanded the troops to pursue the victory. During the pursuit, we captured Brigadier General Dalvie , the 7th Brigade commander of the Indian Army. After being captured, Darvi said, "You destroyed a brigade within 24 hours, which is rare in the world." At 23:00 on the 22nd, the General Staff issued the order to "camera capture Dawang". We received the order from the front of the military region at 10:00 on the 23rd. When the Indian army in Dawang area saw us approaching, they fled to the direction of Xishankou. We only grabbed their rear-end troops. The Shannan Military Sub-district Command Post and the 419 Command Agency immediately entered Dawang.

Wei: What is the result of the Battle of Kejielang?

Yin: The Battle of Kejielang, including pursuit operations in the direction of Dawang, wiped out a total of 1,897 Indian troops, including 832 enemies, 1,065 prisoners, 75 artillery pieces, 122 light and heavy machine guns, 1,104 guns, and 2 helicopters. Our army suffered 388 casualties, including 256 injured and 132 killed.

The Second Battle

Wei: After the Battle of Kejielang, the Chinese government issued a statement proposing three suggestions to stop conflicts, reopen negotiations, and peacefully resolve border issues. At the same time, the General Staff and the front command of the Tibet Military Region ordered our army to stop pursuing and rest and standby north of the Dawang River. This fully demonstrates the Chinese government's desire for peace. But the Indian government not only ignored it, but instead declared a state of emergency across the country, organized a wartime cabinet, issued war bonds, and mobilized war.

Yin: Nehru tore off the mask of the "leader of the Non-Aligned Movement" and publicly begs for military assistance from the United States, Britain and other countries. The Western camp led by the United States immediately met India's military needs, stepped up the airlift of military equipment to India, and encouraged India to continue to engage in military confrontation with China. With the support of the West, Nehru was determined to compete with China again. By the way, we seized a lot of US aid to the Indian army in the battle, some of which have not been unboxed.

Wei: India's new Defense Minister Chafan claimed: he was determined to fight China to the end until he finally won the victory. While the Indian army dispatched troops to the border, it also continued to shell out our positions on the north bank of the Dawang River.

Yin: The Indian army still needs to fight, it is impossible for us to stop, so we have to accompany us. The Indian army stepped up to send additional troops to the border areas. By mid-November, the Indian army's troops on the Eastern Front reached 30,000, of which 15,000 were deployed between the south bank of the Dawang River and Teespur in India. In order to break Nehru's fantasy of achieving territorial demands through military adventures, Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee decided to deal with a heavier blow to the Indian army, forcing India to give up its military adventures and return to the negotiating table. On November 12, the Central Military Commission issued a task to annihilate 3 to 4 brigades of the Indian Army, including 2 to 3 brigades in the direction of Dawang and 1 brigade in the direction of Walanong.

Wei: The self-defense counterattack in the direction of Walanong was responsible for Ding Sheng, the commander of the 54th Army.

Yin: The 130th Division of the 54th Army set out from Sichuan on October 21 and originally planned to participate in the Dawang direction. Later, because the Indian army increased troops in the direction of Walanong, the Military Commission decided to put the division into Walanong and jointly formed the Dingsheng Command Post with the Changdu Military Sub-district, referred to as "Dingzhi" to command the battle in Walanong direction.

Wei: In the second phase of the counterattack, the directions of Dawang to Xishankou and Bondila are the main directions, and in this direction the 419 troops are still the protagonists. Please talk about the deployment of the Indian army.

Yin: As mentioned earlier, the Indian army deployed 15,000 troops from the south bank of the Dawang River to the Tespur, of which about 12,000 people were in the Xishankou, Dejongzong and Bondira areas north of the traditional customary line. The Indian army was equipped in depth along both sides of the road, basically a long snake formation.Marshal Liu Bocheng vividly pointed out that the deployment characteristics of the Indian army were "copper head, tin tail, tight back and loose abdomen." The 62nd Brigade and other units of the Indian Army were about 3,300 people deployed in Xishankou and Shengezong areas; the Tactical Command of the 65th Brigade led about 1,500 people deployed in the Lomadong and Dejangzong areas; the Tactical Command of the 48th Brigade led about 2,200 people deployed in the Bondira, Rahon and Denban areas; the Tactical Command of the 4th Division and the 4th Artillery Brigade were about 1,000 people deployed near Yuwang; the 67th Brigade was in the Vodshan and Misamari areas.

Wei: How many troops has our army invested in this direction?

Yin: In order to strengthen the combat forces in the main direction of the Eastern Front, the Central Military Commission transferred the 55th Infantry Division from Xining. In this way, we have 3 divisions of troops, namely: the 419th Unit, the 11th Division, the 55th Division, and the 4 companies in the Shannan Military Sub-district, artillery, engineering and other units, a total of 18,000 people. The comparison between our army and the Indian army in this direction is 1.5:1. We adopted the tactics of "head, tail, shaving, and caesarean section" proposed by Liu Shuai, implemented a large-scale roundabout encirclement, interspersed and divided into multiple channels, and cut the enemy's long snake formation into several segments, and annihilated them one by one.

Wei: 3 divisions with different structures, and are also equipped with many artillery and engineers. Please talk about the command relationship of our army.

Yin: This direction is unified by the front command of the Tibet Military Region. Commander Zhang Guohua led the front command of the Military Region to move from Mama to Banggang, 5 kilometers north of Dawang on November 1. That place was originally a command post of the Indian army. The Indian army left a sand table. Commander Zhang convened a meeting of cadres above the regiment and above, and used the sand table to study the combat plan and issue various departments to implement roundabout, interspersed and divided tasks. Our army has two tasks in the first step. One is to "cut the tail". Two regiments of the 11th Division carried out a large-scale deep detour from the right wing of the Indian army, and went back to the main force of the Indian army, cut off the highway between Dejangzong and Bondira, blocked the enemy's escape route from the south, and blocked the enemy's aid from the north; the other is to "take the head, strike the back, and cut the caesarean section", and the 419th Unit, the 55th Division, the Shannan Military Sub-district, the artillery, engineer and other departments annihilate the Indian troops in Xishankou, Shen Gezong, and the Luma East area, and then attacked the enemy from Dejangzong north and south with the 11th Division. Commander Zhang Guohua originally wanted the 419th organ to uniformly command the operations from Xishankou to Derangzong area. Given that the 55th Division is a cross-regional established division, I feel that it is not well commanded by us, so I proposed to Commander Zhang to jointly command the 419th Division and the 55th Division to establish a "joint command". Commander Zhang adopted this plan. The United Command followed the 155th Regiment and another interesting thing happened during the marching. Shortly after launching the general attack, our unit followed the 155th Regiment to intersect Shen Bizong, but he took the wrong path and encountered a cliff again, so he became slow. That place was very strange, the radio signal was weak, and the telegram could not be sent out or received. The other part of the United Suggestion also encountered a similar situation. From 2:30 pm on the 18th to 12:00 noon on the 19th, the United Command lost contact with both superiors and subordinates. Our troops have good quality. When we see that we can't contact us, we will immediately go beyond our level and directly contact the front command of the military region. During these 20 hours, Commander Zhang directly commanded the regiment. It was not until the United Nations Radio Station signal was restored that the combat command of the 419th Unit and the 55th Division and other units were restored.

Wei: The battle from Xishankou to Bondila has a distinctive feature, that is, our army's roundabout, interspersed and segmented tactics. After the war, Zhang Guohua pointed out when reporting the combat situation to the central government that the Indian army was most afraid of traversing sideways and detours. Chairman Mao said: "This is not only India, but since ancient times, any army has been most afraid of this move." Please talk about the situation in this regard.

Yin: The flexible use of roundabout, interspersed and segmented tactics is a feature of the Kjelang Battle, and almost all levels have been successfully used. The second battle, namely the battle from Xishankou to Bondira, is more obvious. Judging from the entire battle, there were large-scale detours, such as the "tail cutting" operation of the 11th Division. It took 7 days and 5 nights to marches from the right wing of the Indian army to go around a big bend, 150 kilometers behind the enemy, cut off the road between Bondira and Dejangzong, and drove the Indian army north of Rahon into the large encirclement of our army. Judging from each battle, there are small detours, small interludes, and small segments of different distances. According to the combat deployment of Commander Zhang Guohua and the front-line of the Military Region, the general offensive time of the battle was 8:30 on November 18. Before that, each unit was hidden and interspersed to the predetermined position according to its respective combat tasks.You must neither reach the predetermined position too early to avoid exposing the intention of the battle nor arrive too late, otherwise you will not achieve the goal of multiple centripetal sieges and let the enemy escape from the gap. For example, Guo Zhi's troops from Shannan Military Sub-district set off on the 12th, the 157th Regiment set off on the 14th, the 154th Regiment and the 155th Regiment set off on the 15th, and the 55th Division troops set off on the 14th. Some of these troops started with the Indian army during the roundabout way, but the Indian army "only saw the trees, not the forest" and did not notice the overall combat intention of our army. It was not until the 11th Division cut off their retreat at dawn on the 18th that it realized that our army had such a big appetite and laid them a pocket with a depth of 150 kilometers in the north and south.

Wei: The Indian army was not as tenacious as the first in the second battle. When they realized that they were surrounded, they were afraid of repeating the mistake of the 7th Brigade being completely wiped out, and they all fled one after another. I have read the memoirs published by the Chief of Staff of the 62nd Brigade of the Indian Army in 1979. According to him, on the morning of the 18th, as soon as our general attack was launched, the commander of the 4th Division of the Indian Army broke away from command and fled. Then the commander of the 62nd Brigade of the Indian Army who was defending Xishankou also broke away from command and fled. The Indian army was actually competing to escape in a chaotic state of no leader.

Yin: In the second battle, except for the defensive troops relying on fortifications, the Indian army basically had no combat effectiveness once they were separated from the fortifications. In the battle, our army can overcome or defend, regardless of whether the strength of the Indian army is more or less. The momentum is completely the autumn wind sweeping away the fallen leaves! The Indian army was deployed in a line along both sides of the road. The rear road was broken, and there were pursuers in front and blocked in the back. The two wings were attacked. They fled into the mountains and dense forests on both sides of the road. In this way, the establishment was chaotic and it was difficult to organize decent defense and counterattacks, and the entire front soon collapsed. The troops under the United Army captured Xishankou, Shen Gezong, Lumadong, Milonggang and other places in just two days. The 11th Division captured Derangzong and Bondira and other places. The main force of the Indian army was either annihilated or scattered in the mountains and forests. Two other strands fled toward the direction of Dalong and south of Bondira. The front command of the military region ordered the 154th Regiment of the 419th Unit to pursue Dalong, and the 33rd Regiment of the 11th Division to pursue Nandir south of Bondira. Subsequently, the 154th Regiment chased to Dalong and occupied Jimo Pass; the 33rd Regiment chased to Chaku, occupied Yingke Pass and Bili Pass, approaching the traditional custom line, from which you can see the Indian plain. On the 21st, the Chinese government issued a statement announcing “an active ceasefire across the board and voluntarily retreated.” The troops received the order to stop chasing and turned to the fragmented clearance. During the clearance, the 154th Regiment killed the brigade commander of the 62nd Brigade of the Indian Army, Singh .

Wei: Please talk about the results of the second battle?

Yin: The battle from Xishankou to Bondila, our army annihilated the 62nd Brigade and the 4th Brigade of the Indian Army, basically annihilated the 48th Brigade, the 65th Brigade, the 67th Brigade and other departments, killed 2,886 people below the brigade commander, captured 2,177 people, seized a large number of supplies such as 3,840 guns, 187 artillery doors, 416 cars, and 9 tanks. Our army died 225 people and injured 477 people. Among them, 419 troops killed 2,173 enemies, including killing 896 people below the brigade commander and capturing 1,277 people. It is worth mentioning that during the entire self-defense counterattack, none of our army was captured.

Wei: After the war, our army not only released all prisoners of war, but also returned all the seized weapons and equipment to the Indian army. This is probably without precedent in the history of wars between China and foreign countries in ancient and modern times.

Yin: Later some people commented that this battle was "extremely beautiful and extremely free".

—Excerpted from the second issue of Military History magazine 2005