Different from Western-centrism - Reflection on the current international pattern and its direction Jin Canrong and Liu Shiqiang Abstract: Since modern times, the West has gradually established a central position in the modern international system through institutional innovation

Participation of Western-centrism—Reflection on the current international pattern and its direction

Jin Canrong and Liu Shiqiang

Abstract:

Since modern times, the West has gradually established a central position in the modern international system through institutional innovation, commercial expansion and military conquest. For five hundred years, the central position of the West has undergone a shift from the European stage to the American stage and has endured continuous internal struggle and division. The end of the Cold War once again established the central position of the West in the international structure, but was weakened by US policy errors and internal problems of the West. More importantly, after nearly a hundred years of painful learning and adaptation, the non-Western world has accumulated considerable modern knowledge. With the rise of the non-Western world, the central position of the West inevitably declined. The future direction of the international pattern depends on the self-adjustment of the West, the development trend of the non-Western world, and whether the West and the non-Western can achieve power sharing.

For the past few hundred years, the West has been the center of the modern international system. The West not only has a developed political and economic structure, military organizational methods and social values, but also shapes the basic appearance and communication methods of international relations since modern times, playing a leading role in promoting mankind toward industrial civilization and realizing world modernization. Since the great geographical discovery, the West has gradually gained a comprehensive advantage over the non-Western world in terms of strength, system and concept. In terms of strength, the West's industrial capabilities, scientific and technological level and military skills are in a far leading position; in terms of system, the institutional arrangement of modern capitalism overshadows the traditional mode of production; in terms of concept, it is reflected in modern enlightenment with personal rationality as the core. Until now, the form of civilization represented by industrialization is still centered on Western power structure in terms of power structure, and the Anglo-Saxon model is still dominated by the institutional concept.

Historically, the nineteenth century was the first climax of Western-centrism, that is, the European stage of modern international relations. As the only region where produced advanced modern industrial and commercial civilization, Europe was the world's most dynamic center of power for hundreds of years before the end of the 19th century. ①The European powers combined to influence the basic pattern of world politics—and the international legal system that regulates various international interaction modes—and the same is true for those broader international relations values ​​and ideas that have extremely large historical roles. ② As a result, Europe's full invasion and domination of African-European countries and regions, America and Australia became external extensions of European civilization, and most parts of Asia and Africa became colonies or vassal states, and ancient empires such as the Ottomans and China were not spared from the fate of being semi-colonized. With the rise of the United States, the center of gravity of international power has undergone a shift from the interior of Europe to the flanking edge, and Western-centrism has gradually transitioned to a new stage dominated by Washington. Unlike the Hobbesian European stage period, the United States mainly established the centralist position of the West through institutional construction, rule setting and agenda dominance; while the United States' firm belief in and strongly promoted the value of freedom engraved a clear ideological mark on the Western centralism of this period.

However, the establishment of the Western central position is accompanied by its internal division③, which is concentrated in World War I, World War II and the Cold War. The strength of the allies and the Axis powers, the challenges of Germany and Japan to the international system, and the competition between the US and the Soviet superpowers greatly weakened the West's ability to act and political will as a whole; the hostile sentiment and devastating destruction caused by war confrontation have also made Westerners generally question their own civilization, and even deny them. At the same time, while the West is colonizing and plundering and expanding its power in the non-Western world, it has also caused the widespread spread of advanced technologies and modern concepts, forming the first driving force for latecomers to promote modernization; the internal division of the West also provides considerable space for the rise of the non-Western world. Therefore, when the Cold War ended and the internal division of the West re-broken, the non-Western world had accumulated strong modernization energy through active learning. It is in this context that mankind has entered the post-Cold War era.

1. The United States' global primary position and the re-establishment of Western-centrism

0 The collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War ④, and the bipolar pattern based on the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union is about to end. Although the academic community has been arguing about whether the international structure in the post-Cold War era is unipolar and multipolar, the United States did once establish an unparalleled strategic advantage and primary position that other competitors cannot compete with. ⑤ In fact, the United States enjoys asymmetric power that has never been seen since the emergence of the modern state system. In the past, some leading countries would have an advantage in one area—but the United States was the only such a big country in modern history, and it established a clear leadership position in almost every important area of ​​power. ⑥

On the economic level, since the mid-1880s, the United States has been the most developed and huge economy in the world, and its GDP has remained stable between 25% and 30%, and once jumped to 50% after World War II. After the end of the Cold War, driven by the new technological revolution and financial innovation, the United States experienced a decade-long economic golden growth period, which was in sharp contrast with Japan's economic recession and Europe's weak development. In almost all high-tech fields such as biotechnology, aviation communications, and new energy, the United States maintained a leading development momentum; the United States' education system and immigration policies encouraged full competition and continuous innovation in society; the market integration promoted by globalization has provided unprecedented opportunities for the global expansion of American companies and commodity exports. In addition, the United States' economic strength has the advantages of constant natural resources, geographical conditions and geographical location. It has a vast territory, a large population and a low density. These are superior conditions that countries outside Russia cannot match. As the global population expands sharply, the contradiction between environmental deterioration and scarcity of resources becomes increasingly intensified, this advantage of the United States will become increasingly obvious. ⑦

If the United States maintains a leading position in the economic field, then the United States' military capabilities are even more unparalleled. Although the United States once compressed military spending and reduced military spending at the beginning of the end of the Cold War, it increased again since 1998 and maintained a growth trend for 12 consecutive years. Taking 2003 as an example, the United States' defense spending that year accounted for nearly 40% of the global total, which is seven times that of China, which ranks second. In other words, the United States spends on defense equals the total of the 13 countries that rank behind it. ⑧More important is military control and practical combat capabilities. The United States now has overwhelming nuclear advantage, the world's dominant air force, the only real blue water navy and unique global military delivery capabilities ⑨; the United States has established a global military alliance base, firmly controlling the world's main strategic channels; and its rich war practical experience and flexible military strategic adjustments have further amplified the United States' military hegemony status.

At the geopolitical level, from 1989 to the current 20 years, the power of the United States has profoundly influenced the international order, and the United States' political, economic and diplomatic concepts are the starting point of global action. Washington has become the most powerful foreign force in every continent in the world. It controls the entire Western Hemisphere; in Europe and East Asia, it is the most important external balance force; in the Middle East, Central Asia and South Asia, it is expanding its influence. ⑩ At the same time, the current situation of the United States' hegemony has not spawned the emergence of an anti-American group. Countries outside the West lack strength or the will to challenge the central position of the West. On the contrary, they all take the basic strategic goal of integrating into the current international system dominated by the West, and establishing improvement of relations with the United States as the focus of foreign policy. In this way, most of the world's major powers have become allies of the United States today. With the arrival of the new millennium, the United States has stood alone at the pinnacle of world power. (11)

At the international institutional level, after the end of World War II, the United States established its hegemony in world affairs by building various international mechanisms and institutional arrangements.The international economic mechanism established by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has become a powerful tool for the United States to control and manage the world economy; in the field of security, the United States led the establishment of the United Nations to replace the international alliance, and established the authority of the United Nations Security Council and the principles of major power decisions, thus ensuring the supremacy of the United States in the field of security; in the field of military, the United States established military bases in various strategic locations around the world during World War II and later, and stationed in Europe and Asia, establishing a military strategic network that protects its own interests and power resources. (12) Overall, in the global context of the US-Soviet confrontation, the US-led international institutional network is hindered by geo-competition and ideological confrontation and is difficult to expand to a global scale. The end of the Cold War and the rapid development of the globalization process have made the world market truly integrated, and more and more late-developed countries have joined the current international system under the guidance of the policy goals of opening up to the outside world and integrating into the world. The global expansion of the international system actually strengthens the United States' hegemony dominance. During this period, the United States participated in the establishment, formulation and supplementation of international organizations, international conventions, and agreements, and bilateral or multilateral joint statements issued with various countries, the number and geographical scope and specialized fields it covers are unprecedented in international political history. The United States' efforts to build and consolidate international mechanisms have reduced the cost of maintaining unipolar hegemony, and are of far-reaching significance to safeguarding the strategic interests and economy of the United States. (13)

The United States also has a dominant position in terms of culture and soft power. American TV shows and movies account for about three-quarters of the world market. American popular music occupies the same dominant position. At the same time, American fashion, eating habits and even dress are increasingly imitated around the world. The language of the Internet is English. Most of the knocking actions of computers around the world come from the United States, affecting the content of global conversations. (14) However, the attraction of American culture is not only that, but also comes from the value beliefs conveyed by these objectified products, such as democracy, personal freedom, mobility and openness of economic and social status. (15) Worldwide, the lifestyle and behavioral patterns of the United States are being frantically imitated, and markets, democracy and human rights have become "universal values" shared by the world. The "Washington Consensus" is considered to be the unchanging truth for late-developed countries to achieve modernization. The United States has established strong soft power through the advantages of popular culture, which has thus enhanced the external world's recognition of the legitimacy of the hegemony of the United States.

is the comprehensive leadership of American power and power at all levels mentioned above, which has enabled the generalized West to achieve unity under the leadership of the United States. (16) Since modern times, the West has gradually established its central position in the modern international system, but it has always faced constraints and obstacles from internal and external factors. Within Western civilization, there have been two world wars and the Cold War confrontation; outside the West, there are the rise of national independence movements and emerging forces around the world. The disintegration of the Soviet Union means that the division from the inside is breached; in the face of the hegemony of the United States, most of the external worlds have abandoned checks and balances and chose to integrate into the current international system dominated by the West. In this way, world history once again entered a solid Western-centrism era.

2. Changes in international structure and the decline of Western centrality

Although the world once entered a unipolar moment defined by American hegemony, the interaction and rise and fall of international forces have caused complex and profound changes in the international structure of the post-Cold War era, showing a geopolitical picture that is far from being able to be summarized in the panoramic view of the US dominance or the Western center. From the perspective of world political leadership and being led, we roughly divide the current international structure into the West and the non-Western. (As shown in Figure 1)

The panoramic Western camp, with the United States as the first, is the world leader, has a comprehensive advantage in the relationship between the east and the north and the south, and is the makers of global rules and the main provider of international public goods. The Western camp accounts for ten percent of the world's population, but it has more than two-thirds of the wealth and power of human beings.In the economic field, the West accounts for 60% of the global economic output value, almost monopolizing the research and development of advanced technology industries, providing the vast majority of the world's manufacturing products, owning and manipulating the international financial system, and dominating the international capital market; (17) In the military field, Western countries continue to maintain absolute advantages in all areas such as armament quantity, weapon technology, and organizational efficiency, and are able to threaten force and intervene in other regions of the world; in the aspects of modern knowledge, Internet use, news reporting, etc., the West also dominates, guiding the world's lifestyle and ideas.

However, the same obvious fact is the constant decline of the centrality of the West. In just over a decade since the end of the Cold War, the West, especially the United States, have been significantly weakened in its power structure, international authority and global influence. In terms of force structure, the Western economy, which entered the new century, has entered a new round of weak growth period, and has performed poorly in indicators such as development trend, growth potential and international contribution; the outbreak of the international financial crisis has changed the situation of the West in the financial field, and the development model of extreme belief in the market has been questioned. Although the West still maintains a significant advantage in the military field, their ability to achieve their will through force has seriously declined, and the long-term delay in the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the war on terrorism are strong evidence. In terms of international authority, the unilateral behavior and domineering logic of the West, especially the United States, encountered strong resistance from the non-Western world; the two-sided practices and double standards in foreign affairs highlighted their hypocritical nature, resulting in a decline in soft power; the West's unremitting and unrealistic promotion of democracy has caused governance difficulties and humanitarian disasters in many latecomers, and its international image and moral authority have been seriously damaged. In terms of global influence, although the West has a monopoly position in international order and rules, the West's international mobilization capabilities are strongly limited whether dealing with traditional major power relations and international security, or functional non-traditional issues.

corresponds to the West to a relatively divided and weak non-Western world. They are at a marginal position in the world's power structure. They not only do not have the right to decide the system and the right to distribute interests, but are also subject to wanton interference and strategic squeeze from the Western world from time to time. Specifically, we divide the non-Western world into five categories of states and national groups (18). First, emerging market economies. (19) Over the past 20 years, a large number of emerging market economies have emerged within the world economic system. Under the strategic opportunity of global market opening, these countries have changed from planned economy to market economy, from self-closed to opening up, their economic efficiency has been greatly improved, their national strength has been significantly enhanced, and their proportion in the world economy has continued to rise. In terms of economic aggregate, emerging economies currently account for 43.7% of global GDP (based on purchasing power), and this figure will rise to 50.2% by 2013; in terms of economic driving force, about 78% of global economic growth in 2008 came from emerging economies, while this figure may rise to 88% in 2009. Among them, the "BRICS" contributed more than 45% to global economic growth in 2008. (20) In terms of development trends, according to the latest forecasts of the International Monetary Fund, the real GDP growth of emerging economies in 2010 is expected to reach nearly 5%, while the growth rate of developed economies during the same period is only 1.3%. (21) The enhancement of economic strength of emerging economies has correspondingly improved their position in the world economy and international politics. Their influence at the international and regional levels has begun to emerge, becoming an important force in changing and shaping the current international order.

Second, Russia. The end of the Cold War means the end of the Soviet socialist system on the territory, and Russia inherited the political and strategic legacy of the Soviet Union and became an important actor in the international political landscape. The vast territory, rich resources and strategic nuclear arsenal that cannot be ignored support Russia's status as a political power, but this cannot conceal Russia's extreme weakness and a certain degree of political out-of-control. Accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union was a complete collapse of the domestic economy, social unrest, and a complex and fierce power struggle at the political level. In terms of foreign policy, Russia vigorously promotes the diplomatic strategy of "one-sided against the West" with the national goal of fully integrating into the Western system.(22) But overall, Russia's path choice was not successful. The West not only did not accept Russia as a member of its civilization, but instead continued to squeeze Russia's strategic space. With the recovery of economic strength and strong leadership of political elites, Russia began to respond to the strategic offensive of the West in its surrounding areas through a tough stance. Russia's policy trends have become an important factor affecting future international political changes.

3, Islamic world. There are 57 countries in the Islamic world, with a total area of ​​about 32.14 million square kilometers and a population of about 1.6 billion, making it an important strategic force internationally. (23) Due to the historical grievances, territorial disputes, religious conflicts and interest entanglements of various countries in the region, coupled with the competitive infiltration of major powers outside the region, the Islamic world has become the region with the most complex ethnic and religious relations and the most intense strategic conflict of interest in the world today. After the end of the Cold War, the Islamic world carried out internal changes based on the orientation of modernization, accelerating the country's economic development and political democracy, and thus improving its overall international status. However, the development imbalance, collision of thoughts and model competition that emerged in the process of transformation from tradition to modern system has exacerbated the difficulty of governance within the country; the complex interweaving of ethnic and religious contradictions between countries has greatly aggravated the turmoil and uneasy in the Islamic world; the forced transformation and strategic squeeze of the United States have strengthened the ideological confrontation between the West and the Islamic world. Against this backdrop, more and more Islamic countries have experienced the religious revival movement, gradually abandoning their efforts and attempts to modernize and secularize, and returning to traditional political structures and ideological teachings to seek solutions. (24) In terms of its status and prospects, within, the transformation of the Islamic world will still be a experimental field for the collision, stirring, experimentation and fermentation of various political thoughts or "isms", and it is also a "fighting arena" for various political forces such as modern and tradition, freedom and conservatism, reform and revolution, radical and moderate, and its future cannot be linearly developed. As far as externally, the Islamic world is a "strategic field" where major strategic forces must pay close attention to and make corresponding investments in ensuring security and gaining strategic advantages... Internal development and external changes interact fiercely and hedge, and the Islamic world will thus become an indispensable and difficult-to-ignore strategic force in the international pattern. (25)

Fourth, Anti-Americanism states. (26) After the end of the Cold War, especially since the "9/11", the United States aims to maintain and expand its hegemony in the field of foreign policy, pursues a unilateral strategic orientation, promotes democracy regardless of everything, wants to interfere in other countries' internal affairs, and sanctions or even threatens "disobedient" countries by force. The domineering practices of the United States have caused a strong rebound worldwide, resulting in a rising wave of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism refers to a kind of rejection of a specific American model in thought, an emotional resistance to a specific American value, and an action attack on American interests and their actions. (27) Overall, anti-American countries are relatively weak developing countries. They use various asymmetric and soft checks and balances to weaken the United States' strategic position, attack their international image, and thus create a passive dilemma in the United States' foreign policy. (28) With the major adjustments to the US foreign policy since Obama took office, the global anti-Americanism wave has eased. However, based on the United States' global primacy and expansionary values, anti-Americanism will not only not be eliminated in the short term, but may also be further intensified by a tough shift in US policies. Therefore, anti-American countries also constitute a unique political force in the international pattern, affecting the development direction of the world situation.

Fifth, "failed states". "Failed countries" have long existed as an international phenomenon, and have become a hot topic of concern to the international community with the large number of growth in failed countries after the Cold War. "Failed countries" are mainly concentrated in some developing countries in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. Most of them have experienced the historical process of colonial rule and national liberation, and have strong interest demands for promoting their own country's modernization and realizing national prosperity and strength. However, historical difficulties, weak political and social systems and unfair international order make it difficult for these countries to try to modernize.After the end of the Cold War, the governance difficulties of these countries further intensified against the background of the negative effects of the globalization process, the power vacuum brought by the transformation of the international pattern, and the difficulties in internal modernization transformation. They cannot provide basic security and welfare to their citizens internally, their systems are weak and the laws are ineffective, resulting in political corruption, fierce power struggles and the disintegration of social order; externally, they cannot fulfill basic international obligations, and even difficult to form independent state actors. (29) Pre-modern, anarchy, neglect of human rights and strong dependence constitute the common essential attributes of the "failed state". (30) "Failed countries" have caused a large number of humanitarian disasters and destroyed the stability of the international order, thus becoming an important factor affecting international political changes.

Through the analysis of the Western camp and the non-Western world, we can see that although the West occupies a dominant position in the world's political and economic structure, it has shown a trend of continuous decline. The relatively concentrated international power structure is undergoing differentiation and dispersion, and a more diverse and complex geopolitical picture is taking shape.

3. Analysis on the reasons for the decline of the Western central position

At the beginning of the end of the Cold War, the West re-reached unification under the leadership of the United States and gained global leadership power. The West has an undisputed dominance in terms of rule-making, agenda shaping to international mobilization. However, in just over a decade, the Western-centrism position has shown a tendency to decline. The United States' strategic mistakes, the decline in the overall capacity of Western society and the comprehensive challenges of the non-Western world together constitute the driving mechanism for changes in the international structure.

Figure 2: Basic logic of strategic mistakes in the United States after the Cold War

First, the United States' strategic mistakes. The end of the Cold War established the United States' hegemony in the post-war period and also began the process of its decline in power. Through Figure 2, we can see the logic behind the US strategic mistakes. The historic misunderstanding of the end of the Cold War formed the logical starting point for a series of subsequent strategic mistakes. The direct reason for the end of the Cold War was that the Soviet Union voluntarily gave up confrontation rather than the United States defeated the Soviet Union; the internal mechanism was that the Soviet Union's political and social system was difficult to return and was extremely rigid, and the decision-makers took over radical policy measures, resulting in the end of the communist ideology and the disintegration of the entire country. It is undeniable that the United States has played an important role in this historical process and has exerted multiple pressures on the strategic, economic and value levels. However, from the perspective of international comparison, the final disintegration of the Soviet Union stems from the failure of its internal governance. Judging from the results, the United States did win the Cold War and became the biggest beneficiary of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, the United States confused the causes and consequences of the end of the Cold War, viewing both as a comprehensive victory in the free world. This has led to the extreme expansion of US self-confidence and an unrestrained arrogance. Its concentrated expression is the proposal of the "end of history" and the admiration of market fundamentalism. As for the former, Fukuyama pointed out that the end of the Cold War means that mankind has entered an era of ideological unity, and the liberal democratic system has become the last historical stage of human social development; the latter emphasizes the supremacy of the market and excessive doubts about the country, believing that the power of the free market can overcome all difficulties and solve all problems. It is precisely under this cognition and mentality that the United States has made a series of strategic mistakes. At home, the United States vigorously developed the virtual economy, belittled the value of the real economy, resulting in the subsequent industrial bubble and hollowing out. At the same time, the government relaxed the supervision and constraints on the market, resulting in the proliferation of financial derivatives and the loss of social credit, which laid the root cause of the subsequent outbreak of the financial crisis. On the outside, the United States is even more domineering, often interfering in other people's internal affairs, creating threats of opposition, wantonly promote American values, and excessively abuses military power. This aroused anti-American sentiment and actions around the world, causing the United States' national strength to be overdrawn and its international image was seriously damaged. The "9/11" incident is not only a response from the external society to the hegemony of the United States, but also a new round of anti-American actions.

The United States' strategic mistakes made its international status significantly different from the situation at the beginning of the Cold War.This is reflected in three levels:

First, the over-spilling effect of the new economy no longer exists. Since the 1990s, a new economy with knowledge and information as the main body has been advancing in the United States, and capital from all over the world has poured into the United States like a sleepwalking, stimulating and supporting the prosperity of the free market. With the bursting of the bubble, the spillover effect brought by the new economy ended. Secondly, we no longer enjoy the peace dividends brought by the end of the Cold War. The United States, with the power of the Cold War winner, could once issue orders and followers in the world, maintaining an international order that is beneficial to it at a very small cost. But the US offensive foreign policy and the dilemma faced have caused the international community to feel awe for it. With Russia's open resistance and the head-on collision of the Islamic world, the days when the United States exercises international leadership without any effort have become history. Third, the dual cost problem of hegemony. Before 9/11, the cost of US hegemony was to provide global public products to ensure the unity of the world market and the stability of the international order; however, after 9/11, the United States had to bear the heavy cost of homeland security. In order to prevent the emergence of the second "9/11", the United States has invested a lot of resources to expand the intelligence system externally and increase military power delivery, and military expenditures have increased sharply; strengthening security measures internally also affects citizens' personal rights and social freedom. All of these problems highlight the internal and external dilemma of the United States and exacerbate the decline of Western centrality.

Second, the overall action ability of Western society has declined. Firstly, it is manifested as the introverted orientation of Western society. After the end of the Cold War, the West was increasingly concerned about its internal problems and needs, the most prominent of which were the welfare system and population difficulties. While implementing the Western welfare system for nearly half a century is enviable, it has also caused many problems such as increased government fiscal burden, stagnation of economic growth, decline in social competitiveness, and promoting people's laziness. (31) On the issue of population, the trend of aging age structure and complex racial relations coexist. Faced with the huge population of the non-Western world, the weak advantages accumulated by the West through technological innovation will be difficult to maintain for a long time; and the continuous wave of immigration and the resulting cultural diversity are impacting the white elite dominance and the construction of Western national characteristics. The hidden worries of "who are we" have become prominent as a result. (32) The priority of internal governance limits the West's ability and willingness to act in the external world, and shirking international responsibilities and even withdrawing from world affairs has become a policy choice for many Western countries.

The second is the issue of solidarity in the Western Union. During the Cold War, although there were constant differences within the Western Alliance, it maintained a situation of overall unity under the leadership of the United States. However, the Western alliance in the post-Cold War era is gradually drifting away and loosening. On the one hand, the West has common interests and needs in promoting core values, maintaining a monopoly international rule order, and responding to the rise of the non-Western world; on the other hand, the West has many contradictions and even parted ways in a wider range of international issues, threat perceptions and ways of handling them. Taking the transatlantic relations as an example, the United States is concerned about the issue of hegemony maintenance, while Europe believes that various abstract and postmodern issues are more prioritized; the United States is still in a jungle world where strength is paramount, feeling that threats are everywhere, and Europe is abandoning its strength and entering a world where self-discipline is carried out through laws, rules, transnational negotiations and cooperation; Americans show stronger unilateralism when handling international affairs and alienate international law, while Europeans are more patient and insist on solving problems in a more delicate and complex way. (33) In addition, the United States and Europe are also full of competition in issues such as international currency, financial order, and global governance. Therefore, although internal problems in the West do not lead to the disintegration of the alliance, they also restrict their ability to act as a whole, thus endangering the Western central position itself.

Third, the comprehensive challenge of the non-Western world. The decline of the Western centrality is not only due to problems within the West, but also the rise and challenges of the others in the non-Western world. First of all, there is a challenge for emerging market economies.It should be pointed out that emerging market economies have a satisfactory attitude towards the current international system and are not willing to overturn the existing institutional arrangements. Instead, they seek to seek gradual incremental reforms on the premise of recognizing the rationality of the existing system and gradually achieve equality and balance of the international power structure. But from a long-term trend, the continued economic development of these countries objectively poses a challenge to the Western dominance. Among them, China's growth in strength is undoubtedly of decisive significance. After 30 years of economic growth and accumulation of strength, China's national capabilities have been comprehensively improved; the international financial crisis has further enhanced China's strategic position and the rise trend has become clearer. Based on China's continental power scale, huge energy and cultural characteristics, China's rise will not only affect the world's economic development and strategic pattern direction, but also shape human understanding of social development model and modernity. (34)

Fourth, Russia, the Islamic world and anti-American countries have shown loose alliances, which has challenged the centrality of the West from a geopolitical level. After the end of the Cold War, Russia's strategic space was constantly squeezed. After the disillusionment of integrating into the West was shattered, Russia quickly raised the banner of independence, seeking to restore Russia's status as a great power through a tough stance; the United States' democratic plan in the Middle East and its long-term favoritism of Israel caused general dissatisfaction in the Islamic world, and arbitrarily equating terrorism with Islamic doctrines even aroused strong anti-US sentiment in the Islamic world; the long-term sanctions of North Korea, Cuba, and Venezuela not only did not force them to abandon the revolutionary path, but instead encouraged their original anti-American stance. It should be said that at the beginning, the three were not closely linked. They each opposed the United States and did not have strategic connotations. The purpose was to improve relations with the United States through confrontational measures. However, after tactical means failed to achieve ideal results, Russia consciously strengthened its close ties with the latter two, and a regional alliance aimed at anti-US is forming.

It is worth noting that the Western camp led by the United States and the anti-American alliance led by Russia are "organized and undisciplined" and are far inferior to the alliance system during the Cold War in terms of stability and predictability. The core countries of the camp lack effective control over internal members. Although these members have great differences in strength levels, they all have strong independence and poor self-discipline. Therefore, the marginal areas of core countries will be filled with frequent low-intensity wars, and mankind may enter a "Warm War era" that is neither a comprehensive hot war nor a major power Cold War. Although the international financial crisis has suffered heavy blows from the Russian economy and the spirit of showing "muscles" to the West has declined; the policy adjustments of the new US government have also eased the anti-American sentiment around the world to a certain extent, the Western dominant international structure and the United States' policy stance towards the top three determine that the strategic confrontation with the United States and Russia as the core will continue for a long time, posing a lasting challenge to the Western central position.

4. The development trend of international structure and the future of Western-centrism

Uncertainty remains the norm for world political development. While scholars were still arguing about whether the two poles were more conducive to order stability, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union was enough to make them fall into their eyes; politicians who claimed to be the "New Roman Empire" at the beginning of the end of the Cold War also found it difficult to imagine the strategic situation of the West today. The West still has a central position in the existing international structure, but international power is inevitably shifting. Whether this trend can be achieved in a peaceful and gradual manner depends on the following two key variables.

First, the West’s own adaptability. The contradiction between the complexity of the international environment and the finiteness of human cognition means that states will never make decisions under sufficient information, and at the same time, they cannot avoid the possibility of wrong decisions. The key to the problem lies in whether a country has the ability to reflect strategically and adjust itself. Faced with the continuous decline of its central position, the West must make adjustments in policies and mentality to adapt to new real needs.Internally, as mentioned above, the West faces a series of problems such as weak economic growth, dilemma of welfare system, and complex racial relations. Only by making changes and adjustments, releasing social vitality, promoting institutional innovation, and establishing a new identity can we maintain influence in the world economy and politics. Among them, the US policy adjustment is of decisive significance. Long-term leading position has caused the United States to develop "hegemony dependence". For the United States, maintaining hegemony is not only about the increase or decrease in interests, but also a matter of life and death. So far, less than five percent of the world's population has enjoyed one-third of the world's resources and formed super superior living conditions and consumption habits. It is difficult for Americans to accept the standard of living that returns to the level of developing countries. Therefore, the United States strives to maintain the legitimacy of its hegemony through alliance leadership, institutional construction and military leadership. However, the rise of the non-Western world makes it increasingly difficult to maintain American hegemony. Whether new institutional arrangements can be established to adapt to changes in the international structure without affecting the current lifestyle is a huge challenge for the United States.

On the outside, the West needs to come out of its inherent sense of moral superiority and centralist discourse to adapt to the multipolar reality of international structure. This first depends on whether the West can release new institutional space and truly accept the rise of emerging powers. In the future world economic pattern, the economic growth rate of emerging powers will generally be higher than that of Western developed economies, and their strength and global share will be further enhanced. Reflecting on the international political level, the world will enter a stage where new and old powers coexist, which means that the contradiction between developed countries and emerging powers on balance of interests, dominance of rules and sharing of responsibilities has greatly intensified. The concerns of developed countries about the loss of advantages and the dissatisfaction of emerging powers with the status quo will exist at the same time, which together constitute a challenge to the existing order. Therefore, whether Western powers can provide sufficient development space for emerging powers, and whether new and old powers can cooperate to establish a global system based on equal status and extensive consultation will determine the future tone and development orientation of international politics. Secondly, can the United States achieve a strategic reconciliation with Russia. Russia still hopes to return to the Western family in its heart, but it is still unknown whether the United States can seize the historical opportunity to ease the century-long conflict between the United States and Russia. If not, Russia will continue to hover in the emotional cycle of "hope-disappointment", which also determines the limit of improvement in US-Russia relations. The best situation for Russia-US relations in the future is to maintain a cold peace between the two countries, while the worst situation is to form a loose alliance to confront the United States head-on. Third, can the contradiction between the West and the Islamic world be alleviated? The Islamic world is filled with strong anti-Western sentiment, and the pan-Islamic doctrine poses an open challenge to the Western ideology led by the United States. The US policy adjustments have eased the opposition between the West and the Islamic world to a certain extent, but the geopolitical strategic contradictions and profound differences in values ​​between the two will not be eliminated in the short term, which also determines the uncertainty of the relationship between the West and the Islamic world.

Second, the development trend and policy choices of the non-Western world. Although emerging powers can maintain an economic growth momentum higher than those of Western developed economies, they are still at a disadvantage in terms of economic structure and innovation capabilities; in the current international structure, emerging powers have become an important political force, but still lack the ability to shape international rules and key issues; the outbreak of the financial crisis further highlights the strategic position of emerging powers, but this is mainly due to the relative decline in Western status, rather than the absolute improvement of their own strength. These factors determine the difficulty for emerging powers to convert potential strength into actual influence. More importantly, emerging large domestic countries generally face a series of governance challenges such as political transformation, the gap between the rich and the poor, and the growth of corruption. Internal institutional changes and adjustments to state and social relations determine the development trend and future policy choices of emerging powers. As far as the Islamic world is concerned, the decisive matter is whether the existing social institutional structure can be adjusted, thereby achieving a general balance between Islamic traditions and secular values, local culture and Western influence.In other words, whether the Islamic world can embark on modern transformation driven by endogenous forces determines its future and destiny. For anti-American countries, tough foreign policy cannot cover up the weakness of the internal system. On the one hand, these countries need to gradually promote reform and opening up while maintaining their own legitimacy, and inject new vitality into social and economic development; on the other hand, they need to maintain tension in confrontation and cooperation in the field of foreign policy and strive for an international environment and policy space that is beneficial to them. The primary task facing a failed country is to establish a universal and effective authoritative structure and maintain the basic unity of the regime and the country. At the same time, we will reach compromises and seek consensus among different political factions and armed forces, establish a legal framework for common compliance, and on this basis promote economic and social development and strive for international community assistance.

5. Conclusion

Since modern times, the West has gradually established a central position in the modern international system through institutional innovation, commercial expansion and military conquest. For five hundred years, the central position of the West has undergone a shift from the European stage to the American stage and has endured continuous internal struggle and division. The end of the Cold War once again established the central position of the West, but was weakened by US policy errors and internal problems of the West. More importantly, the non-Western world has accumulated considerable modern knowledge after nearly a hundred years of painful learning and adaptation. With the rise of the non-Western world, the central position of the West inevitably declined. The future direction of the international pattern depends on the self-adjustment of the West, the development trend of the non-Western world, and whether the West and the non-Western can achieve power sharing. From the perspective of the overall well-being of mankind, the ideal situation is to achieve successful transformation within the West and the stable development of the non-Western world at the same time. If so, the international structure will move from an unequal Western-centrism era to a more balanced, reasonable and equal competition. We look forward to this day!

Received date: January 2010

Comments:

①William H.McNeil,The Rise of the West: the History of Human Community,Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1992,Part Ⅲ.

②Shi Yinhong: "New Trends·New Patterns·New Specifications", Beijing: Law Press, 2000 edition, pages 86-87.

③ There are two explanations about the division within the West. One is Lenin's "imperialism theory". The nature of imperialism determines that when Western capitalism develops to the monopoly stage, it will inevitably seek markets, raw materials and colonies around the world, which will lead to the outbreak of war; the other explanation is that Western culture itself is highly competitive and breeds conflicting factors. See Lenin, translated by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin's Works and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: "Imperialism is the Supreme Stage of Capitalism", Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2004 edition; Paul Kennedy, Chen Jingbiao, etc., translated by "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers - Economic Changes and Military Conflicts from 1500 to 2000", Beijing: International Cultural Publishing Company, 2006 edition.

④ The author believes that the end of the Cold War was the sign of the Soviet Union's sickle and axe flag descending from the Krem Palace on December 25, 1991. Although the West commemorated the 20th anniversary of the collapse of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 2009 and exaggerated its symbolic significance, this is only a link in the end of the Cold War. Assuming that the Soviet Empire did not disintegrate in the end, even if the Berlin Wall collapsed, we still live in the Cold War.

⑤About the debate on whether the international structure after the end of the Cold War is unipolar or multipolar, see Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment", Foreign Affairs, Vol.70, No.1, 1990/1991, pp.23-33; Christopher Layne, The Unipolar Illusion Revisited: The Coming End of the United States' Unipolar Moment, International Security, Vol.31, No.2, Autumn, 2006; Robert Kagan and William Kristol,"The Present Danger",The National Interest,spring,2000; Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, American Primacy in Perspective,Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.4, Jul./Aug.,2002; Samuel P. Huntington,The Lonely Superpower,Foreign Affairs, Vol.78,No.2,Mar./Apr.,1999.

⑥Mearsheimer,Tragedy of Great Power Politics,New York: W.W.Norton, 2001, p.71.

⑦Wang Jisi: "The cold is in high places - a preliminary study on the world status of America after the Cold War", published in "American Research" No. 3, 1997, page 15.

⑧The Military Balance:2004-2005, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004, pp.354-358, quoted from [US] Stephen M. Walter, translated by Guo Sheng and Wang Ying: "Taughtering American Power: A Global Response to the Priority of the United States", Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2008 edition, page 17.

⑨ Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, American Primacy in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, Vol.81, No.4, Jul./Aug., 2002, pp.21-22.

⑩ [US] Fared Zachalia, translated by Zhao Guangcheng and Lin Minwang: "The Post-American World: The New Era of Economic Order in the Rise of Great Powers", Beijing: CITIC Publishing House, page 54.

(11) [US] by Stephen M. Walter, translated by Guo Sheng and Wang Ying: "Taughtering American Power: A Global Response to the Priority of the United States", page 14.

(12) Men Honghua: "Analysis of the Mechanism of American Hegemony", published in Journal of Pacific Sinica, 2000, No. 2, page 74.

(13) Wang Jisi, Xu Hui, and Ni Feng, edited by: "American Diplomacy after the Cold War (1989-2000)", Beijing: Current Affairs Press, 2008 edition, page 5.

(14) [US] by Zbignew Brzezinski, translated by China Institute of International Studies: "The Big Chess Game: The U.S.'s Principal Status and Geo-Strategy", Shanghai Century Publishing Group, 2007 edition, page 22.

(15) [US] by Joseph Nai, translated by Zheng Zhiguo et al.: "The Confusion of American Hegemony: Why the United States Can't Be arbitrary", Beijing: World Knowledge Press, 2002 edition, page 11.

(16) The West here is more geographically wider, in addition to the original Europe, North America, Latin America and Australia, it also includes Russia and Eastern Europe, which are marginalized in the West, and Japan, which belongs to the West in terms of institutional form.

(17)Jefery R. Barnett, "Exclusion as National Security Policy", Parameters, 24, Spring, 1994, p54, quoted from Huntington, [US], translated by Zhou Qi and others: "The Conflict of Civilizations and the Reconstruction of the World Order", Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2002 edition, pp. 75-76.

(18) The division of the non-Western world here is mainly based on the different identities, policies and strategic influences of these countries and national groups. This is only for the convenience of analysis, not absolutely complete summary, and there are overlaps in categories in some countries.

(19) The emerging market economies referred to here mainly include the BRICS countries, the five prospects and the eleven new diamonds. For details, please refer to Goldman Sachs: "Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050", http://www.macropolis.org/oriente/BRICS.pdf; "VISTA overtaking BRICs for Trust Investments", May,14,2007, http://en.j-cast.com/2007/05/14007399.html; "The Next Eleven", December 12,2005, http://www.amazines.com/Next_Eleven_related.html.

(20) Gaozu Gui, Wei Zonglei, Liu Yu: "The Rise of Emerging Economies and Its Issue", published in "International Information Information" No. 8, 2009, page 1.

(21)IMF:"World Economic Outlook Update:Sustaining the Recovery",http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/02/pdf/text.pdf.

(22) See Feng Shaolei: "Russia in the 20th Century", Beijing: Sanlian Bookstore, 2007 edition, pp. 198-216.

(23) For the definition and scope of the Islamic world, please refer to Gaozu Gui: "Strategic Forces in Transformation: Islamic World", published in "International Information" No. 4, 2004.

(24) [US] Huntington, translated by Zhou Qi and others: "The Conflict of Civilizations and the Reconstruction of World Order", pp. 111-123.

(25) Gaozu Gui: "Analysis of the International Strategic Status of the Islamic World", published in "Asia, Africa" ​​2004, Issue 3, page 16.

(26) The United States calls anti-American countries "rogue states" or "rogue regimes". It is a political concept mainly used by the US government. It refers to a centralized system, which violates the wishes of other countries, attempts to obtain weapons that other countries seek to control, provoke wars hated by other countries internally or externally, engage in crimes against humanity, harbor terrorists, allow criminal activities that other countries do not allow (such as drug trafficking), or seeks to subvert or harm political entities that other countries do not. The extension of this concept is basically equivalent to the "axis of evil" in American diplomacy. This is a group of countries artificially created by the United States based on its will, including Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Libya, Syria and other countries. See Wikipedia, http://zh.wikipedia.org/zh-cn/%E6%B5%81%E6%B0%93%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6.

(27) Zhao Kejin: "World Anti-Americanism and Its Destiny", published in "International Political Research" No. 1, 2007, pp. 157-159.

(28) Walter summarizes different strategies of different countries against the United States, including checks and balances, intentional obstruction, restraint, blackmail and delegalization. For details, please refer to Stephen M. Walter, translated by Guo Sheng and Wang Ying: "Taughtering American Power: A Global Response to the Priority of the United States", Chapter 3.

(29) See Wei Zongyou: "The Issue of 'Failed Country' and International Order", published in "Modern International Relations" No. 3, 2005.

(30) Song Dexing and Liu Jinqi: "Analysis of 'failed countries' in the international system", published in "Modern International Relations" No. 2, 2007, pp. 29-33.

(31) Jin Canrong and David: "New Trends and Impacts of Changes in Major Countries Relations", published in "Contemporary Asia Pacific" No. 1, 2008, pp. 44-45.

(32) See [US] Huntington, translated by Cheng Kexiong: "Who are we? Challenges facing the characteristics of the United States", Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2005 edition, pp. 16-19.

(33) See [US] Robert Kagan, translated by Xiao Rong and Wei Xia: "Strength and Paradise - America and Europe under the New World Order", Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2004 edition, pp. 1-14.

(34) See [English] Martin Jacques, translated by Zhang Li and Liu Qu: "When China Rules the World: China's Rise and the Decline of the Western World", Beijing: CITIC Publishing House, 2010 edition, Introduction.

Source: 2010 "International Observation" (Shanghai) 2010 Issue 2 Pages 1-11