From the current point of view, the West has finally responded to Russia's nuclear threat . The current general speculation is that Russia naturally will not use nuclear weapons at will, because Russia is very clear that once nuclear weapons are used, it will cause huge and uncontrollable consequences. However, in order to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, Russia must present a clear discourse on the use of nuclear weapons and the ambiguity of the corresponding scope of application to constrain Western decision-making space.
When nuclear countries do not want to really fight a nuclear war, nuclear deterrence generally seeks clear and clear concept definitions in exchange for the credibility of nuclear deterrence. But the ambiguity held by Russia now means that this is not far from practical use. In other words, this may be the historical moment when humans are approaching the nuclear war again after the Cuban missile crisis.
Logically, Russia and Crimea are places where Russia must not be attacked by Ukraine. You can imagine that if Ukraine attacks Russia or Crimea, it is highly likely that Russia will use nuclear weapons. There is a considerable probability that the Russian-occupation area of Luhansk and Donetsk will also use nuclear weapons, and the relative possibility of Zaporoze and Khlsong is relatively low. Of course, given this ambiguity, we don’t know where Russia will be the real bottom line.
The key force still lies in the situation of conventional combat. If Russia's situation is very unfavorable, the possibility of using nuclear weapons will be greatly increased and the scope may be relatively wide. Because after all, Russia has taken out nuclear weapons to deter it because conventional forces are already insufficient. Similarly, if the conventional forces reinforced by the Russian army can still be effectively defended, the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons will be relatively small.
The good news is that Ukraine's offensive ability is indeed insufficient. Although the artillery equipment reinforced by NATO has a serious threat to the warehouses, logistics stations, and transportation lines in the rear of Russia, this cannot change the actual situation of the weak attack capabilities of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian army's counterattack in Kharkov was mainly due to the serious shortage of Russian troops. Once the Russian army stabilized the defense line, the Ukrainian army's assault group could not effectively break through the Russian defense line, and on the contrary, it would suffer heavy losses in front of the Russian defense line. This is also clearer in Premier Mann and Hersson. The key to the problem is that the Ukrainian army lacks armored troops and implements breakthrough operations. The Ukrainian army's mechanized cluster has been consumed in a large amount in the early stage. Now the rapid assault forces are mainly light vehicles, including armored transport vehicles , infantry fighting vehicles, lightning protection vehicles, and a large number of pickup trucks and even civilian cars. Although such mobile forces are fast, their ability to attack is very poor. The emergence of the latter two also shows that the gap in Ukrainian military equipment is very serious. The Ukrainian T-64 and T-72 series main battle tanks have suffered huge losses, and the small amount of T-72M supplies in Eastern European countries are not enough to consume. However, NATO countries represented by Germany are not willing to provide main battle tanks such as "Leopard" 2A6 or M1A2, because NATO does not want Ukraine to really live enough armored forces to provoke Russia's bottom line.
To some extent, Russia's nuclear deterrence is indeed effective, which greatly restricts NATO's intention to support Ukraine in launching an offensive, thus avoiding further collapse of the front before the Russian army's mobilization is completed.
However, the problem has not been resolved. Russia can only end the war as soon as possible by killing Ukraine's vitality as much as possible or completely dismantling the Western aid intention, and these are unlikely to be achieved in the short term. The only short-term thing is a large-scale attack, but the Russian army currently does not have the ability to launch a large-scale attack with advantages. It can be said that Russia has lacked a backup plan in this battle, so it can only continue to drag it on now.
We can only hope that Russia will not lose completely, otherwise the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation system caused by Russia's use of nuclear weapons will lead to a large number of countries around China restarting their nuclear plans. This is a very serious situation.The risks are still small in the short term, but in the long run, uncontrollable factors may continue to increase.
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