The "Taiwan Policy Act" which claims to be "the most comprehensive adjustment of the United States' policy to Taiwan" was voted and passed by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the 14th Eastern Time.
What is this method?
22's "Taiwan Policy Law" was derived from the "Taiwan Relations Law" in 1979. The bill was signed by the then President of the United States, Carter, and came into force on January 1, 1979 and signed into law on April 10, 1979.
In April this year, two top "anti-China" elements, the chief member of the Republican Party of the US Senate Budget Committee, Lindsey Graham, and Democratic Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Menendez, made a sudden visit to Taiwan. After returning from Taiwan, the two jointly proposed the so-called "Taiwan Policy Act 2022" in June.
This bill has embarked on the legislative path after two delays, which seems to indicate a possible major change in Sino-US relations. What details are worth paying attention to in
?
Obviously, the 2022 version is an upgraded version in 1979. The bill completely ignores the principle of "one China" and highlights the US Congress' intention to "actively anti-China" in recent years.
Its main content includes: providing Taiwan military aid funds, the United States Council formulates a comprehensive training program and providing nearly US$4.5 billion in security assistance to Taiwan in the next four years; to strengthen support for Taiwan, the United States Council provides additional support for Taiwan's participation in international organizations and multilateral trade structures; to strengthen Taiwan's economic development, the United States Council strengthens economic cooperation with Taiwan and incorporates Taiwan into the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF); to support educational exchanges with Taiwan, the United States Council creates a Taiwan scholarship program; authorizes Taiwan institutions to rename the "Taiwan Representative Office"; and no longer requires the appointment of the head of the "American Association in Taiwan" (AIT) in Taipei to be approved by the Senate, etc. The most noteworthy part of the
bill is that it gives Taiwan the status of " major non- ally (major non-NATO ally)", which is equivalent to Taiwan's "closeest global partner" of the United States, especially in "defense trade" and security cooperation. The
Act not only strengthens the United States' military support for Taiwan, but also significantly upgrades the diplomatic relations between the United States and Taiwan.
How likely is this method to pass?
Although the bill has taken one step now, is still full of variables and controversy . Facing midterm election pressure, political parties and MPs have their own plans for the bill.
Since Pelosi visited Taiwan, American congressmen seem to have discovered the "anti-China" "traffic password", and have formed groups to go to Taiwan, or competed to propose various "promote Taiwan" proposals. The content of the "Taiwan Policy Act" of
actually incorporates the content of various proposals in recent years; it includes military security, international participation, and scholar exchanges and economic and trade cooperation. The bill will be submitted to the entire Senate for trial next, but it must be passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives before the expiration of the term of this Congress in January 2023 before it can be submitted to the US President for signature before it will take effect. This involves complex political struggles and is not easy to achieve.
and Biden , how to grasp the relationship with mainland China will affect the existence and abolition of this bill.
On the one hand, White House has "concerns" about some of these provisions. Biden may think that this bill is risky and makes the United States lose its balance on its involvement in the Taiwan issue. is to change the "strategic fuzzy" strategy that the United States has always pursued against Taiwan and turn to "strategic clarity".
Because of this method, the United States no longer uses the method of "cutting sausages", but has made a "great leap forward", not only crossing the red line, but also swaggeringly crossing the red line.
. In fact, the repeated jump between clarity and blur achieves the best interests of the American political party, giving the United States an operational space on the Taiwan issue.
Even if the hawkish stance on China policy has become the mainstream consensus among the United States, it does not mean that the White House is ready to make major adjustments to its long-term Taiwan policy.
The United States should not easily give up the card of "strategic ambiguity".
But to do the worst plan in everything, another possibility is to finally come true - the White House is worried about being accused of being "weak" and hurting the Democratic Party's election situation, and will not directly deny it or make every effort to block it. The bill may be passed after fine-tuning.
Then this bill will become a major turning point in Sino-US relations, which will inevitably bring about a new storm in Sino-US and cross-strait relations. China and the United States may move towards a new Cold War in all directions.
The United States is a typical "remembering and not remembering to fight". In August, Pelosi's visit to Taiwan caused an uproar in the Taiwan Strait, and the possibility of a cross-strait accident almost occurred. The People's Liberation Army conducted an unprecedented "lock-up" military exercise, launched the missile long-range over Taiwan, and achieved normalization of such military exercises.
If the "Taiwan Policy Law 2022" is really passed, will the counter-action taken by China be greater than the intensity of House Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan? Once this is the case, both Taiwan and the United States will pay a greater price.
(Reporter of this magazine | Li Wenhui)
This article is a new media article of Hong Kong's " Economic Herald ".
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