"Freedom·Equality·Fraternity"
"Liberty, Equality, Fraternity"
[English] James Stephen, written by
Feng Keli, Yang Ripeng, translated by
Jiangxi People's Publishing House; 2016-09.
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Chapter 2 On the freedom of thought and debate
P24
I pointed out in the previous chapter that mil only announced his theory of freedom, but did not give proof. However, the second chapter of "On Freedom of Thought and Debate" and the third chapter of "On Liberty is one of the elements of welfare" may be regarded as arguments or their application of some of the general principles he proposed in the introduction, so I want to talk about the content of these two chapters. What I object to is not Mr. Mill's actual conclusion, but his theory. Below I hope to show how far our differences in practice have expanded. For most of his discussions on the issue of freedom, my opinion is that in order to prove in practice something that can only be proved with narrow and special reasons, he has established a theory that is incorrect in itself, and tends to affirm those views that are harmful in practice.
The conclusion of the chapter "On the Freedom of Thought and Debate" by Mr. Mill summarized it as follows with his unique concise style:
We have now recognized the necessity of freedom of opinion and freedom of expression for the spiritual well-being of human beings (which all other well-beings of mankind depend on). (p25) There are four clear reasons: First, if a certain opinion is forced to remain silent, we cannot be sure that it may be correct. Denying this is equivalent to assuming that we are infallible. Second, even if the opinion that is forced to remain silent is a fallacy, it may, usually, does contain part of the truth; since any universal or popular opinion is rarely or never entire truth, then there is a chance to obtain other parts of the truth only through mutual debate of opposing opinions. Third, even if the accepted opinion is not only correct, but completely correct, if it is not allowed to withstand intense and sincere arguments, most recipients will hold it in a prejudicial manner, with little understanding or feeling of its reasonable basis. Fourth, the meaning of the doctrine itself is also in danger. It may lose or weaken, lose its influence on personality and behavior; the doctrine becomes a pure cliché, which has no effect on good, but it plays a hampering role in any real, heartfelt belief from reason or personal experience and hinders its growth. (On Freedom, 53-54/257-258)
P25
I think this chapter is the most eloquent and powerful text in the author's works. The greater value of the explanation it contains is not literally, but inspiration it gives people, which is also a feature that the author often reveals.
At the beginning of the publication of "On Freedom", these remarks in this chapter undoubtedly left the deepest impression on readers and could make their readers remember them at the beginning. I think that, because of this, most readers forget the logical structure in which these speeches are located, seeing it as a sound argument for greater freedom to discuss moral and theological issues. If Mr. Mill was limited to making such a point of view, in our own time and country, the major issues of morality and theology should be discussed openly and should be free from all legal restrictions, it is a very important thing, then I would agree with him. But the whole chapter left me the impression that in order to establish this limited practical conclusion, Mr. Mill proposed a theory that is actually very far from the truth, and once this theory is widely accepted, it may cause serious obstacles to reasonable legislation. ”
P26
The author agrees with the infinite freedom to express opinions on all issues. His first reason is: “If a certain opinion is forced to remain silent, we cannot be sure that it may be correct. To deny this is equivalent to assuming that we are infallible.
He justly and comprehensively stated his obvious objection to the above statement: "The prohibition of proclaiming fallacies is the greatest infallibility assumption compared to other things that public power does according to its own judgment and responsibility.” (On Liberty, 22/230) In other words, this assumption does not mean that the persecutor is infallible, but that he is correct in this particular matter. To this rebuttal, his reply is as follows: “For an opinion, it is completely different from the assumption that it is correct because it is not refuted in various opportunities to refute it, and it is correct in order to prevent it from being refuted. We assume that our opinion is correct for the sake of action, and that the condition that our assumption is true is the complete freedom to refute it; there is no other condition that a person with only human capacity can be reasonably guaranteed. "(On Freedom, 22-23/231) The answer to
does not satisfy me. It is not easy to analyze the arguments as its basis to make it clear in form. But I think this is based on the examination of the following propositions:
1. No one can provide a reasonable guarantee for the correctness of any opinion unless he is an inaccurate person, or unless everyone has absolute freedom to refute it.
P27
2. Anyone who prevents the expression of any opinion, that is, through such action, can reasonably guarantee that this opinion is wrong.
3. He also destroys the assertion that he makes A condition where a true reasonable guarantee is established, that is, others refute his freedom.
4. Therefore, he is claiming that he is infallible, which is the only basis for ensuring that his assertion is true.
Articles 1 and 2 seem to me to be wrong.
first. I think that there are countless propositions that people can provide reasonable assurance for their correctness, regardless of whether others refute his freedom, even though he does not claim that he is infallible. Every proposition we believe through our senses, or from a practical perspective, belongs to this category. There are a lot of reasons not to prohibit people from denying London Bridge and The existence of Thames. But worrying about the weakening of the evidence, or worrying that legislators will claim that they are infallible, is not among these reasons.
Zhang San says that Li Si is a thief. Li Si sued Zhang San for defamation. Zhang San defended himself. The jury made a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, accompanied by a thousand pounds of compensation. This is almost equivalent to a law: under the punishment of a huge fine, it prohibits people from expressing opinions related to it, that is, Li Si is a thief. Does this weaken the trust of the whole society in the opinions related to it—that is, Li Si is not a thief—? According to Mr. Mill’s doctrine, no one can provide a reasonable guarantee for this unless everyone enjoys absolute freedom to oppose mainstream opinions. This is obviously not the case.
P28
seems to be explained in this way: prohibiting people from denying a proposition, which weakens the power of the inferences that are favorable to it from their default of the proposition; however, as evidence, their default may only be of insignificance, while other evidence independent of public opinion may not only have overwhelming weight, but the situation of things may not be in line with the assumption that further evidence will appear.
Furthermore, when an opinion is prohibited, the prohibitor may not declare it wrong. Its suppression may be because it is correct, or because it is doubtful for its authenticity, or because it is undesirable to discuss such an opinion. In these cases, there is obviously no infallacy assumption of suppression of it. The proverb says, "The more truth you tell, the more insult you are." There is indeed a certain truth. When it comes to things that apply to this proverb, it is obvious that there is no infallacy assumption that people remain silent. If someone says that a respected elder lives a bohemian life when he is young, this opinion may be very true. However, expressing such opinions would be a crime if they were not for public intention.
, when obviously unable to reach any unquestionable conclusions and can only be satisfied with probability, preventing people from discussing, leaving everyone silent and arrogant. This may be a foolish move, but this practice does not contain any infallacy assumptions. Henry VIII and Elizabeth to a certain extent the Queen does not allow Catholics to speak with Puritans , and wants to limit religious debates to the boundaries defined by law, and they do not assume that they are infallacy. Their thoughts—no way to tell whether it is right or wrong—yes, if religious arguments are not allowed to adhere to some rules, a civil war will break out, so they shut up those debaters.
In short, in my opinion, the situations in which Mr. Mill's argument does not apply can be divided into two categories. First, there is a situation where moral certainty can be obtained based on evidence, and second, there is a situation where such certainty can not be obtained based on evidence.
P29
If moral certainty can be obtained based on evidence, then the suppression of opinions does not include infallacy claims, but includes at most correct claims in a specific situation.
If moral certainty cannot be obtained based on evidence, the suppression of opinions does not contain infallibility claims, because it does not conclude that the suppressed opinions are wrong.
The other three arguments that agree with the infinite freedom of thought and speech are: 1. The suppressed opinions may be partially correct. Only through discussion can this part of the truth be revealed. 2. A correct opinion cannot be believed to be correct unless it is heated and sincerely debated. 3. Unless discussed, it will be held in a conventional way.
What these arguments show is not that the suppression of opinions is never correct, but that sometimes it can be wrong, and no one denies this. None of these arguments proves—if the first argument is evidenced, it could have been proved—in any case, the persecution of a doctrine contains clear knowledge errors. For the first argument, if anyone is always going to persecute the proposition that is likely to be completely correct as a proposition that is likely to be completely wrong, then they will obviously treat only partially correct claims in the same way. Article 2 and 3 arguments—I will talk about them further below—applicable only to a specific small number of people whose opinions depend primarily on the personal awareness they gain through the correct cognitive process. The countless majority of people form their opinions in completely different ways. These opinions attract them because they vote for their temper and meet their wishes, not because they have always had evidence to guarantee that they are right. The consequence of the infinite freedom of thought and debate is that it makes many, many minds have a general doubt on many issues. (p30) If you need fanatical beliefs, let people fight. People persecuted because of opinions, or were persecuted because of opinions, probably nothing can make people more strongly realize how important their opinions are and how evil others' opinions are. The infinite freedom of speech may be a great thing, but it does not tend to be enthusiastic about the meaning of the opinion, or even to make a clear assessment of it. It only causes both parties to have a strong interest in things related to those opinions, which is very personal, deeply rooted, and external restrictions can hardly affect it, of course, if it is aroused by such restrictions, it is a different matter.
(p31-p70 omitted)
P71
is very natural to ask the following question: Are you against the entire trend of enlightened opinions for at least three hundred years? Do you want to go back to the era of the Inquisition and to the era of religious wars that caused the Dutch and Germanic regions to fall into devastated for eighty years? Could it be that all the doctrines and practices of British liberalism are completely wrong, and writers of the de Meister type, their modern believers and imitators are our true guides?
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①Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821): French diplomat and political commentator, one of the representative figures of the conservatives during the Great Revolution, including works such as "On France" and "Communications from St. Petersburg". ——Translator's note
I will answer this unswervingly: No! I am not against the practice of modern liberals.They went through hardships and produced very compelling results, but their doctrines also showed some flaws, which were inseparable from the doctrine of a weak and unpopular party that was opening the road to power. They can only convince those they must convince by finding arguments that the truth that can coordinate tolerance and the recognition of religious teachings. They have to cut off religious freedom from skepticism, and it is very clear that they do not realize to what extent the two are indeed connected. In short, in order to avoid this fact, they mainly established their position on the following three points, each of which is of corresponding importance to the theory I stated earlier.
P72
The first point is that persecution makes people silent, but it does not convince people; what is really needed is convincing rather than silence. This argument is to show that persecution has not achieved its purpose, and the following considerations can answer this, or at least greatly weaken its weight: Although silence of A does not convince A, you thus make it easier to convince B, and you protect B's existing beliefs from A's influence.
The second point is that people should not be condemned for their sincere holding of falsehoods. This argument is to show that cruel and bloody persecution is too expensive to eradicate religious fallacies.
As for the third point, I tend to think that it is actually the most powerful among the kind of people who are more likely to move emotions rather than think, that is, the use of persecution to maintain religion is contrary to the emotions of most religions, especially Christians that are regarded as particularly benevolent. As long as Christianity recognizes hell and uses it as its basis, this statement is always contradictory in my opinion; if it can be faced calmly, it is not always offensive, but it is a weakness and often seems hypocritical. Whatever its value is, it belongs to the same category as the second point. This argument is to show that persecution for the unity of religion is too expensive.
The correct inferences drawn from common sense about the suspiciousness of religious theories and the ineffectiveness of persecution in order to achieve the established goals is to ease the passion of the fighters, not to end the war. People should understand this truth: life has other goals besides religious truth; they are too ignorant and too easy to make mistakes in religious views, so when they persecute, they are likely to persecute the truth as a fallacy; if they want the persecution to work, they must make it powerful and systematic, maintain the momentum, so that it can have the effect of crushing, paralyzing and destroying; the results obtained are likely to be extremely valuable, and the further the persecution goes, the greater the harm it may be; (p73) You should teach people not to live in peace, but you can fight with a gentle attitude, and to recognize the nature and importance of competition better than usual, and to be clear about its complexity, uncertainty, and the difficulty of distinguishing between friends and enemies. The skeptic argument that supports religious moderate attitudes is the only conclusion.
P73
If it can be assumed that a gentle attitude will make the quarrel boring or fruitless, then we should remember that there is a situation in which general thoughts and language confuse the degree of cruelty with the effect. There is a concept that the cruelest and most effective competition is the competition in which the winner brings huge physical harm to the loser, but this is not the case. If you want to test your strength fairly and comprehensively, you will take prudent measures to make the test true and reliable and make the best win. If boxers are allowed to punch randomly, or can still add up their punches and feet after knocking down their opponents, they will give each other more serious damage, but their relative strength and endurance are not effectively tested. The same is true for religion, which is not peace, but fair competition.
De Meister said that compared with all torture and persecution, logical reasoning is countless times more serious to Christian persecution; although this statement is a bit weird, it is correct. Modern religious conflicts—through debate, legislation, and social intolerance—are related to early religious persecutions, just as modern wars have to ancient wars.For the losers in ancient times, the best result was death, and the worst result was enslavement, exile and the decline of status. Modern warfare is more efficient, although the process is less cruel and shameful. During the war between 1870 and 1871, both the German and French forces could have completely wiped out the nomadic tribes fighting in Chalon or Tours, as easy as crushing nuts with a steam engine. The French army was defeated by the Germans and lost its combat capability, just like the effect of selling prisoners of war as slaves. The same is true for the debate between
P74
. The conflicts formed by civil wars, judicial persecutions, the Inquisitions and the series of terror they bring are no more effective than ideological wars. When debates are free from judicial punishment, no system, family, or individual can escape this war. Disputes, ridicule and contempt for cherished emotions, revealing their true feelings, blowing or hurting feelings, and pouring cold water on the public or individual hope is as terrifying as real swords and clear harm. The result of this war is that weaker views—not thriving enough, deeply rooted in emotions—are uprooted, and the land it grew up in is transformed into scorched earth, and the imprisonment, stolen, and killing of the past only knocked it down, and once the environment changed, it would grow again. The blow will only cause temporary injuries or fading. Nitrates will not hurt the surface of the silverware, but will change the color of its body forever. It is impossible to draw a clear line that determines the pain caused by compression. Perhaps a slight touch is enough to make people alert. There are many different ways to cause the most distressing pain. The same is true of treating someone’s point of view as the pain of a fallacy. Differences can be pleasant, boring, or cause intense pain, which can have many different types and have a variety of direct causes. Every way that disagrees with someone and brings pain to him is a certain degree of infringement on his freedom of thought. Having him think in some way would cause him artificial pain, offend Mr. Mill's principle of freedom unless it is for self-defense, which is rare. In my opinion, Mr. Mill's theory of freedom of opinion is like the Quaker's. It seems to be teaching people that no matter what kind of revenge, even its mildest form, is wrong, because taking extreme revenge is destructive to society.
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①Quakerism: A sect founded in the 17th century by George Fox, which preaches the doctrine of brotherhood and opposition to war. ——Translator's note
If human experience proves something, what it proves is to minimize limitations and give maximum freedom to everyone, the result will not be equality, but inequality expanded by geometric series. Among all the freedoms, the most important and generally recognized freedom is the freedom to obtain property. If you limit one person in this matter, it is difficult to see what other freedom you have left him.
——J.F. Stephen (J.F. Stephen)
In the debate on the two core political concepts of the world in the mid-to-late 19th century, Stephen's "Freedom Equality and Fraternity" is a powerful stroke.
—Stuart D. Warner
No one would argue that in a place where all thoughts are suppressed by dogma, the freedom of truth and expression can flourish. But as Stephen argued in his fierce attack on Mill in his book "Freedom Equality and Fraud", historical evidence shows that in the strict discipline of Calvinist Puritans in Scotland or England, or in the army, honest morality, preference for truth, strong individualism, etc., at least as common as in more tolerant and indifferent societies.
——Isaiah Berlin
Author profile
James Fitzjames Stephen (1829-1894), a famous jurist in the Victorian era in the United Kingdom.He worked in India and actively promoted the reform of British criminal law during his lifetime and wrote comments for many magazines for a long time. His main works include "Freedom, Equality, and Fraternity", "History of Criminal Law", "Four Seasons of Leisure", etc.
Content Summary
Stephen examined the trinity values of "freedom, equality, and fraternity" with his calm eyes. As one of the elements that serve social welfare, freedom itself has only instrumental value, and has pros and cons according to time and place. Equality and freedom are contradictory to a certain extent. Because each person’s qualifications and environment are different, the result of freedom is precisely the greatest inequality. Because of the inevitable disputes between interests and the different understandings of social prospects and truth, goodness and beauty, human beings cannot achieve a state of fraternity. The truth is not beautiful, the arguments in this book may be harsh, and the real world picture revealed is not very beautiful, but it may be closer to reality.
directory
order…1
Editor's description…18
First version Preface…20
Chapter 1 Overview of freedom…001
Chapter 2On the freedom of thought and debate…024
Chapter 3On the distinction between secular power and religious power…075
Chapter 4On the freedom of The application of theory in morality…087
Chapter 5 Equality…132
Chapter 6 Charity…178
Chapter 7 Conclusion…225
Appendix…237
Documents…280
Comment…283
Comments…283
Translation suffix…311
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[ Excerpt from this article: Yang Yuanping]
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above is for reference only, thank you!
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The words of evil people are ambushing and shedding people's blood; the of upright people will save people. (Proverbs 12:6 Combination)
The words of the wicked lie in wait for blood, but the speech of the upright rescues them. (Proverbs 12:6 NIV)
INCHRIST
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