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Joseph Nye: The rise and fall of American hegemony: From Wilson to Trump
Introduction
【Author】Joseph Nye (Joseph Nye), a world-renowned international political scientist and professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has served as Assistant Secretary of State for the Carter Administration, Chairman of the National Intelligence Committee of the Clinton Administration and Assistant Secretary of Defense. Authors: "Power and Interdependence", "Destined to Lead the World: Changes in the Nature of American Power", "Is the American Era over? 《The Paradox of American Power”, etc.
[Compilation] Li Yuan
[Proofreading] Li Daini
[Source] Nye Jr, J. S. (2019). The rise and fall of American hegemony from Wilson to Trump.International Affairs 7, 95(1), 63-80.
[Journal] International Affairs, one of the world's leading international relations journals and one of the few journals covering the entire discipline. The journal was founded and edited 90 years ago by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London and is known for its academic rigor and focus on practice.
This article is the latest academic paper by Joseph Nye , and is exclusively compiled and published by the "National Political Scholar" WeChat platform.
The rise and fall of American hegemony: From Wilson to Trump
The Rise and Fall of American Hegemony from Wilson to Trumpp3
Joseph S. Nye
A century ago, Wolold Wilson's intervention in -World War changed the United States' world status. But in the 1930s, the United States once again retreated to its isolationist position. After World War II, leaders such as Truman created an alliance system and a multilateral institutional framework, forming what we are familiar with is "liberal international order" or "peace under the rule of the United States". As a description of the United States' world status, these terms seem a bit outdated, but other countries' demand for public goods to be provided by major powers remains. Wilson's efforts to create an international system and a rule-based international order still have great significance today. Leadership does not mean rule, it needs to be shared. Faced with the decline of US strength and the increasing complexity of the world situation, the "American Exceptionism" should focus on sharing the provision of global public goods, especially those that require the exercise of power with other countries. At the same time, the author believes that the United States' world status may be more threatened by the rise of domestic populist politics than by the rise of other major powers on the international stage.
The End of Optimism in US Foreign Policy
Article Introduction
1
Introduction
Benefiting from the protection of the two oceans and the weakness of neighboring countries, the United States in the 19th century was mainly committed to expanding westward and trying to avoid being involved in a global balance of power centered on Europe. In the early 20th century, the United States had become the world's largest economy, and its intervention in World War I broke the balance of power in Europe. However, by the 1930s, American diplomacy turned inward and retreated again to an isolationist stance. With the outbreak of World War II, leaders such as Roosevelt , Truman, and Eisenhower learned the lessons of US introverted policies, and "internationalism" gradually replaced "isolationism". What followed was the establishment of the American international order or "liberal international order" composed of security alliances, multilateral systems and relatively open economic policies, which also established the United States' world status for more than 70 years. Nowadays, with the rise of new forces such as China on the international stage and the rise of a new round of populist political wave within democratic countries, this order is facing great challenges.
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0htmlRealists and liberals in the first century
At the beginning of the 20th century, with the growth of American power, their global choices also increased. In this section, the author analyzes two leading figures in the expansion of American power in the early 1st century: Theodore · Roosevelt and Wollower · Wilson.Roosevelt and Wilson are both moralists who believe in "" " ( the special mission of the United States2), but they show two completely different aspects of American exceptionalism and moral tradition: realism and liberalism.
Theodore Roosevelt believes in the mission of American civilization. On the one hand, he is a realist who believes in the balance of use of force and power. He despises those who are afraid of war and criticizes Wilson's idealism unrealistic. On the other hand, he also has a moral belief that the United States can combine power with lofty goals to serve humanity. , and Wollowed Wilson, like most American leaders in the early twentieth century, considered himself an idealist . Although he did not support universal human rights, had racial bias with the most popular Anglo Saxon chauvinism of his time, and did not hesitate to intervene in Mexico and the Caribbean to promote democracy, his views on international affairs were basically liberal. The author emphasizes that Wilson did not propose original liberal ideas, but he applied these ideas to what he believed was more ethical American foreign policy. He understands the principle of balance of power, but believes that it is immoral. Therefore, an international alliance based on collective security will be more peaceful and just than a coalition out of balance of power.
The author stressed that while Theodore Roosevelt and Wollowed Wilsonford both endorsed the United States’ intervention in World War I, they were for different reasons. Roosevelt supported the UK for the sake of balance of power. Wilson, on the other hand, seeks peace without victory and does not believe in using force to obtain material benefits. He believes that the United States' mission is not material strengthening, but leading all countries to build a new international community. Wilson stressed that the United States is participating in the war as a cooperative force, not an allies. Faced with Germany's unlimited submarine warfare, Wilson decided to join the war for moral considerations and tried to establish a global order in world politics that is more in line with American moral principles and values. The author emphasizes that Wilson has two goals for transformation here: one is to try to change the United States' foreign policy; the other is to try to change the essence of world politics and connect the two together.
The author believes that Wilson's efforts not only failed, but also backfired in the next 20 years, causing a strong wave of isolationism in the United States. However, it cannot be ignored that Wilson's thoughts had a profound impact on his successors, especially Roosevelt and Truman, and it was them who created the liberal international order after World War II.
WoodrowWilson embedded a vision of "liberal internationalism" that hashelped shape U.S. foreign policy ever since.
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00 years later, today is a difficult time to evaluate the United States' world status and Wilson's liberal legacy, which not only stems from China's rise, but also due to the polarization of American domestic politics. In 2016, Trump's coming to power marked a major change in U.S. policy that lasted for 70 years after the war. Wilson is a liberal idealist who wants to create a multilateral system to make the democratic world safer. Trump is a special realist who only focuses on narrow national interests and belittles democracy as an important source of national soft power.
The author emphasized that The unipolar pattern after the Cold War provided an opportunity for the revival of Wilsonism in US foreign policy. Old Bush is a pragmatic realist who explains the First Gulf War with Wilsonian collective security and the "New World Order". His successor, Clinton, pursues a democratic "participation and expansion" strategy. As the Iraq War gradually reached a deadlock and the support of the American people and their allies declined, George W. Bush also increasingly drew nourishment from Wilsonian moral propositions, emphasizing the "democratic agenda" of US foreign policy.In fact, most neoconservatives were previously liberals, who believed in Wilson's American exceptionalism and democratic communication ideas, although they did not inherit his multilateralist concept. The author of believes that Bush and Wilson have surprising similarities. Although Wilson was an idealist and Bush was a realist, both made the American mission of spreading democracy and freedom in other parts of the world. Neither of them saw the huge gap between their ideals and national strength. They all tried to convince the public to accept this policy shift, but they all failed. Both policies also led to subsequent austerity strategic responses, especially in Trump's policies today.
Next, the author compares Trump and his former rulers' strategies with the aid of the discourse of relevant scholars. Through a simple comparison and analysis of Trump, Obama and the National Security Strategy Report during the Bush period, some scholars believe that although Bush and Obama are very different in many aspects, they both uphold the progressive historical view of universal liberalism, and both believe that the United States is in a liberal international order composed of many liberal countries and is recognized as one of the most important components of the entire order. In contrast, Trump is full of Hobbesian realism, zero-sum game view and narrow definition of national interests. The author emphasizes that Wilsonism is currently dormant, and the future of the American order after World War II is also uncertain.
4
" Liberal International Order "
The author believes that the term "liberal International Order" is somewhat misleading, because this order has never been global and is not always very free. It is a combination of Wilson's liberalism and balance of power realism, which includes four aspects: economy, security, human rights and liberal political values, and protection of the global commons (protection of the global commons). Under this framework, the global economy, society and ecology interdependence continues to strengthen. However, the liberal character of this order may be exaggerated. While the United States may generally prefer democracy and openness, it often supports dictators in the context of Cold War competition. Today, the important question of this order is whether other countries that benefit from such rules-based international order, such as China, will continue to uphold this institutional framework even if the United States' position in this order changes.
The United States' alliance system and multilateral system contribute to the security and stability of the world, and the maintenance of the "liberal international order" depends on the US's domestic consensus and the definition of national interests. Before, domestic public opinion in the United States generally believed that maintaining and expanding the liberal international order is in the national interests of the United States, but until 016, Trump challenged this consensus for the first time. As the order of the United States is heading for an end, its world status is also undergoing major changes.
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Will China replace the United States?
Many observers believe that China's rise will end the American era. However, the author believes that contrary to current traditional views, China does not intend to replace the United States as the world's largest economy. Although China's future economic aggregate may become the world's number one, it will still lag behind the United States in other economic indicators, such as per capita income. Moreover, economic strength is only part of the geopolitical balance. In terms of military and soft power, China is also far behind the United States.
At the same time, the author believes that China benefits from the post-war international order, but the question is whether it will cooperate in the provision of public goods and whether it is ready to play this role. Overall, the author believes that China's behavior so far shows that its intention is not to overturn the current world order that benefits it, but to try to increase its influence within that order. However, this may change as China's strength grows. The author emphasizes that no matter what, as China's strength grows, the liberal world order in the United States will have to change. Power must be shared . China has no interest in liberalism or American domination, it focuses more on an "open" or "rules-based" world order.
China Rising
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U.S. status and global public goods
Economic and military scale are another source of the American exceptionalism. If the United States remains the most powerful country in the world, it has reason to play a leading role in providing global public goods. However, the author emphasizes that the role of requires a broad definition of national interests rather than focusing on " free-riding behavior " ( free-riding ).
On the new transnational issue, while US leadership remains important, the successful resolution of the problem requires to cooperate with other countries . In this sense, power has become a positive-sum game (also known as cooperative game). Therefore, in order to achieve certain common goals, the United States needs to exercise powers with other countries, rather than just emphasizing that the United States exercises powers over other countries. On some transnational issues, granting power to other countries will help the United States achieve its own goals.
In the past, the openness of the United States has enhanced its ability to create global networks and maintain international systems and alliance systems. But today, even if the United States still has military, economic and soft power resources beyond any other country, it may not choose to convert these resources into effective acts of power on the global stage. "America No. 1" is just a slogan to some extent, and every country has the right to put its own interests first. But the more important question behind this is, how does define the scope of national interests, is it broad or narrow? The Trump administration’s definition of national interests is narrow and zero-sum. Therefore, the author emphasizes that the main threat to the future status of the United States may come from within the United States, not outside.
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Power transformation and internal threat
The emergence of populism has both economic and cultural roots. The loss of job opportunities, the impact of issues such as gender, race, and sexual orientation on traditional values are important reasons for this wave. Even if economic globalization does not occur, cultural and demographic changes can produce a wave of populism to some extent. The polarization of American politics began long before Trump was elected. His election is both a symptom and one of the reasons. The polarization of US domestic politics is likely to continue, and its foreign policy tends to weaken the United States' ability to consolidate international systems, establish global networks, and effectively respond to new transnational problems. Native populism will also undermine the United States' soft power and its centrality in the global network.
The author emphasizes that in addition to these domestic and social trends that affect the ability of US power conversion, Trump's unique character has also exacerbated the uncertainty of the world status of the United States today. Meanwhile, while Trump's policies undermine the security and economic dimensions of the liberal order, he has not completely destroyed them so far. In terms of values, Trump is less interested in human rights issues and is more willing to accept authoritarian leaders.
The government is divided against itself and cannot government.
Conclusion
In the next few decades, military power will continue to be an important part of global politics, and the United States will remain the world's leading military power. As Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth said, “the change in power distribution among states is far less intense than it is generally believed.” But the views of domestic academics in the United States on how the United States uses its power have indeed changed drastically. After the Cold War, discussions on major strategies such as offshore balance, austerity strategy, restraint strategy, and "disengagement" strategy have become increasingly popular.
At present, military power is not the solution on many regional affairs and transnational issues. Maintaining global networks and international systems and spreading value norms in emerging fields such as cyberspace and climate change can enhance soft power and supplement the hard power resources of the United States. However, they are facing challenges from Trump's unilateralist policies. Although
spreading democracy can become a source of soft power, the premise is that the means must be moderate. In the past, excessive intervention by the United States to promote democracy has led to counterproductive effects. Therefore, neoconservatism influenced by Wilson is unlikely to succeed, and the struggle to spread freedom and democracy will not gain support from both domestic and internationally. But Wilson's efforts to create an international system and a rule-based international order still have great significance today. Leadership does not mean rule, it needs to be shared. Faced with the decline of US strength and the increasing complexity of the world situation, "American Exceptionism " should focus on sharing the provision of global public products, especially those that need to exercise power with other countries. At the same time, the author believes that the United States' world status may be more threatened by the rise of domestic populist politics than the rise of other major powers on the international stage.
The New Face of American Populism.
Official website link: Oxford Academic
https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/95/1/63/5273551
This article is exclusively compiled and released by the National Political Science and Technology Scholars Platform
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