Li Hanzi: Detailed analysis of negotiations between China and Japan on the "interisland issue" and the "five cases" of the three eastern provinces

From the perspective of the negotiation path on the Madashima issue, it was mainly conducted between the Japanese ambassador to Beijing and the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Japanese ambassador was commanded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs was mainly commanded by ministers Yi Li and Na Tong. The specific negotiations were held by the Minister Ijiyuan in Beijing and Liang Dunyan, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty. The key negotiations were held together by Na Tong (Secretary) and Liang Dunyan. China also negotiated and negotiated directly with North Korea's chief supervisor Hirofumi Ito, Foreign Minister Komura Sutaro, through Minister Hu Weide to Japan and Minister Ma Tingliang to Seoul. In October 1908, Fengtian Governor Tang Shaoyi went to Japan and met with foreign ministers of the village, starting the negotiation process on the "Mashima issue".

Judging from the content of the two agreements signed by the two sides, first of all, it can be said to be a victory for Japan's diplomacy. Japan used the pending Sino-North Korea border affairs to recognize the territorial rights of Madashima as a bargaining chip, and obtained the right to establish a consulate in Madashima and the case of the three and five eastern provinces. In this way, Japan can exercise consular judgment power over the North Korean people in the commercial port through the consulate, that is, through legal means, infiltrate the area north of the Tumen River in the name of "protecting" the North Korean ; it can also supervise and control the North Korean through the consulate to achieve the purpose of silencing the anti-Japanese movement of North Korean , which is obviously beneficial to Japan's consolidation of the colonial rule over North Korean . Not only that, Japan also obtained the rights to build railways and mine coal mines in the three eastern provinces, especially the rights obtained through the Portsmouth Treaty after the Russo-Japanese War were implemented, thus clearing the obstacles to the development of the "Manchurian Railway". Secondly, for China, by signing the two agreements, Japan was ultimately forced to recognize the territorial rights and mixed residences of the North Korean 6 people's judgment belonging to China, thus achieving the unity of territorial rights and jurisdiction to a large extent, especially forcing Japan to withdraw from the illegal "United States Police Station of the General Administration of the Central Bureau of the Times", which is undoubtedly a major victory in China's struggle to safeguard territorial sovereignty. In addition, due to China's struggle, Japan's consular referee authority was limited to four commercial ports, thus blocking Japan's greater aggression attempts and ambitions. Especially due to China's struggle, the two agreements have added a lot of content to safeguard China's sovereignty, which gives China more room for maneuver when negotiating with Japan in the future, which are worthy of recognition. In short, China has preserved the fundamental interests of the country's territorial sovereignty at the expense of some railways and coal mines in the three eastern provinces.

[1] In the article "On the negotiations between China and Japan on the "Inter-island Issues" from 1907 to 1909" ( Northeast Normal University Master's thesis, 2013, page 34), Jiang Hongwei gave a positive evaluation of the struggle and some of the victory achieved by the Qing government in order to safeguard national territorial sovereignty.

[2] For details about the "Jiandao" policy of the Korean Empire, please see Yang Zhaoquan and Sun Yumei: "History of Sino-Korean Border", pp. 408-445; Li Huazi: "The View of Territory and Implementation of the Midao Policy during the Korean Empire (1897-1910 AD), "Journal of the Institute of History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences", Episode 7, Commercial Press, 2011 edition, pp. 483-498.

[3] Edited by the Institute of Modern History of the Central Academy of Research: "Historical Materials of Sino-Japanese and South Korea Relations in the Qing Dynasty" Volume 9, pp. 5952-5953.

[4] 中井喜太郎：《間島問題ノ沿革 》，《間島ノ版図ﾆ関シ清韓両国紛議一件》第3卷，アジア歴史資料センター网，レファレンスコード: B03041195600，REEL No.1-0352/0369。

[5] Curated by Shindaji: "Instructions for the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", pages 53-54.

[6] See Li Shenghuan: "Opening the History of the Japanese, Chinese and Korean Affairs" in Modern East China, pages 41-47.

[7] See Li Shenghuan: "Opening the History of the Japanese, Chinese and Korean Affairs" in Modern East China, pages 47-53.

[8] See Jiang Hongwei: "On the negotiations between China and Japan on the "Inter-island Issues" from 1907 to 1909", Master thesis of Northeast Normal University, 2013, pages 6-8.

[9] Jiang Longfan: "Research on the Policy of the Three Kingdoms of China, Korea and Japan toward the Majima North Korean people", page 94.

[10] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Island Question", page 140.

[11] Palace Museum edited by: "Historical Materials of the Chinese and Japanese Negotiations in the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 71, Peking (Beijing): Palace Museum 1932 edition, page 10; Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Question on Islands", pages 92-93.

[12] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on Negotiation between China and Japan of the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 71, page 16.

[13] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pages 92-93.

[14] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pages 97-98.

[15] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on Negotiation between China and Japan in the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 71, page 16.

[16] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pages 146-147.

[17] Curated by Shindaji: "Introduction to the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", pp. 158-159.

[18] Oshita: "Review on the Isle of Questions", page 36.

[19] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Problem in Islands", page 449; Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials of China-Japan Negotiation between the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 73, page 4.

[20] Wang Yunsheng : "China and Japan Over the Sixty Years" Volume 5 (1932), page 110.

[21] On October 20, 1907, Wu Luzhen arrived at Juzi Street, and on the 25th of the same month, Chen Zhaochang arrived at Juzi Street. See the National History Compilation Committee: "Classification of the General Administration" 2, "Island Questions 1~3", Articles 213, 239, pages 404, 413-414.

[22] Curated by Shindaji: "Introduction to the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", pp. 243-244.

[23] Curated by Shinda: "Instructions for the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Supervision Bureau", pp. 245-246, 254-256; Editor of the Foreign Ministry: "Japanese Diplomatic Documentary" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question on Islands", pp. 435-436, 446-455.

[24] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Problem in Islands", pp. 442-445, 457-460; Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on the Bible of the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty, China-Japan" Volume 73, Page 13.

[25] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pp. 173-175.

[26] Article 12 of the Qing-Korea Trade Treaty stipulates: "Border residents have always traded with each other at the junction of land between the two countries. This time, the land trade charter and tax rules should be reorganized after the contract. If the border residents have crossed the land, they should be safe and secured to protect their lives and property. If there is any potential crossing the border in the future, they should prohibit each other to avoid causing trouble. When the market is opened, they will be agreed upon together when the regulations are discussed.”

[27] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Documentary" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Question on Islands", pages 173-175.

[28] In November 1905, the 6th Japanese Army stationed in , Korea submitted the "Mashima Realm Survey Materials" to the General Staff Headquarters, and in March of the following year, the "Summary of Investigation on Mashima". In September 1907, the General Staff Headquarters dispatched two surveyors to investigate the pile of steles in Changbai Mountain. In addition, the request of the General Staff Office of the General Staff Kitaro Nakai submitted the report "The History of the Mashima Issues" in September 1907; Naito After Hunan was appointed as a entrusted by the General Staff Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it submitted two "Investigation of the Masai Issues" in February 1906 and September 1907 respectively. The above reports and investigation reports provide reference for Japan's formulation of the Masai policy. See Li Hanuko: "Insider of Japan's Investigation on the Attribution Issues of "Masai Issues" from 1905 to 1909", "Research on Modern History" Issue 2, 2015.

[29] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Issues in the Island", Page 172.

[30] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Issues in the Island", Pages 437-439.

[31] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Issues in the Island", Pages 437-439.

[32] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Issues in the Island", pages 437-439, 441-442.

[33] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Liter Japan sent more military police and North Korean police to the Madao area, a total of two times. One was in May 1908, when the North Korean anti-Japanese armed groups marched opposite Maoshan, and Japan sent 32 more military police; the other was in July 1909, Wu Luzhen, the Jilin Border Affairs Supervisor, confronted the "Madao Police Station", and Japan sent 96 more military police and 63 more military police officers. See the Palace Museum edited by: "Historical Materials of the China-Japan Negotiation in the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74; Page 4; Oshita: "Review on the Islamic Questions", page 35.

[36] According to records, since the establishment of the Jiandao Police Station, conflicts and negotiations with the Chinese Border Service Office have occurred, including: Tianbaoshan incident, mountain forest ban incident, Japanese Qing people's fight, mileage extraction incident, Japanese military police obstruction incident, Korean officials' slander incident, Korean officials' slander incident, Doumanjiang ferry obstruction incident, Gugu Ling incident, Qing soldiers' atrocities in mid-September 1908, Juzijie incident, Yuji Cave incident, salt monopoly law implementation incident, Fushaping conflict, Jiafanfang construction obstruction incident, Tailazi conflict incident, Japanese detention incident, etc. See Jidao Jidao editor: "The Importance of the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of the State Administration", pages 274-359.

[37] Co-organizer of Naoda: "The Interpretation of the Police Station of the State Supervision Bureau", pp. 320-324; Editor of the Foreign Affairs Provincial Department: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question in the Island", page 517; Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials of the Chinese-Japanese Negotiation between the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74, pages 12-15.

[38] Editor of the Foreign Affairs Provincial Department: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question in the Island", pages 530, 541.

[39] Co-organizer of Naoda: "Instructions for the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", page 324.

[40] The Minister of the Ijiyuan suggested to Xiaomura Foreign Minister to investigate the "Yuji Cave Incident" with China, but Xiaomura opposes the negotiations on the "Midi Island Issues" about to begin. See the editor of the Foreign Ministry: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question in the Island", pages 527-528.

[41] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on the Chinese and Japanese Negotiations between the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74, page 15.

[42] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on the Negotiation between China and Japan in the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74, pp. 24-25.

[43] Edited by the Foreign Ministry: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Confederation", page 700.

[44] The decision to tie the "mashima issue" with the "five cases" of the three eastern provinces was proposed when Masato Nakachi was appointed as the mainland minister and the foreign minister.See Nakawa Eiko: "Nito Konan's border turmoil" Re-examination of Qinghan's border problem "Island Question" in the early 20th century", pages 183-186.

[45] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 700-703.

[46] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 703.

[47] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 222-224.

[48] Japan is worried that China will compete with the "South Manchuria Railway", which hinders China's construction of the "New Law Railway".

[49] The issue of the "Beijing-Feng Railway" sharing Fengtian Station with the South Manchurian Railway.

[50] The Japanese side wanted to use the Dashiqiao-Yingkou line as the branch line of the South Manchurian Railway.

[51] According to the Portsmouth Treaty signed by Japan and Russia in 1905 and the Treaty on the Three East Provinces of China-Japan Conference, Japan advocated that the coal mines in Fushun and Yantai should be handed over to Japan to mine alone.

[52] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 223-224.

[53] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 227-228.

[54] Tao Dajun from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty interviewed the Minister of the Yijiyuan in his personal capacity. Tao Dajun pointed out that Fushun Coal Mine can be jointly organized by China and Japan. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 42, Volume 1 of "Japanese Diplomacy Book", "A Collection of Japanese Contracts", pages 224-225.

[55] Article 6 of the Portsmouth Treaty stipulates that the Russian government shall not be compensated by any means, and by any rights and property attached to the railway from Changchun (Kuanchengzi) to Lushunkou, as well as by all rights and property attached to the railway in that area, as well as by all coal mines attached to the railway in that area, or by all coal mines operated for the benefit of the railway, and by the Qing government, all permitted by the Qing government to transfer them to the Japanese government.

[56] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 224-228.

[57] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 228.

[58] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 228-229.

[59] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 229-232.

[60] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 232-235.

[61] Case A: Japan asked China to stop the construction of the new French railway, but instead build the "Fakumen-Tieling Line" to connect with the South Manchuria Railway. Case B: Japan allows China to build a new French railway, and at the same time allows Japan to build a railway from the South Manchuria Railway, passing through Fakumen to Zhengjiatun. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 42, Volume 1 of "Japanese Diplomacy Book", "A Collection of Japanese Contracts", page 230.

[62] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 235-238.

[63] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 238-239.

[64] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 239-240.

[65] In 1919, North Korea broke out in the "Tripe One" anti-Japanese movement, and affected by it, the "Tripe One Three" anti-Japanese movement was launched in the Yanbian area. Later, the Yanbian area became an important base for the anti-Japanese armed struggle of North Korea . The following year, Japan used the "Huanchun Incident" to dispatch more than 20,000 troops to attack, which was the "Gengshen year's Great Desperation".

[66] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 240-242.

[67] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 239-240.

[68] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 240.

[69] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 241.

[70] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 243-245, 249-254.

[71] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 245.

[72] Wang Yunsheng: "China and Japan Over the Sixty Years" Volume 5 (1932), pp. 128-148.

[73] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 245.

[74] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 245.

[75] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 246.

[76] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 263-265.

[77] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 248.

[78] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 248-249.

[79] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 249.

[80] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 246-247, 254-255.

[81] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 272-273.

[82] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 273.

[83] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 283-284.

[84] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 293-294.

[85] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 294-295.

[86] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Collection of Contracts in the United States", page 305-307.

[87] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Religion and Contract" in the United States, page 307-309.

[88] According to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan laid out during the Russo-Japanese War, the "Anfeng Line" laid out by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War could be changed to a broad rail after consultation with the Qing government after the war, but the governors of the three eastern provinces refused to make concessions and asked Japan to withdraw troops and police first. Japan refused to make concessions under the agreement and threatened to start construction and issued a note to the ministers of various countries in Japan. In order to resolve the "inter-island issue" as soon as possible, the Qing Dynasty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to compromise with Japan on the Anfeng railway issue. See the Palace Museum edited by: "Historical Materials on the Negotiation between the Chinese and Japanese in the Qing Dynasty" Volume 3, Wenhai Publishing House's 1971 photocopy, pp. 170-182.

[89] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Religion and Contract", page 309.

[90] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Relations in the Constitution", page 309.

[91] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 311-316.

After two years of negotiations and negotiations, China and Japan signed the "Midami Island Agreement" and the "Three East Provinces and Five Case Agreement" in September 1909. There has been a lot of research in the academic community regarding these two agreements. However, most of them describe the process of negotiation and negotiation in a general way, without exploring the specific content of the negotiation and the inside story of the bargaining between the two parties. The domestic academic community generally believes that the two agreements are unequal treaties, and because the Qing court is weak, the right to profit has been repeatedly given. This evaluation has a reasonable side. Japan did use the territory rights of "Mashima" that originally belonged to China as a bargaining chip to obtain the privileges of Mashima and the rights of the three and five cases in the east. However, this evaluation is inevitably biased. It cannot be objectively evaluated through the international environment in which China was in at that time, especially by the unequal treaties signed with the great powers, in which it was in order to maintain territorial sovereignty and forced concessions. [1] In addition, the research on the three and five cases in the northeastern provinces was not clearly sorted out because of the complex content.

This article uses historical materials of China, Japan and South Korea, " Japanese diplomatic documents ", "General Administration Documents", "Qing Guangxu, Korea, China-Japan negotiations", etc., to conduct a detailed analysis of the negotiation process of the Midao issue and the three northeastern provinces and five cases, striving to answer the following questions: Why did the negotiations on the Midao issue delay two years; what kind of negotiation strategy did Japan adopt, and how did China respond; what the focus of the debate between the two sides; which events prompted a turning point in the negotiations; how China can protect the territorial rights and sovereignty of Midao at the expense of railways, coal mines and other interests in the three northeastern provinces. Through the answers to the above questions, we will have a clearer understanding of Japan's initial intention to aggression and the final outcome. China's resolute struggle and forced concessions will make the competition and struggle between China and Japan on the inter-island issue appear in three-dimensional way, to reveal the invasion of Japan's use of Sino-North Korea border disputes and the issue of Yueken Korean people to infiltrate the invasion of the region north of Tumenjiang and expand its rights to the three eastern provinces.

1. Japan provoked the "Jijima issue" and formed negotiation strategy

Japan provoked the Mijima issue to take advantage of the border dispute between China and North Korea and there are a large number of Yuekening North Korea people north of the Tumen River. Since the early Ming Dynasty, China and North Korea have used the Yalu River and Tumen River as the boundary. In the 51st year of Kangxi, the monument was erected on the southeastern foot of Changbai Mountain, clearly demarcating the boundary line of the Changbai Mountain area between Yalu River and Tumen River. Later, during the Guangxu period, with the large-scale cross-border crossing of North Korea and reclaiming the area north of the Tumen River, and at the same time, the new land was named "Jiandao" or "Cultivated Island", disputes over the Tumen River border between the two countries were inevitable. After two boundary surveys during the Guangxu period, although the two sides reached a consensus on Tumen River as the boundary, no agreement was reached at the upstream red soil and water convergence of stone and hydrate, which left hidden dangers for Japan to provoke the island problem.

1895 Sino-Japanese War ended with China's defeat. The Sino-Japanese "Himonial Treaty" announced that North Korea was an "independent country". The vassal relationship between North Korea and the Qing Dynasty had been maintained for more than 200 years. In 1897, North Korea announced the establishment of the "Korea Empire". In 1903, the Korean Empire's government government used the opportunity of Russian to occupy the Northeast and appointed Li Fanyun as the "Northern Reclamation Island Management Envoy". With the help of the reclaiming people, he attempted to include the area north of the Tumen River under the jurisdiction of North Korean . [2] But soon Li Fanyun and his "private artillery team" led by the Qing Dynasty was driven out of the above-mentioned areas by the "Jilinian-Kyrgyzstan Army". The border officials of the two countries signed the "China-South Korea Border Aftermath" in 1904, stipulating that the two countries abide by "the water in the Tumen River area, each guards the flood area, and shall not voluntarily carry troops and carry weapons, and will hinder the attack on the Chinese and foreign countries." [3] It was the Russo-Japanese War at this time, and China asked the North Korean side to send members to investigate the borders to resolve the pending part of the border between the two countries. However, at this time, the internal affairs and diplomacy of North Korea had been controlled by Japan. Therefore, Japanese Minister to Beijing Yasuya Uchida said that he would wait for the Russo-Japanese War to be discussed later, which was recognized by China. [4] This provided an excuse for Japan to provoke the Madashima issue after the war.After prior investigation and intelligence collection, the Japanese side found that the residents north of the Tumen River were mainly 6 Koreans, accounting for 70-90% of all residents; [5] The administrative facilities of the Qing Dynasty were not complete enough. After the Qing Dynasty established a collaborative leader in Hunchun in 1714 (the 53rd year of the Kangxi reign), and later promoted to deputy governor. It was not until 1902 that the Yanji Hall was established to manage local civil affairs. Japan found an opportunity, so it decided to set up a dispatching agency for the General Administration of the Central Commission for the excuse of "protecting" 6 people in North Korea. The General Administration was a colonial ruling institution established by Japan in in 1905 in Korea. The first General Administration was Ito Hirobuki . He planned and provoked the "Jiandao issue", and his strategic intentions can be summarized as follows: First, it can restrain Russia and prevent Russia from counterattacking, because "Jiandao" is between the border between China, North Korea and Russia; [6] Two can consolidate the colonial rule of North Korea and suppress the anti-Japanese movement that may be ignited here; [7] Three can expand from Yanji near North Korea and Jilin to the three eastern provinces, which is closely related to Japan's "mainland policy" of invasion of China. [8] After seizing the interests of Southern Manchuria from Russia during the Russo-Japanese War, we expanded our interests from Eastern Manchuria. The so-called "Lu Da is the main gate, and Yanji is the back gate" refers to this. [9]

1907 (Gregorian calendar), Japan sent more than 60 Japanese military police and North Korean inspections headed by the Army Saito Hijiro Nakasa, and set up the "Tongjianfu Linshidao Police Station" in Longjing Village. [10] On the same day, the Japanese Minister to Beijing sent a note to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating: "Miandao is Chinese territory, and it is South Korea's territory, which has not been resolved for a long time. There are more than 100,000 Korean residents in this office, and they are abused by horse thieves and scoundrels. It is planned that the chief supervisor will send personnel to Maidao to protect him. Please call the Chinese officials in this office to avoid misunderstandings." [11] On the one hand, it claimed that the island belongs to it, but on the other hand, it dispatched military police to station in the place under the name of "protecting" 6 North Koreans.

The Chinese side was not expecting Japan to set up a police station for the General Administration of China in Chinese territory. The Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs soon learned through the Governor of the Three East Provinces that "the Japanese called 'Jiandao', namely the Helongyu, Guangjiyu and other places belonging to the Yanji Department, were indeed Chinese territory in the northern border of the Tumen River"; and the Korean people crossed the border and farmed, "and had cases handled by the Beiyang Minister and Jilin General." [12] Based on this, on August 24, the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied to the Japanese acting minister in Beijing: "The China-North Korea border is based on the Tumen River as the natural boundary, and the original Wujian Island is the name of "the place "The Yanji Department and the Division of Defense and Longyu" is in China's territory; the six people in the North Korean area should still be protected by Chinese "local officials"; "They come to the General Administration Office to send a membership, and China is unable to agree." [13] Three days later, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty replied to the Japanese side again: According to the call from the governor of the Fengzhou Provincial Governor, the place was "very calm" and asked the chief supervisor to order the police station to "revoke it quickly." [14]

Considering that Japan used the Sino-North Korea border dispute to provoke trouble, the Qing Dynasty Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Japan to send personnel to investigate the boundary together. On September 19, the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs ordered Yang Shu, Minister to Japan, to propose to the Japanese side, "withdraw troops first and send personnel to work together to investigate the boundary." [15] However, Japan has no intention of sending people to investigate the boundary immediately. Ito Hirofumi, the chief supervisor of the North Korean who had planned the inter-island issue, pointed out on November 2 that the basis for the demarcation of the two governments will be first, and then the two sides will appoint members to conduct on-site investigation. [16] Japan's real intention to provoke the "Mido Island Issues" was to use Sino-North Korea border disputes to negotiate with China to expand Japan's interests in this region. Japan set up a Mashima Police Station, not as if it were to occupy the place, but to restrain China from being in a favorable position in the negotiations, and ultimately make the "Mashima issue" resolved in a direction that is beneficial to Japan. For this reason, more than 60 Japanese military police and North Korea inspected the inspection, and stepped up the expansion of administrative power in the area north of the Tumen River. The police station divides the so-called "jiandao" into four districts, Beiduou, Zhongchengdao, Huiningdao, Maoshandao, etc. At the same time, one president of the capital was appointed, and it was divided into 41 clubs, one president of each, another 290 villages, and one village chief of each. [17] A military police detention center was set up in important locations, with North Korea inspections attached. For example, 14 military police detention centers were set up in Xinxingping, Juzijie, Toutaogou, Huchuanpu, Yuji Cave, Chaoyangchuan , Fushaping and other places.[18] They also arbitrarily changed the place name and established wooden stakes, from the coast of the Tumen River to Liudaogou (Longjing), nailed wooden stakes along the way, marked the place name, and wrote "Some Society of Beijian Island, Great South Korea" on it. [19] also used the "One Entry" North Korean people, Jin Hailong, and others as minions to encourage the reclaimers to refuse to pay rent to China. [20]

China has firmly resisted and fought against the illegal activities carried out by the police station in Chinese territory. In October 1907, under the order of Xu Shichang, the governor of the three eastern provinces, Chen Zhaochang and Wu Luzhen led about 400 Chinese military and police to Juzi Street and established the "Jilin Border Affairs Office". [21] Later, China sent more troops and patrol officers one after another, reaching more than 4,000 at most, which significantly overwhelmed the Japanese side in terms of number. [22] In addition, in order to curb the illegal expansion of the police station, the Border Services Office has set up 14 sergeant offices in various places, such as Liudaogou, Dongshengyong, Huchuan Street, Mapai, Toudaogou, Tailazi, Shaqi Cave, Tongfo Temple, Jidi, Badaogou, Chacun, Baicaogou , Liangshuiquanzi, Hanyaogou, etc. The Tianbaoshan mine jointly organized by China and Japan also banned, making this issue an important issue in the unsolved case between China and Japan and played a role in the Japanese side. In addition, the Border Services Office has also taken a series of measures to crack down on the support forces and activities of the police station, such as arresting the North Korean inspectors hired by the police station; cracking down on the "one-in-one" activities of pro-Japanese sects; arresting Japanese postal personnel; removing the mileage targets set up by the police station; [23] In Jiushui (Gudong River), Niangniangku ( Songjiang Town ), and other places, Yueken North Korean people were required to shave their hair and change their clothes and become Chinese nationals. [24] This measure crushed the police station's conspiracy to use Yueken North Korean people to expand the scope of the island to the upper reaches of the Songhua River.

As mentioned above, on the one hand, the Japanese side used the police station to try their best to expand its administrative power, and on the other hand, in accordance with Hirobu Ito's instructions, the Minister to Beijing began contact and negotiations with the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On December 7, the Japanese Minister to Beijing, Lin Quanzhu, met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty, Natong, , Yuan Shikai, and others at Yuan’s house. [25] This is the first talks between the two sides on the "international island issue", which has involved two main aspects of the "international island issue": one is the territorial rights issue of "international island", and the other is the North Korea's people's protection rights.

Yuan Shikai, based on the boundary survey map of Kangxi's imperial edict (the decree on the investigation of boundary survey in the 50th year of Kangxi's reign) and the eleventh year of Guangxu (1885), pointed out that China and North Korea took the Tumen River as the boundary; and also pointed out that the official documents from North Korea to the Qing Dynasty in the 13th year of Guangxu (1887) Korea : The measurement of the red soil water and Shiyi water merger point above the merging point to the Yalu River has not yet been decided, that is, the boundary survey results of the thirteenth year of Guangxu. Japanese ambassador Lin Quanzhu was speechless, but asked China to let the Japanese copy the official documents and maps they had. He also pointed out that "regardless of the decision on the issue of state, the Korean jurisdiction does not belong to the Qing officials", that is, he denied that China has the right to protect the North Korean 6 people. Yuan Shikai retorted: The six Koreans in the island had a special status. Around the 17th year of the Guangxu period (1891), the North Korean side relied on China for the protection rights. Article 12[26] of the Qing-Korea Trade Treaty (1898). [27] means that both the territorial rights of the island and the protection rights of North Korea's people belong to China.

Previously, although Japan set up a police station for the General Administration in Longjing Village, it was not clear about the ins and outs of Sino-North Korea border and border negotiations. In order to negotiate with China, Japan began to study China-North Korea border affairs issues. By sending people to conduct field investigations and literature research, the Japanese side soon concluded that the evidence of the Majima belonging to South Korea was weak. [28] For example, on December 6, 1907, the Japanese Foreign Minister issued a power to the Minister in Beijing: "According to our investigation, the arguments of the South Korean government's claim on the issue of the island are weak." "In order to formulate the basis of the state, we must first understand the arguments of the other party." [29] Here, the so-called "weak argument" of the Korean government government means that the idea that the island belongs to South Korea is difficult to establish based on the Tumen and Douman Erjiang theory. In addition, China's firm opposition and demand that the police station withdraw from the place, Japan had to decide to give up its territorial rights and fight for the protection of North Korea's 6 people.

11 On April 7, 1908, the Japanese Foreign Minister issued an "internal training on the Matsushima issue" to the Minister in Beijing, pointing out that the South Korean side's claim was somewhat weak, and as a result, it had to admit that with the Tumen River as the boundary, it was prepared to propose to China to set up a consulate or branch in Matsushima. The consular judgment power of the six North Koreans belongs to the Japanese side, and the "Kyrgyzstan" railway construction rights. Considering that China cannot accept the above conditions immediately, the decision to temporarily insist that the ownership of the island is still undecided. [30] On April 11 of the same year, the Japanese government announced the "Official System of the Linjidao Police Station of the General Administration" through an imperial decree. [31] Its intention is to continue to put pressure on China through the police station on the one hand, and on the other hand, to negotiate with China to achieve the above goals. The introduction of this "internal training" marks the basic formation of Japan's "international island issue" negotiation strategy.

As mentioned above, in order to exchange territorial rights for privileges on the island, we must first deny China's claim of Tumenjiang as the boundary, and then exchange other interests in the attitude of concessions to territorial rights. To this end, the Japanese side carefully prepared a note to refute China. Soon, Saito, the director of the Mashima Police Station, specially transferred from Longjing Village to Beijing to discuss with the ambassador to Beijing. [32] On May 10 of the same year (1908), the note was finally released and handed over Yuan Shikai. The core content was to advocate the Tumen and Douman Erjiang theory and the boundary investigation case in the 13th year of Guangxu (1887). As pointed out: 1) The border between China and North Korea starts with the monument on the Baitou Mountain (Changbai Mountain), with the Yalu River as the boundary in the west and the " Tumen River " as the boundary in the east. The Tumen River is the actual water flow connected to the Monudui (referring to the upstream of the Songhua River) rather than the Douman River (now the Tumen River). 2) When the boundary survey was surveyed in 1885, the North Korean side asked to use the "Tumen River" (upper stream of Songhua River). In 1887, under pressure from China, the North Korean side agreed that the douman river was bounded below the merging of the red earth and the second hydrate of Shiyi as the boundary, but the above merging of the confluence was unresolved, so the 1887 annual meeting was completely invalid. 3) Article 1 of the 1904 "China-South Korea Border Aftermath" stipulates that the two countries' border sites are evidenced by the inscription on Baitou Mountain (implicitly referring to the inscription "East is Tumen" refers to the upstream of the Songhua River), which shows that the Douman River is not a boundary determined by the two countries. [33]

The note on the above Japanese side. On July 2, 1908 (June 4th of the lunar calendar), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty replied to a long article, refuting the views of Japan one by one, emphasizing that the undetermined border between China and North Korea was only above the combined hydration of stone and red earth, and required the two countries to send personnel to conduct investigations and measurements. [34] However, Japan has no intention to resolve the border issue. On the one hand, it delays negotiations on the one hand, and on the other hand, it continues to send additional military police to the police stations to exert pressure and restrain China. By September, the number of Japanese military and police had increased from the initial 60 to 107, reaching more than 250 at the maximum. [35] On the other hand, due to the tit-for-tat struggle between the Border Services Office and the police station, conflicts between the military and police on both sides continued, and the "Yuji Cave Incident" occurred in October of the same year (1908). [36]

2. 1-7 talks between the "Yuji Cave Incident" and the "Six Cases" of the three eastern provinces

In October 11908, a conflict between the Chinese and Japanese military and police occurred, namely the "Yuji Cave Incident", also known as the "Huohu Ligou Incident". In order to send additional military police and detachment centers north of the Tumen River, Japan built a soldier dormitory in Yuji Cave (opposite to Huining, North Korea). After hearing the news, the "Jilin Border Service Office" stationed in Yanji sent military and police to stop it. On October 12, about 60 Chinese patrol officers and military police appeared on the construction site, and only 17 Japanese personnel, including Lieutenant Hirata, were obviously at a disadvantage in terms of number. At first, the military and police on both sides had a physical conflict. Lieutenant Hirata saw that his side was weak, so he ordered the shooting in desperation. As a result, two Chinese patrol officers were shot and died immediately, one was seriously injured, three others were injured, and three were injured on the Japanese side. [37] This incident is the largest conflict since the police station was established in Longjing Village. While proposing serious protests, China urges Japan to resolve the "inter-island issue" as soon as possible.On October 21, the Chinese Minister to Japan, Hu Weide, made the following requirements to the Japanese side: 1) punish the prisoners; 2) punish their chiefs; 3) provide pensions for the casualties; 4) withdraw from the police station; 5) investigate the case-continuing investigation of the case in the 13th year of the Guangxu period, and "the overseas Chinese in Yanji should be settled quickly. These two festivals should be immediately dispatched by the governments of the two countries to clean up the two parties." [38] Regarding China's request to send people to jointly investigate the "Yuji Cave Incident", the Japanese side refused to say "the truth is clear". [39] The reason is that Japan is conscious of its injustice and therefore does not want to be led by China, which is obviously not conducive to the resolution of the "Mashima issue" of Korea and Japan. [40]

At this time, Fengtian Governor Tang Shaoyi was sent to Japan as a special envoy. He was ordered by the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs to propose to resolve two aspects of the "international island issue": one is the case of the Sino-Korea community continuing the case of the 13th year of Guangxu, and the other is the case of the Yue-Korea overseas Chinese. [41] On October 21, Tang Shaoyi and Japanese Foreign Minister Komura Sutaro held talks to discuss Yanji in detail. Xiaomura pointed out that China puts border affairs first, and Japan places the protection of the Korean people first. If China can recognize Japan's "right to protect the Korean people in Yanji", then Japan also recognizes that China "has the right to landlords in Yanji." This is the first time that Japan has publicly stated that it has conditionally recognized that "Mashima" belongs to China. Komura also stated that all Koreans in Yanji "like Korean expatriates at trade ports should be protected by Japan, and there is no other hope", that is, they require the opening of the island and allow Japan to set up a consulate, and Japan will implement the right to protect North Korean people. In addition, Xiaocun also mentioned issues such as railways and coal mines in the three eastern provinces, including the "Xinfa Railway", " South Manchuria Railway " and " Beijing-Feng Railway " in Shenyang, and the "Ji Chang Railway", which were mentioned later, basically mentioned the case of the three eastern provinces and five cases. Finally, he said that the Minister of the Ijiyuan has taken office and will soon propose peaceful discussions to China. [42] The above Tang Shaoyi-Xiaocun talks started the negotiation process on the island issue.

On December 25, 1908 (November 13, lunar calendar), the newly appointed Minister of Yijiyuan informed the Chinese side of the name of the "Six Manchuria Case", [43] including: 1) Fakumen Railway, 2) Dashiqiao branch line, 3) Beijing-Feng Railway extended to Fengtian City Gate, 4) Fushun , Yantai Coal Mine, 5) Mining business along the of the , 6) Interisland issues. The three and five eastern provinces and the inter-island issue are bound together. [44] From this time to March of the following year (1909), 1-7 talks were held between the Minister of the Yijiyuan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty. The details of the 7 talks are outlined below.

11908 (November 16th of the lunar calendar), the Minister of the Yijiyuan met with Na Tong, Yuan Shikai, and Liang Dunyan from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty. This was the first meeting. [45] After the talks began, the Yijiyuan explained in detail the specific content of the "six cases", while Yuan Shikai was responsible for the negotiations. In response to the Japanese side's request for "six cases", Yuan Shikai said that it is best to negotiate with the governor of the three northeastern provinces in railways and mines. If necessary, the central government can advise the governor to compromise, that is, politely refuse Japan to tie the "five cases" and the "inter-island issue". In addition, regarding the "Jiandao issue", Yuan Shikai pointed out that according to Tang Shaoyi's report, the foreign minister of the village has clearly recognized that Jidao is Chinese territory. However, the Ijiyuan denied it, pointing out that the two sides had only exchanged opinions in general, and Japan would add arguments and listen to China's opinions and resolve them on a fair and reasonable basis. [46] Here, the reason why Ijiyuan went back on the issue of the island may be due to a negotiation strategy, that is, to exchange the protection rights of North Korea's people and other interests of the three northeastern provinces in order to use territorial rights as bargaining chips.

111 On January 11, 909, the Minister of the Yijiyuan held the second meeting with Liang Dunyan, Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty, and Tao Dajun, consulting with Tao. [47] At this time, Yuan Shikai had been removed from office by Regent Zaifeng, and he never participated in the negotiations again. Tao Dazhong was a Fengtian negotiator. It is estimated that the negotiations involve railways and coal mines in the three eastern provinces, so they were transferred from Fengtian to Beijing. After the talks began, Liang Dunyan asked to discuss the "Jiandao issue" first, and the Yijiyuan asked all cases to discuss together. So we talked about the Xinfa Railway [48], the Beijing-Feng Railway [49], the Dashiqiao Branch [50], Fushun, Yantai Coal Mine [51], etc. in turn.The two sides did not conduct in-depth negotiations during this talks, focusing on understanding each other's intentions and finding each other's trump cards. Japan also handed over the Book of Awakening (Chinese translation) to China, which refuted the Chinese border theory, with the intention of using the territorial rights of the island to restrain China and as a bargaining chip. [52]

htmlOn November 27, Liang Dunyan brought the right assistant minister Zou Jialai, the right senator Cao Rulin and Tao Dazhong to the Japanese Embassy to hold the third meeting with the Minister of Ijiyuan, [53] mainly discussing the "Midou issue", Fushun Coal Mine and Fakumen Railway, etc. First, regarding the "Jiandao issue", Liang Dunyan has provided a lot of evidence to show that the territory rights of Jiandao belong to China, such as the Korea King's consultation in the eighth year of the Guangxu period, the boundary survey map of the eleventh year and thirteenth year of the Guangxu period, the notes of the North Korean representative Li Chongxia, and the consultation of the King of Korea to Li Hongzhang , etc.; and pointed out that the disputed place or undecided place between China and North Korea is just above the merging of red soil and stone 2 hydration in the upper reaches of the Tumen River. Not only that, he also took out official and private maps of South Korea and Japan, including 22 "Da Tang Map" (South Korea), "Korea Map", and Japanese folk ", North Korea Sea and Land Map", which shows that China and North Korea use Tumen River as the boundary. Regarding the above evidence, the Minister of the Ijiyuan was obviously not confident, but he still argued that the folk map was not trustworthy, and even the official map should not put the disputed area of ​​the island into the Chinese field.

Second, regarding Fushun Coal Mine, Liang Dunyan pointed out that the mine belongs to Wang Chengyao's personal private property. [54] On the one hand, the Ijiyuan stated that it would try its best to compensate the mine owner, and on the other hand, it emphasized that according to Article 6 of the "Handle-Portsmouth Treaty" of Japan and Russia and the "Treaty on Matters of the China-Japan Conference" (hereinafter referred to as the "Treaty on Matters of the East Three Provinces"), Japan enjoys the right to mine the mine, that is, it requires Japan to mine the coal mine alone. Liang Dunyan dared not express his opinion because he involved the treaty signed after the Russo-Japanese War and the interests of coal mines in the three eastern provinces. [56]

Third, regarding the Fakumen Railway, Yijiyuan proposed that in order to avoid the losses caused to the "South Manchuria" railway (Xinmintun to Fakumen) by China's construction of the "New Fa" railway (Xinmintun to Fakumen), it is required to build a railway from Xinmintun to Zhangwutaimen at a distance, such as at Changwutaimen, and then extend it to the west instead of north, so as to be slightly further away from the "South Manchuria" railway. He also proposed another compensation plan: China will repair the "new normal line" and allow Japan to build a railway from the "South Manchuria" railway to the Fakumen, and then to Zhengjiatun (Shuangliao). In response, Chinese personnel expressed difficulty in agreeing, because this would allow Japanese forces to expand to a wider area outside the South Manchuria railway. [57]

htmlOn December 3, Liang Dunyan and Yijiyuan held their fourth meeting, mainly discussing whether the Fushun and Yantai coal mines are applicable to the Sino-Japanese Treaty on Matters in the Three East Provinces. [58] Liang Dunyan quoted the treaty " conference record" No. 10, pointing out that China considered the complexity of mines in the three eastern provinces, so he proposed to handle it under the treaty that had been given to Russia. In order to prevent future misunderstandings, the Japanese side agreed to record the following paragraph on the " conference record": "Mines in Fengtian Province, whether they are open or not, have agreed on fair and detailed regulations." The coal mines in Fushun and Yantai are mines that have been opened and have not been given to Russia, so there is no need to give them to Japan. In response, Ijiyuan said that the Sino-Japanese Treaty on Matters on the Three East Provinces has recognized the Japan-Russia Treaty of Portsmouth, so not only the mines along the railway, but also other mines that Japan believes are related to interests should also be given to Japan. This means that Fushun and Yantai coal mines belong to Japan's legitimate rights under the two treaties.

In order to make the Chinese side clearly understand the requirements of the "six cases", on February 6, the Minister of the Yijiyuan submitted a "Automatic Letter on the Handling of Cases in Manchuria" to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty. [59] On February 10, the two sides negotiated based on the book of Awakening, which is the fifth meeting. [60] First, talking about the Fakumen Railway, Liang Dunyan said that he could not agree with the case A and B proposed by the Japanese side. [61] asked to put this issue aside and discuss the most important "interisland issue" first. Second, talk about the five aspects of the "international island issue": 1) Regarding the mixed residence of Japanese and Koreans: The Minister of Ijiyuan pointed out that if the area around Tumen Jiangbei becomes China's own, then China should recognize that Japanese and Koreans live and operate in a mixed residence and business, and shall not force the change of customs.In response, Liang Dunyan said that the Koreans' mixed residence will not be ignored for the time being, but the Japanese's mixed residence cannot be recognized. Due to China's insistence, the Japanese's right to live in "Miandao".

2) Related to open commercial ports: Liang Dunyan initially stated that opening commercial ports would have relations with foreign countries, so it was not appropriate, but then asked the Japanese side to provide the location of a consulate and branch office, which shows that in order for the Japanese side to withdraw the illegal police station of the General Administration as soon as possible, China has allowed Japan to set up a consulate. In addition, regarding the protection rights of North Korean people, Liang Dunyan pointed out that North Korean people should be divided into two types. One is that residents with land and houses should be placed under China's legal rights; the other is that those who simply travel and travel can be extradited to North Korean if they violate the law. In response, the Minister of Ijiyuan expressed his objection, pointing out that all the jurisdiction of the North Korean people will belong to Japan. Regarding the , North Korea's 6-member jurisdiction over the jurisdiction, the debate between the two sides was the most intense, which made the negotiations delayed for a long time. For China, this issue is related to the unity of territorial rights and jurisdiction of the island. If Japan only recognizes territorial rights and deprives North Korea of ​​6 people, then territorial rights will be nothing but false reputation, so it is determined not to give in.

3) Regarding Tianbaoshan Mine: Liang Dunyan pointed out that the Chinese official did not recognize the contract signed between Jiro Nakano and Cheng Guangdi, and the mine has a relationship with the Americans. The US also has an explanation on this, so it is required to discuss it separately from the "inter-island issue". China actually uses this issue to restrain Japan.

4) Regarding the issue of not hindering the transportation and trade between the island and other parts of China and South Korea: Liang Dunyan pointed out that this term is too abstract and may cause misunderstandings in the future, and asked the Japanese side to specify specific matters. The Minister of Ijiyuan said that this is about China's content that does not hinder the freedom of Tumen River ferry boats and allows North Korean 6 people to transport grains from Mashima. Japan's intention was to incorporate the relevant provisions of the China-South Korea Border Post-Correction (1904) into the new treaty to be signed to strengthen economic penetration north of the Tumen River.

5) Regarding the Jihui Railway: Liang Dunyan said that the Jilin-Changhai Railway (Jilin to Changchun) has not been completed yet, so this issue should not be discussed with the Madao issue; if the Jihui Railway is to be repaired in the future, the Chinese will be run by China, and the , North Korea will be run by Japan. However, the Minister of Ijiyuan insisted on discussing the issue of the Kyrgyzstan Railway and the Midao issue. Considering that China cannot agree to be run by Japan alone, it proposed to be run by China and Japan.

htmlOn December 17, Liang Dunyan and Yijiyuan held their 6th meeting, involving all aspects of the "six cases". [62] First talk about the "Mashima issue": 1) Regarding territorial rights and the 6-member judgement rights of North Korea, the Minister of Ijiyuan pointed out that as long as China recognizes the five conditions related to the "Mashima issue" and other unsolved cases (Japanese side's letter on February 6), then the Japanese side can make concessions on the issue of the Mashima. He received such an order. This is the first time that Yijiyuan has publicly stated that it can be recognized conditionally that the territory rights of the island belong to China. In response, Liang Dunyan said that if only territorial rights are recognized and China's legal rights over North Korean people in the mixed residence, it would be in name only. He suggested that open 2 or 3 commercial ports there, and those who live in commercial ports or travel in other places can obey the legal rights of South Korea; while those who live outside commercial ports (mixed places) and own land to engage in farming should be treated the same as the Chinese and obey the legal rights of China. Obviously, China has made another concession on the judging rights of North Korean people. In addition to simply travelers, residents in commercial ports are also subject to the Japanese referee. 2) Regarding Tianbaoshan Mine: Liang Dunyan pointed out that there is no objection to the joint operation of China and Japan, but the Governor of Fengtian still needs to be asked. 3) Regarding the Kyrgyzstan Railway: Liang Dunyan pointed out that due to the opposition of the Governor of Fengtian, it may be difficult for China and Japan to jointly handle the joint operation. The Kyrgyzstan Railway has always been a bargaining chip in China. Later, on the condition of recognizing the joint operation of China and Japan, China forced Japan to make concessions on the issue of the jurisdiction of North Korea and the water source of the Tumen River in a mixed residence. The details will be expanded later.

Next talks about other unsolved cases, 1) Regarding Fushun Coal Mine: Liang Dunyan pointed out that the Governor of Fengtian, taking into account the position of Japan, agreed to be jointly organized by China and Japan. But Ijiyuan expressed opposition, insisting that this is Japan's legitimate right and demanded to be handled independently.2) Regarding the Fakumen Railway: Liang Dunyan pointed out that the "new normal line" can be separated from the South Manchuria Railway by a distance, which means that China's construction of the new normal line will not affect the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, so the construction of the new normal line is unintentionally suspended. 3) Regarding the branch line of Dashiqiao: Liang Dunyan said that this is a trivial matter. Based on this, Yijiyuan judged that it may not be too big a problem to use the Dashiqiao and Yingkou Line as the branch lines of the South Manchuria Railway.

or above passed the 5th and 6th talks. The Minister of Ijiyuan realized that China was firm in the judgment of the North Korean 6 people in the mixed residence. In order to make progress in the negotiations, he suggested to the foreign minister of the village, , to make concessions. That is, the Japanese side recognized that China had the judgment of the North Korean 6 people in the mixed residence, and the referees were supervised by Japan, such as the Japanese Consul's "Legislative Council" referee, or the 6 people in the North Korean 6 people dissatisfied with the referee's words and requested a "re-examination". [63] However, the foreign minister of Komura expressed his objection and ordered the Minister of Ijiyuan: "For the protection of the Korean people, I hope to fully implement the 's claim" and "do his best to regain the jurisdiction of the Korean people's jurisdiction." [64] The reason why I am so determined on the issue of North Korean people's refereeship is because of the competition for the jurisdiction of North Korean people's refereeship. This is Japan's main goal to provoke the "interis island issue". Its potential intention is to use North Korean 6 people in the region to expand Japanese interests and supervise North Korean 6 people to launch an anti-Japanese movement. Later history proved that this concern was not redundant, it was related to Japan's consolidation of colonial rule over , North Korea, and . [65]

htmlOn December 28, Liang Dunyan and Yijiyuan held their 7th meeting, mainly discussing the jurisdiction of North Korea's six people in the mixed residence and opening up commercial ports. [66] The Minister of Ijiyuan emphasized that the protection rights of North Korea are the foundation of the "international island issue". Since Japan recognizes that the territorial rights belong to China, the protection rights of North Korea should belong to Japan. [67] He also informed China of the geographical scope of the island and the six place names that require opening. Among them, the geographical scope of the island is limited to the existing densely populated areas of North Korea. It is bounded by the Gaya River in the east, along Laoye Ridge in the north, and along Laoling in the west, and up to the demarcation marker. In fact, this was the distribution area of ​​6 people in North Korea north of Tumenjiang at that time, and it was also the scope of Japan's plan to exercise jurisdiction. In addition, Japan requires the opening of commercial ports, that is, the location where consulates and branches are prepared, including the establishment of a consulate in Longjing Village and the establishment of branches in five places including Jizi Street, Toudaogou, Baicaogou, Xiaquanping, and Tongfo Temple. In addition, the Minister of Ijiyuan also proposed to set up a Japanese police station or police officer station outside the commercial port. [68] The reason why he proposed the non-decision of the right to set up a police force, which seriously violates China's sovereignty, was probably due to a negotiation strategy, that is, to use stricter conditions to restrain China and force China to make concessions in the jurisdiction of mixed residences. In response, Liang Dunyan expressed his firm opposition. He pointed out that the right to set up a police force outside the commercial port is more unfavorable to China than the jurisdiction of the referee, and China will not consider it at all. [69]

In short, through the above 1-7 talks, Japan tied the "Jijima issue" with the "five cases" of the three northeastern provinces, using recognition of the territorial rights of the island as a bargaining chip, attempting to seize the jurisdiction of the 6 North Korean html people and the rights of the three northeastern provinces and the rights of the three northeastern provinces and the rights of the rights of the three northeastern provinces and the rights of the rights of the three northeastern provinces and the rights of the rights of the three northeastern provinces and the rights of the rights of the three northeastern provinces and five northeastern provinces. In order to make Japan recognize its territorial rights belong to China and withdraw from the police station, China not only allows Japan to set up consulates and branches on Mashima, and recognizes that Japan exercises its jurisdiction over the six North Koreans in the commercial port. However, mixed residences outside the commercial port still adhere to China's legal rights, which is actually the bottom line of China's negotiations. It can be seen that the focus of the debate between the two sides is on the issue of the judging rights of North Korea's 6 people in the mixed residence.

3. China wants to submit the Hague arbitration and Japan's opposition to the so-called island area north of the Tumen River. The 6 North Koreans account for almost 70% to 90%. If Japan only recognizes China's territorial rights and deprives the jurisdiction of the North Koreans, then the territorial rights will be in vain. Therefore, China insists on the unity of territorial rights and the jurisdiction of North Koreans. In order to put pressure on Japan, China soon proposed to submit the "six cases" to the Hague International Arbitration.

1 On March 22, 1909, Cao Rulin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty conveyed an abbreviation on the "Manchurian Unsolved Case" to the Minister of the Yijiyuan.[70] This section almost completely negated the Japanese side's requirements for the "six cases" and proposed to submit the "six cases" to the Hague International Arbitration. The contents of China's briefing include: 1) Opposing Japan's request for the Fakuman Railway (case A and case B), pointing out that the "new line" that China wants to repair will not harm the interests of Manchuria Railway. 2) The branch line of Dashiqiao is paved by China itself and does not agree with Japan to use it as a branch line of the South Manchuria Railway. 3) Disagree to use Fengtian Station with the Jingfeng Line and the South Manchurian Railway, and pointed out that taking the Jingfeng Line long to Fakumen will not harm the interests of Manchurian Railway. 4) Fushun Coal Mine is Wang Chengyao's personal private property, and Yantai Coal Mine has not given it to Russia. Therefore, according to the " Conference Record" of the Treaty on Matters in the Three East Provinces, the mining rights of the two coal mines cannot be given to Japan. 5) First agree on the methods for coal mines in Fushun and Yantai, and then the Governor of Fengtian will negotiate the mine procedures along the South Manchuria trunk line according to the mine procedures along the Anfeng Line. 6) Regarding the inter-island issue: a) The evidence in the inter-island genus is clear, and it is repeatedly stated by China; the North Korean people, like the Chinese, have always been under the jurisdiction of China and will be the same in the future. If the people of Yuekening North Korean want to return to their nationality, they should return the land they have acquired to China within one year and move to the commercial port to live. b) The commercial port is opened by China on its own location, allowing merchants from all countries to live and trade, and establish consulars; all patrols, construction, health and all administrative powers shall be managed by China in accordance with the method of opening a commercial port by China; consulars of various countries may manage the trade and travel affairs of the people in the country within the commercial port as agreed. Now all Japanese civil and military officials, military police and other items in Yanji were withdrawn immediately. c) The extension of Ji long line to Huining has nothing to do with the affairs of the world, and there is no need to discuss it. In short, as long as "the Yanji issue is ended first", then "the rest of the issues will be easier to trade", otherwise the cases will be "sent to the Hague Peace Association's public judgment", and the Japanese government "whether they are willing to submit the public judgment, I hope to see an overthrow." The above summary shows that the territorial rights of the island and the quarantine rights of the North Korean people belong to China, and on the other hand, the negotiation door is always open.

While delivering the above abbreviation, Cao Rulin also handed over another abbreviation on the Sino-North Korea border to Yijiyuan. [71] This section was briefly drafted by Wu Luzhen and divided into thirteen sections, which were full of words, refuting Japan's fallacy about the Sino-North Korea border, emphasizing that the territorial rights of the island belong to China. [72] After receiving the above two abridgements, the Minister of Ijiyuan realized that China's attitude on the island issue was firm. In order to make progress in the negotiations as soon as possible, he suggested to the foreign minister of the village. After all, China's arguments on territorial issues are sufficient than those of Japan. If China really submits it to the Hague Zhongzai, it will be unfavorable to Japan, so compromise is the best way. He suggested that the village of persuaded the Chinese ambassador to Japan Hu Weide not to submit the "six cases" to the Hague for arbitration. [73]

The news that China wants to submit the Hague arbitration was soon spread by Western media. On March 24, 1909, the London "Taiwushi" published a news stating that China wanted to submit the "six cases" to the Hague for arbitration, and the Japanese ambassador to Beijing was committed to withdrawing the note, and outsiders agreed with China's measures. The newspaper also published detailed contents of the "Six Cases", pointing out that the most important one is the Fakumen Railway and the second is the island issue. [74] The above information is probably disclosed by China on purpose, and its purpose is to gain international support and put pressure on Japan.

In order to understand China's intentions, Japan stepped up intelligence collection and soon found that China wanted to rely on the United States to submit arbitration, [75] and the recommendation that submitted arbitration may be from British people related to the Fakuman Railway. [76] In order to prevent interference from the great powers such as Britain and the United States, Japan has contacted the countries through its ambassadors to Britain and the United States. When the Japanese ambassador to the UK met with the British Foreign Minister, the latter said that he had not received any notice and understood that Japan refused to arbitration. The British side's attitude is probably taking into account the "British-Japanese Alliance", so the Japanese ambassador to the UK said that the British side should not interfere. [77] The Japanese ambassador to the United States met with the US Secretary of State again, and also conveyed Japan's intention to oppose arbitration.[78]

htmlOn April 5, the Minister of the Yijiyuan sent Gaoweitong to express his opposition to the submission of the Hague arbitration to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty. When meeting with Takao, Liang Dun-hiko pointed out that China attaches great importance to the inter-island issue. As long as Japan makes concessions on this issue, it will try its best to reach compromises on other issues. [79] It can be seen that China's intention is not to submit arbitration, but to restrain Japan from making concessions on the Madashima issue. After receiving Takao's report, the Minister of Ijiyuan once again suggested to Xiaomura's foreign minister to make concessions on the judging rights of North Korea , but Xiaomura still disagreed. He said that recognizing China's judging rights is equivalent to destroying the root of the inter-island issue. [80]

Soon after, China took the initiative to withdraw its plan to submit the Hague arbitration. On May 17, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty, Yiji sent a note to the Minister of the Ijiyuan, pointing out that the reason why the cases in the East Province wanted to "send to the Hague Peace Conference for Disclaimer" was because "the meetings were many times, but they had no effect and were only inflicted disputes. Therefore, please submit the strife in order to settle it quickly." However, considering that Japan's request for "the two countries to resolve peacefully on their own", this is consistent with the "original intention" of the Qing Dynasty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggested that "the previous discussions should be held regularly to meet meetings, so that they can be resolved as soon as possible." [81] In response, the Japanese side immediately welcomed this. On May 19, the Minister of the Ijiyuan pointed out in a reply to China that submitting arbitration will only attract third parties’ interference. recommends that reopen the negotiations at a time of convenience. [82] At this point, the negotiations between the two sides on submitting the arbitration in The Hague ended and a new round of negotiations began.

4. The Japanese side concessions on the jurisdiction of North Korea 6 people

html On June 23, Chinese Minister to Japan Hu Weide conveyed a letter to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicating that China's attitude on the island issue remains unchanged, pointing out: 1) Yanji is indeed a place of China and has received a written statement from the Minister of Ijiyuan, who also promised to withdraw the Japanese police there. 2) The 6 people of North Korea have been naturalized in China for a long time and have been governed by China, which is no different from the Chinese people, so they cannot be abandoned and put into the jurisdiction of the Japanese referee. 3) China has promised to open a commercial port on its own. This is the first concession made by China taking into account the friendship between the two sides. It hopes that Japan will also make concessions to achieve so-called mutual concessions to resolve the unsolved case of the three northeastern provinces. [83]

htmlOn July 19, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs replied: 1) Only when China recognizes the inter-island issue and other unsolved cases can Japan recognize that its territorial rights belong to China. 2) The ambassador to Beijing has not stated that he would withdraw Japanese police from Madashima. 3) The Chinese side said that the 6 North Korean people are difficult to be included in the jurisdiction of the Japanese referee, and do not refer to those who have clear naturalization evidence, but those who have not yet naturalized. Obviously, the Japanese side has also identified the so-called 6 North Korean html people divided into naturalized and unnaturalized, trying to include unnaturalized into the Japanese referee. [84]

China firmly opposes this, especially Japan's rebellion on the issue of territorial rights and police withdrawal, which made China indignant. Hu Weide gave examples to refute it one by one. His letter pointed out: 1) Evidence of Japan's recognition of the territorial rights of the island belonging to China, such as the statement of the Minister of the Ijiyuan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Beijing on February 10 of the first year of the Xuantong reign (March 1 of the Gregorian calendar); the summary of the Minister of the Ijiyuan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Beijing on February 5 of the leap month (March 23 of the Gregorian calendar). 2) The Japanese side pointed out the evidence of withdrawing police from the place, such as the statement of the Minister of the Ijiyuan to the Beijing Foreign Affairs Department on February 27, the first year of the Xuantong reign (March 18, Gregorian calendar). Finally, Hu Weide emphasized that Yanji's land, whether it is history or the expropriation, belongs to China, and the evidence is solid and does not need to be recognized by other countries. [85]

At the same time, in order to negotiate and resolve the inter-island issue as soon as possible, China took the initiative to express its attitude of compromise in each case, especially in the five cases. On August 7 (June 22nd lunar month), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty conveyed the "Abstract of Unexpected Cases in the Three East Provinces" to the Minister of the Yijiyuan, including: 1) Yanji is Chinese territory, and the people who have been reclaimed in this area should be judged by China. 2) Yanji can open a commercial port, which is also in accordance with the self-opening of a commercial port. The police in the port should be set up by China, and it is not to be said outside the port. 3) Xinfa Railway: China may allow the proposal to delay the negotiations on the road from Xinmintun Zhan to Fakumen. 4) Dashiqiao Branch: China may allow this road to be transferred as the Nanman branch. When the South Manchuria Railway expires, all of them will be returned to China.5) Fushun and Yantai Coal Mine: The two mines are originally Chinese industries. Now, because of the friendship between the two countries, China may allow them to be jointly organized by China and Japan, and all mining operations along the Anfeng Railway will be handled. 5) Mining business along the Anfeng Railway: Your country's government has allowed it to be jointly organized by merchants like the mining business along the South Manchuria Railway. Now, Fushun and Yantai mines are allowed to be jointly organized by China, and all the articles of association can be negotiated. 6) Beijing-Feng Railway Expo to Fengtian Chenggen: This matter is nothing more than for the sake of traffic, and it has no obstacles to the Nanman route. The previous section is abbreviated as one of the offices and stations. I am sure that the government can accept it. [86] The Chinese side's absurdity above

, except for the territorial rights of the island and the 6-person judgment rights of the North Korean , the others basically meet the requirements of the Japanese side. However, there are still several problems that are different from Japan's requirements. First, the right to build the Kyrgyzstan Railway is not included in the abbreviation; second, the coal mines of Fushun and Yantai, Japan requested to run independently, and China proposed to run together; third, the Beijing-Feng Railway, Japan requested to share a Fengtian Station with the South Manchuria Railway, but China proposed to run each station. After these issues, the two sides continued to negotiate and bargain, especially the right to build the railway in Kyrgyzstan, which was actually a bargaining chip in China. With this, China ultimately forced Japan to concessions on the jurisdiction of North Korea's six people in the mixed residence.

As mentioned above, after China expressed concessions in each case, Japan's attitude also changed. Especially the changes in the political situation of the Qing Dynasty brought about by the death of the two palaces of the Qing Dynasty (Guangxu Emperor, Cixi ), including Yuan Shikai's dismissal from the Regent, Prince Qing (Yi Li), who was in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was attacked by the opposition, and the regent's hope to resolve the island issue as soon as possible after controlling the situation, all of which made the Minister Yijiyuan, who had always dealt with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty, feel a sense of crisis. He is worried that the political situation of the Qing Dynasty will be unstable and the negotiations will be caused by the unstable situation. [87] So, he once again suggested to Xiaomura Foreign Minister that concessions on the judging rights of North Korean people. In order to speed up the negotiation process, he also suggested that separate the legacy of the Russo-Japanese War of Resettlement [88] from the six cases, believing that this is a shortcut to the quick resolution of both issues. [89]

The above suggestions of the minister of Yijiyuan were supported by the foreign minister of the village. On August 9, the foreign minister of the village issued an order to the Ijiyuan: "In view of the repeated statements of the Qing Dynasty government that as long as we make concessions on the issue of the island, we will accept our claims on other issues and decide to satisfy the other party on the issue of the island in order to solve all unsolved cases. The right to judge the Koreans living in the area of ​​the island in the island was given to the Qing Dynasty, so that in order to obtain the original protection of the Koreans, we will request a committee to settle the issue of the island in order to ensure that the Michigan issue was settled." [90]

html On August 13, the Japanese Pavilion Committee approved countermeasures on the unsolved cases in Manchuria, among which the provisions on the issue of the island in the island: 1) Recognize the Tumen River as the border between China and North Korea, and the borders of the upper reaches of the river will be investigated jointly by China and Japan. 2) China has opened 3 or 4 commercial ports on Jiandao, allowing Japan to set up a consulate and 2 or 3 branch offices (the commercial ports are Longjing Village, Quzi Street, Toudaogou, Baicaogou, etc., and the consulate is Longjing Village). 3) Make China recognize the mixed residence and business of North Korea's 6 people in a certain mixed residence area. (This area: from Gaya River in the east, from Laoyeling in the north, from Laoling in the west, and from Denlimit Monument and Tumen River in the south) 4) China guarantees the vested rights and interests of the 6 people in the North, and recognizes that the Tianbaoshan Mine is jointly run by China and Japan. 5) China and Japan do not hinder the transportation and trade between the islands and other China-South Korea places. 6) For 6 people living in the Madao commercial port or traveling in the mainland, Japan exercises the consular judgment power; for 6 people living in mixed residences outside the commercial port, China exercises the judgment power, and the Japanese side sends officials to form a meeting to judge. 7) The Jichang Railway is connected to the South Korean Railway along Chang-Huining and is connected to the South Korean Railway. The laying method follows the example of the Jichang Railway, and the implementation period is determined by the additional agreement between China and Japan. 8) After this document is decided, the implementation date will be set. Japan will set up a consulate before this date and withdraw from the police station of the General Administration. [91] Regarding the above decision, Komura emphasized that it was the limit of Japan's concession. He ordered the Minister of Ijiyuan to try his best to win the interests of Japan on issues such as setting up police power in mixed residences and the Kyrgyzstan Railway.[92] On the same day, the Minister of the Yijiyuan notified the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty on the unsolved case of Manchuria, preparing to conduct the last round of negotiations based on this. [93]

5. Compromise reached for a unsolved case and the final decision of the treaty

The Sino-Japanese negotiations were interrupted since March 22 after China stated that it would submit the arbitration in The Hague. The negotiations were resumed on August 16, and were held by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty, Liang Dunyan and the Minister of Ijiyuan, mainly discussing the following issues: 1) Relevant to the territory of the island: The Minister of Ijiyuan said that the Japanese government recognized that the island belongs to China, which is obvious evidence of the Japanese concession. 2) Regarding the legal status of 6 people from , North Korea: Liang Dunyan emphasized that the referees were always Chinese, which is no different from Chinese; 1 or 2 commercial ports can be opened, and 6 people from North Korea in the ports will be judged by Japanese, which is actually a concession from China. In addition, regarding the jurisdiction of the mixed residence, Liang pointed out that only major cases can be re-examined. In response, the Ijiyuan expressed its objection and requested that both sides jointly investigate the nationality of 6 people from North Korea. Those who are not Chinese will still be judged by Japan. As mentioned above, the Japanese cabinet has agreed to make concessions on this issue, but Ijiyuan still wants to make a last try. 3) Related opening of commercial ports: Yijiyuan requires 6 openings, but Liang believes that there are too many, so he requires 1 or 2 openings. Liang Dunyan also emphasized that the police, fortifications and other matters in the commercial port shall be taken care of by China. 4) Regarding the Jihui Railway: Liang pointed out that it has nothing to do with the Sino-island issue and does not want to build the Jicheng Railway to the border in the future. On the one hand, this is to prevent Japan from expanding its power to Yanji through , North Korea . On the other hand, as mentioned above, it may be China's bargaining chips, in order to force Japan to concessions in the jurisdiction of mixed residences. In response, the Minister of the Yijiyuan almost begged that the Jihui Railway only needs to make an agreement in principle. 5) Related to the other five cases: Japan attaches great importance to Fushun and Yantai coal mines. China promises to make concessions, that is, Japan will mine them alone, and at the same time demands generous compensation to the owner of Fushun mine Wang Chengyao. [94]

The next day (August 17), China proposed an amendment to the treaty text formulated by Japan, and negotiations continued on the 18th. [96] First, discussing the issue of the Japanese Consular Crown Council, Liang Dunyan asked for limited conditions, such as major cases of life theft or heavy sentences of imprisonment for more than 10 years, and cases with property of more than 100,000 yuan in civil litigation cases, the Japanese Consul shall be advised after the judgment is made by Chinese officials; if the Japanese Consul finds that the judgment is not based on the law, he can request a review from the Chinese side. However, the Minister Ijiyuan believed that it was far from the intentions of Japan and opposed it. In order to restrain China, he proposed that before the various codes and judiciaries of the Qing Dynasty were completed, the Japanese consul ruling North Korean html people were temporarily judged.

Secondly, discussing the issue of the Kyrgyzstan Railway, Liang Dunyan pointed out that China has made many concessions on other issues, so it cannot give in. He has also been criticized by the government authorities, so he demanded the cancellation of the Kyrgyzstan Railway negotiations. In response, the Minister of Ijiyuan said that if it is inconvenient to put it into the treaty, he could sign another secret contract or another non-contract; Liang Dunyan said he would discuss it again, but the result could not be guaranteed. In desperation, the next day (19th), the Minister of Ijiyuan sent a translator named Takaotong to the Qing Dynasty Minister of Foreign Affairs Natong, saying that the Japanese side attached great importance to the Kyrgyzstan Railway. If an agreement cannot be reached, other unsolved cases cannot be reached. Natong pointed out that the jurisdiction of the six North Koreans in the mixed residence must belong to China. If this condition is agreed, another agreement on the Kyrgyzstan Railway can be signed, which stipulates that China first uses Japanese capital when capital is needed. He also pointed out that if the Japanese side concessions on the dictatorship of North Korea's people, all negotiations can be ended within one day. [97] Obviously, he tried to use the construction rights of the Jishui Railway to exchange the jurisdiction of the North Korean 6 people to exchange for the mixed residence.

htmlOn August 21, the Minister of the Yijiyuan met with Na Tong and Liang Dunyan, and the negotiations were made breakthroughs. [98]1) Regarding the right of judging North Korean people: The Japanese side proposed a draft treaty, stipulating that: North Korean 6 people in the mixed residence obey Chinese laws, and the Japanese consul has the right to a committee and the right to request review.[99] In response, China requested the restriction of the Japanese leadership's committee and proposed an amendment: "As for all civil and criminal litigation cases related to the Korean people, Chinese officials should be tried impartially in accordance with Chinese laws. Japanese consular officials may be appointed by consular officials and may be appointed to court for trial. However, serious cases of death must be held in the court for trial according to the Japanese consular officials. If Japanese consular officials can point out the judgment according to the law, they may be asked to send another person to review." [100] Regarding the above "responsibility" in the Chinese amendment, the Minister of the Ijiyuan asked and to "all" in the hall to be heard. Na Tong said that this would make the Japanese side annoyed and pointed out that China recognized that Japan built the Jihui Railway, which was conditional on the Japanese side to transfer the jurisdiction to China completely and without reservation, otherwise the railway's right to be built will be withdrawn. [101] Therefore, the Yijiyuan had to disagree with China's amendment. The amendment later became the main text of the fourth paragraph of the Mashima Agreement.

2) Regarding the Kyrgyzstan Railway: The Minister of the Ijiyuan said that Japan has made great concessions in the judgment power, so the Kyrgyzstan Railway must be carried out in accordance with the Japanese proposal. China proposed an amendment: "If the Kyrgyzstan Railway is extended to , North Korea, , Huining, all measures will be handled according to the Kyrgyzstan Railway, and the conditions will be handled as appropriate in accordance with the Chinese situation during the establishment period, and then discussed with Japan." [102]

3) Regarding the Tumen River border above Maoshan: China requires the Shiyi Water as the boundary, on the grounds that Shiyi Water is slightly further away from Changbai Mountain than Red Earth Water (the Dynasty requested this water in the 13th year of the Guangxu period), and Changbai Mountain is the birthplace of the Qing Dynasty. The Qing imperial family attached great importance to this mountain, especially the Regent Zaifeng attached importance to this matter. In response, the Minister of the Ijiyuan said that red soil and stone and water are only a matter of 50 or 100 steps. We should not decide which water should be used as the boundary. In the future, China and Japan will send people to investigate together before making a decision. Na Tong expressed opposition, pointing out that if the boundary issue cannot be resolved in full, it would be contrary to the purpose of clearing all unsolved cases and could not be explained to the Regent. Yijiyuan expressed his discussion again. [103] The next day, in the report to Xiaocun's foreign minister, suggested that admit that Shi Yishui was the boundary, but Xiaocun ordered that the original case still adhere to the original case, that is, China and Japan will make a decision after joint investigation. [104] It is estimated that it is to exchange other interests with China for this issue.

As seen above, through the negotiations between the Minister of the Ijiyuan and Natong on August 21, the issue of the judging rights of North Korea's six people in the mixed residence was finally resolved, especially the approval of China's amendment was passed. This is the result of China's long-term struggle, and China has also paid a lot of price, such as agreeing to the referee of the Japanese Leading Council and requesting a review, and agreeing to the joint operation of the Kyrgyzstan Railway by China and Japan. [105]

After that, on August 24, 26, 31 and September 1, the Minister of the Ijiyuan held final negotiations with Na Tong and Liang Dunyan. [106] Among them, on the 24th, the treaty texts of Fushun and Yantai coal mines were decided. At the request of China, words such as "Japan respects all sovereignty in China" were added. deleted content that Japan might aid as an example was unfavorable to China. For example, "The Qing Dynasty recognized Japan's legitimate mining rights over the two coal mines in accordance with Article 6 of the 'Japan-Russia Treaty' (referring to the Treaty on Portsmouth) and Article 1 of the 'Japan-Shenzhen Treaty' (referring to the Treaty on Matters of the Three East Provinces) on Manchuria, and changed to "China's government recognized the right to open two coal mines in the mining of the three East Provinces" and was recorded in the main text of the "Agreement on the Three East Provinces and Five Cases". [107] On August 26, the main text of the treaty of the Beijing-Feng Railway, the Dashiqiao Yingkou Line, the Anfeng Railway and the Xinfa Railway among the five cases was decided. [108] In addition, the provisions of the Fushun and Yantai Mining Services and the official text of the "Jiandao Agreement" were finally decided on August 31 and September 1. On September 4, two agreements were signed, namely the "Midai Agreement" and the "Three and Five Case Agreement in the East" were signed.

The above-mentioned negotiation content on August 24 and later can be summarized as follows: 1) Regarding Fushun and Yantai coal mines: The Japanese side gave Fushun mine owner Wang Chengyao certain compensation, but it was not written into the main text of the treaty, but signed another official document. [109]

2) Regarding the Tumen River boundary above Maoshan: China proposed to use Shiyi Water as the boundary, and Japan proposed to draw a line between the red earth and Shiyi Water starting from the boundary marker. China expressed its opposition and insisted on using Shiyi Water as the boundary.[110] Later, due to the issue of the Kyrgyzstan Railway, China proposed that if Japan admits to using Shiyi Water as the boundary, then the Sino-Japanese joint construction of the Kyrgyzstan Railway could be written into the main text of the treaty, so Japan agreed to using Shiyi Water as the boundary. [111] In fact, there is a more important question on the upper reaches of the Tumen River, namely the question of what is the boundary from the origin of Shiyi Water. Previously, when the boundary survey was surveyed in the 13th year of Guangxu, China proposed that Shiyi water connects Xiaobai Mountain (about 530 kilometers southeast of Tianchi) as the boundary, so that it can be a distance from the Tianchi Lake in Changbai Mountain; North Korea proposed to connect the stele pile of Changbai Mountain with red soil water. However, China has no time to take care of these in this negotiation, and is only satisfied with the boundary markings connecting Shiyishui. However, the delimiting mark is close to Tianchi (about 4 kilometers southeast of Tianchi), and in fact, is the great that hinders the birthplace of Changbai Mountain.

3) The relevant island is open to commercial ports: The draft proposed by the Japanese side is "All the constitutions of the commercial ports shall be separately established by the Japanese and Qing governments." China firmly opposes it because it damages China's sovereignty, and later the Japanese side had to agree to delete this content. In addition, the number of commercial ports opened was originally proposed by the Japanese side (Longjing Village, Quzi Street, Toudaogou, Baicaogou, Xiaquanping, Tongfo Temple). China believes that there are too many and requires the removal of Baicaogou, which may be considered as the mainland. However, the Japanese side expressed opposition and demanded that one of the Tongfo Temple and Xiaquanping be removed. Finally, during the negotiations on August 31, China stated that the local governor's office opposed the opening of so many commercial ports, and even the Minister of Juzi Street (there are 20,000 Koreans in the area) did not agree, so the Japanese side agreed to remove Xiaquanping and Tongfo Temple and retain the other four. [112]

4) Regarding the Kyrgyzstan Railway: During the negotiations on August 21, China requested to agree on the following content outside the agreement: If China intends to build the Kyrgyzstan Railway, it will be up to China to decide if it is insufficient capital to use Japanese capital; when China builds the self-organized railway, it will be up to China to decide. [113] During the negotiations on August 26, the Minister of the Ijiyuan once again requested that the Kyrgyzstan Railway be included in the main text of the treaty and to restrain China by using the upper reaches of the Tumen River; [114] On August 31, China had no choice but to agree to include the contents of the Kyrgyzstan Railway in the main text of the treaty. [115]

5) The scope of mixed settlements: It was proposed by the Japanese side during the negotiations on August 31. China generally had no objection, but the place name was different from the original name of China, so it was decided to draw a map as a supplement. The map is also provided by the Japanese side, mainly in Chinese names, and some in Japanese names are also available. [116]

6) Relevant police station retreat date: During the negotiations on August 31, the Japanese side proposed to withdraw from the police station and establish a consulate within two months. China asked to withdraw within one month. Later, due to Japan's insistence, it had to agree to withdraw within two months. China also requested to include the content of the police station's immediate retreat in the main text of the treaty. [117] As stipulated in the seventh paragraph of the Mashima Agreement, "After this agreement is signed, each article of this agreement should be implemented. The police station and civil and military personnel of the Japan General Administration will retreat quickly and be limited to retreat within two months. The Japanese government government opened a commercial port in the second paragraph and also set up a consulate within two months."

7) Related affiliated documents: Few people noticed that the final result of the negotiations, in addition to the two agreements, also affiliated documents, which were signed as secret documents. There are three additional documents: 1) The Japanese government has paid some silver to Wang Chengyao, a Qing Dynasty native who was originally related to Fushun Coal Mine, and the amount will be distributed according to the amount of his capital contribution. 2) The projects, patrols, health and other matters in commercial ports and areas shall be handled by the Qing government. The constitution was decided by the Qing Dynasty itself, and after it was drafted, it would be contacted with the consul stationed in the place. 3) If there are no obstacles in the Tianbaoshan Mine, there will be no objection to jointly run by Japan and Tsinghua. If there are difficulties in implementation, the two countries will handle the matter. [118]

html On September 1, all negotiations ended and were divided into two agreements, namely the "Midou Agreement" and the "Three and Five Case Agreement in the East" and there are additional documents, but they are not disclosed. China decided to sign it by Liang Dunyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and signed by the Japanese ambassador to Beijing, Yijiyuan. The two completed the signature on September 4th. [119] The two-year negotiations on the island issue ended.

Summary

After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, on August 19, 1907, Japan sent more than 60 Japanese military policemen and Korean inspections headed by Shijiro Saito, and set up the "Tongjianfu Linjishima Police Station" in Longjing Village in Yanbian.On the same day, the Japanese ambassador to Beijing issued a note to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, claiming that the "Mashima" belongs to it. In order to "protect" the six North Korean people from being abused by horse thieves and scoundrels, the chief magistrate sent officials to the place, which provoked the so-called "Mashima issue". Japan's strategic intention to provoke the island issue was, first, to restrain Russia; second, to consolidate the colonial rule of Korea; third, to open up new paths for expansion to the three eastern provinces.

The Japanese side sent people to conduct on-site investigations and literature research to conclude that the evidence of the genus South Korea was weak. In addition to China's firm opposition, especially the "Jilin Border Service Office" and the Madao Police Station fought against each other, so the Japanese side decided to give up their territorial rights and seize the protection rights of North Korea's 6 people. In April 1908, the Japanese Foreign Minister issued an "internal training on the Matsushima issue" to the Minister in Beijing, and decided to recognize that the territory rights of Matsushima belong to China. At the same time, he strived to set up a consulate in Matsushima, so that the jurisdiction of North Korea's six people belongs to Japan, and obtain the rights to mine Tianbaoshan Mine and build the "Jikkihui" railway. In order to contain China, the decision remains undecided. The introduction of the internal training marks the basic formation of Japan's "meta-island issue" negotiation strategy.

In order to achieve the above goals, Japan, on the one hand, used the police station to vigorously expand its administrative power in order to restrain China and be in a favorable position in the negotiations; on the other hand, ordered the ambassador to Beijing to begin contact and negotiations with the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On December 7, 1907, Japanese Minister to Beijing Lin Quanzhu and Qing Dynasty Minister Na Tong and Yuan Shikai met at Yuan's house. This was the first talks between the two sides on the "Jiandao issue", which involved two main aspects: one was the territorial rights issue of Midao, and the other was the North Korean people's protection rights. Yuan Shikai claimed that the territorial rights and the protection rights of North Korea's 6 people belong to China; while Lin Quanzhu was vague about the territorial rights, and at the same time denied that China had the protection rights of North Korea's 6 people. In order to put pressure on China, Japan deliberately delayed negotiations.

In October 11908, a conflict between the Chinese and Japanese military and police occurred in Yuji Cave (opposite of Huining) north of the Tumen River, namely the "Yuji Cave Incident". When the Mashima Police Station built a house in order to add a military police station, it clashed with the Chinese military and police who came to stop it. Lieutenant Hirata from the Japanese side ordered the shooting with few people and weak people, resulting in a vicious incident in which three Chinese military and police were killed and three injured. While using this incident to protest to Japan, China urged Japan to resolve the inter-island issue as soon as possible. At this time, Fengtian Governor Tang Shaoyi was on a mission to Japan as a special envoy. When he met with the foreign minister of the village, he proposed to resolve two aspects of the island issue: one is to continue the boundary survey of the Sino-North Korea border in the 13th year of Guangxu, and the other is to establish a foreign country in Vietnam. The Foreign Minister of the Village said that as long as China recognizes that the protection rights of North Korea's 6 people belong to Japan, then Japan can recognize that the territorial rights belong to China. This is the first time that Japan has publicly stated that it has conditionally recognized that the territorial rights of the island belong to China. The Tang Shaoyi-Xiaocun talks started the negotiation process on the island issue.

On December 28 of the same year, the Japanese Minister to Beijing Ijiyuan proposed to the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs to resolve the "five cases" and the "interis island issue" in the three northeastern provinces, that is, the so-called "six cases". From this day to February 28 of the following year (1908), the Minister of the Yijiyuan and Liang Dunyan, Minister of the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held 1-7 talks on the "Six Cases". Japan's claim is that as long as China accepts the requirement that the jurisdiction of North Korea's 6 people belongs to Japan and the five cases, then Japan can recognize that the territory rights of the island belong to China. China advocates the unity of territorial rights and the jurisdiction of 6 people in the North Korean . Although China promises to open 1 or 2 commercial ports north of the Tumen River, allowing Japan to set up consulates in commercial ports and impose judging rights on 6 people in the commercial ports, mixed residences outside commercial ports require 6 people in the North Korean to obey China's legal rights. Since the two sides were unable to reach a compromise on the judgment rights of North Korea's 6 people in the mixed residence, the negotiations encountered a bottleneck.

In order to restrain Japan from making concessions, China proposed in March 1909 to submit six cases to the Hague International Arbitration.Japan realized that China's attitude on the issue of territorial rights and the jurisdiction of North Korea's six people; in addition, through intelligence collection, China was supported by British and Americans related to the Fakumen Railway; especially after the death of the Qing Dynasty, Japan was worried about political instability and was afraid that the negotiations so far had problems, so it decided to make concessions on the jurisdiction of North Korea's six people, and at the same time required Japan to have the power of consular council and request review.

htmlOn August 16, the two sides resumed negotiations. On August 24, Japan officially recognized that the North Korean 6 people obeyed China's legal rights, and China also made concessions, recognizing that Japan had the power of the consular ruling and requesting review. At the same time, China has set conditions for the Japanese leadership's Standing Committee, stipulating that only in major civil criminal cases can the Japanese leadership have the right to establish the committee. Other unsolved cases are resolved. It is worth mentioning that China has forced Japan to recognize that the Kyrgyzstan Railway is jointly organized by China and Japan to force the Japanese to recognize that the jurisdiction of North Korea is all subject to China (the Japanese side previously asked that the North Korean 6 people be divided into naturalized and unnaturalized, trying to include the unnaturalized into Japanese referees), and the upper reaches of the Tumen River are bounded by Shiyishui. All negotiations were concluded on September 1, and the "Mashima Agreement" and the "Three East Provinces and Five Case Agreement" were signed on September 4, which limited the withdrawal of the Mashima Police Station within two months and the establishment of a Japanese consulate instead.

From the perspective of the negotiation path on the Madashima issue, it was mainly conducted between the Japanese ambassador to Beijing and the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Japanese ambassador was commanded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Qing Ministry of Foreign Affairs was mainly commanded by ministers Yi Li and Na Tong. The specific negotiations were held by the Minister Ijiyuan in Beijing and Liang Dunyan, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty. The key negotiations were held together by Na Tong (Secretary) and Liang Dunyan. China also negotiated and negotiated directly with North Korea's chief supervisor Hirofumi Ito, Foreign Minister Komura Sutaro, through Minister Hu Weide to Japan and Minister Ma Tingliang to Seoul. In October 1908, Fengtian Governor Tang Shaoyi went to Japan and met with foreign ministers of the village, starting the negotiation process on the "Mashima issue".

Judging from the content of the two agreements signed by the two sides, first of all, it can be said to be a victory for Japan's diplomacy. Japan used the pending Sino-North Korea border affairs to recognize the territorial rights of Madashima as a bargaining chip, and obtained the right to establish a consulate in Madashima and the case of the three and five eastern provinces. In this way, Japan can exercise consular judgment power over the North Korean people in the commercial port through the consulate, that is, through legal means, infiltrate the area north of the Tumen River in the name of "protecting" the North Korean ; it can also supervise and control the North Korean through the consulate to achieve the purpose of silencing the anti-Japanese movement of North Korean , which is obviously beneficial to Japan's consolidation of the colonial rule over North Korean . Not only that, Japan also obtained the rights to build railways and mine coal mines in the three eastern provinces, especially the rights obtained through the Portsmouth Treaty after the Russo-Japanese War were implemented, thus clearing the obstacles to the development of the "Manchurian Railway". Secondly, for China, by signing the two agreements, Japan was ultimately forced to recognize the territorial rights and mixed residences of the North Korean 6 people's judgment belonging to China, thus achieving the unity of territorial rights and jurisdiction to a large extent, especially forcing Japan to withdraw from the illegal "United States Police Station of the General Administration of the Central Bureau of the Times", which is undoubtedly a major victory in China's struggle to safeguard territorial sovereignty. In addition, due to China's struggle, Japan's consular referee authority was limited to four commercial ports, thus blocking Japan's greater aggression attempts and ambitions. Especially due to China's struggle, the two agreements have added a lot of content to safeguard China's sovereignty, which gives China more room for maneuver when negotiating with Japan in the future, which are worthy of recognition. In short, China has preserved the fundamental interests of the country's territorial sovereignty at the expense of some railways and coal mines in the three eastern provinces.

[1] In the article "On the negotiations between China and Japan on the "Inter-island Issues" from 1907 to 1909" ( Northeast Normal University Master's thesis, 2013, page 34), Jiang Hongwei gave a positive evaluation of the struggle and some of the victory achieved by the Qing government in order to safeguard national territorial sovereignty.

[2] For details about the "Jiandao" policy of the Korean Empire, please see Yang Zhaoquan and Sun Yumei: "History of Sino-Korean Border", pp. 408-445; Li Huazi: "The View of Territory and Implementation of the Midao Policy during the Korean Empire (1897-1910 AD), "Journal of the Institute of History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences", Episode 7, Commercial Press, 2011 edition, pp. 483-498.

[3] Edited by the Institute of Modern History of the Central Academy of Research: "Historical Materials of Sino-Japanese and South Korea Relations in the Qing Dynasty" Volume 9, pp. 5952-5953.

[4] 中井喜太郎：《間島問題ノ沿革 》，《間島ノ版図ﾆ関シ清韓両国紛議一件》第3卷，アジア歴史資料センター网，レファレンスコード: B03041195600，REEL No.1-0352/0369。

[5] Curated by Shindaji: "Instructions for the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", pages 53-54.

[6] See Li Shenghuan: "Opening the History of the Japanese, Chinese and Korean Affairs" in Modern East China, pages 41-47.

[7] See Li Shenghuan: "Opening the History of the Japanese, Chinese and Korean Affairs" in Modern East China, pages 47-53.

[8] See Jiang Hongwei: "On the negotiations between China and Japan on the "Inter-island Issues" from 1907 to 1909", Master thesis of Northeast Normal University, 2013, pages 6-8.

[9] Jiang Longfan: "Research on the Policy of the Three Kingdoms of China, Korea and Japan toward the Majima North Korean people", page 94.

[10] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Island Question", page 140.

[11] Palace Museum edited by: "Historical Materials of the Chinese and Japanese Negotiations in the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 71, Peking (Beijing): Palace Museum 1932 edition, page 10; Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Question on Islands", pages 92-93.

[12] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on Negotiation between China and Japan of the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 71, page 16.

[13] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pages 92-93.

[14] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pages 97-98.

[15] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on Negotiation between China and Japan in the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 71, page 16.

[16] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pages 146-147.

[17] Curated by Shindaji: "Introduction to the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", pp. 158-159.

[18] Oshita: "Review on the Isle of Questions", page 36.

[19] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Problem in Islands", page 449; Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials of China-Japan Negotiation between the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 73, page 4.

[20] Wang Yunsheng : "China and Japan Over the Sixty Years" Volume 5 (1932), page 110.

[21] On October 20, 1907, Wu Luzhen arrived at Juzi Street, and on the 25th of the same month, Chen Zhaochang arrived at Juzi Street. See the National History Compilation Committee: "Classification of the General Administration" 2, "Island Questions 1~3", Articles 213, 239, pages 404, 413-414.

[22] Curated by Shindaji: "Introduction to the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", pp. 243-244.

[23] Curated by Shinda: "Instructions for the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Supervision Bureau", pp. 245-246, 254-256; Editor of the Foreign Ministry: "Japanese Diplomatic Documentary" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question on Islands", pp. 435-436, 446-455.

[24] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Problem in Islands", pp. 442-445, 457-460; Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on the Bible of the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty, China-Japan" Volume 73, Page 13.

[25] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Literature" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Problem on Islands", pp. 173-175.

[26] Article 12 of the Qing-Korea Trade Treaty stipulates: "Border residents have always traded with each other at the junction of land between the two countries. This time, the land trade charter and tax rules should be reorganized after the contract. If the border residents have crossed the land, they should be safe and secured to protect their lives and property. If there is any potential crossing the border in the future, they should prohibit each other to avoid causing trouble. When the market is opened, they will be agreed upon together when the regulations are discussed.”

[27] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomatic Documentary" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Question on Islands", pages 173-175.

[28] In November 1905, the 6th Japanese Army stationed in , Korea submitted the "Mashima Realm Survey Materials" to the General Staff Headquarters, and in March of the following year, the "Summary of Investigation on Mashima". In September 1907, the General Staff Headquarters dispatched two surveyors to investigate the pile of steles in Changbai Mountain. In addition, the request of the General Staff Office of the General Staff Kitaro Nakai submitted the report "The History of the Mashima Issues" in September 1907; Naito After Hunan was appointed as a entrusted by the General Staff Headquarters and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it submitted two "Investigation of the Masai Issues" in February 1906 and September 1907 respectively. The above reports and investigation reports provide reference for Japan's formulation of the Masai policy. See Li Hanuko: "Insider of Japan's Investigation on the Attribution Issues of "Masai Issues" from 1905 to 1909", "Research on Modern History" Issue 2, 2015.

[29] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 40, Volume 2, "One Issues in the Island", Page 172.

[30] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Issues in the Island", Pages 437-439.

[31] Foreign Ministry Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Issues in the Island", Pages 437-439.

[32] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Issues in the Island", pages 437-439, 441-442.

[33] Foreign Provincial Editor: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Literature Liter Japan sent more military police and North Korean police to the Madao area, a total of two times. One was in May 1908, when the North Korean anti-Japanese armed groups marched opposite Maoshan, and Japan sent 32 more military police; the other was in July 1909, Wu Luzhen, the Jilin Border Affairs Supervisor, confronted the "Madao Police Station", and Japan sent 96 more military police and 63 more military police officers. See the Palace Museum edited by: "Historical Materials of the China-Japan Negotiation in the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74; Page 4; Oshita: "Review on the Islamic Questions", page 35.

[36] According to records, since the establishment of the Jiandao Police Station, conflicts and negotiations with the Chinese Border Service Office have occurred, including: Tianbaoshan incident, mountain forest ban incident, Japanese Qing people's fight, mileage extraction incident, Japanese military police obstruction incident, Korean officials' slander incident, Korean officials' slander incident, Doumanjiang ferry obstruction incident, Gugu Ling incident, Qing soldiers' atrocities in mid-September 1908, Juzijie incident, Yuji Cave incident, salt monopoly law implementation incident, Fushaping conflict, Jiafanfang construction obstruction incident, Tailazi conflict incident, Japanese detention incident, etc. See Jidao Jidao editor: "The Importance of the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of the State Administration", pages 274-359.

[37] Co-organizer of Naoda: "The Interpretation of the Police Station of the State Supervision Bureau", pp. 320-324; Editor of the Foreign Affairs Provincial Department: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question in the Island", page 517; Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials of the Chinese-Japanese Negotiation between the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74, pages 12-15.

[38] Editor of the Foreign Affairs Provincial Department: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question in the Island", pages 530, 541.

[39] Co-organizer of Naoda: "Instructions for the Temporary Island Police Station of the State Administration of China", page 324.

[40] The Minister of the Ijiyuan suggested to Xiaomura Foreign Minister to investigate the "Yuji Cave Incident" with China, but Xiaomura opposes the negotiations on the "Midi Island Issues" about to begin. See the editor of the Foreign Ministry: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 41, Volume 1, "One Question in the Island", pages 527-528.

[41] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on the Chinese and Japanese Negotiations between the Guangxu Dynasty of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74, page 15.

[42] Edited by the Palace Museum: "Historical Materials on the Negotiation between China and Japan in the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty" Volume 74, pp. 24-25.

[43] Edited by the Foreign Ministry: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Confederation", page 700.

[44] The decision to tie the "mashima issue" with the "five cases" of the three eastern provinces was proposed when Masato Nakachi was appointed as the mainland minister and the foreign minister.See Nakawa Eiko: "Nito Konan's border turmoil" Re-examination of Qinghan's border problem "Island Question" in the early 20th century", pages 183-186.

[45] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 700-703.

[46] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 41, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 703.

[47] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 222-224.

[48] Japan is worried that China will compete with the "South Manchuria Railway", which hinders China's construction of the "New Law Railway".

[49] The issue of the "Beijing-Feng Railway" sharing Fengtian Station with the South Manchurian Railway.

[50] The Japanese side wanted to use the Dashiqiao-Yingkou line as the branch line of the South Manchurian Railway.

[51] According to the Portsmouth Treaty signed by Japan and Russia in 1905 and the Treaty on the Three East Provinces of China-Japan Conference, Japan advocated that the coal mines in Fushun and Yantai should be handed over to Japan to mine alone.

[52] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 223-224.

[53] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 227-228.

[54] Tao Dajun from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Qing Dynasty interviewed the Minister of the Yijiyuan in his personal capacity. Tao Dajun pointed out that Fushun Coal Mine can be jointly organized by China and Japan. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 42, Volume 1 of "Japanese Diplomacy Book", "A Collection of Japanese Contracts", pages 224-225.

[55] Article 6 of the Portsmouth Treaty stipulates that the Russian government shall not be compensated by any means, and by any rights and property attached to the railway from Changchun (Kuanchengzi) to Lushunkou, as well as by all rights and property attached to the railway in that area, as well as by all coal mines attached to the railway in that area, or by all coal mines operated for the benefit of the railway, and by the Qing government, all permitted by the Qing government to transfer them to the Japanese government.

[56] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 224-228.

[57] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 228.

[58] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 228-229.

[59] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 229-232.

[60] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 232-235.

[61] Case A: Japan asked China to stop the construction of the new French railway, but instead build the "Fakumen-Tieling Line" to connect with the South Manchuria Railway. Case B: Japan allows China to build a new French railway, and at the same time allows Japan to build a railway from the South Manchuria Railway, passing through Fakumen to Zhengjiatun. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Volume 42, Volume 1 of "Japanese Diplomacy Book", "A Collection of Japanese Contracts", page 230.

[62] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 235-238.

[63] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 238-239.

[64] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 239-240.

[65] In 1919, North Korea broke out in the "Tripe One" anti-Japanese movement, and affected by it, the "Tripe One Three" anti-Japanese movement was launched in the Yanbian area. Later, the Yanbian area became an important base for the anti-Japanese armed struggle of North Korea . The following year, Japan used the "Huanchun Incident" to dispatch more than 20,000 troops to attack, which was the "Gengshen year's Great Desperation".

[66] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 240-242.

[67] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 239-240.

[68] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 240.

[69] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 241.

[70] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 243-245, 249-254.

[71] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 245.

[72] Wang Yunsheng: "China and Japan Over the Sixty Years" Volume 5 (1932), pp. 128-148.

[73] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 245.

[74] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 245.

[75] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 246.

[76] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 263-265.

[77] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 248.

[78] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 248-249.

[79] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 249.

[80] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 246-247, 254-255.

[81] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 272-273.

[82] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 273.

[83] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 283-284.

[84] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 293-294.

[85] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 294-295.

[86] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Collection of Contracts in the United States", page 305-307.

[87] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Religion and Contract" in the United States, page 307-309.

[88] According to the Treaty of Portsmouth, Japan laid out during the Russo-Japanese War, the "Anfeng Line" laid out by Japan during the Russo-Japanese War could be changed to a broad rail after consultation with the Qing government after the war, but the governors of the three eastern provinces refused to make concessions and asked Japan to withdraw troops and police first. Japan refused to make concessions under the agreement and threatened to start construction and issued a note to the ministers of various countries in Japan. In order to resolve the "inter-island issue" as soon as possible, the Qing Dynasty's Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to compromise with Japan on the Anfeng railway issue. See the Palace Museum edited by: "Historical Materials on the Negotiation between the Chinese and Japanese in the Qing Dynasty" Volume 3, Wenhai Publishing House's 1971 photocopy, pp. 170-182.

[89] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Religion and Contract", page 309.

[90] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Relations in the Constitution", page 309.

[91] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 311-316.

[92] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 312.

[93] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 316-321.

[94] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 322-324.

[95] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 326.

[96] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 325.

[97] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 328.

[98] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 329-332.

[99] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Book" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 331 (Not Telephone 265).

[100] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 331 (Not Telephone 266).

[101] Editor of the Foreign Ministry: Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Diplomacy Agreement", page 332.

[102] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Collection of Contracts in the United States", 330 pages.

[103] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Collection of Contracts in the United States", pages 330, 333.

[104] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 333, 337.

[105] Until the "September 18 Incident" in 1931, the Jihui Railway was only built to Dunhua , and did not reach the North Korea border. See Jiang Longfan: "Research on the Policy of the Three Kingdoms of China, Korea and Japan toward the Majima North Korean people", page 151.

[106] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 340-345, 349-352.

[107] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 340-341.

[108] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 340-345.

[109] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 342-343.

[110] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 343.

[111] Editor of the Foreign Ministry: Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Diplomacy Agreement", pages 349-352.

[112] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 351.

[113] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 329.

[114] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 344.

[115] Editor of the Foreign Ministry: Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Diplomacy Agreement", page 349.

[116] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 351.

[117] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", page 351.

[118] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 352-353.

[119] Foreign Ministry edited: "Japanese Diplomacy Literature" Volume 42, Volume 1, "A Japanese Contract for the Contract", pages 352-358.

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Learning the ancient book version is inseparable from viewing the real objects, follow ancient book online auctions, and understanding the market price! Little and drops are the low-cost and most convenient learning method: long press the picture to select "Recognize QR code in the picture " Follow Little and drop auction or click to read the original text to view more lots.