Author : Jared Diamond
Professor of Physiology Professor of the School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, American Academy of Arts and Sciences , National Academy of Sciences, and one of the few contemporary thinkers who explore human society and civilization.
When I first visited Finland in 1959, I knew almost nothing about the history of the two wars between Finland and the Soviet Union. At that time, I asked several landlords in Finland why Finland implemented those policies, why they imported those not-so-good quality Moscow brand cars , and why they were so afraid of conflict with the Soviet Union. I told them that if Finland really had a conflict with the Soviet Union, the United States would definitely help Finland. Looking back now, there is nothing more cruel, ignorant and rude than this. In Finland's national memory, there is such an indescribable pain: when the war between Finland and the Soviet Union broke out in 1939, neither the United States nor Sweden nor Germany nor the United Kingdom nor France reached out to Finland. This history warns the Finns that Finland's survival and independence are in their own hands. Not only that, it is only when the Soviet Union feels safe and has entrusted trust in Finland that Finland can be at ease.
Many non-Finns should have known more than me, but they also held the ignorant attitude I had at the time. They gave Finland's policy a derogatory term, called " Finnishization ". The New York Times explained Finnishment in 1979: "In a sad state, a weak country succumbed to powerful neighbors and made shameful and embarrassing concessions to its sovereignty and freedom." Those who denounce Finnishment believe that Finnish policies are essentially cowardly.
"Storm Changes: The Turning Point of Human Society and the National Crisis"
[US] Jared Diamond by
Zeng Chuyuan Translated by
CITIC Publishing Group
January 2022
indeed, many actions in Finland scared a number of observers in Western Europe and the United States. In the United States or Germany, there will never be any such thing as postponement of the presidential election or the presidential candidate withdrawal from the election just to avoid angering the Soviet Union. These actions seem to violate the right to freedom of movement granted to their citizens by democratic countries.
Here, I quote again the words of President Gicconen : "A country's independence is not absolute... A country that does not need to succumb to historical necessity does not exist." Finland needs to succumb to historical necessity more than the United States or Germany. The reason is obvious: Finland is a small country that shares borders with Russia, and neither the United States nor Germany do not have these constraints. Those who sneer at the Finnification policy, what do you think Finland should do? Should we take the risk of conflict with the Soviet army again regardless of the Soviet reaction?
Those who oppose Finnization have such a fear in their hearts: they are afraid that the Soviet Union will have their own country. However, the environment of other Western European countries and the United States is completely different from that of Finland, and they do not have to face the geopolitical dilemma of Finland. Giconin’s defense of Finland’s foreign policy is condensed into one sentence: “Finnish is not exported.”
In fact, Finland’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union must be complicated. The end result of this policy was that in the 70 years after the end of World War II, Finland did not become a vassal of the Soviet Union or (now) Russia. On the contrary, Finland successfully maintained good relations with the Soviet Union while strengthening ties with the West. At the same time, the Finns are well aware that the circumstances are unpredictable, so Finland requires men in the country to serve in the military voluntarily and women can voluntarily enlist in the army. Finns are required to undergo up to a year of rigorous military training when serving in the military, because Finland’s expectation is that every Finn is capable of going to the battlefield.After a year of training, Finns are summoned to serve in reserve every few years before they are 30-35 years old. Finland's reserve troops account for 15% of the country's total population, and if this proportion is placed in the United States, it would be equivalent to having a reserve troops of 50 million.
Now, we analyze the factors that affect the results of national crisis in Finland (see Table 1.1) for this history in Finland (see Table 1.2). Among the many factors that affect the outcome of the national crisis, 7 factors helped to resolve the Finnish national crisis; one factor initially hindered the resolution of the crisis, but later played a positive role; the lack of the other 3 factors made it difficult for Finland to solve a fundamental problem - the threat from strong neighbors.
(Table 1.1 Factors affecting the outcome of individual crisis)
(Table 1.2 Factors affecting the outcome of national crisis)
When solving national crisis, Finland clearly demonstrates the role of the following 7 factors: proactively assume responsibility (factor 2), draw a clear line (factor 3), strong National identity (factor 6), honest self-assessment (factor 7), patience to deal with national failure (factor 9), flexibility in specific situations (factor 10), and core national values (factor 11). First, among the national sample of this book, Finland is a model for taking responsibility and making honest, practical self-assessment. This assessment is particularly painful for Finland, because many people have lost their lives, close relatives, or their homes to survive. Finland must remain sober and avoid falling into the trap of self-pity and hatred, which in turn destroys relations with the Soviet Union. However, the Finns finally realized the reality: we are a small country; we share a long border with the Soviet Union; we cannot expect effective support from our allies; our country's life and death depend entirely on ourselves; we can temporarily resist the attack of the Soviet army, making the Soviet front slow, costly and painful progress, but we cannot fight it for a long time. The Finns learned from their pre-war foreign policy and finally accepted the reality: winning the trust of the Soviet Union was the only way to maintain Finland's political independence.
The Finnish case fully demonstrates the theme of selective change and drawing a clear line (factor 3). In its last confrontation with the Soviet Union (after September 1944), Finland changed its past policies and broke the tradition of ignoring the Soviet Union and not dealing with the Soviet Union. Finland adopted a new policy to engage in economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and conduct close political interactions. However, these changes are largely selective, as Finland maintains independence and remains a liberal democracy. These two seemingly conflicting identities—the unchanged old Finland and the already changed New Finland—coexist. This made many non-Finns both confused and angry. So they created the contemptuous statement of "finnization" to imply that Finland could and should have made different choices at that time.
The strong national identity shown by the Finns (factor 6) is amazing - those who don’t understand Finland probably wouldn’t have expected that such a small country would have such a strong national identity. After all, from other aspects, it is just a typical Scandinavian country. The Finns' national identity and firm awareness of their own country's uniqueness are largely derived from the beautiful, unique and profound Finnish . Not many non-Finns have the courage to learn this language. They also originated from the oral epic "Kalevara" created in Finnish, and the history of independence and autonomy that lasted for a century under the rule of Tsarist Russian . At that time, Finland already had its own government, currency and parliament. What further strengthens the Finns' national identity is the recognition of Finnish musicians, track and field athletes, architects and designers by the people of the world. Today, the Finns' national identity is also closely linked to the country's military achievements in the Winter War .The Finns are proud of their achievements in World War II, which is far stronger than the citizens of other countries and second only to the United Kingdom. In the 2017 Finnish Centennial Celebration of Finnish Independence, the Finns attached no less importance to the achievements of World War II than to the national independence in 1917: Just like in the United States, the focus of the celebration of Independence Day (July 4) was the victory of the United States in World War II, rather than the Declaration of Independence published in 1776.
Finland shows how a country patiently deals with initial failures and perseveres in searching for possible crisis solutions until it finds an effective path (factor 9). When the Soviet Union made territorial claims against Finland in October 1939, Finland did not proactively propose economic cooperation and political interaction, which Finland only proposed later. Even if Finland took the initiative to make these suggestions at the time, Stalin would likely refuse. It was Finland's tenacious struggle in the winter war that convinced Stalin that keeping Finland independent was the right choice. From 1944, Finland realized that its pre-war ignorance of Soviet policies and its policy of resorting to military means during wartime had failed. In order to maintain its economic and political independence, while maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union, Finland went through a long and continuous trial phase.
Finland demonstrates a country's flexibility in a specific situation (factor 10). Faced with the concerns and sensitivity of the Soviet Union, Finland did something unimaginable to any other democratic country: through the traceability law, , trial of its own country's wartime leaders, parliament passed an emergency decree to postpone the original presidential election, etc. Other democracies may disapprove of these measures, and in Finland we can see the flexibility reflected in this: sacrificing part of the principles to obtain the most inviolable political independence. Again, quote Zaroga used in his biography of Mannerin : The Finns are excellent in "choosing the least bad one among a few bad options".
Finland's history shows an unquestionable core value of this country (factor 11), which is to defend national independence and defend the country from being occupied by other countries. The Finns are prepared to fight for this core value, even if many of them lose their lives as a result. Fortunately, the Finns survived and defended the independence of the country. There is no absolutely correct solution to the dilemma in Finland. When facing Germany's demands, both of the Polish and the 1941 Yugoslavia both expressed their rejection and fighting for the independence of the country, but they were not as lucky as Finland : both countries lost and were occupied or continued to be occupied, and suffered the shame of living under others' roofs. In contrast, because of the huge difference in military strength between themselves and the other party, 1938's Czechoslovakia , 1939's Baltic Three Kingdoms , and 1945's Japan received ultimatums from Germany, the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. Thinking of this, the situation in Czechoslovakia may not be completely hopeless at that time, but we have no way to know the truth now.
The factor that hindered the resolution of the Finnish crisis at the beginning but played a positive role later was the national consensus on the crisis (factor 1). Finnish nationals initially lacked consensus on the crisis of the country, but eventually reached this consensus. Throughout the 1930s, most Finns were unaware of the looming crisis between their country and the Soviet Union, and in 1939 they misjudged that Stalin’s demand was merely bluff. Since 1944, Finnish nationals began to reach a consensus and formulated the Pasirquivi-Gickonin route, with the leaders of the Finnish government in close dialogue with the leaders of the Soviet government and learning to look at the problem from the Soviet point of view.
Three factors that are obviously lacking in Finland that help resolve the crisis are: assistance from allies (factor 4), role models for reference (factor 5), and freedom of choice without geopolitical constraints (factor 12).Among the countries discussed in this book, Finland received the least assistance from allies: During the Winter War, all traditional and potential allies of Finland refused to provide it with the substantial assistance it needed. (Sweden provided a little non-governmental assistance, including sending 8,000 volunteer soldiers and receiving refugee children from Finland; Germany did provide the necessary military and economic assistance in continuing the war in .) Finland cannot find any case of a weak country successfully fighting against the Soviet Union or Nazi forces: other European countries either accept the requests of each other (such as the Baltic Three Kingdoms), or resist stubbornly and be brutally conquered (such as Poland and Yugoslavia), or successfully resist with their own military strength (that is, Britain), or make moderate concessions in exchange for national independence (such as Switzerland and Sweden that make concessions to Germany). Conversely, no country can successfully deal with the delicate relationship with the Soviet Union like Finland (i.e. "Finlandization is not exported). Because it shares a long border with its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union, Finland's freedom of choice is severely restricted by geopolitical factors. Finland's state of being unable to choose freely due to being constrained by powerful neighbors, I am afraid that only Germany after World War II can empathize to some extent.
is only targeted at the influencing factors of national crisis rather than personal crisis. Two factors are reflected in Finland's case: the power of leaders and post-conflict reconciliation. Finland benefits from the power of outstanding military and political leaders both during and after World War II. As a military leader, General Mannerin is an expert in allocating scarce resources. He is good at analyzing and judging the threats posed by the Soviet Union to Finland on different fronts, and can still maintain calmness and clear thinking in critical moments, and boost morale. Former Finnish President Yuho Basskivi, who served as prime minister, and his successor Ur Ho Gickonen can speak fluent Russian. Although he was at a disadvantage in negotiations with Stalin, he could gain and maintain Stalin's trust in himself with his harmonious skills, and also convinced Stalin that keeping Finland independent was a policy favorable to the Soviet Union (Imagine if you were Pasirquivi in September 1944, who flew to Moscow to end the winter war in March 1940 for peace negotiations. Later, Finland tore up the contract and cooperated with Germany in the summer of 1941 and recovered Karelia . At this time, you were about to fly to Moscow to meet Stalin for peace talks in order to end the war. You would be 1944 What did Stalin say in 2019? ——"Believe me, I deserve your trust this time"?) Then again, the influence of Mannerin, Baschikivi and Ginkonin as leaders should not be overstated, because their goals and strategies are actually very similar to other outstanding Finnish generals and politicians, except that they show better skills.
Another factor that only targets the national crisis is fierce internal conflicts or settlements after the civil war. Finland's settlement after the end of the civil war in 1918 is much faster and more thorough than that of the settlement after the end of the military dictatorship in Chile after the end of the military dictatorship. In comparison, Indonesia has experienced it After the genocide instigated by the army in 1965, there was not much reconciliation work. On the one hand, the difference in reconciliation levels in these countries was related to the strength of the domestic military and whether it could pose a threat to the former enemy. After 1965, the Indonesian military continued to take over; the Chilean military was still arrogant and threatening even after Pinochet stepped down; the Finnish army gradually became secluded behind the scenes after the civil war and became low-key. On the other hand, the Finnish military was People have a consensus on the uniqueness of Finland: the winners and losers in the Finnish Civil War both follow the same egalitarian tradition, and are different from other nations in the world because of the Finnish language. They all recite "Kalevara" and are both compatriots of Jean Sibelius and Pavo Rumi. Among the two countries mentioned in the book
that are in crisis due to sudden external shocks, Finland is the first case.In the next chapter, I will discuss the Meiji era Japan, another country with a strong national identity and unique language, whose culture is more distinctive than Finland, it has undergone more intense selective changes and has a significant realism like Finland. However, Japan's vastly different geopolitical conditions allowed it to pursue a long-term strategy that was more independent than Finland.