Our mood at that time was just as Comrade Liu Bocheng described in his article "Review of the Long March": "The vast majority of cadres have failed one after another since the five "encirclements and suppression" and are now almost on the verge of despair. In contrast to the situ

Zunyi meeting before and after

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Our mood at that time was just as Comrade Liu Bocheng described in his article "Review of the Long March": "The vast majority of cadres have failed one after another since the five "encirclements and suppression", and now they are almost on the verge of despair. In contrast to the situation before the four "encirclements and suppression", they gradually realized that this was the right route represented by Comrade Mao Zedong. As a result of the wrong route, the troops obviously grew skeptical dissatisfaction and positive demands to change their leadership. This emotion, with the failure of our army, has become increasingly prominent, and Xiangjiang Battle reached its peak. "

Central Red Army As soon as he crossed the Xiangjiang River, the Kuomintang Chiang Kai-shek realized that my Red Army was going to Xiangxi to join the Red Second and Sixth Corps. So on the one hand, he mobilized more than 100,000 main forces of Liu Jianxu and Xue Yue , and arranged them in the Hunan two cities, Suining , Jingxian, Contract, and Wugang , and arranged them into a large sun bag, waiting for the Red Army to drill in. On the one hand, on the road of our Red Army advancing, we built bunkers, set up new blockade lines, and made every effort to block the Red Army from heading north.

At the same time, the Red Second and Sixth Corps located on the border of Hunan, Hubei, Sichuan and Guizhou were also located in the north. In order to support the Central Red Army's advance, under the leadership of Comrades He Long, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, Wang Zhen and other comrades, although they launched a powerful offensive against the enemy and destroyed two enemy divisions, occupied Chengzhou and Taoyuan, and threatened Changde . However, because Chengbu and Wugang have been occupied by the enemy, the road to the Central Red Army's rendezvous and Red Army's 2nd and 6th Legions has been blocked, and it has become impossible to realize the original plan.

Faced with this unfavorable situation, Wang Ming "left" adventurers still pin their hopes on their reunion with the Red Second and Sixth Legions. On the one hand, we continued to telegram to Comrades He Long, Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke and Wang Zhen from Changde, Hunan to northwest Hunan, and on the other hand, we forced the Central Red Army to go north and insisted on hiking into the enemy's "pocket". Our army was in a very dangerous situation.

On December 11, the Central Red Army occupied the Hunan Channel. At this time, the central leaders held an extraordinary meeting to discuss the direction of the march. At the meeting, Comrade Mao Zedong deeply analyzed the situation of the enemy and us, and firmly advocated that the Central Red Army turn to the southwest and go to Guizhou where the enemy is weak, so as to get rid of the enemy in western Hunan and gain the initiative, so that the troops that have traveled thousands of miles and fought hard for two months can rest, recover their physical strength, and improve their morale. Comrade Mao Zedong's proposal was approved and supported by most comrades. But it still failed to convince Bogu , Li De and others.

In mid-December, about a week after the channel meeting , my vanguard of the army advanced towards Liping, Guizhou. At that time, there was a regiment stationed in the brigade of Zhou Fangren of the Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie, but they abandoned the city and fled before our vanguard arrived. The defeated troops retreated to 100,000 square meters. The enemy stationed at 100,000 square meters also fled backwards and retreated to Wuliqiao. The invincible and fleeing in a panic form a sharp contrast with the situation of the warlords of Hunan and Guangxi and Chiang Kai-shek's direct troops. These situations attracted the attention and great interest of the central leaders who arrived in Liping.

Then, the central leaders further learned that the four factions of Guizhou warlords Wang Jialie, Youguocai, , Hou Zhidan, and Jiang Zaizhen were named Unity, but in fact they each occupied one side and often had internal conflicts. Although Wang Jialie was named the chairman of the Guizhou Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang and the commander of the 25th Army, and was in charge of Guizhou's military and political affairs, in fact, there were only two divisions of troops that could be commanded by him. It was also learned that in order to open up wealth and enrich your private pockets, the rulers of Guizhou not only set up a large number of donations and miscellaneous joys, but also publicly announced the ban on opium, and planting infants and smoking opium can be seen everywhere. The rich make money by opium cigarettes, while the poor smoke lose all their money by smoking cigarettes, and sell their children and wives with huge differences in the wealth and poverty, and the contradiction is extremely sharp. In particular, the army also smokes opium, which is called "double spearmen" (one rifle plus one smoker). It has poor combat effectiveness and is easier to fight.

At this moment, the Party Central Committee held a Politburo meeting in Liping.The meeting fully affirmed Comrade Mao Zedong’s correct opinions on entering Guizhou, made a resolution to establish a new base on the Sichuan-Guizhou border, and formally decided to move towards the Sichuan-Guizhou border region centered on Zunyi. This was the first time that the Party Central Committee accepted Comrade Mao Zedong’s correct opinions on major strategic decisions after Wang Ming’s “left” line leader excluded Comrade Mao Zedong’s correct opinions on major strategic decisions. It can be said that it was the beginning of our strategic transformation and the basis for the successful convening of Zunyi Conference in the future.

However, our leading cadres of Red First Division learned that the spirit of this meeting was on our march after we left Liping. One day, our Red 1st Division was resting in a small town and met the front echelon of , the Central Column of , passing through here. I heard that our Red 1st Division headquarters was here, and the front echelon also stopped. At this time, Comrades Mao Yidong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and other central leaders, including Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, Bo Gu, came to our division headquarters together. That day, the cooking team of our headquarters happened to kill a pig. Our teacher's son, on the one hand, asked the kitchen team to prepare meals, and on the other hand, reported the situation to the leaders of the central government. During our report, several leaders interrupted each other and laughed constantly. During this period, Comrade Mao Zedong spoke the most, and he asked with concern how our troops were eating? Are there many patients? Is it good to have a rest? Recover fatigue (Chairman Mao also used this word at that time) Didn’t it?

After they talked, they then had a meal. At that time, the leaders were entertained for dinner, and as long as they had some meat, it would be a good meal. They were very happy to see that cooking class brought several plates of meat at once. I couldn't remember who it was, and when I saw the meat, I shouted: "Wow, there is such succulent !" They ate and talked at the dinner table. He kept laughing, and for more than half a month, Comrade Bo Zhan was frowning and helpless, and he became active at this time and spoke a lot. We have never seen the central leaders so excitedly. We guessed that they had reached a consensus on some major strategic decision-making issue. But since none of them mentioned it to us, it was not convenient for us to ask questions.

When the central leaders were leaving the house after dinner, they met Li De coming in. Comrade Mao Zedong pointed his hand back and told Li De:

"There is food in it, go and eat it!"

This sentence Chairman Mao said to Li De was originally a very ordinary sentence. But later people turned it into a joke that "Mao Shengxi said Li De was a bucket". We think this is not good, but we can't correct it at once. It is no wonder, because at that time everyone was really disgusted with Li De and especially hated his argument: The Chinese Soviet Republic has more than 30 counties and 100,000 troops, which is a country! What is the army of a country that is a regular army, and should fight for regular wars, and should fight outside the country's gates, and fight for inches of land! What is there a short attack! What is a big victory for fortress against fortresses and accumulating small victory? I remember that shortly after the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" began, he once told us the tactical class of "short attack" at the division and regiment commander meeting of a legion, from supper the first day until the next morning. What’s even more annoying is that he commands troops to fight and march entirely based on the map. As for whether the map is accurate or not? Can the troops have a meal? Are there any time to sleep and rest? He didn't consider any of these. Therefore, it is understandable that the majority of commanders and fighters blamed him for the failure of the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" and the failure since the Long March of .

Around December 20, on the way to Jianhe, the first legion received the Liping meeting of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee Liping meeting "Resolution on Establishing Base Areas on Sichuan and Guizhou Borders", which was immediately conveyed by the Political Commissar Nie Rongzhen of the Legion to our division and above cadres. When we heard that "in view of the current situation, the Political Bureau believed that the decision to establish a new Soviet base area in western Hunan in the past was impossible and inappropriate at present." "The new base area should be the Sichuan and Guizhou Border Area, and in the area that should initially be Zunyi as the center", everyone applauded happily.When we heard that "when we were moving towards Zunyi, the actions of the field army should resolutely eliminate the Guizhou enemy troops that blocked us, and strive to avoid major battles against Jiang, Xiang and Gui enemies", we smiled knowingly again. Because everyone feels that Comrade Mao Zedong's strategy of defeating the enemy in the central base area, which is "fight if you can win, and leave if you can't win" is back.

Then, the Red Army followed the orders of the Central Military Commission. We advanced in two ways, and we won the battles along the way, and we marched quickly. At the end of December, the entire army approached the south bank of Wujiang . At that time, the Central Military Commission ordered the First Army to cross the Wujiang River first, under the command of the command of the commander of the regiment Lin Biao and the political commissar Nie Rongzhen, to enter the Huilongchang Ferry on January 1, 1935. It was the New Year, but the commanders and soldiers of the troops did not hold a party, but instead organized discussions on how to complete the combat mission of breaking through Wujiang and taking down Zunyi.

At this time, the Guizhou warlords' army built river defense fortifications at the crossing estuaries along the river, trying to use the natural danger of the Wujiang River to block the Red Army on the southern bank of Wuting. KMT Central Army Wu Qiwei and Zhou Hunyuan two columns. After following our army into Guizhou, they have also arrived in the areas of Huangping , Sansui , and Zhenyuan . Therefore, it became the top priority for the Red Army to cross Wujiang quickly.

When our division organized a forced crusade in Huilongchang, a regiment served as avant-garde. On January 2, despite the storm and rain, commanders and soldiers, led by the regiment commander Yang Dezhi and political commissar Li Lin, used firepower to suppress the enemy on the other side, and organized more than a dozen warriors to choose places with relatively slow water in the downstream to cross. The forced crossing was successful on the morning of the third day, and the entire division and subsequent troops crossed the Wujiang River safely. At the same time, the Second Red Division also crossed the Wujiang River in the direction of the river, and then occupied Zunyi City.

On January 15, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee with great historical significance-Zunyi Conference was successfully held here. Our party exposed and criticized the mistakes of the Party Central Committee in military leadership during the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" and at the beginning of the Long March, ending Wang Ming's "left" adventurism in the Party Central Committee.

Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership in the Red Army and the Party Central Committee was established. He turned the party's line to the correct track of Marxism-Leninism, which began with this meeting.

The Battle of the Four Crossings of Chishui after the Zunyi Conference fully demonstrated the great power of Mao Zedong's military thought and directly reflected the great achievements of the Zunyi Conference. After our front army captured Zunyi, Chiang Kai-shek gathered more than 150 regiments of warlords from Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi and Guizhou, as well as the direct Xue Yue Corps, and rushed forward from all directions from Zunyi, trying to encircle and annihilate our front army in the narrow and crappy area northwest of Wujiang.

In order to break the serious situation of the enemy's attempt to siege our army from all directions, the Central Military Commission and Comrade Mao Yidong decided to take advantage of the enemy's encirclement before the enemy formed an encirclement and command the Red Army to advance from Zunyi area to southern Sichuan and cross the Yangtze River to the north. On the one hand, it is required that the Fourth Red Army on the Sichuan-Shaanxi border "take the close cooperation between Jiangxi and Jiangxi before they fully entered Sichuan and carried out the "encirclement and suppression"" cross the Jialing River in the west and constrain the enemy in Sichuan and prevent the enemy from concentrating their forces on the front line of the Yangtze River. At the same time, it is required that the Second and Sixth Corps on the Hunan-Hubei-Shiguan border actively attack eastward, restrain the enemy in Hunan-Hubei-Hubei-Guizhou, and support the battles of the Fourth Front Army.

At that time, the central government determined that a front army marched towards Sichuan and crossed the Yangtze River north. The selected crossing location was on the line between Yibin and Luzhou .

On January 19th, the army divided into three routes to command the north and advanced towards Chishui County. Our Red Army set out from Tongzi and occupied the Donghuang Hall (now Xishui) on January 23, driving the Qian enemy Hou to flee north and south. Then, our Red First Division opened the way for the entire army and advanced rapidly towards Wanglong Field through Yuanhou (Yuanhou) Field. On January 26, at the Huangpo Cave about 30 miles from Chishui County, he encountered the Sichuan-Enemy Zhang Anping Brigade, which was from Chishui County to Tucheng. The enemy first occupied the high ground on the right and used the fortifications on the left to block our division's firepower. Our division is surrounded by the enemy on three sides.

At this time, the Central Column and the Third, Fifth and Ninth Legions had arrived in Tucheng.However, the Sichuan warlords who came from warm water also chased their vanguards, Guo Xunqi Brigade and Pan Zuo Brigade's Sixth Regiment formed a confrontation with the fifth legion of our defenders in the northeast of Tucheng. A fierce battle began in Tucheng area.

In order to eliminate the troops of Guo Xunqi in Sichuan, comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and other comrades came to the front line to command. On the 27th, on the one hand, they sent me the First Red Division to stop the enemy from going south in Huangpi Cave, and on the other hand, they ordered the Third Army, the Fifth Army and the Wu Army to move back to the surrounding Guo Brigade. Although our division was surrounded by three sides at that time, for the victory of the Tucheng battle, we still bravely fought against the enemy's multiple attacks. Seeing that the situation was critical, the leader of the Red Second Regiment suggested withdrawing from the battle. I said that if we persist here for an extra hour, the battle in Tucheng will have more confidence in victory, and we cannot withdraw until we have to. Then he persisted until dusk the next day before withdrawing from the battle.

The Central Military Commission and Comrade Mao Zedong considered that Tucheng had been fighting all day long and although he annihilated a part of the enemy, the enemy's reinforcements were about to arrive. The original plan to occupy the Chishui River and cross the Yangtze River north was blocked by the enemy and could not be realized. The long-term battle was not good for me. So the Central Military Commission made a quick decision and ordered the withdrawal of the battle overnight. Before dawn on January 29, it crossed the Chishui River from the monkey field and Tucheng west (i.e., crossed the Chishui River) toward Gulin .

When my division was preparing to cross the river at the Yuanhouchang Ferry, Comrade Mao Zedong sent a staff officer from the General Headquarters to come to the ferry to find us and asked me, political commissar Huang Su, chief of staff Geng Biao, and political department director Comrade Tan Zheng to them. This is the third time I have met Comrade Mao Zedong on the Long March.

Comrade Mao Zedong talked about three issues to us when he saw us (Comrade Geng Biao was not coming because he commanded the troops to cross the river), the first question was Zunyi Conference. Comrade Mao Zedong told us that the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo to resolve the leadership problem of the Military Commission. He also said that Comrade Silai played an important role, and this was the first time that our leaders of the Red First Division heard about the Zunyi Conference. And it was told to us by Comrade Mao Zedong himself, so I was particularly impressed.

When we heard that this meeting “solved the leadership problem of the Military Commission”, everyone was very happy. Because this issue was the most concerned issue for everyone since the Long March, and it was what the party wanted and the military came to the end at that time. Although the Liping Conference decided to turn to the army, our army has changed from the original policy of "fighting to the death" with the enemy everywhere to the policy of "avoiding the strong and attacking the weak" and "avoiding the sharp and attacking the weak" and no longer penetrates the pockets arranged by the enemy. However, if the problems in military leadership are not solved, it is still difficult to fundamentally ensure the victory of the Long March. The spirit of the Zunyi Conference was transmitted to the Red First Division more than ten days later. According to analysis, there are probably the following reasons:

On the one hand, the First Army had entered the Tongyang and Songkan areas 50 kilometers away from Zunyi before the Party Central Committee held the Zunyi Conference. As soon as the Zunyi Conference was over, our division was ordered to be the vanguard to advance towards Chishui. The military situation was urgent and there was no time to convey it to us. On the other hand, Comrade Nie Rongzhen, the political commissar of the Legion who attended the Zunyi Conference, had not healed due to his fullness and had not been able to suppurate his feet. He marched with the Central Column on a stretcher and did not return to the front troops. On the other hand, it is related to Lin Biao's attitude towards the Zunyi Conference. In the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression", Lin Biao was an active advocate and follower of Li De's "short-surgery" tactic. He was criticized at the Zunyi Conference, and Lin Biao did not say anything. After the Zunyi Conference, Lin Biao agreed to Li De and the First Army to "experience life". Therefore, although Lin Biao returned to the army after attending the Zunyi Conference, he did not convey the spirit of the conference to us in a timely manner. Of course, this was an analysis afterwards, and I didn't notice it at that time.

The second question that Comrade Mao Zedong talked about is about the problem of maneuvering and flexible strategic tactics. He said:''Your division was hit by the enemy several times during the Long March, and they all handled it well in accord with the changes. You avoided the enemy's edge and made a quick decision according to the intentions of the Military Commission. This was the correct implementation of the orders of the Military Commission. There will be many such situations in the future, which is to use mobile and flexible combat methods."

Maneuverability and flexibility are the strategic and tactical guiding principles that Comrade Mao Zedong has always advocated. In the first, second and third anti-encirclement and suppression of the Central Soviet Area, Comrade Mao Zedong adopted a series of mobile and flexible strategic and tactical principles against the powerful enemy, tempting the enemy to penetrate deeper, conceal the main force, and suddenly attacked, first attacking the weak enemy, then attacking the strong enemy, and defeating each of them, to command our army to win consecutive victories. In the fourth anti-encirclement and suppression of the "encirclement and suppression of the "encirclement and suppression of the "encirclement and suppression" of , he continued to use Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical ideas about maneuverability and flexibility, so he still achieved great victory. At this time, Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized the use of mobile and flexible combat methods, and its intention was based on my understanding at that time. Filled, we should not forget the lessons learned from the five anti-"encirclement and suppression", we should also tell us not to have any other ideas because of the current plan of the Military Commission to change its plan to cross the Yangtze River from Yibin to Huzhou, and "there will be many such situations in the future" and be prepared for our ideological preparation.

Comrade Mao Zedong told us the third issue of the reduction of the troops. Comrade Mao Zedong said, "The troops must be reduced after they arrive in Tsaxi." You (referring to me) are going to be the commander of the division. Then, Comrade Mao Zedong asked me:

"Do you think it's OK?"

"Okay! No problem!" I replied.

"Yes, I should have no problem. You only have those soldiers! Although it is a division in name, it is actually just a regiment." Chairman Mao asked again: "How many people do you have in the first division?"

"There are more than 3,000 people." I replied

"There are too many more people in a regiment. Let's decide this according to the situation!" (Later, when we arrived in Zhaxi, the first legion was streamlined, except for the division's direct team, the rest of the organization has not changed.)

At that time, I and Huangwa and Tan Zheng were both very happy to receive Mao Zedong's personal instructions. After returning, they immediately conveyed to other cadres in the division. Everyone was very excited after hearing this and said that they must do what Comrade Mao Zedong said.

"The Red Army's combat line is subject to the combat direction of the Red Army. The unfixed combat direction affects the unfixed combat line. Although the general direction does not change in a period, the small direction in the general direction changes at any time. If one direction is restricted, it must turn to the other direction. After a period, the general direction is restricted, and even this general direction must be changed." This is what Comrade Mao Zedong wrote in "Strategic Issues of the Chinese Revolutionary War" in 1936, and that was done at that time.

When the divisions of our front army arrived in northeastern Zaxi on February 89, Chiang Kai-shek urgently dispatched three brigades of the Yunnan Army to attack the attack in Zhenxiong, and ordered more than ten brigades of Sichuan enemy to come from north to south. Zhou Hunyuan of the Central Army rushed towards the Zhayou area. At this time, the Central Military Commission and Comrade Mao Zedong looked at the overall situation and judged the situation. Given that the enemy troops from all walks of life were coming and the enemy troops in northern Guizhou were weak, they decided to use the enemy's illusion that our army was still crossing the Yangtze River north, and unexpectedly, they first waved their fingers to the east, returned to southern Sichuan, and then reentered Guizhou. Therefore, the Red Army units crossed the Chishui River on February 20th. The attempt to encircle the Red Army was lost by leaving Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to encircle the Red Army.

After our division crossed the second crossing of the Chishui River south of Gulin, the vanguard Hongyi Regiment led by the regiment commander Yang Dezhi, marched eastward day and night, arrived in Tongzha on the evening of the 24th, and launched a siege in the dark. In less than two hours, two companies of Jiang Deming's troops of the Fourth Regiment of the Guest Guizhou Army fled to Loushan Pass. At dawn on the 25th, our army occupied Tonghua City again, opening the prelude to the Zunyi Battle.

The Red Army suddenly returned to northern Guizhou and pointed directly at Zunyi, which was something Chiang Kai-shek had not expected. In order to prevent the Red Army from advancing northern Guizhou, he not only urgently ordered the Central Army to move closer to Zunyi, Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie also personally went to Zunyi to take command, and ordered his elite troops Liu Heming's Sixth Regiment to guard Loushan Pass, trying to resist stubbornly with natural dangers and wait for reinforcements. However, with the cooperation of Ding and the First Legion, after half a day of repeated rushing, Loushan Pass, known as "one man is at the pass, ten thousand men cannot open", was occupied by our Red Army.

will win Loushan Pass, and Zunyi will have no danger to take.1. The third legion took advantage of the victory and launched a chase and annihilation battle in the direction of Zunyi. On the 20th day, Comrade Peng Dehuai commanded the three legions to occupy Zunyi. When our division arrived in Zunyi, we did not enter the city, but fought from outside the east gate to the south gate, cooperated with the three legions to fight, first defeated the enemy's reinforcements, and then rushed to the enemy with the three legions to the Wujiang River. Because the enemy cut off the floating bridge on the river, they were spared from being destroyed. The entire Zunyi Battle ended on the morning of March 1st.

Within one week, the Red Front Army led Tongzi, Loushanguan and Zunyi to annihilate and defeat eight enemy divisions, achieving the first great victory since the Long March, knocking down the enemy's arrogance, and encouraging our army's morale.

After our army won the second victory of occupying Zunyi, it was moved to the Yaxi area about 30 to 40 miles southwest of Zunyi City to rest for about a week. This was the first time that he had won a big victory from Jiangxi and got a long rest. The troops were in high spirits, and the commanders and soldiers all said in unison: Chairman Mao would be better for leadership. As soon as Chairman Mao commanded, he would win the battle.

After our army resting in the Yaxi area, the enemy regrouped again and crossed the Wujiang River north to attack me. So our army quickly and voluntarily gave up Zunyi, crossed the Chishui River three times on Maotai on March 16, and advanced towards Gulin again. The enemy thought our army was still going north, so he quickly changed the deployment. However, Comrade Mao Zedong ordered us to turn east and crossed the Chishui line from Erlangtan , Taiping Crossing , and then turned south, thus leaving the enemy on the northern line far away.

Since the beginning of 1935, the First Red Army was able to change the military adverse situation, turn danger into safety, turn passive into activeness, gallop across the vast areas of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, and move back and intersperse among hundreds of thousands of enemy troops, mobilize the enemy, attack the enemy, and annihilate the enemy, and enable Chiang Kai-shek to "encircle and suppress" the Red Army to safely get rid of the enemy's numerous encirclements and continue the smooth Long March. All of this is unimaginable without the successful convening of the Zunyi Conference. Therefore, the Zunyi Conference is indeed a turning point in the history of our party, and the great historical significance of common people will never be erased.