Author: Hu Xianda
In the interaction between the chairman and the founding general, Su Yu, who was born in Jinggang, is a very special one.
Unlike Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, Su Yu was ordered to stay in the Soviet area in the face of danger. Since Red Army withdrew from the Jiangxi Soviet area, he has basically lost contact with the Chairman. In the three-year guerrilla war, Su Yu also tempered his ability to stand alone in difficulties and difficulties.
Due to long-term independence, Su Yu's strategic thinking ability has reached a very high level. Su Yu's ability once annoyed the Chairman, but in the end he gained the Chairman's special trust and promotion.
After Liu Deng's army jumped into Dabie Mountains , Jiang Jun was chased and beaten by Bai Chongxi, Hu Lian and others, and was unable to open the situation expected by the Chairman for a long time, and even had the danger of being untenable and having to withdraw from it.
Seeing that Liu and Deng were surrounded by enemies in Dabie Mountains, and struggled to support it, the Chairman thought of sending Su Yu from East China to lead the troops of three columns straight into Jiangnan, using the strategy of surrounding Wei to save Zhao, attracting the enemy from the flanks, and reducing the pressure on Liu and Deng on the battlefield.
1948 On January 28, 1948, the headquarters called Su Yu, asking him to lead Ye Fei's first column, Tao Yong's fourth column, and Wang Bicheng's sixth column to cross the river to the south, and to rescue the enemy, and to support Liu and Deng.
At that time, the headquarters gave Su Yu three plans, which could also carry out this strategic task in February, March or autumn.
htmlOn February 1, the headquarters called Su Yu again, clearly stating that the three columns must set out to cross the river in late March.suddenly changed from the original multiple-choice question to the single-choice question. The reason for this is that Liu and Deng suffered another fatal blow from Hu Lian not long ago. Liu and Deng's several urgent telegrams made the Chairman unable to sleep or eat, and he had to urge Su Yu to go south within a specified time limit to assist Liu and Deng in defending the Dabie Mountains, a strategic location that penetrated straight into the heart of the enemy.
However, with the new changes in the war situation in the Central Plains, Su Yu has his own different opinions on the Chairman's decision to go south. He believes that after the three columns went south by leaping forward, they would encounter unbeatable factors that were difficult to overcome because they did not have their own rear support, and they might repeat the mistakes of Liu and Deng. Replenishing combat losses such as soldiers, ammunition, and food from the Chiang Kai-shek Army ruled area is definitely not as convenient as relying on the liberated areas. At the beginning of the War of Liberation, Chen Su's joint defeat in Huainan made Su Yu fight on the outside line without a rear support, which was still fresh in memory and very afraid.
Faced with the headquarters' urging message, Su Yu suggested on April 18 that the three columns in Huaye would not cross the river south for the time being, but would continue to rely on the strong support of the liberated areas to find opportunities to fight a larger annihilation war in the Central Plains Huanghuai region.
Su Yu's suggestion is tantamount to vetoing the Chairman's division of troops to the south and supporting Liu and Deng's strategic decision. This is the first time in the history of our army. The Chairman had carefully considered it by sending three columns from Huaye to cross the river to the south. After receiving Su Yu's telegram, the Chairman was also very annoyed.
A war zone commander wants the headquarters to change its established combat deployment, which is not a joke.
Of course, no matter how annoyed the Chairman was, he still wanted to listen to Su Yu’s thoughts in person.
On April 30, the Chairman, Zhu De, Zhou Gong , Ren Bishi, Chen Yi and others listened to Su Yu's report specifically at the Chengnanzhuang station in Fuping County, Hebei Province.
1948, Su Yu and others went out to greet him in person at the Nanzhuang, Xibaipo City,
, but Su Yu's heart was still quite nervous. Because he refused the headquarters' order to go south three times, this is unprecedented. Moreover, disobedience on the battlefield is not allowed in any army.
"Hello Chairman! I'm here to apologize for the thorns! I hope my telegram has not interfered with your determination!"
"Su Yu! There is no question of apologizing for the thorns. You have the right to give opinions. Look, I have invited President Zhu, Vice Chairman Zhou, and Shao Qi and Bi Shi, both of them. I'll listen to you to teach us some old guys."
's opening remarks made the originally expected tense atmosphere of the meeting relax.
Su Yu finished his analysis of the enemy and situation of Jiangnan and Central Plains in one breath and predicted the situation, and looked at the Chairman's final decision with a nervous look.In the quiet conference room, no one spoke. The chairman stood up and thought for a long time, saying, "Let's come here for today's meeting first."
In the evening, the chairman had another night's meeting with Zhu De, Zhou Gong and others. The next day, the Chairman told Su Yu two decisions: one was to agree that Su Yu would not be able to escape from the river; the other was to appoint Su Yu as commander and political commissar of the Huaye Field Army; and the third was to annihilate 5-12 enemy brigades in about half a year.
Chairman’s handling of Su Yu’s “disobedience” is unique. Not only is it not to dismiss the post and replace it, but it is more trusted and promoted and reused.
This trust is reflected in his unique telegram reply with Su Yu.
1. "Very happy and very comforted"
This kind of callback usually occurs when East China Field Army wins the battle. After receiving Su Yu's report on annihilation of the enemy, the Chairman often called back: "Very happy and very comforted." The few short words seem very simple, but they contain the Chairman’s emotional color towards Su Yu.
Suzhong Battle is Su Yu's fledgling battle in the War of Liberation. 7 battles and seven victories made the chairman look at him with admiration. After disobeying the decision of the headquarters to go south, the Chairman greatly appreciated Su Yu's strategic mind and his ability to predict the entire situation. The Chairman gave Su Yu the battle command in a strategic area and the chairman was extremely trusted. Su Yu's victory in the battle was expected to be the Chairman's trust, and it brought joy to the Chairman. Behind the "very happy and very comforted" is the Chairman's greater trust and joy in Su Yu.
2. It doesn’t matter if one or two battles were not fought well. Summarize the experience well, the situation is generally good. The callback like
occurs when Su Yu lost some local battles. Su Yu is a commander of our army at the level of war gods and is known as the "eternal victory general". Of course, the victorious generals also suffer defeat. After occasionally losing a battle, Su Yu would usually conduct a deep review of Military Commission with a very self-blame attitude. Faced with Su Yu's self-blame, the Chairman was more comforting and cheering. It doesn’t matter if one or two battles are not fought well. Summarize the experience well, the situation is generally good.
This kind of reply occurred in 1947, when Su Yu suffered two defeats in Nanma and Linqu. Since the opponent was Hu Lian of the 18th Army, the Chairman understood Su Yu's difficulty and Hu Lian's courage very well. After the defeat, the Chairman neither held accountable nor criticized further, but gave more comfort and encouragement. It doesn’t matter if one or two battles are not fought well. Summarize the experience well, the situation is generally good. These words are filled with the Chairman's psychological comfort for Su Yu's defeat and his continued trust in him. The defeats of Nanma and Linqu are nothing. They are local defeats and do not affect the overall situation. We must emerge from the shadow of failure as soon as possible, continue to maintain sufficient confidence and defeat the enemy. This reply is exactly the Chairman's cleverness. He used words to treat Su Yu's shadow of defeat and restored his confidence in the battle.
3. You can make a decision on the spot, and you don’t have to ask for instructions on everything
. This kind of callback appears in Su Yu’s use of strategies and tactics and the main attack direction. Whenever there is a different combat plan, Su Yu often reports to the Military Commission for instructions. For Su Yu's use, the Chairman has a high degree of trust and bold delegation. Fighter jets are often fleeting. After the major combat policy and combat layout are determined, the commander's decision on the momentum is extremely important. The Chairman understands these truths deeply. Therefore, on the battlefield, the Chairman attaches more importance to the commander's grasp of the fighter jets, and he also fully trusts Su Yu's ability to make decisions on the spot.
After the first phase of Huaihai Battle , whenever Su Yu asked for instructions, the chairman's reply was usually: You can make a decision on the spot and don't ask for instructions in everything. The Chairman’s meaning is very obvious. I trust you very much. Don’t always send telegrams and ask for instructions and missed the fighter plane.
This reply reflects the Chairman’s trust in Su Yu. This kind of trust is rare in Lin Biao, Peng Dehuai and others. For example, on the battle of , the battle of Siping and the battle of Jinzhou in , the Chairman's disagreement with Lin Biao's wavering "disobedience" and his constructive disagreement are often more harsher words and instructions.
[Deeply cultivate the history of war, promote positive energy, welcome to submit articles, private messages will be replied]
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