As we all know, Peng Dehuai is not the first candidate to command North Korea, at least Su Yu and Lin Biao should be in the top two. However, as long as we look at the formation process of the Volunteer Army Headquarters and the division of labor among the three deputy commanders, we will find that in addition to Lin Biao, Mr. Peng should be one of the most suitable generals to command the four field troops.
Peng Dehuai entered the DPRK before the volunteer army, which made Deng Hua, Hong Xuezhi and others spend two days of worrying (because the radio car did not keep up). In the past two days, Peng Dehuai not only discussed relevant combat matters with Kim Il Sung, but also formed a plan for the formation of the Zhi Division and the specific work situation of the relevant personnel.
According to Peng Dehuai's original plan, the 13th Corps was not the later Zhisi. He wants to use the 13th Corps as the basis, and then supplement some personnel to form the final headquarters. After learning the latest battle situation from Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai changed his mind. Except for the addition of Piao Yiyu, who is the deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the Korean People's Army , the others are all members of the team of the 13 Corps. However, the specific division of labor for each person is slightly different.
Deng Hua was the general ordered by Lin Biao himself (exchanged with Huang Yongsheng), no one is more familiar with Siye than Lin Biao. In the early days of the Anti-Japanese War, he was the political commissar of the 685th Regiment of the 343rd Brigade of the Eighth Route Army. During the war of liberation, he also served as the column commander and the corps commander. Deng Hua served as the first deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the Volunteer Army. Peng Dehuai is absolutely assured. He is mainly in charge of: cadre work and political work.
The first on the right is Deng Hua
How much does Peng Dehuai know about the personnel organization and the focus of related work at Siye? It can be fully reflected in the process of appointing Hong Xuezhi.
was changed from the 13th Corps Headquarters to the Zhi Division, and Peng Dehuai must have thought deeply about the selection of the chief of staff.Xie Fang was originally the chief of staff of the 12th Corps of the Four Wilds. As a result, related problems such as unfamiliar organization and personnel will inevitably arise in the work. Therefore, before the 13th Corps became Zhisi, the first candidate for chief of staff in Peng Dehuai's mind was Hong Xuezhi.
The first from the left is Hong Xuezhi.
Hong Xuezhi used to be the deputy commander and chief of staff of the 15th Corps (before the exchange of the 13th Corps and the 15th Corps). He is the most suitable chief of staff of the Volunteer Army. However, since the 13th Corps is now used, Xie Fang will naturally continue to serve as the chief of staff. Therefore, Peng Dehuai appointed Hong Xuezhi as the second deputy commander of the Volunteer Army, in charge of: the work of the headquarters, special forces and logistics.
It can be seen that part of the "work of the command" is actually to assist the solution to complete the work of the chief of staff (General Hong Xuezhi explained this matter in his memoirs). Boss Peng knew that in every respect, Hong Xuezhi was more familiar with Siye's troops than Xie Fang. At the beginning of the war, he was assisted by Hong Xuezhi. With the continuous running-in, Xie Fang will gradually adapt to the "new" position.
The first one on the left is the solution.
If Peng Dehuai's appointment of Hong Xuezhi stemmed from his familiarity with the Four Fields, then the appointment of Han Xianchu reflected four words: know people and make good use of them.
It is true that Han Xianchu is the "cyclone commander" of the four fields, but he was Peng Dehuai's subordinate as early as the Red Army period. In May 1936, Peng Dehuai led the Red Army and the Red Army to the west. As the commander of the Red 78 Division, Han Xianchu (Red 15th Army Corps) blatantly "disobeyed" Peng Dehuai's order and resolutely wanted to destroy Dingbian City ( Ma Hongkui ). He even said: "Even if shoots me, I can't let go of this good opportunity... " After the battle, Peng Dehuai not only did not punish Han Xianchu, but also praised him for his ability to catch fighter .
After this incident, Peng Dehuai knew that Han Xianchu was good at fighting and did not "play cards" according to common sense. In the organizational structure of Zhisi, Mr. Peng appointed him as the third deputy commander, but he "didn't" arrange specific work: did not have a specific division of labor, and went to the army to supervise and inspect combat problems. Han Xianchu's job is to be with the army, which is actually the job he wants most. It is not Han Xianchu's style to only study the combat plan in front of Zhisi's map.
Han Xianchu is in the middle of the front row. However, how to integrate the four field battles together to maximize combat effectiveness is equally important. Some people used the results of the fifth battle to prove that Peng Dehuai was not suitable to take command of North Korea. Mr. Peng also admitted in his later self-report that it was a defeat in his military career. But what strategist in the world is always winning? MacArthur , Ridgway ? Or Montgomery , Zhukov?
The Volunteer Army quickly adapted to the battlefield under extremely unfavorable conditions, which had a lot to do with Peng Dehuai's clever use of several senior generals from the four fields in the early days of the war. After all, war is a complicated matter, and the art of commanding is not just about formulating an excellent combat plan. How to make 1+1=2 or even 1+1>2 is equally important. From this point of view, Mr. Peng is completely suitable to take command of North Korea.
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