Author | Leng Yan Author Team - Youling
Word count: 4001, Reading time: about 11 minutes
Editor's note: 1644 was an extremely weird year for Chinese history. At the beginning of this year, Li Zicheng, who had just won the , had just won the Shaanxi Province, led his army to the east, and was unstoppable. In the spring, he took over Beijing, the capital of the Ming Empire. But when everyone thought the overall situation was about to be settled, the Qing army from the Northeast came from behind and defeated Li Zicheng, who had occupied Beijing for only 40 days. In just two months, the three regimes have changed, and this is closely related to a heroic barrier. That is Shanhaiguan, which controls , Liaoxi Corridor and , North China Plain . So, why did the Qing army take down Shanhaiguan before they finally enter the Central Plains?
Before the Qing army entered the pass from Shanhaiguan in 1644, the Qing army had actually crossed the Great Wall many times and entered the North China Plain. However, these entry into the country failed to gain a foothold in the North China Plain. This phenomenon exists because of the existence of Shanhaiguan. The Qing Dynasty rulers have commented on it themselves.
Qianlong In the 43rd year of Emperor Gaozong's visit to Shengjing, saying, " Shanhaiguan Jingdong natural danger, and the Ming Dynasty heavy troops guarded this to prevent our dynasty. Whenever the army attacked from Xifeng and Juyongdao, it was like entering a no-man's land. However, if there was Shanhaiguan control and blocking it, the internal and external momentum would not be connected, and then the other entrances would enter, and Peter disturbed my retreat. Therefore, Beile Amin He abandoned Luan, Yong, Zun and moved back to the four cities. Although Emperor Taizong angrily condemned him, he did not personally lead the entrance of the army since then. The counties and counties that he conquered Shandong and Zhili were not guarded and left without guarding them, all because of the blocking of Shanhaiguan. ”
By 1644, with the Xianguan of Wu Sangui, the Qing army was finally able to gain a foothold in the North China Plain and send troops to pacify the world. It can be seen that military geography is important for the rise and fall of dynasties.
After the Northern Expedition in the early Ming Dynasty, it quickly captured the strategic location of Shanhaiguan area and sent troops to the area in time. Hongwu set up Yongping Guard in the fourth year. The guard is located in Yongping Prefecture , and there are 7,021 Yongping Guard official troops. During this period, the Ming army still focused on offensives, and Shanhaiguan's strategic position was not outstanding. With the failure of Xu Da's Northern Expedition in the fifth year of Hongwu, the strategy of eliminating , the Northern Yuan in one fell swoop was forced to adjust to defend the border. At this time, the status of Shanhaiguan became important.
The first month of the 14th year of Hongwu, " General Xu Da sent 15,100 troops from Yanshan and other guards to repair Yongping, Jieling and other 32 passes" " Ming Taizu's Records ", when Xu reached the Dashan Haiguan area, the pass here was still Yuguan originally built by the Sui Dynasty. During the Sui Dynasty, the western Liaoning Corridor had not yet taken shape, and by the early Ming Dynasty, the western Liaoning Corridor had become an important hub for communication between Northeast China and North China . At this time, the location of Guyu Pass was obviously unable to adapt to the role of controlling the western Liaoning passage.
Xu Da moved Shanhaiguan 60 miles east of ancient Chongqing. Because it leaned against Yanshan Mountain in the north and connected to Bohai in the south, it was named Shanhaiguan. After Xu Da built Shanhaiguan, he established bathroom here to further strengthen the military defense of the area. Xuande html adjusted the garrison in four years. Shanhaiguan had eight thousand households under its jurisdiction, with a 10,000 soldiers. The troops near Shanhaiguan had more than 37,000 soldiers, which shows the Ming court's attention to this area. However, since the Ming army had successfully captured Liaodong at this time, the importance of Shanhaiguan was on a downward trend in most of the Ming Dynasty .
Four towns and three passes record: " first built ten military institutions, with 10,000 official troops. Later, because of nothing, more than 7,500 were transferred to Yibishi and guard the border, and 2,000 were transferred to Dalinghe, Liaodong and other places to garrison. There were 280 official troops and 200 Chengcao troops. "
However, after the Ming and Qing wars began, the status of Shanhaiguan suddenly increased. In the leap April of 1618, 1618, Shanhaiguan Town was established. "H, the fourth route of Jizhen Dongxie belongs to Shanhaiguan as a town. The troops who recruited 4,000 border troops and 2,000 Shanhai Road soldiers, which were divided into the left and right camps.At this time, the scope of Shanhaiguan Town included the areas under the jurisdiction of the four routes of Yanheying, Gongtouying, Shimenzhai and Shanhaiguan, which were originally from Jizhen East Association. The specific scope was from Shanhaiguan in the east and Jianchangying in the west.
▲Xuda
In the first half of the Ming and Qing War, Shanhaiguan's role was not yet prominent. But with the fall of Liaoshen in the early years of the Tianqi period and the fall of Guangning, the role of Shanhaiguan suddenly became more important.
But at this time the situation of Shanhaiguan was very bad. When the king of arrived at Shanhaiguan in Jin , he recorded the scene he saw. " city was eight miles around, one hundred and thirty-seven steps and four feet high, four feet high, and bricks were built outside the ground." But "After a long time of peace, the soil and stones were peeled off... The city was thin but not guardable, people could not line up, and horses could not gallop together." Moreover, at this time, Liaodong was defeated. "Hidden the Sanshuimen rushed into a pit, and each blocked the walls were as many as slanted.
So Wang Zaijin began to repair Shanhaiguan and proposed to use Shanhaiguan as the defense core, and by building a heavy city in Balipu, and then step westward to enhance the defense depth of Shanhaiguan. The focus of Wang Zaijin's plan is to focus on Shanhaiguan's defense. This plan was naturally formulated based on the current situation of the Ming army. But this plan seems petty to the Sun Chengzong who came to inspect. Sun Chengzong believed that Ningyuan should be seized immediately, and the construction of a city in Ningyuan would control western Liaoning, and then restore the entire Liaoning step by step.
▲Sun Chengzong
Personally, although Wang Zaijin's plan is relatively conservative, it conforms to his own reality. As a minister who has no connection with the Apocalypse Emperor, Wang Zaijin has limited trust and resources, so the proposal proposed is relatively conservative. Sun Chengzong was different. As the Emperor's Master of the Tianqi, he was an old man from Qiandi and a new senior secretary of the cabinet. The resources he could allocate far higher than those of Wang Zaijin. Therefore, Sun Chengzong had the confidence to propose a larger plan.
At this time, Sun Chengzong's plan was to increase the depth of defense for Shanhaiguan. However, with the successful construction of Ningyuan, Sun Chengzong seemed to have found a magic weapon to restore Liaodong. Through the construction of the city, it gradually expanded from western Liaoning to Liaohe , and then regained Guangning and narrowed the activity space of the Later Jin army. The initial construction of Jinzhou was to provide Ningyuan with a defensive depth, and when Dalinghe , it inevitably met the Later Jin army head-on.
Chongzhen The four-year Battle of the Great Linghe became the turning point of Sun Chengzong's strategy of building a city. In the fourth year of Chongzhen in the Ming army, Sun Chengzong, who was in charge of Liaodong for the second time, went out to inspect the city and prepared to build Dalinghe City. Huang Taiji After hearing this, he decided to send troops to attack the Daling River to prevent the Ming army from expanding eastward.
On July 20, Huang Taiji led the main force of Eight Banners from Shenyang. Since Huang Taiji had initially integrated Mongolian tribes in the battle to enter the pass two years ago, the Mongolian tribes that sent troops to surrender to Later Jin also sent troops to help the battle. After the two armies met, Huang Taiji decided to divide his troops into two groups and led the main force to besiege the city, while Beledege, , Ajige, and Yue Tuo led 20,000 troops to cut off the connection between Dalinghe and Jinzhou.
Due to the previous defeats of Ningyuan Battle and Ningjin Battle , Huang Taiji did not choose to attack Dalinghe in this attack, but chose to siege as the main focus. Huang Taiji ordered the Later Jin army to dig trenches around the city. At this time, Daling River had more than 13,000 soldiers led by the Daling River, but due to the short construction time of Daling River, only half of the project was completed, and there was not much food and grass stored in the city, which was difficult to support long-term combat. The only way for the Ming army was to rescue the enemy.
But at this time the peasant uprising army in the pass had spread from Shaanxi to Shanxi, and the main force of the Ming army's border army was largely restrained on the battlefield in Shanxi and Shaanxi and could not be transferred eastward. The Battle of Daling River could only rely on the power of the Ming army outside the Pass, but after several rounds of competition, the Ming army outside the Pass was ultimately defeated Huang Taiji's Eight Banners Army. The Battle of Daling River ended with the complete failure of the Ming army.Accompanying the fall of Daling River are Guanning elites who have spent countless money and grain to build from the early years of the Tianqi period. After that, the Ming army no longer had the strength to expand eastward, and Sun Chengzong's fortress strategy was declared bankrupt.
is also accompanied by the bankruptcy of the fortress strategy and is related to the wavering of Ning's defense line. Since the Later Jin Dynasty had already controlled the Mongolian tribes outside the Ji Liao border at this time, the Guanning defense line became a narrow and dangerous area facing the enemy and the sea. The Eight Banners Army even felt like they were in a no-man in the entire western Liaoning Corridor.
For example, in the ninth year of Chongzhen, Ajige entered the pass and plundered, Huang Taiji sent Dorgon Doduo to attack Ningjin to restrain him. The Qing army looted at will among the fortresses in western Liaoning. After going around Ningyuan, attacked Shahesu, Zhonghousu, Qiantun and other places... bandits inside and outside the pass were everywhere. The Qing army arrived at Caojiazhuang forty miles west of Ningyuan and set fire to the fire. " Ningyuan hung lights all night. The next day, the thieves returned and attacked Shahesou. "
Because the Ming army lacked the strength of field battles, they could only watch the Qing army destroy the foundation of the settlement in western Liaoning. After , the Battle of Songjin , the Ming army was even compressed to Ningyuan. At this time, the Guanning defense line was already in danger. In the 16th year of Chongzhen, the Qing army captured Zhonghou, Qiantunwei, Zhongqiankou, Ningyuan City had become an isolated city. The Guanning defense line could no longer be maintained, and there was less than a year before the demise of the Ming Dynasty.
So is this Guanning line of defense worthless in vain national strength? The author believes that the role of Guanning’s defense line is worthwhile in terms of defending against Shanhaiguan Pingwei. But in terms of restoring Liaodong, this line of defense can be said to be a deficit.
The Guanning Ming army, which is more than 100,000 yuan, was divided into defenders and combat soldiers by this line of defense. As more and more castles, fewer and fewer combat soldiers can be used for field battles, and they cannot defeat the Qing army in field battles, and the guards have become dead soldiers trapped in the castle. Even if the Ming army expanded the scale of Guanning's army, it was impossible to logistically. Guanning's logistics relied entirely on the sea channel, and the annual delivery of 600,000 stones was already the limit. It can be said that even if the Ming army had enough troops, it did not support the logistics conditions for these soldiers to fight in Liaodong.
The Ming army's fortress tactics fell into a vicious cycle from the beginning. Liaodong's huge military expenditure became an important driving force that overwhelmed the Ming Dynasty's finances, and the expenditure of Liaobao was more than 74.64 million yuan after the third year of Chongzhen. What does this expenditure mean? The Korean War, which lasted for seven years during the Wanli period, only cost 7.8 million military expenses, which means that the annual expenditure of Guanning alone is close to the 0,000 Korean War . Such financial pressure lasted for twenty years, and eventually led to the complete collapse of the Ming Dynasty.
▲Liaosheng
Coincidentally, three hundred years later, the decisive battle that determined the fate of the world started again in the Liaoxi Corridor. In the autumn of 1948, the Northeast Field Army of , attacked the Beining line and captured Jinzhou in one fell swoop. The 500,000 troops in the northeast were evacuated to the west, causing a closed door and a dog to be beaten. Regarding Liaoshen Campaign , everyone’s impression is the strong attack of Jinzhou City .
In fact, the first fist of the Northeast Field Army hit Ningyuan City ( Xingcheng ). On September 12, the commander of the Second Corps, Cheng Zihua, commanded the 11th Column, the three independent divisions and artillery brigades of the Hebei-Chahar-Religious Military Region, and attacked Changli to Xingcheng. After the Northeast Field Army besieged the city and fought aid under Xingcheng City, it quickly captured Shimen and Anshan, and captured Changli on the 14th.
After the Liaoshen Campaign ended, the Northeast Field Army entered North China from Xifengkou . At this time, Shanhaiguan became an isolated city and could no longer play a role in blocking the Northeast Field Army from entering the pass. Fu Zuoyi was forced to give up Shanhaiguan.
▲Northeast Field Army entered the pass
So why did the Northeast Field Army gain a foothold in North China without breaking through Shanhaiguan three hundred years later, but the Qing army had to seize Shanhaiguan? There was a view in the past that even if Wu Sangui did not offer Guan Qing's army, he could enter North China to defeat Li Zicheng. The important argument for this view is that three hundred years later, the Northeast Field Army brought heavy equipment and entered the pass from Xifengkou to enter North China to divide the Fu Zuoyi Group.
But those who hold this view forget that the situation in ancient and modern times is different. Before the Northeast Field Army entered the pass, most of North China was already the base of our army enough to support the army's operations, but Fu Zuoyi only retreated to a few big cities and was strategically at a disadvantage. However, the Qing army three hundred years ago did not have such conditions. If you fail to hit Beijing City, you can only retreat outside the pass again. The strategic risk is extremely great. Only by controlling Shanhaiguan can the Qing army use their fingers as their arms and fingers, and can regroup even if they make a small setback.
After talking about the importance of Shanhaiguan, let’s take a look at the Liaodong strategy in the late Ming Dynasty. As mentioned above, relying on fortress tactics to recover Liaodong was bankrupt after the Battle of Daling River. At this time, if the Ming Dynasty adjusted its strategic goals in time and placed the positioning of the Guanning defense line on blocking the Qing army's entry into the pass, the Ming Dynasty would be able to adjust its troops in a timely manner, and even give up the full operation of the west of Ningyuan.
Ningyuan Jinzhou is about 170 miles away, which is undoubtedly too long for the Ming army that has lost its field combat capabilities. The saved troops can also be used in various battlefields within the pass, and the huge Liao pay expenditure can also be reduced a lot. Perhaps the direction of historical progress will also change.
References:
"Records of the Ming Taizu"
"Records of the Ming Shenzong"
"Records of the Shengwu Ji"
"Collected by Sun Chengzong"
"Border Defense History of the Ming Empire"
"The Problem of Liao Fee in the Late Ming Dynasty"
"The Record of the Facts of Liao in the Three Dynasties"
"The Battle of Liao and Shen"
"The Battle of Pingjin"
"The Manuscript of Eagle Valley"
This article is an original manuscript of the Cold Weapon Research Institute. The editor-in-chief Yuan Kuo and the author Youling. No media may reprint without written authorization. Violators will be held legally responsible. Some pictures are from the Internet. If you have any copyright issues, please contact us.
