In October 1950, the Chinese People’s Volunteers responded to the call of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and Chairman Mao Zedong to "resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and defend the country." They crossed the Yalu River and joined the Korean People’s Army. "Combat.
The Chinese and North Korean armies are engaged in joint operations. How can they coordinate and command together?
In order to coordinate and unify the command of the Chinese and North Korean military operations and effectively fight against the common enemy, in December 1950, through consultations between the leaders of the Chinese and North Korean governments, the two armies were formed with Peng Dehuai as the commander and political commissar. Joint Command. As the commanding headquarters of the Chinese and North Korean military, the China-North Korea Joint Command commanded one million Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army. The "United Nations Army" signed the armistice agreement and made important contributions to the victory in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea.
So, what is the composition of the joint headquarters of the Chinese and North Korean armies? What important role did it play in the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea?
The issue of the unified command of the Chinese and North Korean armies was raised and discussed
The Chinese People's Volunteers went to North Korea, and The Korean People’s Army faces a very important practical problem in joint operations, that is, how to coordinate and unify command.
In early October 1950, before the Chinese People's Volunteers went to fight in North Korea, Premier Zhou Enlai, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, went to the Soviet Union to hold talks with Soviet leaders such as Stalin on issues related to resisting US aggression and aiding Korea. During this period, after Zhou Enlai received Mao Zedong’s telegram about the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee meeting again to discuss the issue of sending troops to North Korea, according to the content of Mao Zedong’s telegram, he made eight requests to Stalin to answer questions. When it cooperates with the Korean People’s Army, how should the command relationship between the two parties be resolved."
Stalin did not answer this question.
After the Chinese People’s Volunteers arrived in North Korea, on October 21st, during the talks between Commander Peng Dehuai and North Korean Prime Minister Kim Il Sung in Dadong, North Ping’an, Peng Dehuai proposed that in order to coordinate the fighting between the Chinese and North Korean armies, he hoped that Prime Minister Kim Il Sung would lead the People’s Army. The General Command and the Volunteer Army Command live together so that they can negotiate and deal with major issues at any time. Kim Il Sung said that there are still many problems that he urgently need to solve, and he sent the Minister of Internal Affairs Park Il-woo to live in the Volunteer Army headquarters as the representative of North Korea.Major issues can be resolved through Park Yiyu's negotiation. After the Chinese People's Volunteers entered the DPRK, Peng Dehuai was asked to direct and dispose of them.
Peng Dehuai and Kim Il Sung are on the front line of North Korea (data map)
Through talks with Kim Il Sung, Peng Dehuai learned: After the US Army landed in Incheon in September, there were more than a dozen divisions of the two regiments of the Korean People’s Army. It was cut off to the south of the "38th Parallel" and was in a disadvantageous situation of being attacked by the enemy. There are only three divisions and two regiments in the north, scattered in various places. At this time, Peng Dehuai felt that, in response to the menacing offensive of the US and South Korean troops,
currently only relies on his command of the first batch of volunteer troops to enter the DPRK with more than 200,000 troops.
In order to facilitate the coordinated operations of the Chinese and North Korean armies, before the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Headquarters is about to issue a composition order, on October 24, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai and pointed out:
Volunteer Army Headquarters, in addition to Chinese comrades, please contact Kim Il Sung Discuss with a North Korean comrade as deputy commander and deputy political commissar, or one as deputy commander and one as deputy political commissar
.
According to Kim Il-sung’s opinion that Park Il-woo will be sent to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army as a representative of North Korea, and major issues can be resolved through Park Il-woo’s consultations, on October 25, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the issue of the establishment of the volunteer army’s leadership and the deployment of main cadres In the telegram, Piao Yiyu was appointed as the deputy commander and deputy political commissar of the Volunteer Army and the deputy secretary of the Party Committee of the Volunteer Army.
The second battle conducted by the Chinese People's Volunteers expelled the "United Nations Army" and the South Korean Army to the south of the "38th Parallel" and forced the enemy to turn into defense, which basically reversed the situation in North Korea. In this campaign, the two corps of the People’s Army, separated behind enemy lines, joined forces with the Volunteer Army, plus the troops of the People’s Army in the north. At this time, the People’s Army that was able to participate in the first line of operations had three corps, 14 divisions, and 75,000. people.
At this time, the issue of how the Chinese and North Korean armies work together has become increasingly prominent. Coupled with the intervention of Soviet military advisers in North Korea, it is even more necessary to resolve the issue of unified command between the two armies.
In order to enable the Chinese and North Korean forces to coordinate and cooperate effectively,
During the second battle, Peng Dehuai once proposed to Chairman Mao Zedong and Prime Minister Kim Il Sung that the Chinese and North Korean forces should implement unified leadership and command
.
Peng Dehuai proposed that Prime Minister Kim Il Sung and the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, Stykov, will be stationed in the front, and a three-person team composed of Kim Il Sung, Stykov and Peng Dehuai will be responsible for deciding military policies and combat operations. Many of the relevant current policies seek mutual agreement to facilitate the war.
On November 5, regarding the issue of the signature of the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army and the Korean People’s Army battle report, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai and pointed out: In order to confuse people, it is not appropriate to publish the battle report in the name of the joint command, but the People’s Army. The headquarter issued a battle report in the name of the headquarters, but there should be a few sentences in the battle report mentioning that the Chinese People’s Anti-U.S. Aid Korea Defence National Defense Force (referred to as the Volunteer Force, not called the Volunteer Army externally, but called the Volunteer Army internally) participated in the battle, and the fight Be very brave.
In order to effectively solve important issues such as the unified command of operations in North Korea, on November 13, Mao Zedong called Stalin to solicit his opinions on this issue. The telegram relayed Peng Dehuai's proposal on the Korean war and the unified command of the Chinese and Korean armies.
The telegram emphasized that
The Chinese and North Korean armies now urgently need joint command. The important issue now is that the leading comrades of North Korea, China and the Soviet Union in North Korea can unite well and reach consensus on various military and political policies_ p1p
, the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers can cooperate well in combat, and according to your proposal, a considerable number of North Korean troops and Chinese volunteers can be mixed together (preservation of the Korean army’s organizational units). In this way, victory is certain.
Because North Korea and the Soviet military adviser to North Korea Vasilev advocated that the Volunteers of the Second Campaign should continue to pursue the enemy south of the Chingchuan River, they did not agree to retreat dozens of kilometers. After arguing with the North and the Soviet side, Peng Dehuai immediately Call Chairman Mao Zedong to truthfully report the situation.
On November 14, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China sent a high post to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army to discuss with the DPRK and the Soviet side the operational policy for the second campaign and the issue of joint operations between the Chinese and Korean armed forces. On November 15, Kim Il Sung and the Soviet ambassador to North Korea, Stikoff, discussed with Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang on the operational policy of the second campaign. At the meeting, Stykov advocated that the Chinese and North Korean armies should be under unified command. However, the talks did not reach an agreement on the formation of a three-person team by Kim Il Sung, Stykov, and Peng Dehuai and the unified command of the Chinese and North Korean armed forces.
On November 16, Stalin replied to Mao Zedong, expressing his full support for the Chinese comrades to uniformly command the operations in North Korea, and sent the same telegram to the North Korean Prime Minister, the Supreme Commander of the People’s Army, Kim Il Sung, and the Soviet Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to North Korea. Stykov. The next day, Mao Zedong forwarded the telegram to Stalin and Stalin's reply to Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang, commander of the Northeast Military Region.
In early December, Kim Il Sung was invited to Beijing. On the 3rd, they held talks with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai on war issues, policy issues, leadership issues, unified command issues, military issues, and relations between the two parties. Regarding the issue of unified command,
Kim Il-sung said that Stalin had a telegram instructing the Chinese and North Korean forces to be in unified command. Because the Chinese Volunteers have experience, the Chinese comrades should be the leader and the North Korean comrades should be the deputy. The Politburo meeting of the Workers’ Party of Korea has agreed to this
.
Regarding the leader of the China-North Korea Joint Command, Mao Zedong told Kim Il-sung that Peng Dehuai was the commander and political commissar of the Chinese side. Kim Il-sung said that North Korea pushed Kim Xiong (the commander of the Korean People’s Army Frontline Command) As the deputy commander, Park Yiyu was the deputy political commissar. He immediately confirmed that the joint orders would be signed by Peng Dehuai, Kim Il Sung, and Park Yiyu, and the individual orders to the volunteers remained the same as before. The joint command can be established after Jin Il Sung returns to China and negotiated with Peng Dehuai.
Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung met in Beijing (data map)
On the second day after the talks, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China telegraphed Peng Dehuai and Gao Gang: "The cash has been returned, please consider whether Peng can make an appointment now. And high up to the front to hold a meeting and set up a joint command. I hope to report."
The joint command of the Chinese and Korean armed forces is officially formed
According to the instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Peng Dehuai invited Prime Minister Kim Il Sung to the Volunteer Army Command to discuss the Sino-Korean joint The composition of the command. On December 6, Kim Il-sung informed Peng Dehuai by telephone that he would leave that night and go to the headquarters of the Volunteer Army in Dayudong before dawn on the 7th to discuss the formation of the China-North Korea Joint Command and the deployment of leading cadres in the joint department.
At 11 o'clock on the same day, Peng Dehuai telegraphed Mao Zedong about this situation, and said: To facilitate future command, the Volunteer Army Headquarters must be moved south to Shichuan or to the south of Dechuan. After the battle on the Eastern Front is over, please Gao Gang come forward again.Discuss issues such as the composition of the joint command and food bombs.
At 22:00 on December 6, Mao Zedong called Peng Dehuai and transferred to Kim Il Sung, suggesting that Kim Il Sung and the joint headquarters and the Volunteer Army headquarters should be moved to a suitable location south of Dechuan, but the conditions for concealed air defense must be paid attention to. main idea. The two corps of the People’s Army in the Jiangjie and Dingju regions asked Comrade Kim Il Sung to promptly order them to accept the command of Comrades Peng Dehuai, Kim Xiong, and Park Il Woo, and set out with the volunteers to the south of Pyongyang to cooperate with the volunteers.
On December 7, Peng Dehuai and Kim Il-sung held talks on the specific issue of the formation of a joint headquarters between the Chinese and North Korean troops in Dayu-dong. According to the principles reached by Mao Zedong and Kim Il-sung in the Beijing meeting, the two sides agreed:
The Joint Command has jurisdiction over the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Command and the Korean People’s Army Command, but the Sino-North Korean Joint Command does not make public announcements. All joint operations within the scope of combat and on the front lines are issued in the name of the China-North Korea Allied Forces General Command. And decided to form a Sino-Korean Joint Command
within a few days.
After the meeting, Peng Dehuai immediately telegraphed Mao Zedong: The talks with Kim Il Sung were very good today, and Kim Il Sung agreed to form a joint headquarters. It has been agreed that the Third Army of the People’s Army will cooperate with the Ninth Army of the Volunteers under the command of Song Shilun.
In early December,
The Joint Command of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army (referred to as the Joint Command or Joint Command of the Chinese and Korean Armies, also known as the Joint Command of the Chinese and Koreans) formally formed
, with Peng Dehuai serving as commander and Political commissar, Jin Xiong is the deputy commander, and Park Yiyu is the deputy political commissar.
In February 1953, the North Korean government appointed Cui Yongjian as its deputy commander. As the front-line commander of the Korean People’s Army, Deputy Commander Jin Xiong commanded operations on the front line. Deputy Political Commissar Park Yiyu lives in the China-North Korea Joint Command and coordinates the joint operations between the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers. After the establishment of the Sino-Korean Joint Command, the Supreme Command of the Korean People’s Army sent a military liaison group to liaise and coordinate the joint operations of the People’s Army and the Volunteers. The contact group is directly under the leadership of Piao Yiyu, deputy political commissar.
Regarding the powers and responsibilities of the joint command headquarters between China and North Korea, Zhou Enlai drafted for the CPC Central Committee on December 8, 1950, in the "Agreement between China and North Korea on the Establishment of a Joint Command Headquarters between China and North Korea." To fight against the common enemy,China and the DPRK agreed to immediately establish a joint command headquarters to uniformly command all operations and related matters in North Korea. "The Korean People's Army and all guerrillas and the Chinese People's Volunteers are under the unified command of the joint command. "The Joint Command has the authority to direct all operations related to operations (roads, railways, ports, airports, wired and wireless telephones and telegraphs, etc.), food preparation, manpower and material mobilization, etc. "For all work related to the front mobilization, supplementary training, and restoration of local administration in the North Korean rear, the joint command may submit reports and suggestions to the North Korean government based on actual conditions and war needs. "The news reports on the operations at Fanguan will be edited and reviewed by the agency designated by the Joint Command, and then handed over to the North Korean news agency for unified release under the name of the Headquarters of the Korean People's Army. _P1p
All orders issued by the China-North Korea Joint Command to the Korean People’s Army and the Chinese People’s Volunteers were issued by the Korean People’s Army General Command and the Chinese People’s Volunteers Command respectively
.
Kim Il Sung (left 3) Group photo with members of the China-North Korea Joint Command Peng Dehuai (fourth from left), Jin Xiong (first from left),
Park Yiyu (second from left), etc. (data map)
The China-North Korea Joint Command is not open to the public. On December 8, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China replied to Peng Dehuai and pointed out that it can only be organized in reality. It is neither open to the outside world, and internally issued only to the military and independent divisions, but all relevant operations must be under unified command. The Agreement between China and North Korea on the Establishment of a Joint Command Headquarters between China and North Korea further clarifies: "For the sake of confidentiality, the signed orders of Peng Dehuai, Jin Xiong, and Park Yiyu are limited to the North Korean People’s Army Headquarters and the Chinese People’s Volunteers Army Headquarters. , The order only relayed the joint command order without mentioning the names of the three. "_P1p
The Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Headquarters and the Korean People’s Army Headquarters were under the jurisdiction of the China-North Korea Joint Command. When the China-North Korea Joint Command was established, the Chinese People’s Volunteers Command was under the jurisdiction of the 38th, 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 50th , The 66th Corps and the 9th Corps of the 20th Corps, the 26th Corps, and the 27th Corps, a total of nine armies, as well as three artillery divisions under the Volunteer Army’s artillery headquarters, four engineering regiments under the engineering command post, and one The railway division and four logistics divisions totaled more than 300,000 people.
When the volunteer army entered the DPRK with the largest number of troops participating in the war, there were 19 armies.Including the air force, artillery, armored force, engineering force, railway force and other units, a total of 1.35 million people. The General Headquarters of the Korean People’s Army administers four regiments, including the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 5th corps (each corps is equivalent to one army). There are three corps participating in the frontline operations, and one corps is responsible for Pyongyang’s defense mission. There are also guerrilla forces.
There is also a Sino-Korean Air Force Joint Command under the Sino-Korean Joint Command. In order to better command the Chinese and North Korean air forces in coordinated operations,
In March 1951, after consultation between China and North Korea, the Sino-Korean Air Force Joint Command was established. This command is under the joint command of China and North Korea and is "under the leadership of the Joint Department"
.
Chinese People’s Volunteer Army Air Force Commander Liu Zhen is appointed as the commander of the Sino-Korean Air Force Joint Command, political commissar Zhou Chiping (concurrently), the North Korean Aviation Administration Director Wang Lian, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force Deputy Commander Chang Qiankun as the deputy commander, Shen Qixian as the chief of staff , Li Shian served as deputy director of the Political Department. The Sino-Korean Air Force Joint Command consists of five divisions: operations, reconnaissance, communications, confidentiality, and management, and four divisions: military affairs, navigation, navigation, and meteorology. The main task of the Sino-Korean Air Force Joint Command is to unify the command of the Chinese and Korean air forces and the "United Nations" air force.
A certain unit of the Chinese People’s Volunteers Air Force on the Korean battlefield (data map)
The China-North Korea Joint Command also leads the China-North Korea Joint Railway Military Transportation Command. In order to meet the needs of the war, China and North Korea agreed that the North Korean railway must be placed under unified military control. After consultations, it was decided to establish the China-North Korea Joint Railway Military Transport Command in Shenyang under the leadership of the China-North Korea Joint Command to "unify the planning and command of wartime North Korean railway transportation, repair and protection issues." "Under the leadership of the United Railway Military Transportation Command, the General Railway Military Administration was established in North Korea, which is responsible for the implementation of military management, transportation, repair and protection of North Korean railways." "Commissioner and political commissar of the United Railway Military Transportation. Comrades shall serve, and one to three persons from each of the DPRK and China shall serve as deputy commanders and deputy political commissars. The director of the General Administration of Military Administration shall be served by a Chinese comrade, and each of the DPRK and China shall serve as a deputy director." The units under the Chinese Railway Corps and the North Korean Railway Repair Command Organization are unified under the jurisdiction of the Military Transportation Command and the General Administration of Railway Military Management.
In May 1951, the Chinese and North Korean governments signed the "Agreement on Wartime Military Control of Korean Railways."In August, the China-North Korea Joint Railway Transport Command was formally established
. He Jinnian was the commander, Zhang Mingyuan was the political commissar, Liu Juying, Li Shouxuan, and Ye Lin were the Chinese deputy commanders, and Nan Xuelong and the other were the North Korean deputy commanders.
In December, the Forward Transportation Command was established under the Joint Railway Transportation Command, with Liu Juying also serving as the commander. The railway emergency repair unit under the jurisdiction of the China-North Korea Joint Railway Military Transportation Command consists of 4 divisions and 1 regiment of the Volunteer Railway Corps, and 1 railway engineering brigade in North Korea. The establishment of the China-North Korea Joint Railway Military Transportation Command fundamentally guaranteed the unified command of the China-North Korea Joint Command over transportation and reversed the passive transportation situation at the beginning of the war.
Railway Transportation Command organized the transportation of materials to the front line (data map)
In order to strengthen the defense of North Korea's east and west coasts, prevent the US army from landing from the side, strengthen the unified command of the east and west coasts of the Chinese and Korean forces, 1951 In September, the China-North Korea joint command post established the East Coast Joint Command Post and the West Coast Joint Command Post on the East Coast and West Coast respectively.
The East Coast Joint Command Post is concurrently served by the leadership of the 9th Corps of the Volunteers, Song Shilun also serves as the commander, and Li Fali, commander of the 7th Corps of the Korean People's Army, also serves as the deputy commander, and unified command of the 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Corps of the Volunteers And the 47th Division of the 16th Army and the 7th Army of the Korean People's Army.
West Coast Joint Command Post, with the deputy commander of the Volunteer Army Han Xianchu concurrently serving as the commander, and the 4th Army Corps Chief of the Korean People's Army Park Zhengde concurrently serving as the deputy commander. Unified command of the 38th, 39th, 40th, and 50th Corps of the Volunteers and the 1st and 4th Corps of the People's Army. After the East and West Coast Joint Command Post was established, coastal defense forces were deployed to actively prepare for anti-landing.
Since late December 1952, in order to strengthen preparations for anti-landing operations, the China-North Korea Joint Command has further strengthened the command structures on the east and west coasts
. The east and west coast command posts were renamed the command headquarters. Deng Hua, acting commander and political commissar of the Volunteer Army, concurrently served as the commander and political commissar of the West Coast Joint Command, with Liang Xingchu as the deputy commander, Fang Hushan, commander of the People's Army, and commander of the 39th Army of the Volunteers Wu Xinquan is also the deputy commander, Du Ping is the deputy political commissar and director of the political department, and Wang Zhengzhu is the chief of staff.
is to coordinate and command the operations of various special forces,Under the West Coast Joint Command, the Air Force Forward Command Post, Naval Operations Office, Armored Forces Second Command Post, and Artillery Chief’s Office were set up. The East Coast Joint Command is concurrently served by the 3rd Corps of the Volunteers, with Wang Jinshan as the acting commander, the Deputy Commander of the China-North Korea Joint Command, the Commander of the Korean People’s Army Frontline Command Jin Xiong and the Deputy Commander, Du Yide and the Deputy Political Commissar, Wang Yunrui and Chief of Staff, Liu Youguang and Director of Political Department.
At the same time, the China-North Korea Joint Command comprehensively adjusted the battlefield deployment to further strengthen the anti-landing operations. In charge of the defense mission on the west coast, there are 6 volunteers, 14 ground artillery regiments and 9 battalions, 2 antiaircraft artillery regiments and 13 battalions, 16 tank regiments, 2 corps and 1 brigade of the People's Army. In the defense of the East Coast, there are two corps and one division of the Volunteer Army, two regiments of the ground artillery and three battalions, five battalions of the anti-aircraft artillery, one tank regiment, and two regiments of the People's Army and two brigades. The establishment of the East and West Coast Joint Commands strengthened the anti-landing defense force and smashed the attempts of the U.S. forces to land from the side and back, and the Chinese and North Korean forces seized the initiative on the battlefield.
The China-North Korea Joint Command unified the command of the Chinese and North Korean military operations
After the establishment of the China-North Korea Joint Command, the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army began to fight against the "United Nations Army" and the South Korean Army under their unified command .
On December 31, 1950, the Sino-Korean Joint Headquarters commanded the six corps of the Volunteers (38th, 39th, 40th, 50th, 42nd, and 66th corps) and the three corps of the People’s Army (1st, The 2nd and 5th Corps) more than 300,000 people were divided into left and right columns,
from the Linjin River to the west, along the Hantan River and the "United Nations Army" positions along the "38th Line" launched a fierce attack (ie The third battle)
. After seven days and nights of continuous pursuit, it broke through the enemy's defense on the "38th Line", wiped out more than 19,000 enemies, and expelled the enemy to the north and south areas of the "38th Line". This was the first battle commanded by the joint command of the Chinese and North Korean armies, and it was a relatively successful battle.
After the end of the third battle, the Chinese and North Korean troops were transferred to rest and reorganization as planned. In order to unify thinking, sum up experience, and win greater victories in the spring offensive operations, the Sino-North Korean Joint Command held a meeting of senior Chinese and North Korean military cadres in the gentleman of Chengchuan County. Prime Minister Kim Il Sung attended the meeting and spoke,Commander Peng Dehuai made a report.
Some senior generals of the Chinese and Korean armed forces spoke at the meeting. The meeting summarized the experience of the first three battles, analyzed the situation, and put forward the next combat missions and combat policies. The meeting is ongoing. On January 25, 1951, with the support of a large number of air forces, the "United Nations Army" carried out a large-scale counterattack against the Chinese and North Korean military positions with a multi-lane column composed of infantry and tanks.
On January 27, the Chinese and North Korean troops were forced to stop rest and reorganization and immediately switched to defensive operations
. In the face of the enemy's counterattack, Peng Dehuai, commander of the China-North Korea Joint Command, organized the Chinese and North Korean forces into three combat groups: East, West, and Central, and engaged in the fourth battle with the "United Nations Army." On the western front, Han Xianchu, deputy commander of the Volunteer Army, commanded the 38th and 50th Army and the 1st Corps of the People’s Army (Han Group for short) to resist the "United Nations" attack in the direction of Seoul.
On the Eastern Front, Deng Hua, deputy commander of the Volunteer Army, commanded the 39th, 40th, 42nd, and 66th Army (referred to as Deng Group) to counterattack in the direction of Wonju and Hengcheng. Jin Xiong, the deputy commander of the Joint Command and the front-line commander of the People’s Army, commanded the People’s Army’s 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Corps to cover the Deng Group assembly, and the 3rd and 5th Corps counterattacked towards the southeast of Hengcheng on the left wing of Deng Group .
The Sino-Korean Joint Command led the Chinese and North Korean forces in the fourth battle. They carried out a variety of defenses, counterattacks, and movement defenses. It lasted 87 days and wiped out 78,000 enemies and successfully completed the defense mission. , Gained time, covered the assembly of the strategic reserve team, and created favorable conditions for the fifth battle
.
On April 22, 1951, the China-North Korea Joint Command, in order to smash the "United Nations" plan to establish a new line of defense at the waist of North Korea, commanded the Chinese and North Korean forces to launch the fifth battle. In this battle, the China-North Korea Joint Command gathered 15 armies of the Chinese People’s Volunteers and the Korean People’s Army and nearly a million troops divided into the east and west and launched a sudden onslaught on the "United Nations". The Chinese and North Korean armies fought for 50 days and wiped out more than 82,000 enemies. They shattered the "United Nations" plan to establish a new line of defense and got rid of the passive situation in the fourth battle. At the same time, after this battle, the "United Nations Army" was forced to reassess the strength of the Chinese and Korean People's Army, and had to switch to strategic defense and accept negotiations.
The Fifth Battle Map (Data Map)
After June 1951,On the Korean battlefield, the warring parties formed a confrontational situation along the "38th parallel" area, and the war entered a stalemate stage. At this stage, the China-North Korea Joint Command commanded the Chinese and North Korean forces to conduct the defensive campaign in the summer and autumn of 1951, the anti-strangulation and anti-bacterial warfare, the counterattack in the fall of 1952, and the counterattack in the summer of 1953.
Due to the brave operations of the Chinese and North Korean troops, the "United Nations Army" headed by the United States was forced to sign the Korean Armistice Agreement on July 27, 1953
.
At this point, the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea ended successfully, and the Joint Command of the Chinese and North Korean Armies also completed its historical mission
.
.
