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今天小编为大家带来的是最新钱报（六十四），
具体为文献推文（期刊论文）的精读
《A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate》
欢迎您的用心访问！
本期推文阅读时长大约9分钟，请您耐心阅读。
Share interest, spread happiness, increase knowledge, leave beautiful.
Dear you,
This is LearingYard Academy!
Today Xiaobian brings you the latest money report (64),
Specifically for the intensive reading of literature tweets (journal papers)
A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates
Welcome your heart visit!
Thistweetwilltakeabout9minutes to read, please be patient.
今天小编分享一篇期刊论文《A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate》的分散决策部分，小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块来介绍这一部分内容，请读者跟小编一起学习一下吧！
Today Xiaobian shares the decentralized decision-making part of A journal paper "A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates". Xiaobian will introduce this part of the content from the mind map, intensive reading content, knowledge supplement three plates, please readers to learn with Xiaobian!
1.思维导图
该篇文献的分散决策的思维导图部分如下图所示：
The mind map of decentralized decision-making in this paper is shown in the figure below:
2.精读内容
学者分散决策部分研究的是制造商主导下的情况，其中制造商是供应链中的主导者，因此制造商在定价决策中具有优先权。零售商在观察制造商的定价决策后，以自身利益最大化为目的做出最优定价决策。学者所采用的求解方法为逆向归纳法。首先对零售商的利润判断凹凸性，判断是否有最大值（二次求导后小余0为凹函数，二阶海塞矩阵计算大于0为凹函数）。然后直接令一阶导等于0直接求解或联立求解即可得到决策变量的最优反应函数。再者，将决策变量的最优函数再带到制造商利润函数中，再对制造商利润函数中的决策变量求二次导判断其凹凸性，判断出满足凹函数的条件，接着再令决策变量的一次导等于0，联立求解得出制造商函数中决策变量的最优解。接着，再将最优解带入先前求出的最优反应函数中，即可求得所有参数的最优解。最后，将最优解带入需求函数、利润函数中即可。
In the part of decentralized decision-making, scholars study the situation dominated by the manufacturer, in which the manufacturer is the dominant player in the supply chain, so the manufacturer has the priority in the pricing decision. After observing the manufacturer's pricing decision, the retailer makes the optimal pricing decision for the purpose of maximizing its own interests. The solution method adopted by scholars is backward induction. First, judge the concavity of the retailer's profit to determine whether there is a maximum value (small residual 0 after quadratic derivative is a concave function, and the second order Hesse matrix calculation greater than 0 is a concave function). Then directly set the first derivative equal to 0 to solve directly or simultaneously to get the optimal reaction function of the decision variable. Furthermore, the optimal function of the decision variable is introduced into the manufacturer's profit function, and then the second derivative of the decision variable in the manufacturer's profit function is calculated to judge its convexity, and the condition of meeting the concave function is determined. Then the first derivative of the decision variable is set equal to 0, and the optimal solution of the decision variable in the manufacturer's function is obtained simultaneously. Then, the optimal solution can be obtained by substituting it into the optimal reaction function previously obtained. Finally, the optimal solution into the demand function, profit function can be.
学者这一部分中一共得出两个结论：
Two conclusions are drawn from the scholars' part:
结论1：在制造商和零售商都提供回扣时，求出制造商的最优批发价格、最优在线产品价格和最优线下零售价格，从求解结果中可发现在线评论中得到制造商的批发价、在线直销价和零售商的价格与返利和在线评价的感知价值均相关。
Conclusion 1: When both the manufacturer and the retailer provide rebates, the manufacturer's optimal wholesale price, the optimal online product price and the optimal offline retail price are obtained. From the solution results, it can be found that the manufacturer's wholesale price, the online direct selling price and the retailer's price obtained from the online review are correlated with the perceived value of the rebate and the online evaluation.
结论2：在分散决策下，当制造商和零售商都提供返利时，制造商的批发价格与在线评论的感知价值正相关。当消费者对在在线评价的感知价值与交叉价格弹性系数满足一定条件时，制造商批发价与返利正相关，否则负相关。
Conclusion 2: Under decentralized decisions, when both manufacturers and retailers offer rebates, manufacturers' wholesale prices are positively correlated with the perceived value of online reviews. When consumers' perceived value of online evaluation and cross-price elasticity coefficient meet certain conditions, the wholesale price of manufacturers is positively correlated with rebates, otherwise it is negatively correlated.
在一定条件下，制造商的批发价格会随着返利的增加而上升。这是因为当零售商的价格随着返利而上涨时，制造商为了获得更多的利润，也会提高批发价。此外，制造商的批发价格上升，因为感知在线评论的价值提高了，因为在线评论的感知价值通过影响制造商的在线价格来影响其批发价格。
Under certain conditions, manufacturers' wholesale prices will rise with the increase of rebates. This is because when retailers' prices go up with rebates, manufacturers also raise wholesale prices in order to make more profit. In addition, wholesale prices for manufacturers go up because the perceived value of online reviews goes up because the perceived value of online reviews influences wholesale prices for manufacturers by influencing their online prices.
从需求函数的结果来看，我们发现制造商的线下需求与返利有关，而与在线评论中感知价值无关。然而，制造商的在线需求与返利和在线评论的感知价值均有关。
From the results of the demand function, we find that manufacturers' offline demand is related to rebates, but not to perceived value in online reviews. However, manufacturers' online demand is related to both rebates and the perceived value of online reviews.
学者在这部分求解的思路清晰，其求解过程与结果都不算复杂。但小编发现，学者考虑的在线评价和返利两个因素是相互影响的两个因素，制造商通过返利引导消费者进行在线评价，即在线评价中制造商要付出的成本即是返利。同时，制造商所考虑的返利是在线评价后即可获得的。
Scholars have a clear idea of solving this part, and its solving process and results are not complicated. However, Xiaobian found that the two factors considered by scholars, online evaluation and rebate, are two factors that influence each other. Manufacturers guide consumers to conduct online evaluation through rebates, that is, the cost to be paid by manufacturers in online evaluation is rebate. At the same time, manufacturers consider rebates that are available after online reviews.
3.知识补充
1.什么是需求函数？模型中需求函数的构建类型？具体怎么建立？
1. What is the demand function? What types of requirements functions are built in the model? How do you set it up?
需求函数：是用来表示一种商品的需求数量和影响该需求数量的各种因素之间的关系。
Demand function: It is used to represent the relationship between the demand quantity of a commodity and the various factors that affect the demand quantity.
需求函数分为线性需求函数与通过效用函数建立的需求函数。
Demand function is divided into linear demand function and demand function established by utility function.
需求函数的构建有两种类型。一是线性需求函数，二是通过效用函数构建需求函数。
There are two types of requirements function construction. One is linear demand function, and the other is to construct demand function through utility function.
需求函数模型1：从效用函数构建，分为直接构建与间接构建
Demand function model 1: From utility function construction, it can be divided into direct construction and indirect construction
（1）直接构建：
(1) Direct construction:
预算约束为：
The budget constraints are:
在预算约束下使效用函数最大，运用拉格朗日函数进行求解。
In order to maximize the utility function under the budget constraint, Lagrange function is used to solve.
（2）间接构建：
(2) Indirect construction:
利用下图进行求解：
Use the following figure to solve:
需求函数模型2：线性需求函数
Demand function Model 2: linear demand function
论文中常见的需求函数为：D=a-b*p (a>0,b>0）,a为市场容量，b为需求对价格的敏感系数，再根据具体因素进行添加
The common demand function in this paper is: D= A-b *p (a>0,b>0), where a is the market capacity and b is the sensitivity coefficient of demand to price, which is then added according to specific factors
2.什么是序列博弈？在分散决策中制造商与零售商分别主导的思路？
2. What is a sequential game? Manufacturers and retailers lead the way in decentralized decision-making?
序列博弈：博弈者在选择行动时可能占据一定优势进而行动有先后顺序或某些对局者可能率先行动。
Sequential game: Players may have an advantage in choosing their actions and then move in sequence or some opponents may move first.
若制造商主导即为制造商先行，零售商主导即为零售商先行。即制造商主导时，制造商先决策，零售商后决定；零售商主导时，零售商先决定，制造商后决定。
If the manufacturer leads, the manufacturer leads, and the retailer leads. That is, when the manufacturer dominates, the manufacturer makes the decision first, and the retailer makes the decision later. When the retailer dominates, the retailer decides first and the manufacturer decides later.
3.什么是逆向归纳法的求解
3. What is the solution of backward induction
逆向归纳法是求解动态博弈均衡的方法。即博弈参与人存在先后行动的次序,并且后行动的参与人能够观察到前面的行动。
Backward induction is a method to solve dynamic game equilibrium. That is, there is a sequence of actions, and the later player can observe the previous actions.
逆向归纳法思路是从动态博弈中的最后一步步往回推（倒推的过程）， 以求解动态博弈的均衡结果。
The idea of backward induction is to calculate the equilibrium result of the dynamic game by pushing back the last step in the dynamic game.
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参考资料：有道翻译
参考文献：[1] Xia Z, Liu Y, Zhang Q. A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and rebate[J]. Journal of Revenue and Pricing Management, 2022, 21(3): 321-331.
本文由LearningYard学苑整理并发出，如有侵权请在后台留言！
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