This article was first published on "Star News Agency", editor-in-chief, and the author authorized to push
On September 8, according to the consensus reached at the 16th round of chief talks between China and India, the front-line troops in Kanandaban began to organize disengagement in a planned manner.
Comrades asked to talk about the border disengagement, saying that after Modi withstood the pressure of the domestic opposition, is he really going to change his past?
In fact, looking at the problem requires two sides. The pressure on Indian opposition and extreme nationalists is very high, but no matter how great it is, it is not as high as the pressure on China-India's national strength gap and national strategic needs. Only the head knows that the food and rice are expensive. The subsequent pressure is the fundamental reason why Modi had to agree to disengage from contact.
In fact, this is not the first time Modi has been criticized by the opposition on the border issue.
In February last year, after China and India broke off from the -pangonghu based on the consensus on the ninth and tenth rounds of military chief talks, the Indian opposition party accused Modi of "cede territory to China", and some extreme nationalists also scolded Modi.
This time this time, another group of opposition politicians found a performance stage. They claimed that leaving contact on the border was "India suffered a loss", and even made a fuss out of nothing that the Modi government "ceded 1,000 square kilometers of territory" to China, which was a typical "submission without fighting" and so on.
But Modi still insisted on implementing disengagement in accordance with the consensus reached between China and India. Why?
is because the two evils are the least.
First of all, the political situation in India is generally stable, and Modi's Indian Party ruling foundation is also relatively stable. The opposition seizes the border issue and attacks Modi, which can incite some extreme nationalists and a few people who don't know the truth, but it does not fail to shake Modi.
Why can't Modi shake?
is because there is no factual basis, so these remarks are fragile.
Everyone should remember that at the most tense moment after the Galwan incident in June 2020, in the face of the wave of accountability caused by major casualties in India, Modi did one thing at the All-India Party Conference attended by nearly 20 major parties:
took the initiative to confess that the Chinese army did not enter Indian territory.
At that time, many comrades were wondering why he said this at such a sensitive moment, because it was actually because of his domestic political struggle needs, which had nothing to do with personal morality and personality.
Modi used this move to defeat the opposition.
This is his sophistication.
This is the lighter side of the two evils, and domestic pressure is controllable.
The other side is that international pressure is huge.
We have introduced before that Modi's governance ideas can be summarized as:
takes Hindu nationalism as the theoretical basis, and strives for a good internal and external environment for India's rapid development through the internal policy of strong reform and an independent diplomatic strategy.
A while ago, he also gave a time point to achieve this goal, 2047.
Let’s not talk about whether his goal can be achieved, but simply the struggle process. To catch up with China, he needs an external environment that is more relaxed than in the early days of China’s reform and opening up, especially the surrounding environment. Therefore, he must strictly control the differences with China.
Once the gun goes off, the devastating lesson of the Nehruian's defeat caused the entire country to be interrupted by the defeat, and he would not dare to take this risk no matter what.
This is the first point of international pressure. The second point of international pressure is that it is the critical moment of the transition from the old and new world order. Developed countries have already tried their best to maintain the old order. As the representative force of developing countries in , China and India are now the mission of facing difficulties and making the cake bigger.
If there is friction or even confrontation between each other now, the final result will definitely be a loss:
China will be delayed in the construction of a fair and reasonable new world order. As a country whose industrialization has not been completed, its industrial system has not yet been strong, and domestic reforms have not yet entered the deep waters, what will be lost will be the entire development stage.
In other words, once developing countries lose the battle against the old order, China, which has entered a new normal of development, will still live a good life, while India will stagnate at its current level for a long time. At that time, various internal contradictions covered by the expectation of rapid development will erupt in a concentrated manner and the situation will be difficult to deal with.
This is why Modi must put India-China relations at the top, and it is also the fundamental reason why the Indian government repeatedly emphasized the strategic nature of India-China relations.
From this perspective, Modi's choice to break away from contact is pragmatic and worthy of recognition.
But does this mean that there will be no waves in the Sino-Indian border issue since then?
is not, because on this issue, controlling differences are just Modi's first-hand preparation.
His second-hand preparation is called strategic entanglement.
What is strategic entanglement?
is to achieve higher-level goals, and repeatedly pull on specific issues, using low-intensity and medium-intensity games that are entangled without fighting and medium-intensity games that are not broken for a long time consume the patience of the game objects, and ultimately obtain a larger range of benefits.
It is concentratedly reflected in maintaining border control and trying to raise the border issue to the global height of the so-called foundation of India-China relations for negotiation.
On August 2, 2020, that is, after the Galwan incident entered the emergency diplomatic handling stage, Indian Foreign Minister Su Jiesheng said in an exclusive interview with the Times of India: "Steply realizing the normalization of bilateral relations while maintaining peace and tranquility in the border areas is the basis of the policy of previous Indian governments toward China. The situation in the border areas is inseparable from bilateral relations, and this is the reality."
[Original words: The state of the border and the future of our ties cannot be separated. That is the reality.]
This statement seems reasonable at first glance, but it is illogical if it comes from a practical perspective.
The illogical part is that:
All previous Sino-Indian border frictions were initiated by India. If India constructs the basis of India-China relations on border peace and tranquility, it should not damage this stability; if it damages, it should not talk about improving India-China relations.
But the reality is that India had previously damaged the so-called "foundation" of the relationship between the two countries, and also talked about improving the relationship for strategic interests. Isn't this a contradiction?
It can be seen from this that India does not really believe that India-China relations depend on border issues. This statement is just its strategic entangled negotiation strategy.
India-China relations are a global issue, and the border issue is only a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition for . The Indian rulers and diplomatic team are well aware of this.
Don’t tell lies in front of real people. It is obviously not feasible for Indians to be careless on this issue. Therefore, in response, our Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly pointed out that the boundary issue is not the whole of China-India relations. India should not continue to elevate the boundary issue to the global basis, but should put it in a realistic position:
This is the deep meaning of this sentence.
Since then, we have been trying hard to persuade India not to mess with this issue anymore. Continuing to get involved in this non-global issue will only make the global issue more complicated.
So, why should India raise the boundary issue to the height of the global foundation?
Because the boundary problem is indeed a good strategic entanglement tool:
First of all, the boundary problem is extremely complex, involving many fields such as history, politics, ethnicity, military, and economy. It does not have the possibility of proper resolution in the short term. Therefore, it has the long-term ;
Secondly, the boundary problem is extremely sensitive, and can leverage the international situation externally and mobilize public opinion at any time internally. For a country like India that seeks development in the cracks and has complex internal interests, it has the incomparable practicality .
Third, the boundary issue is extremely specific. Sometimes it takes only one shot, one person or even one stone to change the situation. China is a country that has long pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, good neighborliness and friendship. It has always maintained a high degree of restraint for regional peace and stability and the overall situation of developing countries, and it is even more impossible to provoke trouble. Therefore, for India, the boundary issue also has a high degree of initiative .
Because of the above three reasons, manipulating the boundary issue has become a dangerous but handy tool for Modi, who is ambitious, and claims to have means.
Therefore, since 2017, India has launched provocations from the Doklam area on the eastern front, and is ready to adjust its posture at any time. Its behavior is erratic, as if it thinks that as long as it is not done too much and shows weakness at any time, China will cooperate with it magnanimously.
For example, we intercepted the actions of several months in the first phase after the Galwan incident to analyze:
In this phase, Modi cooled down the situation through withdrawal and speech, and on the other hand, he suddenly visited the Indian so-called " Ladakh Region " half a month later, causing the situation to face the risk of heating up again.
After that, the Indian government has staged a series of advance and retreat, sometimes contradictory actions on the border issue.
Also at this stage, the Indian government operates border issues while making frequent moves at home and abroad:
domestic part, Modi took advantage of the situation to promote the self-reliance movement he proposed in May (" Self-Reliant"), and launched economic nationalist behaviors such as port seizure of Chinese goods, banning Chinese APPs, and prohibiting Chinese enterprises from participating in infrastructure in India.
Of course, this effort did not achieve any substantial consequences, and by September, China's share of India's total imports had risen to 18.3% from 13.7% in the previous fiscal year.
And throughout 2020, India's total imports from China were US$58.7 billion, exceeding the second and third place in the United States and the UAE.
foreign part, at this stage, Modi frequently stepped up cooperation with the United States, Japan and other countries. For example, in October, QUAD, the four foreign ministerial talks of the United States, Japan, India and Australia were held one after another in New York and Tokyo after a year; in November, the four countries held the "Malabar 2020" maritime military exercise in Bay of Bengal , which is the second time India invited Australia to participate in the performance after many years.
Especially on October 27, India officially signed the "Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation" with the United States after the "2+2 Talks" of the US-Indian Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers. It is a major decision to obtain military data such as terrain, navigation and aviation designated by the United States.
The above operations are examples of India promoting its domestic and foreign agenda through the border issues with China in just a few months.
And this is exactly what Modi’s strategic entanglement is.
If we travel back to that time period, we will see different news from India every few days. If we don’t understand Modi’s ideas, we will probably think that the Indian government has been divided and done its own thing.
So, will Modi's playing style change?
Judging from the internal stage and external environment in which India is currently in, there is little possibility of change.
First of all, India's obsession with being a "Vishwa-Guru" is getting worse.
Modi's theoretical basis for rule is Hindu nationalism. Therefore, since his election as prime minister, he has frequently quoted quotations from the famous Hindu thinker and religious leader Vivekananda - a legendary figure who was designated as the National Youth Day of India on January 12, especially directly applying the core view that India should become a world mentor to guide the development of mankind and even the universe, in order to adapt to the surging nationalist trend in India.
As a modern variant of the "world mentor" theory, Modi's ruling slogan of "leadership-oriented power" is to revive " ancient India " and build a "big India" covering South Asian subcontinent , so he pursues the strong diplomatic and military policy that India prioritizes.
This determines that he must adopt a risky forward strategy on the border issue, and it is impossible to truly be kind to his neighbors.
In fact, whether it is with China or other neighboring countries, India has been working hard in recent years, and has had bloody conflicts with six of the eight.
Secondly, India's strong pragmatist national character determines that it cannot give up the two-sided eating strategy of using China to bargain with the United States and using the United States to fight for more interests with China.
Especially after Modi promoted India's diplomatic reform, Su Jiesheng clearly stated that India's foreign policy should "transcend Delhi dogma" and turn it into a bolder and more flexible direction "result-oriented".
This approach will inevitably make Indian diplomacy lose some of its traditional characteristics, such as complete independence, refusal to join any camp, prudent response to international changes, etc.
Therefore, on international issues such as building a new order that concern the core interests of developing countries, India will fight side by side with China, and on the road to national rise, India will spare no effort to leverage the United States.
To sum up, it is not impossible to expect Modi to completely change his border issues, because this is part of his strategic entanglement.
So how should we deal with it?
is very simple, unity and struggle are combined. Since our main goal at present is to build a more just and reasonable international order, and India is an important force that can be used as aid, then in the overall situation, unity should be the first priority.
Is that because we have to compromise with its unreasonable demands?
is of course not. There is still a struggle where it should be fought. Only in this way can we better maintain unity.
The way to fight against India is to let it understand one truth:
is in the face of the huge gap in comprehensive national strength, every time it struggles, the gap in strength between the two sides of the China-India border widens by one point. When will the gap between
be so big that it cannot accept it, naturally I won’t make any trouble.
Indians have good mathematics, and I believe that they can calculate the gains and losses in the end.
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