When analyzing the Battle of Moscow in World War II, there is an almost forgotten detail very important, that is, the German military officers' meeting held by the German army in Orsha on November 13, 1941. Since this meeting was a critical moment when the German army won the two siege battles between Bryansk and Viazima, and Zhukov had just taken over as commander of the Western Front, it was of historic significance to decide whether the German army would launch a larger-scale attack. But from the perspective of post-war summary, this meeting was not as confident as the German Command imagined. Not only did the three chiefs of staff of the army group pessimistic about the prospects, but even proposed to suspend the offensive and fight again in the spring at the level of logistics support and step-changing. To a certain extent, this meeting also set the tone for the subsequent operations and laid the foreshadowing for the withdrawal of the 2nd Armored Army of Guderian from the southern front battlefield.
01 Typhoon operation, the German armored troops won two consecutive siege battles, but unexpectedly encountered Soviet counterattacks and climate obstacles.
Strictly speaking, the Moscow battle should be divided into two stages. The first stage was from September 30, 1941 when the German army launched the typhoon operation to Zhukov took over as commander of the Western Front. Although this period was very short, it was crucial for the German army, because in just half a month, the German army surrounded and annihilated the Soviet Bryansk and Viazima two combat groups, clearing the obstacles to advance for the German army to attack Moscow.
But since Zhukov took over as commander of the Western Front on October 10, the second phase of combat initiative gradually turned to the Soviet army. There were two factors influencing this. One was that Zhukov changed his tactical style and no longer fought head-on with the German army. In fact, he did not have much force to fight head-on with the German army; the other was that the 1st Guard Infantry Army and the 5th Airborne Army blocked Guderian's 4th Armored Division in Mzensk, causing Guderian's offensive strength to be sharply reduced.
However, another important reason why the German army dared not continue to launch a large-scale offensive was that the climate helped Zhukov a lot. Because the German army had no prior understanding of the geographical environment in Moscow, the German armored troops were trapped in the muddy roads before the arrival of winter. The German support department only considered that wheeled vehicles were running fast in advance, and did not realize that wheeled loading was difficult to move forward on the muddy roads. Objectively speaking, this was caused by the German army's inadequate consideration.
From this perspective, from the war on June 22, 1941 to the end of the 10th period, although the Soviet army deployed its defensive forces on the Western Front suffered significant losses, the German army also had problems of insufficient troops, disconnection of the insurgency and unrestrained logistics support. Because winter cold-resistant materials could not be reached, the train transporting supplies and maintenance had to give way to the train transporting oil and ammunition. On November 4, Marshal Long Destedt, the commander of the Southern Army Group, suggested stopping the attack and preparing for the spring of 1942.
02 Joint Conference of Chiefs of Staff Orsha, a key conference that decided the fate of the Moscow battle, and ineffective protection became the focus.
Zhukov's takeover in October quickly changed the unfavorable situation of the Soviet army in the Moscow battlefield. Although the first defensive front he quickly established was forced to retreat several kilometers in just a few days after taking office, with the firm support of the Moscow military and civilians, with the firm support of the Moscow military and civilians, Stalin sitting in the formation Kremlin , forcing Zhukov to fight against the enemy.
In order to prevent the German armour from moving quickly, Zhukov suggested that Stalin establish a consolidation line of defense in Mozaisk, and at the same time add two divisions to the Independent 7th Army defending Leningrad to prevent the Finnish army from meeting with the German army in Ladoga Lake . On the southern front, as Manstein was fighting fiercely with the Soviet army on Krim Peninsula , the 1st Panzer Army's attack on Rostov was also stubbornly blocked by the Soviet army.
In this case, German Army Chief of Staff Halder flew to the Eastern Front General Command in person and held a joint meeting with the chiefs of staff of three armies in Orsha between Minsk and Smolensk on November 13 to discuss how to continue to launch a large-scale offensive.
But the result Halder heard made him feel disheartened. Almost all the chiefs of staff mentioned that only one-third of the German motor vehicles could be started, and the combat strength of each division decreased significantly, and some were only one-third or one-half of the original combat capability. Due to the different railway gauge, the trains transporting winter supplies were extremely short of, and they also had to give way to the trains transporting ammunition and fuel. And what Hald was most worried about was that the armor ran too fast and the infantry was left behind far away. Take Guderian's second armored cluster for example. Every time he went to a place, he would send tank troops to use them as infantry to maintain the public order of the occupied land and prevent Soviet guerrillas from harassing them.
This meeting also reminded Halder of one thing, that is, on June 30, a week after the start of the Soviet-German War, Adolf reminded him that although the German blitzkrieg was invincible, armored troops would never be allowed to enter Moscow without the support of a large number of infantry. Now, Adolf's foresight is correct.
From this perspective, during the period when the offensive was resumed from the end of October to November 15, 1941, the German Command and the frontline commanders still had many differences on whether they could continue to launch a new offensive, especially as the climate became colder and winter supplies and logistics support were lagging behind, and the German army's confidence and determination to continue fighting had been greatly reduced.
03 Orsha meeting analysis was correct, but the German army continued to attack and failed to return.
Some people are puzzled. Since the front-line chiefs of staff unanimously agree that there is little hope for continuing to attack Moscow, why should we continue to attack? This is mainly because Adolf did not allow the German army to retreat. Although Guderian also suggested suspending the attack at this time and proposed a plan to fight again next spring, the German army launched a new offensive starting from November 15.
However, under the command of Zhukov, the Soviet army used this half-month buffer period to make full defense preparations, especially in how to prevent the German armor from moving quickly. Two battle examples forced Guderian to completely lose confidence in attack and the German infantry lost their determination to attack.
Once, the 1st Guards Cavalry Army successfully blocked Guderian's 2nd Armored Army. The commander of the army, Major General Bellov, used cavalry mechanized cluster tactics for the first time, invested in many synthetic tactical operations such as T34 tank , Katyusha rocket launcher , anti-aircraft artillery , and infantry, and stopped Guderian's 17th Armored Division attack near Kahira and was defeated. It can be said that it was this army that successfully stopped the vanguard troops of the 2nd Armored Army that made Guderian decide to withdraw from the battlefield in early December, thus eliminating the German threat to Tula .
Another time was the Soviet guards' 1st Motorized Division and the 33rd Army attacked the German 4th Army from the flank. Since the 4th Army was the main force of the German army's attack on Moscow along the Minsk Highway, its armored maneuver completely relied on this road as the main transportation money. The two Soviet troops set up ambushes close to both sides of the road. With the help of muddy roads, the German armored troops became living targets on the road. By December 5, the Soviet army launched a full-scale counterattack, and the offensive of the 4th Army was completely suppressed.
From the above analysis, it can be seen that the victory or defeat of each battle is traceable, so the failure of the German army in the Moscow battle has a fundamental reason. The most important thing is that logistics support cannot support the German army in fighting protracted wars and attrition wars. As for the Orsha Conference, the German staff officers on the front line have the most say. Unfortunately, the German Command did not listen, so it is not surprising that they lost this key battle.
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