As the "President Jiang" of Whampoa Military Academy and the "Chairman of Jiang" of the Military Committee of the National Government, Chiang Kai-shek is also considered a person who knows the military and has a certain strategic vision.
As early as two years before the outbreak of Anti-Japanese War, he determined the general policy of using Beijing and Shanghai as the outpost, Sichuan as the general rear, and resisting step by step along the Yangtze River. This defensive idea was later summarized as "exchanging space for time." This defensive idea is similar to Chairman Mao’s discussion on the strategic defense stage in " on protracted war ".
Before the outbreak of the full-scale aggression against China, Japan's military presence in China was mainly in the Northeast and North China. In the future, it would inevitably go south through Pinghan Road and Jinpu Road to launch an attack on the coastal areas of central China, southern China and inland areas, but these areas were not the main defense direction that Chiang Kai-shek hoped.
The main reasons why Chiang Kai-shek did not want to fight with the Japanese army on Pinghan Road and Jinpu Road are two main reasons:
First, this is the North China Plain and the hinterland of the Central Plains. Except for a few east-west rivers and several large and medium-sized cities with strong defenses, most of them are plains and it is difficult to form an effective defense. Second, most of these places are stationed by local warlords, and are unreliable and do not fully obey commands.
must change the direction of the Japanese army's main attack to facilitate China's strategic defense.
In 1934 and 1935, Chiang Kai-shek and his senior staff members Jiang Baili and German consultants von Seckert, Falkenhausen and others had a long discussion.
Fakenhausen judged that the Japanese army's strategic offensive would divide troops into three routes: the first route, attacking the direction from Hebei to Zhengzhou (i.e. Pinghan Road); the second route, attacking Shandong and Xuzhou (i.e. Jinpu Road); the third route, attacking the Yangtze River, attacking the capital Nanjing, and attacking Wuhan along the river, and considering that this route is the route with the most Japanese troops (i.e. the main attack direction).
Farkenhausen's suggestions and analysis were accepted by Chiang Kai-shek, so the defense plan of the National Government was roughly released, that is, the area around Beijing (Nanjing) and Shanghai (Shanghai) was used as the main outpost, the Yangtze River was used as the strategic center (including Wuhan as the strategic hub), and Sichuan was used as the general base for the War of Resistance Against Japan, and resisted step by step along the Yangtze River.
The subsequent war development was indeed as Chiang Kai-shek and others expected.
" July 7 Incident ", the Japanese army launched a series of strategic attacks in North China, and captured Taiyuan, Shanxi Province, and captured important towns such as Niangziguan. However, during the battle of Xuzhou, the Japanese army was annihilated more than 10,000 people in the Taierzhuang Battle, delaying the pace of attacking south. On the Pinghan Railway Line, it was also hindered by in the Yellow Flood Zone. The heavy equipment of the Japanese army was trapped in a quagmire river and marsh, blocked by the Zhanghe line in , northern Henan.
In August 1937, the National Government judged that if the Battle of Songhu was expanded, it could restrain the Japanese army in North China and shift the Japanese army from the "main offensive target" to the "secondary offensive target" in order to disrupt its position.
Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek strengthened his determination to organize a battle against Japan in the Songhu area.
Shanghai is the economic center of the Far East and the largest industrial and commercial city in China. The surrounding areas of Shanghai are the center of the Kuomintang's political and economic rule. The Japanese army had long wanted to take Shanghai and its surrounding areas into account, and to seize this fertile land, it could hold the "purse bag" of the Kuomintang authorities and destroy the financial foundation it relies on to resist. Therefore, taking over Shanghai was originally one of the established goals of the Japanese army, but before that, the Japanese army had always hoped to take over the entire North China first and then seize Shanghai.
Since the war in North China was unfavorable, the Japanese army took Shanghai as the next target of attack, and then gradually turned the main attack direction to attack Wuhan along the Yangtze River Basin, and invaded China from north to south, and changed to invading China from east to west. The Japanese army drew a large number of troops from North China and the local government, and the Japanese army participated in the Battle of Shanghai in and finally reached nearly 300,000.
Seeing that the Japanese army had been dragged into the defensive circle expected before the war, Chiang Kai-shek's plan had been more than half successful, which shows that the National Government is indeed "a step ahead of the game" in terms of strategy.
But if Chiang Kai-shek didn't use a few "stinky moves", then it wouldn't be Chiang Kai-shek.Sure enough, Chiang Kai-shek made frequent moves after that.
First, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 700,000 troops to fight against the Japanese army in the Songhu area, including most of Chiang Kai-shek's central army's German-armed troops. The Kuomintang army was fully equipped with elite troops, which seemed a bit like "slaughtering" and "last battle".
According to Chiang Kai-shek's strategic guidance of "Defense along the Yangtze River, exchanging space for time" , the Kuomintang army should take major damage to the enemy in Shanghai urban areas and suburban water networks, and evacuate in an orderly manner to maintain the vitality and system of the army. But the order he issued was to fight to the death with the Japanese army in Shanghai. This determination is not consistent with the strategic guidance of "space for time".
Second, the Battle of Shanghai was a war for foreigners to a certain extent. At that time, Chiang Kai-shek still hoped that Western countries could mediate. Affected by this, the Chinese army looked forward and did not make a concerted effort.
Third, in terms of specific tactics, Chiang Kai-shek misjudged the situation and ignored the possible strategic roundabout encirclement of the Japanese army. Judging from past experience, this is a tactic that the Japanese army is extremely good at. On November 5, 1937, three Japanese landing formations had more than 100,000 troops, and landed on the 15-mile coastal coastal area near Kingsoft Guard in Hangzhou Bay, raiding the flanks of the Chinese army, and a small number of local garrisons caught off guard. Although Chiang Kai-shek ordered the front-line commanders to send troops to reinforce, he failed to retreat to the enemy and the defense circle in the Songhu area collapsed.
Due to the sudden incident, the planned orderly retreat turned into a life-like retreat, which caused a serious impact on the orderly development of Nanjing Defense War .
After Japan won the victory in the Songhu battlefield, it immediately marched into Nanjing. This action of the Japanese army made its main attack direction continue to follow Chiang Kai-shek's pre-war plan.
The Japanese army gradually moved into the "pocket" they had laid out before, and Chiang Kai-shek still had the opportunity to turn defeat into victory. The various defensive areas on this line on the front line of the war should be well built and can play their full role, right?
But the actual situation is that many fortifications are still on paper and have not started construction; if the construction is completed, the quality will either not be up to standard, or the defenders will flee in a hurry, and the fortifications will be equivalent to not being built. Before the battle was fought, my own stance was shaken.
In terms of military deployment, Chiang Kai-shek did not view the Songhu battlefield and the Nanjing battlefield as a whole, and did not mobilize sufficient troops to the Shanghai and Beijing routes as soon as possible to form a strategic and combat defense deployment with a certain depth. When the Battle of Songhu started, only 60,000 people were stationed inside and outside Nanjing. The Songhu battlefield next door has gathered millions of troops. Even if it is planned for the future, Chiang Kai-shek should strengthen the defense of the capital.
Maybe Chiang Kai-shek just paid attention to Shanghai and forgot Nanjing.
The Battle of Songhuhui was defeated, and the Nanjing Defense War was about to start. Hurry up and increase troops to Nanjing, but it is too late. There are only two reinforcements from Hankou . The Nanjing Defense War still relies on the defeated troops who have been replaced from the Songhu battlefield. However, these troops fought for three months and suffered huge losses. They should have had enough combat effectiveness after rest and replenishment, but the Japanese army came to the ranks and there was no such rest time. The incomplete defeated Songhu army arrived in Nanjing. Faced with the powerful Japanese army, the Supreme Command of hesitated to defend Nanjing again. The final result can be imagined.
You should know that Chiang Kai-shek had long regarded the Shanghai-Nanjing-Wuhan Yangtze River as the main defense direction, and then the Japanese army was taking action according to Chiang Kai-shek's idea. How strategically successful and proactive this is! It can be said to be a big deal.
What is incredible is why Chiang Kai-shek acted late in battle tactics, slow in movements, passive everywhere, and was controlled by others. If you want to say that Chiang Kai-shek doesn't know the military, this idea is in line with the development of the war; if you want to say that he knows the military, he has made frequent mistakes and has suffered major losses one after another.
This strategic planning blueprint for Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Japanese war was really early and late. Chiang Kai-shek never disappointed people in this way.
