During the entire Liberation War, the war god Su Yu fought some defeats, two of which were the most tragic, the greatest impact, and the most profound lesson: the first was the Nanma Battle , which attempted to encircle and annihilate Hu Lian's reorganization of the 11th Division; the second was the Linqu Battle , which attempted to encircle and annihilate the 8th Army of Li Mi, which was very good at defense, and suffered great losses.
In these two battles, East China Field Army killed about 20,000 enemies, but its own casualties reached more than 30,000, and the battle loss ratio was still relatively large. Because of these two crushing defeats, the East China Field Army lost its foothold in the old revolutionary base south of the Yellow River in Shandong and had to retreat to , the Yellow River, and rested north of the Yellow River.
Before these two battles started, we have to mention the background before these two battles started:
After the failure of the "Decisive Battle between Shandong and Zhongzhong", Okamura became a guest of honor for Chiang Kai-shek . Okamura's understanding of the Communist army is that he is good at espionage, and he is also flexible in combat, and is especially good at concentrating superior forces to annihilate the enemy. After gaining enlightenment from Okamura, Chiang Kai-shek re-examined the situation and proposed a new tactical idea: "It is better to overlap than to advance in parallel, and to advance together rather than to advance in segments. Advance with three or four divisions overlap and interact with each other." According to the new tactics formulated by Chiang Kai-shek, Fan Hanjie changed the previous formation of moving in parallel, with shoulders facing shoulders and arms against arms, replaced by overlapping and interactive advance formations, using "roller-style tactics" to gradually "roll" towards the mountainous area of Shandong Zhongshan District.
Faced with the "roller" tactic, Su Yu was indeed a little scratched at first, and the division was definitely not possible. Su Yu's original plan was to attack with three columns to force Fan Hanjie to return to the aid, while the main force of Huaye gathered on the Yishui line to standby, but at this time, he received a telegram from the Central Military Commission. The telegram said that Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping would lead the Shanxi, Hebei, Shandong and Henan field troops to cross the Yellow River south, launching a nationwide strategic counterattack. For this reason, Mao Zedong hoped that the Chinese field could divide troops in western Shandong and southern Shandong to open a channel to meet with Liu and Deng, "if the movement is slow, there will be no time."
. Should we divide the troops? After Su Yu and the leader of Huaye jointly negotiated, they finally decided to divide the troops into three groups: one way to western Shandong; one way to southern Shandong; and one way to continue to stay in Yishui. The three columns originally scheduled to be divided from Luzhong became five. This is the "July Division" in the history of the Chinese field war. The division of troops in July greatly weakened the power of the Huaye. It could no longer concentrate several times the superior forces to annihilate the enemy like the Menglianggu Battle , which also laid hidden dangers for the failures in the Nanma Battle and the Linqu Battle.
Before the Battle of Nanma, many military chiefs and soldiers of the East China Field Army believed that the reorganized 74th Division, which is known as Imperial Army , was annihilated in Menglianggu. The combat effectiveness of the 11th Division is definitely not as good as the 74th Division. When the East China Field Army has an absolute military advantage over the 11th Division, it seems that it is not difficult to eliminate the reorganized 11th Division. The army is filled with a tendency to underestimate the enemy and be arrogant.
However, in fact, Hu Lian who graduated from Huangpu Military Academy is by no means a good person. Hu Lian's performance on the battlefield is slightly higher than his colleagues. He has the "savage" of Zhang Lingfu , but he does not have the "pride" of Zhang Lingfu; his "loyalty" is no less than Huang Baitao , and his "scheming" is definitely more than Huang Baitao. During the Anti-Japanese War, the 11th Division commanded by Hu Lian showed strong combat effectiveness, especially during defensive operations. The 11th Division had a rich combat experience and a strong fighting will. It was by no means comparable to the ordinary Kuomintang army. Especially in the Shipai Battle, which was related to the life and death of Chongqing, the 18th Army commanded by Hu Lian (reorganized into the 11th Division after the victory of the Anti-Japanese War, but the actual scale of the establishment did not decrease) was famous in the battle and fought against the Japanese invaders.
As a powerful general of the Kuomintang, Hu Lian was highly valued by Chiang Kai-shek. In Hu Lian's later years, his subordinates asked him why he could break through bravely every time. Hu Lian only said four words: alertness and calmness. When encountering difficulties, keeping a normal mind is what is called calmness. When encountering problems, you should know that being smart is alert. In terms of performance, it seems that these four words are easy to do, but there are very few people who can really do these four words on the battlefield.
After the end of the Menglianggu battle, Huaye aimed at Hu Lian. At that time, because Hu Lian reorganized the 11th Division as ace division, if such an army was annihilated by our army, it would boost morale. If Hu Lian, the ace division, was eliminated, it would definitely be a big blow to the national army. Hu Lian knew this very well, so he was very careful every time he marched.
In the late stage of the Battle of Central Shandong, in order to ensure Xuzhou , Chiang Kai-shek transferred 7 reorganized divisions from the battlefield of central Shandong. At that time, there were only 4 divisions left in the national army on the battlefield of Shandong, including Hu Lian's reorganized 11th division. At that time, Hu Lian's reorganized 11th Division was gathering in the Nanma area. After the retreat of the large army of the National Army, Hu Lian was prepared for danger in times of peace and immediately smelled the crisis. Hu Lian accurately analyzed and believed that Chiang Kai-shek was caught in the plan of diversion from the mountain by Huaye. It is very likely that Hu Lian's lonely army had been targeted by the People's Liberation Army.
Hu Lian felt that the situation was wrong and immediately ordered the troops to stop advancing and build fortifications on the spot. Hu Lian spent 15 days to build an open fort, a secret fortress and a mother fortress. In addition, Hu Lian also ordered the troops to pull up several barbed wire mesh at the front of the position and buried a large number of landmines.
On July 18, 1947, after the four columns of Huaye completed the task of mobilizing the enemy, they returned to Luzhong and vowed to take down Hu Lian's troops. At that time, Hu Lian built a solid fortification in advance, the Huaye Army made a particularly slow progress. After fighting fiercely with the 11th Division of the enemy's reorganized army for 4 days and 4 nights, our army approached the enemy's core position. At this time, heavy rain suddenly fell, and many of our army's ammunition was wet by the rain and failed due to moisture, which directly led to a great weakening of the offensive firepower. At the same time, the reinforcements sent by Chen Cheng also broke through the defense of the 7th Column of Huaye. At that time, our attacking troops were attacked from both sides and had to retreat.
Battle lasted four days and five nights. The People's Liberation Army said that it was annihilated more than 5,000 people in the 11th Division, more than 4,000 people in the 25th, 64th and 9th Divisions, a total of more than 9,000 people, and more than 10,000 people were killed or killed (there were 21,000 losses in the 21,000 battles in the 11,000 people were obtained after deducting the Linqu battle). The National Army reported that more than 20,000 People's Liberation Army were killed and injured, more than 3,000 people were captured, 3,000 rifles were seized, more than 200 machine guns were seized, and more than 4,000 casualties were killed or 4,000 people were killed or killed in the entire 11 years. A rough analysis: There is little difference in casualties between the 11th Division, roughly between 4,000 and 5,000, and half of them (more than 2,000 people) are the 18th Brigade in front of the Ninth Column.
0 Column 9th Column suffered the most casualties among the three columns attacking Nanma of the People's Liberation Army, about 4,600 people; the Sixth Column suffered about 2,500 casualties; the Second Column had about 4,000 casualties, including the Political Commissar of the Fifth Division of the Second Column Qin Xian'an , Hu Dabing, deputy commander of the 18th Regiment of the Sixth Division, and Wei Ziqiang, head of the Organization Section of the Political Department of the Fourth Division, were all killed. In this way, the three columns of the 11th Division suffered casualties of about 11,000 people. During the blocking battle on the southern front, the 64th and 25th Divisions suffered great losses in the Niuxinkou and Yujiakou areas, and about 2,000 casualties were suffered in Niuxinkou alone; the Ninth Division suffered minor losses without fierce battle. Therefore, the total losses of the three divisions of the National Army were at least 3,000 to 4,000 people, and the Seventh Column in person were 2,500 casualties, plus the local troops, a total of about 3,000 people. According to the comprehensive results, the national army suffered about 8,000 to 9,000 people, and the People's Liberation Army had about 14,000 people.
The reason why Hu Lian could escape the battle in the Nanma Battle was that in addition to the weather factors that hindered the strength of our army, what is more important is that before this battle started, Hu Lian had already smelled the crisis and made full preparations for the crisis. If Hu Lian had not made complete preparations in advance at that time, he would have been annihilated by our army. The reorganized 11th Division would not last for four days and four nights no matter how strong it was.
As soon as the Battle of Nanma ended, the 8th Army of the Kuomintang Army Li Mi captured Linqu near Nanma, posing a threat to the rear of the East China Field Army.In order to revive the lost morale after the defeat of the Nanma Battle, the East China Field Army, which had just experienced a fierce battle, decided to pull out the nail of the 8th Army of Linqu. Many military chief officers and soldiers of the East China Field Army believed that Linqu was only the force of one army. The four powerful columns of the East China Field Army fought against the enemy and one army. The victory was still very good, and the troops still had the idea of underestimating the enemy.
However, Li Mi, the military chief of the 8th Army, was not a good man. Li Mi, from Yunnan, graduated from the fourth phase of Huangpu . He was a platoon leader of the Third Army's teaching regiment stationed in Nanchang . He refused to participate in the Nanchang Uprising and fled to Nanjing. He became the deputy commander of Zhang Ying's unit of the Sichuan Army. In 1932, the division was surrounded by Chen Cheng's 18th Army, who was good at annexing the miscellaneous army. However, Li Mi refused to obey the order and led his troops out of the siege. After receiving the report, Chiang Kai-shek scolded Li Mi in person in Lushan to resist the inclusion. Li Mi replied: "The principal has only taught us how to fight bravely, and has never taught us to surrender!" Chiang Kai-shek was not angry and was promoted to the commander of the lieutenant colonel of the 36th Army, and since then he became a direct line.
1939 Kunlun Pass Battle , Li Mi served as deputy commander of the Fifth Army's honorary 1st Division, assisting the division commander of the 5th Army, Zheng Dongguo (Phase I of Huangpu) to attack hard, and annihilate the 21st Brigade of the Japanese invaders; after the war, the division was expanded into the Eighth Army, Li Mi took over as the commander of the Rong 1st Division. In 1940, at the most critical moment of the Second Changsha Battle of , Li Mi followed the army commander Zheng Dongguo to counterattack Yichang to implement the "surround Wei and save Zhao", fought bloody battles in Emperor Mountain, captured Yichang Airport, burned more than 20 Japanese planes, and achieved brilliant results. He can be called a famous anti-Japanese general.
After the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan, Li Mi was promoted to commander of the 8th Army and transferred to Shandong to fight, becoming a relatively capable national army in Jiaodong area. It was gradually expanded into the 13th Corps. Li Mi served as Lieutenant General Commander, so he started two tricks of escaping from death:
The first time, Huaihai Battle , under the command of Du Yuming , he was surrounded by Huaye in Chenguanzhuang with the Second Corps of Qiu Qingquan and the 16th Corps of Sun Yuanliang . After the general attack began, all parts broke through. The cunning Li Mi did not flee south, but fled to Shandong in the opposite direction. Finally, he crossed the sea and sneaked back to Nanjing via Qingdao , and was immediately ordered to go to Yunnan to reorganize the Eighth Army.
For the second time, on the eve of the Yunnan Uprising, Lu Han detained Li Mi of the Eighth Army of the Central Army and Yu Chengwan of the 26th Army in the name of a meeting. The two signed together, but the two armies without the commander could jointly counterattack Kunming. The two were released to persuade the troops to cease the war, and Li Mi successfully escaped again.
Objectively speaking, Li Mi's 8th Army is still relatively good at defensive battles, so Huaye faces a tough bone. From the perspective of Huaye itself, the four columns of Su Yu's East China Field Army suffered varying degrees of reduction in personnel in the Battle of Nanma, and the ammunition was also consumed a lot. The troops were actually very tired, and their offensive capabilities and combat capabilities were weakened to a certain extent. In addition, Li Mi's 8th Army has always been good at defending and the fortifications built are also very solid. It can be said that they were defending according to the danger. Linqu was unable to conquer in the end. After paying a large price of casualties, they had to withdraw from the battle. The Chinese and wilderness suffered losses in the Linqu Battle, including the blocking of aid battle, and about 500 were captured.
I think the reasons for the failure of the battle are as follows:
1. Huaye has seriously confused the optimism of the entire war situation with the situation in the face
Due to insufficient estimates of the enemy situation in the face, the entire field army is too optimistic. After the battles in Laiwu and Menglianggu, Huaye always wanted to have an "unprecedented unprecedented". No one wants to see the good news of annihilated thousands of enemies. It is as boring as smoking yellow smoke after smoking cigars. In fact, Huaye has divided his troops and underestimated the enemy's strength and overestimated his own strength, which has caused some mistakes. As the chief of staff of the Red Seventh Army and the Red Tenth Army, Su Yu experienced the Battle of Tanjiaqiao and escaped by chance.Later, he personally commanded the Huangqiao Battle , Suzhong Battle , and Menglianggu Battle. Su Yu, who was seeking victory in the danger, knew the cruelty of the war and would never take it lightly!
2. The 2nd, 6th and 9th columns of the Huaye inside siege lack the tactics of attacking the bunkers, and lack sufficient experience in fighting the bunkers. Except for the 9th column, the rest are not very powerful; the 7th column of Chengjun, which attacks the aid forces, is not very effective, and the troops and materials for attacking the tough and aid forces are not sufficient
11 Division is one of the five aces of the National Army, just like the 74th Division. The 2nd, 6th columns of the Huaye lack experience in fighting the bunkers, which delays time. In another three days, our army may capture Nanma, and the aid forces are not very effective, and even when the enemy and our forces are equal, they cannot block it. The stronghold must have sufficient material preparation and sufficient time, and when the strongholds are hit, there must be sufficient troops. If the four main forces of the 11th Division were the 1st Column, 4th Column, 6th Column, plus 9th Column, and the 10th Column of Song Shilun were responsible for the blocking and aid tasks, it is estimated that Hu Lian of the 11th Division might have to be loyal to the party and the country in Nanma, and he would be disabled even if he didn't fight. Just like Meng Lianggu, the entire Huaye army was dispatched, what's the point of asking about the 2,000 bunkers? However, Huaye was ordered to divide the troops in July, and the troops were divided into three, resulting in insufficient siege and blocking reinforcements.
3. The climate is not effective in fighting against our Huaye
Heavy rains for several days, causing mountain torrents. The troops were blocked by mountains and rivers and failed to cross the river in time to fight, which delayed a considerable period of time, which delayed the combat mission. In the hot and hot weather, the troops marched at night and slept in the open during the day, which was too tired. Some troops had not dried their clothes or quilts for more than 20 days, and even the ammunition was moist, which naturally increased the combat difficulties of Huaye.
4. The internal worker of the "Three-person Group" of Huaye does not fully meet the needs of Huaye during the war
As mentioned above, since Deputy Commander Su Yu is responsible for the battle organization and command of Huaye, he should be responsible for the strategic design and planning of the entire Huaye. Su Yu had to bear all the command responsibilities of Huaye in military terms, and did not have the full military command responsibilities of Huaye. It was like dancing in small shoes, which was so difficult! The central government later realized this situation. In 1948, Su Yu proposed to the Central Committee that the Huaye First Corps had not yet been adopted. Based on the comprehensive recognition of Su Yu's strategic and tactical talents, the central government has handed over all the military power of Huaye to Su Yu in full responsibility since May 1948, and Su Yu has made a full cheating.
5. Our intelligence has made serious mistakes
Hu Lian's 11th division is stationed in Nanma, and 2,000 bunkers have been built. Our intelligence shows that Hu Lian's fortifications have not been completed. This situation is like the replica of the Chairman's regaining military power after the Zunyi Conference, and he wanted to encircle and annihilate Guo Xunqi's troops in Tucheng. Tucheng Battle , our army received information: the enemy army had 6,000 people in four regiments of the Sichuan Army, which was actually more than 10,000 people in 6 regiments, and there were follow-up troops, and they were well-equipped and had strong combat power. As a result, Commander-in-Chief Zhu went to the front line, Chen Geng's cadre regiment also went to the front line, and the Red Army turned danger into safety. After the failure of two battles in
, it had a very negative impact on the East China Field Army. The morale of the entire army was very low, and some people questioned Su Yu's military command capabilities. Objectively speaking, after entering the strategic counterattack, the East China Field Army implemented the division of troops in July in order to restrain the Kuomintang troops in all directions. After the division of troops in July, Su Yu had only four columns of troops, and was constrained in the use of troops and deployed troops. It was difficult to concentrate five or six columns in the Battle of Menglianggu to implement an absolute advantage in the enemy's local areas. Under such circumstances, the East China Field Army commanded by Su Yu still hopes to annihilate the reorganized 11th Division and then annihilate the 8th Army. Whether from the theoretical level or from the practical level, it is indeed unrealistic.
On September 3, 1947, Su Yu made a report on "Recognizing the situation of the war, improving work, and striving for victory". The failure of the Nanma and Linqu battles was attributed to the following three reasons:
1. The optimistic situation of the entire situation is still seriously confused with the situation of the face-to-face
Due to insufficient estimates of the face-to-face situation and excessive optimism, he developed a pride of underestimating the enemy, and always wanted to have an "unprecedented unprecedented". Because our appetite is too big, no one wants to see the good news of annihilation of thousands of enemies, just like smoking cigars and then smoking yellow smoke. In fact, we had already divided our troops at this time, and we estimated the enemy too lowly, causing some mistakes.
2. Some people reported that the 11th Division is stronger than the 74th Division
In fact, it is not mainly because the enemy built more fortifications. There are three or four hundred bunkers in a village, and there are one or two thousand bunkers around Nanma. Then of course he can defend it, and we lack sufficient experience in attacking tactics - fighting bunkers, which delays the time. If we have three more days, we can still beat it. However, our troops who were fighting for reinforcements were not very effective, and they could not even block him under the same forces as our enemies. Here comes an experience: the stronghold must have sufficient material preparation and sufficient time, and at the same time, there must be sufficient reinforcements, and this time we do not pay enough attention to it subjectively.
3. It is undeniable that the weather this time is hindering our combat
It has been raining heavily for several days, and the troops were blocked by mountains and rivers and could not cross the river in time to fight, which delayed a considerable period of time, which also delayed the combat mission. In addition to the hot and hot summer, the troops marched continuously at night, sleeping in the open during the day, and were too tired. Some troops had not dried their clothes and quilts for 20 days, and even the ammunition was moist, which naturally increased our difficulties.
Tan Zhenlin accused Su Yu of "not having a big strategic problem, mainly organizational command and tactical problems." Chen Yi also agreed with Tan's opinion at that time. Tan Zhenlin also wrote a letter to Su Yu, bluntly pointing out that Comrade Su Yu is often "often careless and lacks foresight in military affairs", "often only see one or two steps", "and cannot simply review it with optimism, so that the problem cannot be clarified."
Su Yu took the initiative to send a telegram to write a review on August 4, 1947, requesting punishment. On August 6, 1947, the command center replied: "Comrade Su Yu has already sent a message. It doesn't matter if the battles have not been fought well, the whole situation is still good. I hope to work with peace of mind, boost morale, and fight again."
On the same day, East China Bureau also sent a telegram with the same spirit as the command center's telegram. The article says, "In the 20 years of revolutionary war, you have made great contributions to the Party and the people. Although the battles in the past two months have not been as great as before May, they have given strong injuries to the enemy. The casualties in recent months have been large, and there may be some subjective shortcomings, but there are also objective reasons. As long as you are good at research and experience, you will definitely achieve greater victory. Since the annihilation of the 74th Division, you have been dizzy and have not recovered for a long time. We miss them very much, so I hope to take care of them."
Chen Yi sent to Military Commission and East China Bureau on the same day: "Recently, Su Yu, Chen Geng and others have stood out one after another, with a long future. They will be with Peng (Dehuai), Liu (Bocheng), and Lin (Biao) Advance side by side is a great victory for our party and the people. "It is also said, "We have always been responsible for the guidance and deployment of the battle. In the past, we have always won this. In recent battles, I have not foreseeed it before, nor have I saved it during the event. We should be responsible for it afterwards, so we should learn lessons so that we can fight again." On August 11, the command center drafted a telegram to Chen Yi, Su Yu and Rao Shushi, believing that Chen Yi's August 6 telegram "is very good, and fully agree that although the number of personnel was reduced in July was large, it did not hinder the strategic task." After learning of the defeat of the battle, the command center did not reprimand the generals below like the national army, and left all the failures behind the generals below, but patiently encouraged the generals below! The God of War is the God of War! Su Yu soon came out of the failure of the two battles in Nanma and Linqu, and won the victory in Eastern Henan Battle a few months later.
