If our army wants to liberate Taiwan by force, when will it complete military preparations?
As we all know, solving the Taiwan issue is one of our core interests and the only way to complete the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
In the way of cross-strait reunification, peaceful reunification is undoubtedly the best solution.
However, with the increasing rampant Taiwan independence forces on Taiwan's island, our country seems to need to consider more means of unification of force.
So, how is our army’s current military preparation for Taiwan? When is the most advantageous time to attack Taiwan?
(our army cruises Taiwan waters)
Are the Taiwan army afraid?
In recent years, in order to put pressure on Taiwan independence elements and declare sovereignty, our army has carried out intensive cruises and exercises in the waters of the Taiwan Strait.
According to data released by Taiwan’s defense department, in 2021, our army conducted more than 940 flight training and patrols in the airspace around Taiwan.
has so many flight patrols that even our pilots say that performing such a task "feels like turning around in the 'our own yard'."
In these island cruises and simulated attack patrols, our army not only dispatched a large number of military aircraft, but also had a wide range of models.
From fighter jets such as J-16, J-11, J-10, to bombers such as the H-6, to various types of anti-submarine aircraft, electronic warfare aircraft, etc., it can be said that it is all available.
(our army cruises Taiwan waters)
Under such military pressure, the Taiwan army on the island began to become in panic all day long.
The Taiwan Army's aviation forces must not only be ready to take off at any time to accompany and monitor our military aircraft for training, but also overcome the logistical support difficulties caused by the high-intensity use of its disadvantaged forces and old equipment.
The normalized and practical cruise of our army has put a lot of pressure on the power of Taiwan independence, and has also made the defense departments of Taiwan realize that the People's Liberation Army is serious about the matter of "military unification".
Sure enough, on October 6, late 2021, Qiu Guozheng, the head of Taiwan’s defense department, published his predictions on our army’s attack on Taiwan in an interview with the media.
Qiu Guozheng claimed that: The People's Liberation Army currently has the initial ability to attack Taiwan and will have the ability to attack Taiwan in full by 2025.
Is this really the case?
(Qiu Guozheng)
In fact, Qiu Guozheng's remarks are still full of subjective conjectures and self-comfort.
The author is not clear about how he defines "preliminary" and "comprehensive". The implicit meaning in his discourse seems to imply that it is still difficult for our army to carry out the attack on Taiwan at the moment, and Taiwan still has capital to "maintain the status quo".
But in fact, whether it is now or 2025, our army has the ability to win the unified war without any hesitation, and our army has always had the ability to "comprehensively" attack on Taiwan.
Professor Jin Canrong, a famous international relations expert in my country, said that in solving the Taiwan issue, "We are already mature in military preparation."
However, it is undeniable that with the increasing overall national strength and military strength of our country, military preparations for Taiwan will only become more and more sufficient.
2025 is not a time node for our army to have the ability to "full" attack on Taiwan, but a time node for our army to "easily" attack on Taiwan.
(Ambulatory combat exercises by our army)
If our country decides to adopt the means of unification of force in the resolution of the Taiwan issue, then there are two aspects of combat operations that need to be prepared.
The first is to block the possible U.S. military interference forces, and the second is to carry out cross-sea landing operations against the Taiwan military and eliminate the Taiwan military that is unwilling to put down its weapons and still supports the Taiwan independence forces.
In other words, if our army wants to attack Taiwan, it must have the military strength to win two battles at the same time.
In order to deal with these two battles with different combat modes, combat environment and combat intensity, our country has also carried out comprehensive construction of the Five Armies of our army's naval, land, air, fire and branch.
and through a system of joint combat with multiple arms, they finally formed two ropes to exert force.
The first rope is aimed at the US military's regional denial/anti-intervention capabilities, and the second rope is the ability to cross the sea to combat.
(The Navy is the vanguard of the US interference force)
2
attacking Taiwan, we must first strengthen the preparation for the US military
In terms of regional denial/anti-intervention, our army has formed a relatively complete combat system, and is confident that it will be within the scope of the first island chain and even the second island chain to defeat any intervention force that dares to invade.
At present, the core of our army's regional denial system is still various advanced and numerous medium- and short-range ballistic missiles.
These missiles such as DF-15 and DF-16 can strike fixed military targets such as airports and military ports deployed by the US military in the first island chain.
Some special models such as DF-21D, DF-26, DF-17, etc. can also carry out anti-ship operations and strike important technical weapons such as US aircraft carriers.
After the Rocket Force completes its initial firepower preparations, our army's aviation and maritime forces can "clean up" the remaining enemy forces.
(my country's regional denial system in the eyes of the US military)
In the subsequent "cleanup" operations, the naval and air combat forces that our army can invest in are currently mainly more than 100 J-20 fifth-generation fighter jets of the Air Force, more than 1,000 fourth-generation fighter jets of various types, and two aircraft carrier combat groups of the Navy.
At present, although our army has made great achievements in the construction of this area, there are still some shortcomings.
For example, although the total scale of my country's fighter aircraft fleet has reached a level close to that of the US military, the number of fifth-generation aircraft is not much compared to the more than 600 US military. The situation in the navy is similar. Although the number of aircraft carriers in our army is the same as that of the US military that can invest in East Asia in a short period of time, there is a certain gap in quality.
For example, our army's aircraft carriers still use ski jump takeoff. Compared with the US Nimitz-class and Ford-class aircraft carriers that use catapult takeoff, not only are the dispatch efficiency relatively low, but also cannot use large fixed-wing auxiliary aircraft such as early warning aircraft.
(Shandong ship)
And by 2025, our army's naval and air strength will become stronger, and these shortcomings will be filled.
At present, my country has begun to expand the Chengfei Group fighter production line. The J-10 fighter jet, which was originally responsible for Chengfei, has also been reported to be transferred to Guifei for production to give up production capacity for the J-20.
As the Air Force continues to accelerate modernization and replacement, the number of fifth-generation aircraft in our army is likely to increase to about 300 or even more by 2025.
By the time, the catapult aircraft carrier that our army is building will initially form combat capabilities, and will be matched with the already-established large frigate 055 and the fifth-generation stealth carrier-based aircraft to form the core of our army's new generation of maritime operations.
In 2025, the scope and intensity of the rejection in our military region will be further increased. By then, the US military will commit suicide if it wants to interfere in our internal affairs.
(J-20 formation)
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Amphibious login can also play new tricks
In terms of cross-sea landing operations, our army's capabilities have also been greatly improved in recent years.
If you want to conduct amphibious landing operations on Taiwan Island, there are two main offensive directions that can be selected.
The first direction is to directly cross the Taiwan Strait and launch a landing operation from the West Coast, and get ashore in Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Kaohsiung and other places. This is also the most traditional path.
The second direction is to use large amphibious landing ships and amphibious assault ships to circle to the northeast of Taiwan Island and start landing from Keelung and Yilan. The two solutions of
have their own advantages and characteristics.
(Taiwan Strait)
From a geographical perspective, the plan for landing on the West Coast is the simplest , because the distance from the coast of Fujian to Taoyuan and Hsinchu is only about 130 kilometers.
Our army does not even need to use landing ships to cross the Taiwan Strait. It can be done by relying on the 05 amphibious infantry fighting vehicle/assault vehicle's own floating ability.
In order to have stronger beachhead assault capabilities during the landing battle across the straits, our army has also established the most powerful amphibious landing force in the world.
In addition to regarding amphibious operations as the old Marine Corps, even the Army has established 6 amphibious landing brigades.
(Type 05 amphibious tank)
These troops are all equipped with 05-series armored vehicles dedicated to amphibious landing. This series of armored vehicles has a water ferry speed of about 25Km/h, and its indicators are among the forefront in the world. The performance advantages of
enable our army's amphibious forces to quickly pass through the most dangerous offshore floating stage in landing operations.
After logging in and landing, the firepower and defense capabilities of the 05-Series armored vehicles are enough to allow our army to deal with most threats.
For example, the 05 assault vehicle equipped with a 105mm rifled gun is enough to suppress the Taiwan Army's active CM-11 "Yanghu" main battle tank.
(Zhi-8 helicopter)
Taiwan Strait is not large in width, and it is also very convenient for our air assault troops to conduct vertical landing operations.
The transportation and general-purpose helicopters equipped by our army mainly include Mi-171, Zhi-8, Zhi-20 models. The combat radius of these helicopters is about 300 kilometers, which is enough to take off from my country's coast to any location in Taiwan.
While the amphibious forces launch a frontal impact, our air assault forces can also behead and seize control operations at key nodes behind the Taiwan Army.
After the first wave of assault forces successfully landed ashore and opened a stable landing field or mastered airports and ports, our army's subsequent forces, especially heavy armored troops, can enter the battlefield on tank landing ships, roll-ro-cargo ships, transport aircraft and other vehicles, seeking a decisive battle with the Taiwan military field forces.
(Taiwan topographic map)
launching such a login operation is enough to take over Taiwan Island, but if you only initiate login from the West Bank, there are certain risks.
Taiwan's terrain is generally mountainous, with its main plains concentrated on the West Coast, and most cities are also established here.
, but there are two exceptions, that is, Keelung and Yilan, these two cities are established on the east coast of Taiwan, and their connection to the west coast urban belt is separated by a mountainous group, so the transportation is not convenient.
After our army landed from the West Coast, if the Taiwan army retreated its main force in Keelung and Yilan, it would be very likely to use the geographical advantage to cause difficulties in our army's advancement.
In this way, not only our army may face greater casualties, but the duration of the war in the Taiwan Strait will also increase, and it will have more impact on maritime trade along the southeast coast of my country.
(071 released the 726 hovercraft)
Therefore, our army also needs to open up a second battlefield for landing from the east coast, and directly take over the two cities of Keelung and Yilan at the beginning of the battle.
To carry out such a battle, it must have a large number of large amphibious landing ships.
At present, the main force of our army's amphibious ship is the Type 071 dock landing ship with a total of 8 ships in service.
This ship can carry 4 Type 726 air cushion landing craft, 4 helicopters and several amphibious vehicles. This type of landing ship can send a battalion-level Marine Corps to launch landing operations at one time.
However, it also has one disadvantage, that is, the helicopter has weak operational capabilities and cannot initiate large-scale vertical landings, or carry a large number of armed helicopters to carry out air cover to the landing echelon.
(type 075 amphibious assault ship)
The enrollment of my country's new type 075 amphibious assault ship has solved this problem.
As of now, and two type 075 amphibious assault ships, at the same time, the No. 3 of the 075 has also been delivered to the troops and will be in service soon. The
At the same time, the dock of 075 is not much weaker than that of 071. It can still be equipped with three 726 air cushion landing craft to transport heavy armor power. The Type 075 amphibious assault ship, which gradually formed an army, will gradually become the main force of our army's future amphibious operations.
(imaginary image of type 075 amphibious assault ship)
There is a news that our army has added a batch of 075 amphibious assault ships.
By 2025, the number of large landing ships in our army is likely to increase to 14-16. Such a huge ocean-going amphibious landing fleet is enough to support the landing operations of an amphibious armored brigade of our army.
In this way, our army can launch a landing battle against the two cities of Keelung and Yilan on the east coast.
Using this combat plan not only prevents the Taiwanese army from seeing the war on the Western Front from being unfavorable, but also bypasses the main force of the Taiwan army and attacks Taipei from the east.
This way, the liberation of Taiwan can be completed at a faster speed with lower casualties.
(Our Army Login Exercise)
4
Conclusion
In general, our army has long been able to fully attack Taiwan.
The huge gap in military strength between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait cannot be eliminated by relevant personnel of Taiwan’s defense department by just talking.
However, if our army wants to achieve Taiwan's unification by force, the more military preparations, the better.
In 2025, our army will usher in an important node in modernization construction. By then, our army will be able to make up for the shortcomings in almost all aspects and enter the global leader in the main military technology fields.
Will this become the time for our country to solve the Taiwan issue? All readers are welcome to leave their own opinions in the comment section.
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