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From the end of World War II , the US State Department of began to study the basic policies of post-war Japan. The basic starting point and destination of the State Council are based on the elimination of Japanese imperialist hegemony and maintaining strategic coordinated relations with the Soviet Union.
1. The origin of Okinawa's transfer to Japan
1943, the "Territorial Subcommittee" under the "Post-war Foreign Policy Advisory Committee" of the State Council made a recommendation:
In accordance with the "principle of not expanding territory" stipulated in the " Atlantic Charter ", Okinawa will be returned to Japan after the de-armedization of Okinawa.
In the autumn of 1944, the Japanese expert of the State Council, Bolton, made a suggestion:
"If Taiwan and the former entrusted ruling areas (the territory of the former Germany entrusted by Japan after the First World War in the southwestern Pacific) were separated from the Japanese Empire, the strategic importance of Ryukyu Islands became limited."
"Japan has always emphasized historical territorial rights, national identity and geographical adjacency to the archipelago."
From this point of view, Okinawa should be retained within Japan's territory. After
" Yalta Agreement ", although the US State Department's policy principles on Okinawa began to change, it did not directly link the Okinawa issue with the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and was still considered from the perspective of preventing Japan from posing a new threat to the security of the United States.
From December 1945 to January 1946, Robert Imoson, an official from the Far East Investigation Department of the State Council (formerly Professor of International Relations at Harvard University) was ordered to study the Okinawa issue.
He believes that if there is no need to use Okinawa as a base in military terms, Okinawa should be returned to Japan.
If it is necessary to use Okinawa as the military base of the United States, Okinawa will be divided into three parts:
will only return the northern part of Ryukyu (north of 28 degrees 40 minutes north latitude) including Amami Oshima , which was originally under the jurisdiction of Satsuma ; the southern part of Ryukyu will be used as a "general trusteeship area" and a "strategic trusteeship area" respectively.
The so-called "strategic trusteeship areas" refer to areas that are indispensable to the United States' defense and must never allow future potential enemy countries to control. Based on these recommendations, the Interministerial Far East Regional Committee drafted and submitted policy documents on trusteeship and its approach to the Interministerial Policy Coordination Committee of the State Council, the Ministry of Army and the Navy. This is the SWNCC59/1 file.
The basic conclusion is:
"From the political and diplomatic perspective, Okinawa should be treated as a small island and returned to the de-armed Japan."
The "small islands" mentioned here are based on the statement in the Potsdam Declaration.
The Potsdam Declaration stipulates:
" Cairo Declaration conditions will be implemented, and Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the people, Hokkaido , Kyushu, Shikoku and other islands we decide."
The reason why the Far East Bureau of the State Council insisted on "returning Okinawa to Japan after demilitarization" was that a memorandum of the State Council on June 19, 1946 explained the reason.
The document believes that in the territory of the former Japanese empire, the areas that will be placed under the control of the United States must meet the following conditions:
This area should be an indispensable area in terms of security guarantees in the United States; the United States' control over the area cannot be regarded as a threat by other allies, and cannot damage friendly relations with other allies; the area and population of the area cannot become a burden to the United States. The further away the controlled area is from the United States, the weaker the legitimacy of control on the grounds of security needs. The more people in the controlled area, the more likely the United States will be to blame for imperialism.
It is these ideas that set the tone for the US government's policy to deal with Okinawa.
The Truman government initially followed this policy direction. The "U.S. policy to Japan in the early post-war period" publicly published on September 22, 1945 announced:
"Japan's sovereignty will be limited to the Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku Islands, and some peripheral islands decided in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements that the United States has participated or may want to participate in."
2, the United States' direct control of Okinawa
Compared with the State Department, US Department of the Army , the Department of the Navy and other military institutions focus on the importance of overseas military bases to the security of the United States. Between September and October, 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been discussing the needs of the United States in overseas military bases and their rights, and putting Okinawa Islands, Greenland Islands, and Iceland .
Among them, Okinawa is regarded as the most important overseas military base in the Asia-Pacific region, and advocates "putting Ryukyu, Ogasawara Islands, the islands ruled by former Japan, and all islands in the central Pacific under the exclusive strategic control of the United States."
In January 1946, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed more clearly:
"All islands south of the 31st North latitude line and between Kyushu and Taiwan are all trustworthy as strategic areas" (the 31st North latitude line is the dividing line between Kyushu and seed island ).
On January 29, 1946, the Allied Command announced:
"The administrative jurisdiction of the Japanese government is limited to the Japanese mainland and its surrounding small islands. Okinawa, Amami Oshima, Izu Islands , and Ogasawara Islands are placed under the direct military and political jurisdiction of the United States."
In this way, there are actually many choices within the US government in dealing with Okinawa's policies.
Within the State Council, there is a "return theory" that separates military bases from administrative management power. Within the Interministerial Policy Coordination Committee, there is a "return theory after demilitarization".
There are actually two opposing policy propositions within the US government:
The State Department emphasized from a political perspective that Okinawa should be returned to Japan, and only the military base in Okinawa was regarded as a "strategic trusteeship area"; while the Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated the use of the entire Okinawa Islands as a "strategic trusteeship area" from a military strategic perspective, and the two were tit-for-tat.
The two sides negotiated many times, but there was no result.
In November 1946, President Truman issued a statement, treating the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands the same as the former Japanese trusteeship ruling areas, and putting them under the strategic trusteeship ruling of the United States, and proposed this plan to UN Security Council .
On April 2, 1947, the United Nations Security Council passed this proposal from the United States, which was publicly published on July 18 of the same year. The Tokyo Allied Command separates the area south of 30 degrees north latitude from the Japanese mainland in terms of administrative jurisdiction according to the instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
3, US domestic differences over Okinawa
At the same time, with the intensification of conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe and the emergence of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Ministry of the Army, the Ministry of Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Council Policy Design Committee and other departments have evolved toward completely denying the current policy to Japan, directly linking the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union with the policy to Japan and demanding the re-formulation of the policy to Japan. The understanding of relevant decision-making bodies of the US government on the Okinawa issue has gradually shifted from differences to unity.
The so-called "divergence" refers to the fact that there are still different opinions on how to deal with Okinawa in the field of international diplomacy.
First, the basic position of the State Council Policy Design Committee is: "From the strategic reason, the southern part of the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, should be placed under the strategic trust of the United States."
" Since this plan means the expansionist action of the United States, attention should be paid to making United Nations easy to accept when proposed."
"If the Soviet Union gave the southern half of the Kuril Islands to Japan, the US government should make the same move and return the northern part of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan.If the Soviet Union does not implement such concessions on territorial issues, the US government should retain its right to deal with the northern part of the Ryukyu Islands before proposing a strategic trusteeship rule over the southern part of the Ryukyu Islands. "
" Our country's troops in the Pacific must be properly deployed. It is necessary to deploy them near the native Japanese islands, namely the Ryukyu Islands and the Ogasawara Islands. "
" should separate the southern part of the Ryukyu Islands, Ogasawara Islands, volcanic islands, and Nantoshima from Japan and put them under the strategic control of the United States. "
" During the negotiations, the US government should first propose the separation of the entire Ryukyu Islands from Japan, and retain the final right to deal with the status of the Ryukyu Islands before discussing Japan's future defense issues.
However, if the Soviet Union participated in the peace meeting with Japan and agreed that Japan would lead the southern half of the Kuril Islands, the US government should propose that Japan would lead the Ryukyu Islands north of the 29th north latitude (for the United States, the region has only a small strategic value). In this way, at the end of the negotiations, the US government should propose that Japan possess the northern islands. "
Second, the basic position of Pentagon is: "This should be clearly pointed out in the documents of the State Council Policy Design Committee, requiring that the Ryukyu Islands placed under US strategic control are south of 29 degrees north latitude. " North latitude 29th line is located between the southern island of Kyushu and Amami Oshima, which also means separating Amami Oshima and Ryukyu Islands from Japanese territory.
" Before the problem with the Soviet Union was resolved, before the problems related to China were successfully resolved, especially before the realization of ensuring that Japan, which is being deemed unarmed, is not subject to invasion from the Asian continent, if the US military forces retreat from Japan and Ryukyu Islands, it will harm our country's security interests. "
Here, the Pentagon changed the pillars, transforming the central topic of US security from "the United States to prevent Japanese aggression" to "the United States should defend Japan from invasion from the Asian continent."
Third, the Far East Bureau of the State Council does not agree with the strategic trusteeship and rule, and advocates the implementation of "rental" method in accordance with the United States' military base in Philippine to avoid international public criticism from the United States.
Fourth, the commander of the Tokyo Allied Commander MacArthur believes that the strategic defense line of the United States is no longer the west coast of North and South America, but the east coast of the Asian continent. The defense stronghold in the Philippines should be extended northward to build a U-shaped defense line from Manila to Japan, Hawaii to Aleutian .
Among them, the strategic bombing capabilities of the air force are the strategic core, and Okinawa has an important position as an air base. There is no need to establish an air base in Japan, but it should occupy the Ryukyu islands south of 29 degrees north latitude.
"Now, the United States has established its exclusive rights to Okinawa. Okinawa is not under the jurisdiction of the Allied Command, but under the jurisdiction of the commander of the US Far East Army. Therefore, the Ryukyu Islands are already completely under the control of the United States. If we disagree, it is perfectly OK even if we are not open to the public. "
In MacArthur's view, as long as the United States can ensure control over Okinawa, Japan's local governments may achieve demilitarization. In other words, when considering the status of Okinawa, MacArthur focused on the relationship between Okinawa and its occupation policy against Japan, and regarded Okinawa's long-term military base as a guarantee for the demilitarization of Japan.
4, the final unification of Okinawa's ownership issue
The so-called "unification" refers to the highest decision-making body of the United States' national security policy in 1 The United States' policy on the Okinawa issue was finally determined between October 948 and May 1949.
On October 7, 1948, United States National Security Council discussed the NSC13/2 document that transformed its occupation policy against Japan.
On the Okinawa issue, the document proposed:
"The United States should maintain various facilities in Okinawa for a long time, as well as the various facilities considered necessary by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Ryukyu Islands, Nanto Island, and Southern Islands south of the Waiwoo Ice.Therefore, military bases in Okinawa and near Okinawa should be expanded. The US organs that bear the jurisdiction of the above islands should formulate and implement relevant plans as soon as possible to improve local socio-economic and social welfare, and minimize the economic deficit of local residents as much as possible. At the right time, the international community should be recognized in the most favorable way for the international community to recognize the long-term strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands, Nanto Island, and southern islands south of Waitou Rock. "
It should be said that this plan basically integrates the proposals of relevant parties.
However, Army Secretary Luo Yar still believes that this plan does not fully express the Pentagon's wishes and requires modification and supplementation. The full text of the amendment he proposed is as follows:
"The US government believes that within the limits required to ensure political and economic stability, it is the national interest of the United States to reduce the burden caused by the occupation costs of the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees north latitude. It is not in the interests of the United States to publish this in the world. Under the current circumstances, it is not an appropriate time to gain recognition from the international community.
The US government's policy on the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees north latitude should be as follows. That is, in order to realize the above-mentioned social and economic and social welfare plans, in order to minimize the local economic deficit in the future, within the necessary and possible range, the US military and government agencies stationed in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees north latitude will begin to pay daily expenses after 60 days from today. The above-mentioned areas do not belong to other occupied areas financially and do not bear any debts. ”
On January 17, 1949, Acting Secretary of State Lovett agreed to use this paragraph as a supplement to Article (5) of the NSC13/2 document. On February 1, President Truman approved this amendment. On May 6, 1949, it was officially included in the NSC13/3 document.
In accordance with the provisions of the NSC13/3 document, the Ministry of War is responsible for formulating and implementing the Okinawa strategic trusteeship plan; the State Department is responsible for solving the international recognition method of Okinawa's status.
In this way, the US's policy on occupation of Japan subordinates its policy toward Okinawa to the strategic goal of curbing the Soviet Union. At the same time, the US's policy on Okinawa and the US's policy on Okinawa is in line with the US's policy on Okinawa. Japanese policies are relatively separate and unique.
This episode is reflected in:
The US government has never asked Japan to give up its sovereignty over Okinawa, and has always insisted on the US trusteeship rights of Okinawa. From then on, the changes in the US government's southern territorial policy on Japan's southern territorial policies mainly focus on how to determine the boundary line of the trusteeship area.
5. Who exactly has the sovereignty of Okinawa?
From the perspective of the Okinawa issue, the military forces led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Council Policy Design Committee.
U.S. The Far East Bureau of the State Council and the Japanese government both argue that Okinawa is not suitable for trusteeship rule, but should be leased and used through security guarantee treaties or special base agreements, and its sovereignty should be returned to Japan.
U.S. National Security Council Document No. 13/3 determined the tone of the policy of dealing with the Okinawa issue.
Dulles actively adjusted the differences between the United States and Japan, which not only met the various requirements of the U.S. government's demand for trusteeship of Okinawa, but also met some of the Japanese government's requirements. After the San Francisco Peace Treaty against Japan, the Okinawa issue changed from multilateral international political issues to the issue of US-Japan relations. U.S. government's policy toward Okinawa and its policy toward Japan gradually moved from separation to integration. However, the U.S. government's treatment of Okinawa The policies in question were still quite different in the 1950s and 1960s.
During the Truman government and the first Eisenhower government, the core issue in U.S.-Japan relations was that the United States directly linked the Okinawa issue with Japan's reorganization of arms. The United States actively demanded that Japan reorganize arms, while the Japanese Yoshida Shigeru government insisted on gradually increasing arms according to the level of Japan's national economic recovery and development.
After the "Fulongmaru incident", the Eisenhower government accepted Japan's "gradual increase of arms". The "reorganization of arms" issue is no longer a major issue in the development of U.S.-Japan relations, and the contradictions in Okinawa's status issue are becoming increasingly prominent.
However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that as long as Japan does not actively redevelop its arms and reaches the level required by the US government, Japan will not have the ability to defend Okinawa. Whether Japan can be a strategic partner of the United States for a long time is an unknown, so it cannot be returned to Okinawa.
In this way, although Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty against Japan recognizes Japan's "remaining sovereignty (potential sovereignty)", the current situation in Okinawa is difficult to change.
In 1953, the US government issued a statement when deciding to return Amami Oshima, simply emphasized that "as long as there is a threat of international communism and international tensions, the US government will continue to maintain its position in Okinawa."
" Japan-US Security Treaty " and "Administrative Agreement" do not apply to Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty against Japan. The Japanese government has no right to interfere with the deployment and configuration of the US military in Okinawa, and does not talk about Japan's so-called "residual sovereignty (potential sovereignty)" over Okinawa at all.
This is the so-called "clear sky" policy. As a result, it means that Japan's participation in the Okinawa issue was excluded.
Hatoyama Cabinet proposed a new policy of "independent reorganization of arms", hoping to promote the US government to resolve the issue of returning Okinawa by modifying the US Security Treaty and including Ogasawara Islands in the scope of application of the new security treaty. However, Secretary of State Dulles not only revisited the old tune, but also asked Japan to understand the U.S. government's policy of not considering changing the status quo of Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands.
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