Wittgenstein is definitely an unavoidable figure in the history of Western philosophy. Whether it is his legendary life experience, his lonely lifestyle, or his subversion of Western philosophy by "the sound of the sea tide, the roar of the lion" - he completely destroyed the foundation of metaphysics in Western philosophy, and most of the debates in the history of philosophy are just mysteries caused by unclear semantics and logical confusion. He believes that philosophy should be "a struggle to prevent our reason from being deluded through linguistic means."
language is our first door to Wittgenstein's philosophy. He strives to express and interpret philosophical issues in a language that is strictly accurate and can be used in daily life. This does not mean that Wittgenstein is a nihilist or scientist. He hopes to use linguistic clarification to draw a sky for poetry, art and music, because in his opinion, these, like philosophy, are human attempts to approach the ultimate question. Wittgenstein criticized philosophers in his later years: First, philosophers were separated from the use of words in daily life. Second, philosophers use language like a game. They can no longer express real things and can only generate meaning through the connection between words. Under the cold thinking, what is hidden is Wittgenstein's reluctance to ask about the ultimate value. He hopes to use logical and clear expression to create a language that belongs only to philosophy. Philosophy cannot directly answer these ultimate values, but can use another way to make these "unspeakable things" continue to shine in the spiritual world of mankind.
This article is excerpted from the book "A Brief History of Paradoxes" and is authorized by the publisher.
"A Brief History of Paradoxes" Author: [US] Roy Sorensen Translator: Li Yuezhen Version: Jiuzhou Publishing House August 2022
Problems caused by misunderstanding our language form have profound characteristics. They are profound uneasiness, their roots are as deep as the form of our language, and their meanings are the same as the importance of our language. Let us ask ourselves: Why do we think a grammatical joke is profound? (and that is the depth of philosophy) - Wittgenstein, 1958, 111
Reverend Charles Dodgson, a logician and mathematician - more often known by his pseudonym Lewis Carroll - famous for his humorous language. In "HTM1 Alice in Wonderland ", the duck futilely asks what the "it" refers to in the mouse lecture: "The patriotic Archbishop St. Ang of Canterberre believes that 'it' is wise... Go and go and go on a trip with Edgar Athelin..." The duck assumes "it" should refer to something specific, such as a frog or a worm. But here the mouse uses the word "it" as a false pronoun, and it is implanted into the sentence just to meet the grammar's needs for object words. If David Hume is correct, then Descartes may be very similar to the duck's behavior when looking for the reference to "I" in "I think so I am".
Dogchison's wonderful ideas also continued into his entertainment-style mathematics. Interestingly, he believed that these puzzles could accomplish a serious purpose: to provide a spiritual protection. In the introduction to his book Pillow Problems, Dodgeson writes: "There are some skepticism ideas, and they now seem to eradicate the firmest beliefs; there are some blasphemous thoughts that rush into the most pious souls like untimely guests; there are unholy ideas, tormenting the illusion of what should be pure with their abominable existence. Opposing all this true mental work is a most helpful ally." The puzzle should be challenging, but not too difficult. People who often visit the sensing deprivation chambers will suggest that you construct rational challenges for yourself to eliminate time: for example, recite the alphabet upside down, list all prime numbers within 100, etc.They reminded that the problems you asked must be able to be solved. If you unfortunately choose a question you cannot answer, then you have no way to switch questions. You will become disgusted with this problem, but you can't stop thinking about it.
Wittgenstein of childhood.
paradox, like a parasite, attracted the attention of Bertrand Russell 's darling Ludwig Wittgenstein (Ludwig Wittgenstein , 1889 — 1951). Wittgenstein was disgusted with philosophers who were actually keen on Eternal Questions. The reason why he is engaged in philosophy is just to eliminate his urge to give an answer as soon as possible.
Wittgenstein's therapy
When Leo Tolstoy was young, his brother challenged him: he had to stand in the corner of the room before he stopped imagining the white bear. The more Lev tried to stop imagining , the more he thought of it. Only when he thinks of something else can he stop imagining the white bear. People who are troubled by unavoidable thoughts cannot simply decide not to think about them anymore. Relief comes involuntarily. The most a thinker with an unfree mind can do is to distract himself by changing the environment he is in.
Wittgenstein distracted him by watching American movies, especially westerns. He would choose to sit in the front row of the theater, eat the crust and meat pie, and watch it with all his attention. He also read a lot of detective novels (many philosophers read, perhaps out of a desire for solutions). However, this shift in attention can only provide Wittgenstein with a few hours of relief. His only period of peace lasted was in 1921, after the publication of his " Logic Philosophy" (Tractatus). At that time, he believed that he had revealed that all philosophical problems arise from violations of ideal grammar, so he retired from the philosophy and worked as a primary school teacher in Trattenbach, a remote village in Austria.
Ludwig Wittgenstein 's second brother, one-armed pianist Paul Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein was eventually convinced and believed that this ideal language itself was just an illusion. He returned to Cambridge University in 1929 with uneasiness. Over the next 10 years, he pieced together what he called " Daily Language Philosophy ". Full of self-blame, Wittgenstein gave up the transcendental requirement that the grammar he had asked for earlier should be logical. Instead of trying to think about how language must work, he decides to observe the speaker's actual behavior. From the perspective of this anthropological , a natural language like English is similar to the city of London, a city that has both ancient roots and is alive and growing. Some of these modern parts have neat grid-like layouts. But at the same time, there are many old neighbors that spread randomly. London is not defined in one day. It is a mixture of overlapping mechanisms. All useful generalizations must be limited and only apply to local. When we overuse analogy, when we use expressions off the background, when we detach the discourse pattern from its actual (and unrealistic) purpose, a paradox arises. According to Wittgenstein, we can choke most paradoxes in the bud by bringing words back to their natural use environment—for example, by studying how words are taught to children, and by noting the role words play in greater practice. To avoid being overwhelmed by complexity, he also considered simplified language games. However, these artificial samples should not be considered as "ideal language" that is imperfectly approached by everyday language. We can easily fall apart because of our idealization. We stabilize our minds by constantly returning to the rough ground. In some cases, we may find that the rules of language do lead to contradictions. Russell and Fregg regard contradictions as crisis.
"The Legend of Wittgenstein: Genius is Responsibility"
Author: (English) Sri Munch Translator: Wang Yuguang Version: Qizhenguan·Zhejiang University Press April 2014
But Wittgenstein compared discovering a contradiction to discovering a certain game that can ensure a small victory. If we encounter trouble, we can choose to use a special method to fill this loophole. If no one actually exploits this vulnerability, then we don't need to fix it. We can endure some paradoxes coexist with us. Perhaps some of these problems, such as the free will issue occasionally brings us trouble in practice. After all, we sometimes have to make judgments in serious cases involving issues such as addiction, impulse and compulsion. But the appropriate response here is to make minor adjustments. We should not replace common sense joints with metaphysical prosthetics.
Sexdo Npirico attempts to end philosophical inquiry in any way available, whether it is rational or irrational. If there is some safe "anti-philosophical pill", Sex will write it on the prescription. Witt Gentstein is opposed to non-cognitive therapy. He believes that to get rid of philosophical troubles, we must first understand in-depth how language sets traps for us.
"Wittgenstein Readings" Author: (English) Wittgenstein Translated by: Chen Jiaying Version: Shanghai People's Publishing House June 2020
The meaning of the word "name" seems to be particularly simple. When Abraham Lincoln says "Fido", the meaning of the word is its carrier: the soft and drooping, rough hair, yellowed, and unknown blood dog. In the conversation of Plato , Socrates simply expands this model of "Fedo"/Fedo to terms such as "courage", "knowledge", and "good". Since these words have no carriers in the world, Socrates inferred that they must have transcendent carriers: courage, knowledge and good. This transcendent use of language has led to a series of problems with common . Can a common phase exist without an instance? Does each pair of common phases have to be connected through a higher common phase? How can material beings understand these abstract entities?
Wittgenstein insists that if we observe how we actually use words, we will find that generally there are no characteristics that are common and unique to all language usages. In the "game", there is only a network composed of overlapping similarities, a family resemblance. Socrates' requirement for definition is therefore based on a false presupposition: there is a certain commonality between all usages of a word.
This "Fido"/Fido model is also hidden behind the key paradox of the philosophy of mind. We presumed that words like "headache" have a carrier. Since this carrier cannot be physical, we introduce that there is a spiritual carrier. On the one hand, this non-physical entity seems elusive because it does not appear in everyone's sight. Therefore, there is no independent checking method to determine whether it exists. On the other hand, pain seems to be the easiest thing to know. It is impossible for a person with a headache to mistakenly think he has a headache. If he had a headache, then he wouldn't have been able to not notice it. For pain, existence is perceived. The realm of such private entities is easily seen as the realm most familiar to those who own them. Therefore, it becomes tempting to regard the psychological realm as the basis of all other knowledge. You have no way to check the psychological field of other people, so you seem particularly unsuitable to judge whether others have the same ideas as you, or even have such ideas. The entire external world looks like something we must boldly infer based on our own ideas. At least, what you know best is your own ideas. At the very least, what you are really talking about is the idea that you are holding or possibly holding.Since these concepts must be yours and you think there will be no mistakes, then each of us is actually speaking a private language. Communication is impossible because there are no words or sentences that have the same meaning between our languages. We cannot agree with each other, nor can we disagree with each other.
Wittgenstein with student Malcolm in Cambridge.
Wittgenstein believes that private language is impossible. A rule that only you can follow is a rule that cannot maintain the difference between observing the rule and violating it. Without the possibility of violating the rule, it is impossible to comply with it. Private rules are unambiguous and contradictory. Private rules must be used to define private language. Therefore, private language is impossible.
Wittgenstein also questioned the assumption that "pain" has alleged. He thought "my head hurt" was not reporting the headache; it was expressing the pain like a moan. It is not to cover your forehead in pain, but to replace it with a verbal act. “The paradox will only disappear when we completely break the idea that language always works in one way and always serves the same purpose—that is, conveying ideas, perhaps about houses, pain, good and evil, or anything else you want to convey—that is, the paradox will disappear. Wittgenstein encourages people to propose alternatives to his “avowal theory”. What Wittgenstein wanted to do was not replace this philosophical theory with another philosophical theory. He does not think that the problem with philosophy is simply the wrong premise. Wittgenstein believes that the real problem is that we think we must choose a certain premise.
Relevance of language weirdness
Scottish writer Robert Louis Stevenson (Robert Louis Ste venson) likes a little girl who complains that her birthday is on Christmas Day. She could have received gifts two days of the year, but now she only receives gifts in one day. In his will, Stevenson bequeathed his birthday to the girl. He attached the following clause: "But if she fails to use the estate properly, all rights should be transferred to the President of the United States."
Stevenson's " bequest for " shows that a birthday is not a transferable property. The meaning of this is similar to the philosophical commentary about limits. A philosopher facing "his heart problem" commented: "I can't feel your pain." It is helpful to compare the deep personalities of pain with the shallow personalities of birthdays.
Wittgenstein "Once said that a serious, excellent, and philosophical work that is composed entirely of jokes (at the same time does not seem funny). Another time, he once said that a philosophical paper can only contain questions (and not answers)." In his book " Philosophical Research ", Wittgenstein often mixes jokes and questions:
Why can't a dog pretend to be in pain? Is it because it's too honest? Why can't my right hand give my left hand money?
Why does the sentence "He feels deep sorrow for a second" sound strange? (Just because it rarely happens?) (1958, 250, 268, II, i)
Anthony Kenny (Anthony Kenny)—A methodical Wittgenstein scholar reported that Philosophical Research contained 784 questions; 110 of them were answered, but 70 of these answers were intentionally wrong answers.
Wittgenstein said his purpose is to "teach you to transform the disguised meaningless words into obvious meaningless words." (1958, 464) For example, one might compare the sentences “where will the concept go after being thought” and “where will the flame go after being turned off”. Since jokes and puzzles are both concise and recognized instances of clearly meaningless discourses, they are good candidates for these logical analogies.
Other "everyday language philosophers" try to resolve these problems by comparing philosophical problems with obvious linguistic absurdity.Gilbert Ryle's Concept of the Heart often accuses Rene Descartes of for making "category mistakes".
If a person says that only three things will not rise: tide, hope and average age of death, then he will be regarded as a bad joke. Other similar jokes, good or bad, include: the existence of prime numbers, Wednesdays, public opinion and navy, or the existence of both body and mind.
Wittgenstein believes that similar boundaries are revealed through philosophical comments such as “green and blue cannot be in the same place at the same time”.
Daily language philosophy is the descendant of common sense philosophy after it is deleted. Contrary to what Thomas Reed expected, physics after the 18th century overturned some common sense beliefs. The principle of applying to medium-sized objects under common conditions collapsed on the scales studied by astronomers and microphysicists. In order to avoid invasion of scientific territory, everyday language philosophers retained only the linguistic aspects of Reed's philosophy. They limit their research scope and comment only on how language works. As native English speakers, they master the rules of English and can tell whether a sentence belongs to English. Unfortunately, we cannot directly understand the rules we use.
We must deduce the rules based on which sentences belong to English data. Statements about language rules are analytical. They are not comments about the world. This explains why philosophy can be armchair-like. Like mathematics, philosophy is an innate field.
In practice, everyday language philosophers often use empirical clues to determine what the rules may be. We know that English cannot include infinitely independent rules, because that will make the language unacquireable. When discussing how the agreement is organized, Wittgenstein often resorts to the function of language. But this "peeping" is much like the informal test used by geometry to guide their conjectures. Even if we do use acquired research models, these statements are inherently innate.
(it's important that the statement can be learned without relying on experience) When we use the language correctly, our questions are well structured: Even if it turns out that we can't know the answer, there is always an answer there. When it comes to philosophical questions, we are caught in a dizzying confusion: what exactly can be counted as an answer? This emotion can be traced back to Wittgenstein's "On the Logical Philosophy" period:
Most of the propositions and problems that can be found in philosophical works are not fake, but meaningless. Therefore, we cannot give any answers to such questions, but only prove that they are meaningless. Most of the propositions and problems of philosophers stem from our failure to understand the logic of our language. (They belong to the same category as whether they are more or less the same as "good" and "beauty")
It is no surprise that the deepest problems are actually not the problem at all. (1969a, 4.003)
philosophical questions have no answers, because in fact there is no such problem at all, and there are only pseudo-questions that disguise themselves as problems. A field can only make progress by answering questions, so progress in philosophy is impossible. ("The puzzle does not exist. If a question can be asked, then it can be answered.") People can at best resolve philosophical problems by showing that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings about the way our language works.
text/(US) Roy Sorensen
editing/Yuan Chunxi
proofreading/Yang Xuli
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