The direction of the war in the past 10 days proves that the Russian Command obviously took a military adventure after February 24 with a hope for the collapse of the Ukrainian army, and the relatively large losses paid by the Russian army confirm the failure of Russia's politica

[Text/Observer Network Columnist Wang Shichun]

The most important military news this week is naturally the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The direction of the war in the past 10 days proves that the Russian Command obviously took a military adventure after February 24 with a hope for the collapse of the Ukrainian army. The relatively large losses paid by the Russian army have also made the outside world doubt the strength of Russia and brought us thoughts.

The Russian army did not fight beautifully, but for us it was all lessons learned

front

Let’s first talk about the situation facing the Russian army to facilitate readers to understand the current situation. As of March 5, written by the military review this week, the Russian army was mainly launching offensives on four major battlefields from north to southeast, and made great progress in all four directions, causing irrecoverable losses to the Ukrainian army in front of them. However, due to the long front of the Russian army, which exceeded the farthest depth attack distance stipulated by the regulations, and the supplies carried by the Russian army themselves have been exhausted, the Ukrainian army continued to ambush below the company and platoon, causing the Russian army to lose more than 500 people.

This is the best battle report picture on March 6. The source of the picture is thanks to Weibo @Red Robe Firefly

in the northwest direction, which is the Kiev direction that the outside world cares about. Russia continues to advance in the north of Kiev, and Russian airborne troops continue to slash into the suburbs of Kiev in the direction of Kiev, running towards the Gostomer region and Butcha region. The tank troops on the east bank of the Russian River may continue to slash into the Chernigov region on the east bank of the Dnieper River to meet with the troops in the direction of Koumei. The US military speculates that the Russian army will surround Kiev from the northeast and east.

Although it advanced 100 kilometers, the Russian light armored troops suffered two obvious casualties in this direction, namely, the two airborne platoon-level forces in the direction of the marching column were wiped out by Ukrainian special forces in close range. Video information released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense confirmed that the Russian army had lost 10 paratrooper combat vehicles affiliated to the 76th Division of the Airborne Army here, and the losses were estimated to have lost more than 50 troops. The Russian Ministry of Defense has issued a "revenge order" to these Ukrainian special forces that wantonly posted photos of Russian troops.

Russian army continues to engage in a security battle with Ukrainian small special forces in northern Kiev Picture source: Social media

Although the Russian army suffered a blow in the suburbs of Kiev, on March 3, a close-up interview with the Gostomeli military airport An 225 on the first Russian TV station confirmed that the Russian army suffered a small threat in this direction and has detained prisoners of war from the capital defense force. This report brings people doubts on the front line. At present, a reasonable explanation is that the Ukrainian army has no longer had many established and serious resistance forces north of Kiev City, and only Ukrainian special forces are still active in the area, but these dead and hard elements have caused considerable losses to the Russian army by exerting their subjective initiative. At present, the Russian 76th Division and the Chechen National Guards' inspection and crackdown are still continuing. At the same time, the Russian army advanced from the east to Kiev, especially in the direction from Konotup and Nizin.

This photo is more suitable for interpreting this war: two countries used weapons from the previous era to destroy the civilization achievements of the previous era. Picture source: Social media

In the direction of Kharkov , the Russian army is currently staying in the western and eastern Kharkov. The actions of interspersing from Kharkov to other directions have been temporarily suspended. At present, the attacks around Kharkov are still mainly based on artillery firepower and aerospace weapons firepower. The Russian army continues to use precise guided weapons and sub-compounds to attack the defenders of this city. The information released by the defenders in this city is getting less and less. It can be judged that the artillery and technical weapons in the city are being gradually consumed and eroded by the Russian army. The 4th Tank Division of the Russian Kandimilov Guards and the 27th Brigade of the Sebastopolmo invasion bypassed the city east and west in the past 48 hours, but it also stopped.On March 3, the T-80BVM tanks of the Independent 200th Brigade of the Naval Infantry Propelled from Kharkov to Poltawa were recovered by the local militia, and some 2S19 self-propelled artillery and other weapons were also recovered, but there was no video of Russian equipment being destroyed in this direction. At the same time, the militia only claimed that these weapons were "seied". The author speculates that this may be because after the 4th Division tried to intersperse Poltava, the superiors changed the original combat plan, retreated the troops to the rear to gather for supply and prepare for the next offensive, and the troops in the front discarded part of the heavy weapon that had no time to recover during the retreat. But in the southwest of Kharkov, on March 3 local time, the Luhansk People's Army troops advanced north from southern Luhansk to Kharkov's New Aidar Town met with a Russian airborne brigade advancing from the north to the region.

Naval Infantry T-80BVM tank was abandoned and was recycled by Ukraine. Source: Social Media

But in this direction, the Ukrainian army's technical weapons were also quickly exhausted. Source: Social Media

. On the southern line, the Russian army has progressed faster than the northern line in the past week. This can also be seen from the number of medals of the Russian army Heroes of the Russian Federation. In the direction of Mariupol , the Russian army basically controlled the entire Dnieper River , and occupied Berkansk and established a new offensive starting point. At the same time, Donbas advanced 30 kilometers toward the Luhansk People's Army and Donkatsk People's Army respectively. The Russian army had already joined forces with Donkatsk People's Army in the northern part of Mariupol, completely surrounding Mariupol, and continued to launch artillery, long-range rocket and missile attacks on the city. The Russian ground forces suspended the offensive, but on March 3 and 4, the Donkatsk Armed Forces in the north had street fighting with the deadly hard elements of Mariupol. The famous "Spartan" battalion and the elements of the Ukrainian right-wing special forces "Donbas" battalion held fire. The Russian army, which was advancing smoothly on the southern line, may be prepared to launch street fighting against Mariupol in the next 24-48 hours. At present, Russia has implemented a unilateral ceasefire in Volnovaha and Mariupol on the Donbas front on the morning of March 5, opening humanitarian rescue and evacuation channels for trapped residents in both places, and then resumed fire, reflecting the subsequent actions of the Russian army.

Donbas working class armed forces through the statue of "steel workers" Picture source: social media

In the western part of the southern line, after occupying the city of Khlsong, Russia extended northwest and launched a new offensive to the city of Nikolayev where the Ukrainian Navy Command is located and Odessa in the southwest. So far, the Ukrainian Army organized a certain scale of defense in this direction, destroyed the mechanized weapons of some Russian vanguard troops, such as several T-72B3 tanks, and seized a BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle that was aggressive in the army, but it stopped there. The Russian army also lost an Su-25 attack aircraft and a Su-34 attack aircraft in this direction, setting the largest single-day loss of the Aerospace Army since the war started. The Russian army has now entered the suburbs of Nikolayev and is preparing to log in in the direction of Odessa. Of course, logging in is a feint. It can be inferred that the Russian army will establish a connection between Crimea and Odessa and assist in logging in. In addition, the Russian army continued to advance in the direction of Zaporoze and did not suffer new large-scale losses in this reverse direction.

In this direction, the losses of the Russian army's three fixed wings are unacceptable. Source: Social Media

Although the Russian army overcomes many adverse factors, it advanced more than 100 kilometers in all directions, occupying hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land. During the 10-day war, the Russian military's military strikes basically defeated the organized defense of the Ukrainian army. Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov said on the evening of March 5 that the Russian military has destroyed more than 2,100 military facilities in Ukraine.Since the beginning of the operation, a total of 2,119 Ukrainian military infrastructure have been destroyed, including 74 command posts and communication hubs, 108 S-300 surface-to-air air defense missile systems, the Beech M-1 and the Wasp air defense systems and 68 radar stations, "Konashkov continued to say, "69 aircraft were blown up on the ground, 21 aircraft were shot down in the air, 748 tanks, and armored vehicles, 76 volley rocket systems, 274 artillery and mortars, 532 units of special military vehicles and 59 drones. Before the war, the Ukrainian Army had about 2,000 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Since the Russian war report was basically credible, the Ukrainian army's technical weapons had basically been consumed. For Ukraine, the losses this time were comparable to those of the Saddam regime in 1991. After that, Ukraine, which lacked heavy industry, would be difficult to restore its original military strength even if it had the support of NATO . But despite this, the Russian army has suffered losses that exceeded the previous estimates by outside observers in a week-long rush. According to , the spokesman for the Russian Ministry of Defense , Konashenkov said on the same day that since the special military operation in Ukraine, 498 Russian troops died and 1,597 injured. According to relevant military regulations of the Soviet Union, the material reserves of the Russian military division brigade generally can only support division and brigade-level units to fight for 3-5 combat days. Although the intensity of combat on each front is different, as the war enters the 10th day, the Russian army will inevitably stagnate and rectify, and at the same time, it will be invested in the subsequent second echelon in the country to take over the new offensive.

The Ukrainian army's technical weapons have basically been damaged, and NATO needs assistance to rebuild

Military adventure

As the first hot war that took place on the European continent after entering the 21st century, the final situation of this war is indeed beyond the expectations of everyone, including NATO and the Supreme Command of Russia. The losses paid by the Russian army come from the passive position of the Russian army on the battlefield, and the passive position of the Russian grassroots troops is obviously caused by the decisions made by the Russian Command that violates military common sense.

Chairman Mao once pointed out: "The active position is not unimaginable, but concrete, material. The most important thing here is to preserve and gather the largest and vibrant army." War practice shows that the powerful side is generally prone to occupy an active position in joint battles. The joint campaign should emphasize the concentration of superior forces, especially at decisive opportunities and locations, so that the combat forces always form an advantage against the enemy, in order to strive for a favorable situation and proactive position.

However, in the past week of battle, the Russian army obviously gave up its military advantage and took the initiative to put the troops in a passive position. In addition to the large restriction of the use of artillery fire by the Russian army, this can be seen from the long-distance interlude of the Russian army's violation of military regulations. The current combat mission depth of the Russian army in this mission has far exceeded the military capabilities of the Russian army. The Russian army's military equipment has improved compared with the Soviet era, but due to its logistical capabilities, its full mission depth is not much better than that of the Soviet army. According to relevant combat regulations, in offensive battles, the Soviet army will determine the depth of the combat mission based on the formation of enemy groups and defensive positions, the battle (combat) attempts and combat capabilities of its own troops, and the terrain conditions. Under normal conditions, the fully mechanized combat mission of the Soviet army's MoF Division can reach 50 kilometers in the full depth, and only 30-35 kilometers when breaking through the fortification areas and carrying out attacks in difficult-to-pass areas. When attacking weak enemies in plains and moderately undulating areas, the full depth can reach 80 kilometers.

The situation chart drawn by the Europeans can be seen that a BTG has to deal with the traditional brigade-level region

But the reality is that on the tenth day of the war, the Russian army's current advancement has exceeded the Russian military regulations and regulations. On the northern line, the Russian army raided Bucha from the Russian-Ukrainian border as the starting point of the battle, and the assault depth reached 110 kilometers. On the eastern line, the Russian army's Kandimilov division advanced 100 kilometers towards Sumei and 80 kilometers towards Kharkov, while the Russian army on the southern line is the most exaggerated: from Crimea to Mariupol, the Russian army raided 100 kilometers in the direction of Zaporoze, and in the direction of Mariupol, the Russian army raided a full 180 kilometers, reaching the Mariupol coastal Mariupol. These Russian troops who were in place not only escaped from the support range of Russian helicopter aviation and the army's long-range firepower, but also escaped from the logistics support force of the Russian army's superiors. Just talking about the distance of progress, the armed forces of the Russian Federation have reached the first 10 days of advancement of the US military in the land operation in 2003 Iraq War , but obviously, the Iraqi army's willingness to resist in the Iraqi war is much smaller than the Ukrainian army's willingness to resist.

While the Russian army was interspersing, the size of the Russian army's participating troops was very rare compared to the extended front line. The Russian army still retained a large number of main troops and failed to go forward. At present, according to the Russian army's troops, the author has only found several special purpose brigades in Ukraine, including the 138th Brigade of the Moon Infantry (suspected), the 27th Brigade of the Moon Infantry, the 163rd Regiment of the 150th Division, the 136th Brigade of the Moon Infantry, the 4th Division of the Moon Infantry, the 37th Brigade of the Northern Fleet Naval Infantry, the 31st Brigade of the Airborne Army, the 7th Division, the 76th Division, and the GRU, which are equipped with the military's air defense , artillery, rocket artillery and tow artillery and logistics supply forces, several battalions of the National Guards, and the detachment of the Russian Federal Security Bureau. The current observations show that the elite Russian army "Kandamilov" is a combined combat group of division-level air defense forces. A interspersed team often has to be responsible for nearly 100 square kilometers with a reinforced battalion-level force, and is even close to the controlled area of ​​a synthetic brigade after our army reform. For a country like Ukraine that spans 500 kilometers north and south and has a width of 1,000 kilometers east and west, this amount of military force is indeed rare. So far, the Russian army has at least 20 division-level troops in China and is useless. On March 4 local time, the Russian Ministry of Defense also released the deeds and information of the first batch of seven Russian Federation heroes, and its combat areas also basically verified the scale of the current forces deployed by the Russian army.

The tank driver of the naval infantry defeated the Ukrainian army in symmetric combat with courage and quality. Under the passive position of "the Russian old mechanized army" , just interspersing, the Russian army caused a large amount of non-combat losses. For example, in the self-defense counterattack against Vietnam in 1979, our army had only 7 regiments and 2 battalions of tanks. Among them, the main forces were several military and military tank regiments. Among them, more than 600 tanks and armored vehicles were damaged in the process of rushing and interspersing, but most of the tanks were repaired, and in the end, only more than 40 tanks were completely damaged due to excessive damage. However, such repairs occurred when our army had absolute advantages in military strength and firepower, and the 43rd Army tank regiment was only 80 kilometers away and there were several army supporters in the rear. The problem facing the Russian army at present is that the troops on both sides are rapidly interspersed, and their troops consumed severe fuel and logistics. The Russian army's main mechanized troops are too old, with a large number of old cars of more than 30 years of age. Although the vehicles are short, they are actually far from the reliable equipment that is discarded as the Russian army said. In fact, they face the problem of rest, replenishment and reorganization in order to continue to invest in high-intensity combat. The Russian army's division and brigade-level units have a range of more than 80 kilometers on the northern line and a range of nearly 200 kilometers on the southern line. Their non-combat losses will not be small.

excessive progress has caused a large number of losses to field air defense systems. Image source: Social Media

We currently do not have objective statistical methods for the losses of the Russian army, because the "base camp war report" of the Ukrainian military is too exaggerated, and even literally there is one more 0 in the battle results. We can only turn to the open source information in this war. According to the pro-Western open source intelligence enthusiast Oryx, identifying and counting all the war-damaged equipment of Russia and Ukraine in all photos and videos on the Internet, the total number of photos of various types of mechanized equipment confirmed by the Russian side is 555, including 227 photos of total loss, 131 were abandoned, and 189 were captured, including 72 tank losses and 23 total losses; 75 infantry fighting vehicles were lost, including 23 total losses, 17 mobile air defense missile vehicles, of which 6 were destroyed by TB-2 drone , and 184 photos of various other wheeled vehicles. Although oryx, a pro-Western open source account, also confuses a lot of photos of "total damage" and "captured" in its blog, calls a large number of videos taken by "Ukrainian fellow villagers" "captured", and there are a lot of repeated statistics. However, judging from the open source statistics, the Russian army has indeed given up the main combat equipment such as tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored transport vehicles, and other large-scale units, and a large number of old wheeled vehicles were damaged and abandoned during the operation.

The Russian army's hard interlude made the troops lose sight of each other. Although the Ukrainian army did not launch a large-scale counterattack, the Russian army still lost some platoon-level troops. Public videos show that the Russian army's aggressive advance in the first week of the war also suffered several major losses in the days of the end of February. Among them, the main combat equipment on the front line also suffered battalion-company losses in the brutal melee battle. For example, in the ambush suffered in the direction of the north of Kiev on February 27 and March 4, the Russian army suffered two ambushes, suffered losses from the level of three airborne platoons, and lost more than 20 airborne gangs and more than 8 airborne chariots. These losses are also confirmed by the Russian Ministry of Defense that the Russian army killed 498 people in the operation. It can be judged that the Russian mechanized troops in the main attack direction have about 1,500 main combat equipment and logistics vehicles and artillery support equipment with a quantity of slightly less than main combat weapons. Although they have not suffered any losses in the established system, after a week of low-intensity combat, the Russian army's front line needs to wait for subsequent forces to replenish before making plans.

The equipment lost by the Russian army also shows the passiveness of the Russian army in its strategic situation. The Ukrainian advanced weapons in Europe and the United States, such as "javelin" and "TB-2", did not cause much damage to the Russian army. So far, the "javelin" has not caused many results, and there is no corresponding strike video. It is only inferred that a T-80BVM was suspected to be caused by an ambush by the Ukrainian army. At the same time, the convoy destroyed by TB-2 is also located in the Russian weak logistics convoy, and the TB-2 rarely prevents the Russian vanguard mechanized troops protected by "armor" and "Tunguska" from launching a fierce attack. It can be said that the Russian combined column, which strengthened a large number of subordinate forces, did a good job in annihilated the harassment of small Ukrainian troops and achieved the planned battle goals. However, the main losses of the Russian army came from the logistics supply convoy and the subsequent artillery convoy. It can be said that the source of losses of the Russian army even came from the Ukrainian light weapons, , mines, anti-tank direct aim weapons and Ukrainian imitation Soviet anti-tank missiles.

TB-2 has caused certain results on the logistics convoy

There are many reasons why the Russian army restricts its own military operations. It is not difficult to speculate that in order to facilitate the handling of the Ukrainian issue after the war and its international reputation, the Russian army strives to reduce casualties as much as possible. But the determination of another part of the anti-military common sense chief issued by the Russian commander obviously has its political purpose, but such a decision is obviously a speculative act.

Russia is the strong side against Ukraine, but is the weak side against NATO, and Ukraine Battle is not a complete "military account" and has a large number of "political accounts".In such a situation where the enemy is strong and we are weak, this kind of speculative behaviorism and the "left" opportunism military strategy during our country's Agrarian Revolutionary War are similar to the military adventure, which is similar to a military adventure that changes the situation where the enemy is strong and we are weak. It can be inferred that the Russian army hopes to "bloom multiple points" in various parts of Ukraine, through the interspersion of a large number of troops in Kiev and Kharkov, and even the airborne troops alone, crush the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian army in public opinion and morale, realize a "military parade", forcing the Ukrainian army to take the initiative to come out and collide with the Russian mechanized troops in order to fight a decisive battle, and at the same time force the Ukrainian government to issue an order to stop resistance.

However, military practice and historical experience show that once such a military adventure fails, the consequences will be unimaginable. The Russian army failed to withstand the losses of the establishment during the war that lasted for a week, but the strategic goal that the Russian Command tried to achieve was not achieved. As we have seen in the past 200 hours, although the troops of more than a dozen brigades in eastern Ukraine were not strong in resistance, they did not mobilize and fight in an organized manner in the past week, but almost all chose to establish solid positions in important cities and settlements, intending to fight to the end. The Russian army did not find the opportunity to quickly annihilate the Ukrainian army in the maneuver. It can be said that the Ukrainian army built hundreds of "Four-House Warehouses" east of the Dnieper River, with the purpose of winning "international support" for the Ukrainian authorities in "death with dignity".

Ukrainian artillery observer squatting in children's dormitory

For the Ukrainian army, what they did in the first week of the war was the most rational choice. The Ukrainian army did not have the strength to repel the Russian offensive troops on their own territory. For the Ukrainian army, although they faced the situation where the enemy was extremely strong and we were extremely weak, they could avoid the strategic intentions of the Russian army through a series of means, that is, avoid the Russian army's quick victory and the rapid defeat of their own. The Ukrainian army rarely left the position since the first day of the war. They defended the Russian army on the spot by relying solely on the large amount of materials, solid fortifications and approaching residential areas, forcing the Russian army to stop and turn to the attack, or forcing the Russian army to put down their moral burdens in front of global media.

The Ukrainian army did not completely lose its subjective initiative. The Ukrainian army used NATO's intelligence advantages to the attack on the Russian army, and used a small force to attack the Russian army. The attacks below the company were piecemeal and often "death together." But a lot of them together caused the losses of as many as 500 Russian soldiers and more than 1,000 injured today. The losses caused by this military recklessness were indeed a tactical mistake of the Russian command. The series of losses suffered by the Russian army during long-distance maneuvers have further encouraged the determination and arrogance of the military's dead and hard elements to fight to the end through the Western-controlled media information war, and further dispelled the Russian army's idea of ​​"fast victory".

NATO's early warning aircraft and camera helped the Ukrainian army obtain valuable intelligence

So far, the Libra of the war is still turning to Russia. As the Russian army increases the dispatch of fixed-wing fighter jets, drones and armed helicopters in the Aerospace Army, gradually relaxes firepower strike restrictions, and the Ukrainian army, which lacks supplies and soldiers, has gradually consumed all combat forces, and the Russian army still firmly grasps the initiative on the battlefield. The Ukrainian army's losses are decreasing every day, while the Russian army's front line is gradually stabilizing and its troops are increasing. The established Ukrainian military headquarters are constantly occupied by Russian and Donbas militias. Judging from the current situation, this delayed war will continue to be delayed, and the changes in the geopolitical situation still make the Russian army at a disadvantage.

Chechen night vision instruments and Russian military drones are Ukrainians that cannot be handled by

. Another lesson learned from the Russian Command of the military's military's military's military's military almost completely gave up the political method of "propaganda". Chairman Mao has taught us that the propaganda work of the Red Army’s is the first major task of the Red Army. The Communist Party of China When it first entered the Chinese political stage and carried out the revolutionary struggle, it had a deep understanding of military propaganda work.Ukraine has complete infrastructure, telecommunications facilities and mobile phone penetration rate, and the Russian army has a certain understanding of the communication effect of military operations using the network. However, in this Russian-Ukrainian conflict, under the military decision of "politics is greater than military", the Russian military's propaganda system failed to disintegrate the Ukrainian army's continued tenacious will to resist while choosing not to cut off the Internet in the entire territory of Ukraine. This is indeed worth learning from our experience and lessons. Due to various reasons, Russia failed to disclose the progress and results of the troops in a timely manner. The first batch of results of the war was released 96 hours after the war started, and the released video was only a strike video of the aerospace army armed helicopters. In the entire joint battle spanning several armies and air division naval bases, only the Chechen armed forces and the Donetsk and the Lugansk armed forces carried out regular information releases. This was something that none of us expected at the beginning of the war.

Mobile phones and cameras provide the Ukrainian army with valuable communication command methods

Russian netizens, Ukrainian netizens and netizens from other countries outside the region almost unilaterally receive videos of Russian military vehicle loss taken by Ukrainian people. Due to the "military adventure" of the Russian Command, the inevitable losses brought by the Russian mechanized column in the process of continuous assault and the relatively casual attitude of the Russian army towards Ukrainian civilians, this video of "Russia's heavy losses" began to fill the Internet several hours after the war started. 48 hours after the war started, due to direct interference from Western forces and the influence of Western social media administrators "finding and deleting the entire network", Ukrainian equipment damaged videos disappeared on Western-controlled social media platforms such as Twitter , Facebook , and oil pipes, leaving only a large number of videos of Russian abandoned vehicles and damaged vehicles, allowing netizens from many countries to only see the losses of the Russian army and the Ukrainian army being annihilated.

Judging from the situation I have observed, these continuous anti-enemy videos, combined with the rare drone results of the Ukrainian army, have greatly encouraged the fighting spirit of Ukrainian nationalists and indirectly affected NATO's determination to interfere. It can be said that the Russian propaganda system, which has long served as the "child of other people's families" in the hearts of netizens in my country, especially its military propaganda system, disappeared like the investigation and attack drone in this Russian-Ukrainian conflict.

Can we do better?

This is an unprecedented war of "transparency". The author's team watched, analyzed the battle situation, and sorted it out to form a live broadcast of effective information, which ultimately created a miracle in the history of contemporary news and was also a reflection of the Chinese people's concern for this war. This bizarre war is a teaching without paying tuition. Whether we or the comrades in Youshi have already had the same or different thoughts about this war, but these thoughts ultimately point to a common direction. For us who are facing the war of national reunification, when that day really comes, can we do better?

Regarding this doubt, the author has had some non-confidential exchanges with some comrades in the army in the past few days. We and comrades in the army generally believe that the answer is yes. First of all, our commander will definitely not make any speculation when making decisions. As people who broadcast this war in a panoramic live manner, we all have a deeper understanding of the saying "Soldiers are the major affairs of the country, the place of life and death, and the way of survival and death." Military is the continuation of politics, and winning military victory is absolutely the first priority. The commander should not have any military fantasies, modify normal military decision-making plans in the plan, and weaken the intensity of military strikes. In the words of my friend, you can't hit the Sichuan Road Bridge in Suzhou River before you start to consider the "Ask of Little Warriors". Putin did not answer this question well, so the battle was very ugly. The political systems of the Chinese and Russian troops are different. The fundamental principles and systems of the Party’s absolute leadership over the army are the political characteristics and fundamental advantages that completely distinguish the people’s army from all old troops. Therefore, our leaders will never use the lives of the soldiers to do military adventures and political speculation.

"Would you like the building of capitalist , or the warrior of proletarian ", this question must be considered before firing.

Putting aside the gap in the command, this war has good reference significance for many friends in the army. All the disadvantages shown by the Russian army are avoided as much as possible. This war brought many new topics and new reflections to the comrades in the army, many of which involved "how should we fight such a war."

If the war in 1991 awakens us, then the war in 2022 is just a way to check for omissions and fill in the gaps. The war we are going to engage in is much more complicated than the Kharkov offensive. In view of this, many of my friends believe that the systemic gap reflected by the Russian army in this military operation is comprehensive, not just a small problem such as "insufficient investigation and attacking integrated drones". The Russian army used drones in large quantities in the war, but even so, the Russian army did not have a unified information command system, and the information fed back by the drone could not be processed and could only be provided to the squad for alert. Due to the lack of informatized reconnaissance feedback methods, the Russian army's fixed-wing troops and drone troops have poor strike efficiency against the Ukrainian special forces that have been broken into pieces and the Ukrainian mechanized troops huddled in the city. Under all these constraints, the Russian army can only rely on frequent close combat and use the quality and courage of front-line combat personnel to defeat the Ukrainian army in a small system supported by drones.

If the army-level joint battle launched in Ukraine this time is the PLA on the other end of the Eurasian continent, , , the PLA will rely on the informatization advantages established after the "military reform", with the support of advanced equipment and combat systems, and will fight a war that is far more beautiful than the Russians. Our army can rely on information advantages, divide the zones and grids, and carry out full strikes on the city defense enemy forces while pursuing the same political demands through large-scale precise strikes. At the same time, modern mechanized infantry can rely on the advantages of the military officer team, advanced sight-seeing and information communication systems, and under the cover of its absolute advantage in the air and artillery precise firepower, use the offensive at night and even during the day to "precisely draw points" in the city to quickly collapse the enemy's defense. Speaking of officer qualities, the Russian army rarely organized night battles at the battalion-level level in this war, which may be related to the lack of level of the Russian General Staff and the inability to organize large troops to fight at night. The systemic gap of

is not possible. Source: Social Media

But in the end, the various reasons exposed by the Russian army were still the problems of national strength. The Russian army's military expenditure is limited, and its aerospace army fleet is only a literal fraction of the People's Liberation Army (the difference in the fighter fleet is about 1,400 to 400, the difference in fifth-generation fleet is about 80 to 1, and the difference in special fleet is about 10 to 1). In the crucial special fleet, especially electronic confrontation aircraft and early warning aircraft fleets. Even if outside observers make excuses, the absence of the Aerospace Army in the past 10 days of war is inappropriate, especially the strong attack power of the Aerospace Army is an indispensable part of the Soviet-style offensive campaign system. Regarding the absence of the Aerospace Force, we need to wait for the Russian side to decrypt it later, but a possible military speculation is that the Russian army is still afraid of NATO fighter jets that are far stronger than the Russian army. After all, it is now the Russian Aerospace Force. Any aircraft captured on Ukrainian territory can be called by Western countries as aircraft captured by Ukraine. This can also be seen from the Pentagon briefing on March 1. The Ukrainian air force and air defense forces are almost unable to organize effective defenses, the United States insists that Russia has not obtained Ukrainian air supremacy . However, the Russian army has been unable to organize a decent air offensive for a long time, which shows that the Russian Aerospace Forces still have to prepare for the "strong enemy" west of Lviv .

Just when the manuscript was completed, the author saw this news: China's military budget this year is 1450.45 billion yuan, and increased by 7.1% year-on-year, an increase of 0.3 percentage points from last year. This is the first time that China's military budget has increased by more than 7% since 2019.Compared with the Russians, we are undoubtedly lucky. Behind us is a country that can continuously provide the most advanced fighter jets to the People's Army. The Russian army can indeed launch a war with Yars and " Brava " as its confidence, but the Russian army without J-20 cannot beat this war as beautiful as other hegemonic countries. For us, we can think with peace of mind whether our Dongfeng 41 is enough while providing the People's Army with dozens of brigades of advanced fighter jets. In any case, the Russians’ problems and lessons need to be written, and they can’t be finished in three days and three nights. If we say that this bizarre war is summarized in one sentence, it is that the Russians can always provide us with lessons.

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