A few days ago, Tsai Ing-wen's office broke out in Taiwan's version of " WikiLeaks ". The reporters interviewing Tsai's office received confidential information such as "palace drama" and opinions from staff before the DPP authorities' high-level meeting. Although the contents of these materials are difficult to distinguish between true and false, they seem to be mostly for Tsai Ing-wen’s “internal reference”. Therefore, although the data may be leaked due to the computer network being hacked, it should not be the case as Tsai’s office claimed to the outside world that the network system within the agency was attacked by hackers. The more likely situation is that Tsai Ing-wen’s staff’s private computer has long been “locked” by hackers.
Although the Cai Office said the information distributed to reporters was forgery and alteration, it also pointed out that the official network system was hacked, and the green camp people also blamed the mainland hackers for attacks. But these words to the outside world at the first time mean that the content of the outflow information has a considerable degree of authenticity; otherwise, if you want to distribute the opinions of the forged and altered Tsai Ing-wen’s staff, why should you first hack into the Tsai Office’s network system? That is, if there has never been any "decrypted" in the outflow information, Tsai Office is "scared" and doesn't even need to mention it.
In fact, Taiwan administrative agencies have relevant regulations on the security responsibility level of communication, and list high-level units and "municipalities directly under the central government" as "A" in the security responsibility level, that is, they are protected by the highest level of protection in terms of information security. Not only that, the Taiwan Legal Affairs Department Investigation Bureau has established the "Qualification Investigation Office", which is responsible for "preventing and controlling network and computer crimes" and "searching and reporting various situations of computer and network security, and promptly informing all administrative agencies of hacked". The Investigation Bureau failed to realize that the probability of successful hacking of Tsai's official network was actually very low.
Normally, every year, the execution units in charge of the security business of Taiwan administrative agencies should go to various administrative agencies to check for security loopholes and promote security prevention and control matters. Cai Office’s network protection capabilities should be very strong. Besides, if the Cai Office network is really captured by mainland hackers, why is it still missing the head of affairs Chen Ju Secretary-General appears to publicly explain the truth?
In fact, it is said that the email account address sent to reporters is not from Tsai Ing-wen's office. Therefore, Tsai Ing-wen's staff members were locked by hackers using their private computers, causing the files he created to be "moved away", which is greater than that of Tsai's Office being hacked. In particular, the contents involved in the outflow information are not matters that Tsai decided on the authority. It is believed that the staff members are not likely to use official computers in accordance with normal procedures based on the needs of "confidentiality".
DPP Chairman Zhuo Rongtai accused the outbreak of this incident to divert the focus, and the purpose was to "surround Wei and save Han." In fact, this incident broke out on the eve of Tsai Ing-wen's new term, and it is difficult not to associate with the ongoing personnel layout and resource competition. Perhaps some people use the means of "decryption" because of the "crisis". Therefore, the claim that the Cai Office was shocked may be just a "siege" method to "save Cai".
Author Gui Hongcheng, Taiwan Shixin University, serves as associate professor
Source: Zhongshi Electronic News
Editor: Zuo Qiuzi
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