On January 15, the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee with great historical significance— Zunyi Conference was successfully held here. Our party exposed and criticized the mistakes of the Party Central Committee in military leadership during the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression" and in the early stages of the Long March 2, ending Wang Ming's "left" adventurism in the Party Central Committee.
Comrade Mao Zedong's leadership in Red Army and the Party Central Committee was established. He turned the party's line to the correct track of Marxism-Leninism, which began with this meeting.
The Battle of the Four Crossings of Chishui after the Zunyi Conference fully demonstrated the great power of Mao Zedong's military thought and directly reflected the great achievements of the Zunyi Conference. After our front army captured Zunyi, Chiang Kai-shek gathered the troops of Hunan, Sichuan, Guangxi and Guizhou, as well as the direct Xue Yue regiment, and the troops of more than 150 regiments of Zunyi from all directions, attempting to encircle and annihilate our front army in the narrow and narrow area northwest of Wujiang.
In order to break the serious situation of the enemy's attempt to siege our army from all directions, the Central Military Commission and Comrade Mao Yidong decided to take advantage of the enemy's encirclement before the enemy formed an encirclement and command the Red Army to advance from Zunyi area to southern Sichuan and cross the Yangtze River to the north. On the one hand, it is required that the Fourth Red Army on the Sichuan-Shaanxi border "take the close cooperation between Jiangxi and Jiangxi before they fully entered Sichuan and carried out the "encirclement and suppression"" cross the Jialing River in the west and constrain the enemy in Sichuan and prevent the enemy from concentrating their forces on the front line of the Yangtze River. At the same time, it is required that the Second and Sixth Corps on the Hunan-Hubei-Shiguan border actively attack eastward, restrain the enemy in Hunan-Hubei-Hubei-Guizhou, and support the battles of the Fourth Front Army.
At that time, the central government determined that a front army marched towards Sichuan and crossed the Yangtze River north. The selected crossing location was on the line between Yibin and Luzhou .
On January 19th, the army divided into three routes to command the north and advanced towards Chishui County. Our Red Army set out from Tongzi and occupied the Donghuang Hall (now Xishui) on January 23, driving the Qian enemy Hou to flee north and south. Then, our Red 1st Division opened the way for the entire army, and advanced rapidly towards Wanglong Field through Yuanhou (Yuanhou) Field. On January 26, at the Huangpo Cave about 30 miles from Chishui County, he encountered the Sichuan-Enemy Zhang Anping Brigade, which was from Chishui County to Tucheng. The enemy first occupied the high ground on the right and used the fortifications on the left to block the firepower of our division. Our division is surrounded by the enemy on three sides.
At this time, Central Column and 3, 5 and 9 have arrived in Tucheng. However, the Sichuan warlords who came from warm water also chased their vanguards, Guo Xunqi Brigade and Pan Zuo Brigade's Sixth Regiment formed a confrontation with the fifth legion of our defenders in the northeast of Tucheng. A fierce battle began in Tucheng area.
In order to eliminate the troops of Guo Xunqi in Sichuan, comrades Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De and other comrades came to the front line to command. On the 27th, on the one hand, they sent me the First Red Division to stop the enemy from going south in Huangpi Cave, and on the other hand, they ordered the Third Army, the Fifth Army and the Wu Army to move back to the surrounding Guo Brigade. Although our division was surrounded by three sides at that time, for the victory of the Tucheng battle, we still bravely fought against the enemy's multiple attacks. Seeing that the situation was critical, the leader of the Red Second Regiment suggested withdrawing from the battle. I said that if we persist here for an extra hour, the battle in Tucheng will have more confidence in victory, and we cannot withdraw until we have to. Then he persisted until dusk the next day before withdrawing from the battle.
The Central Military Commission and Comrade Mao Zedong considered that Tucheng had been fighting all day long and although he annihilated a part of the enemy, the enemy's reinforcements were about to arrive. The original plan to occupy the Chishui River and cross the Yangtze River north was blocked by the enemy and could not be realized. The long-term battle was not good for me. So the Central Military Commission made a quick decision and ordered the withdrawal of the battle overnight. Before dawn on January 29, it crossed the Chishui River from the monkey field and Tucheng west (i.e., crossed the Chishui River) toward Gulin .
When my division was preparing to cross the river at the Yuanhouchang Ferry, Comrade Mao Zedong sent a staff officer from the General Headquarters to come to the ferry to find us and asked me, political commissar Huang Su, chief of staff Geng Biao, and political department director Comrade Tan Zheng to them. This is the third time I have met Comrade Mao Zedong on the Long March.
Comrade Mao Zedong talked about three issues to us when he saw us (Comrade Geng Biao was not coming because he commanded the troops to cross the river), the first question was Zunyi Conference. Comrade Mao Zedong told us that the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo to resolve the leadership problem of the Military Commission. He also said that Comrade Silai played an important role, and this was the first time that our leaders of the Red First Division heard about the Zunyi Conference. And it was told to us by Comrade Mao Zedong himself, so I was particularly impressed.
When we heard that this meeting “solved the leadership problem of the Military Commission”, everyone was very happy. Because this issue was the most concerned issue for everyone since the Long March, and it was what the party wanted and the military came to the end at that time. Although after the Liping Conference decided to turn to the army, our army has changed from the original policy of "fighting to the death" with the enemy everywhere to the policy of "avoiding the strong and attacking the weak" and "avoiding the sharp and attacking the virtual", and no longer penetrates the pockets arranged by the enemy. However, if the problems in military leadership are not solved, it is still difficult to fundamentally ensure the victory of the Long March. The spirit of the Zunyi Conference was transmitted to the Red First Division more than ten days later. According to analysis, there are probably the following reasons:
On the one hand, the First Army had entered the Tongyang and Songkan areas 50 kilometers away from Zunyi before the Party Central Committee held the Zunyi Conference. As soon as the Zunyi Conference was over, our division was ordered to be the vanguard to advance towards Chishui. The military situation was urgent and there was no time to convey it to us. On the other hand, Comrade Nie Rongzhen, the political commissar of the Legion who attended the Zunyi Conference, had not healed due to his fullness and had not been able to suppurate his feet. He marched with the Central Column on a stretcher and did not return to the front troops. On the other hand, it is related to Lin Biao's attitude towards the Zunyi Conference. In the fifth anti-"encirclement and suppression", Lin Biao was an active advocate and follower of Li De's "short-surgery" tactic. He was criticized at the Zunyi Conference, and Lin Biao did not say anything. After the Zunyi Conference, Lin Biao agreed to Li De and the First Army to "experience life". Therefore, although Lin Biao returned to the army after attending the Zunyi Conference, he did not convey the spirit of the conference to us in a timely manner. Of course, this was an analysis afterwards, and I didn't notice it at that time.
The second question that Comrade Mao Zedong talked about is about the problem of maneuvering and flexible strategic tactics. He said:''Your division was hit by the enemy several times during the Long March, and they all handled it well in accord with the changes. You avoided the enemy's edge and made a quick decision according to the intentions of the Military Commission. This was the correct implementation of the orders of the Military Commission. There will be many such situations in the future, which is to use mobile and flexible combat methods. "
Maneuverability and flexibility are the strategic and tactical guiding principles that Comrade Mao Zedong has always advocated. In the first, second and third anti-encirclement and suppression of the Central Soviet Area, Comrade Mao Zedong adopted a series of mobile and flexible strategic and tactical principles against the powerful enemy, tempting the enemy to penetrate deeper, conceal the main force, and suddenly attacked, first attacking the weak enemy, then attacking the strong enemy, and defeating each of them, to command our army to win consecutive victories. In the fourth anti-encirclement and suppression of the "encirclement and suppression of the "encirclement and suppression of the "encirclement and suppression" of , he continued to use Comrade Mao Zedong's strategic and tactical ideas about maneuverability and flexibility, so he still achieved great victory. At this time, Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized the use of mobile and flexible combat methods, and its intention was based on my understanding at that time. Filled, we should not forget the lessons learned from the five anti-"encirclement and suppression", we should also tell us not to have any other ideas because of the current plan of the Military Commission to change its plan to cross the Yangtze River from Yibin to Huzhou, and "there will be many such situations in the future" and be prepared for our ideological preparation.
Comrade Mao Zedong told us the third issue of the reduction of the troops. Comrade Mao Zedong said, "The troops must be reduced after they arrive in Tsaxi." You (referring to me) are going to be the commander of the division. Then, Comrade Mao Zedong asked me:
"Do you think it's OK?"
"Okay! No problem!" I replied.
"Yes, I should have no problem, you only have those few soldiers! Although it is nominally a division, it is actually just a regiment." Mao Shixi asked again: "How many people do you have in your first division?"
"There are more than three thousand people."I replied
"More than 3,000 people formed a regiment, and it's too many. Let's decide this according to the situation!" (Later, when we arrived in Zhaxi, the first legion was streamlined, except for the division's direct team, the rest of the organization did not change.)
At that time, I and Comrade Huangwa and Tan Zheng were both very happy to receive Mao Zedong's personal instructions. After returning, they immediately conveyed to other cadres in the division. Everyone was very excited after hearing this and said that they must do what Comrade Mao Zedong said.
"The Red Army's combat line is obedient to the Red Army's combat direction. The unfixed combat direction affects the unfixed combat line. Although the general direction does not change during a period, the small direction in the general direction changes at any time. If one direction is restricted, it must be turned to the other direction. After a period of time, the general direction is also restricted, and even this general direction has to be changed. "This is what Comrade Mao Zedong wrote in "Strategic Issues of the Chinese Revolutionary War" in 1936, and that was what he did at that time.
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