期刊简介
《安全研究》（Security Studies）收录并出版具有创新性的学术稿件——无论是理论研究、实践经验分享还是两者兼而有之。安全研究包含广泛的议题，涵盖核扩散、核威慑、军民关系、战略文化、种族冲突、流行病与国家安全、民主政治、外交决策以及定性与多方法研究的发展。Journal Citation Reports显示，其2020年的影响因子为2.464。
本期目录
1 鹰壶：美国、英国、法国和以色列关于核禁忌和非战斗人员豁免的公众舆论
Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel
2 网络行动、调节信号和国际危机的降级
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
3 网络武器转让：意义、限制和影响
Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications
4 微不足道的前哨部队？：军事能力和联盟再保证
Trivial Tripwires? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance
5 推翻领袖，保留政体？2011年阿拉伯之春期间突尼斯和埃及军方的专制军民关系和政变行为
Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime? Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring
6 王冠不稳：针对宗教合法性和国家间争端军事化的外部威胁
Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization
文章摘要
鹰壶：美国、英国、法国和以色列关于核禁忌和非战斗人员豁免的公众舆论
题目：Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel
作者：Janina Dill, 牛津大学纳菲尔德学院研究员；Scott D. Sagan, 斯坦福大学卡罗琳S. G. 芒罗政治学教授、国际安全与合作中心高级研究员；Benjamin A. Valentino, 美国达特茅斯学院副教授。
摘要：近来的学术研究已经证实当美国人自身受到威胁时，大多数美国人会支持使用核武器，并违反非战斗人员豁免原则。然而，一些学者认为，这些鹰派的观点只是例外，其他西方民主人士已经将核禁忌和禁止故意杀害平民等理念充分的内在化。为了调查关于这些重要国际规范的跨国家看法，本文实施了一项在美国、英国、法国和以色列公民范围内的民意调查实验。研究发现美国式看法绝非特例。相反，以色列的受访者表现出最鹰派的偏好，法国和美国的看法大致相同，英国公民则一直是最不支持核武器使用或针对平民的。绝对禁止核武器使用或针对平民的看法在上述四个国家中对于塑造公众舆论影响不大。每个国家的公众舆论都遵循了相同的结果论逻辑：当运用核武器比常规选择更有效的时候，多数或接近多数的受访者都愿意支持使用核武器，但随着附带的平民死亡人数上升，使用核武器的意愿会下降。相较之外国公民，受访者对同胞的偏爱以及受访者的对于报应的态度有助于解释个人层面的态度差异。
Recent scholarship has established that a majority of Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of noncombatant immunity when American lives are on the line. Some scholars contend, however, that these hawkish American attitudes are an outlier and that other Western democratic publics have more fully internalized the nuclear taboo, as well as the prohibition on deliberately killing civilians. To investigate cross-national attitudes on these important norms, we conducted a survey experiment of American, British, French, and Israeli citizens. We find that American attitudes are not exceptional. Rather, Israeli respondents display the most hawkish preferences; French and American citizens are roughly equally hawkish; and the British public is consistently the least supportive of nuclear use or targeting civilians. Categorical prohibitions—against nuclear use and targeting civilians—do little to shape public opinion in these four countries. Instead, public opinion in each state follows the same consequentialist logic: a majority or near majority of respondents are willing to support using nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but support declines when collateral civilian deaths rise. Respondents’ preferences for compatriots over foreign civilians and respondents’ retributiveness help explain individual-level variation in attitudes.
网络行动、调节信号和国际危机的降级
题目：Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
作者：Erica D. Lonergan，美国西点军校网络研究所助理教授、哥伦比亚大学索尔兹曼战争与和平研究所研究员；Shawn W. Lonergan，美国陆军预备役军官、普华永道网络风险监管部门高级主管。
摘要：信号是国际危机谈判和强制外交的核心要素。为了在危机中取得成功，一个国家必须向其敌对国传达出其拥有施加有利结果的能力并且付诸行动的决心，同时还要控制无意识升级的风险和战争。然而，有关信号的文献中研究较少的是：国家如何利用信号来管理风险的升级，乃至使危机降级。本文阐述了一种网络空间中的信号理论。研究认为，尽管网络行动在强制外交的背景下并不特别适合作为代价高昂的决心或能力的信号，但其对于控制升级风险的信号具有独特的效用。本文围绕网络空间中调节信号的因果机制构建了一个框架，并通过比较案例研究构建了一个框架。研究发现，在某些情况下，网络行动可以起到调节信号的作用，特别是当决策者面临同时调节向国内受众和敌对政府发出信号之间的紧张关系时。
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalating crises. In this article, we develop a theory of signaling in cyberspace. We argue that, although cyber operations are not particularly well suited as costly signals of resolve or capabilities in the context of coercive diplomacy, they have a distinct utility for signaling to manage escalation risks. We build a framework organized around the causal mechanisms of accommodative signaling in cyberspace and test it against a set of comparative case studies. We find that cyber operations can act as accommodative signaling under some conditions, particularly when decision makers are faced with managing tensions between simultaneously signaling to domestic audiences and adversary governments.
网络武器转让：意义、限制和影响
题目：Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications
作者：Max Smeets，斯坦福大学网络安全研究员G。
摘要：网络领域武器转让的动机和机会是什么？尽管学术界未能系统地解决这个问题，但准确的答案对于理解网络指挥和情报联盟的运作、二十一世纪北大西洋公约组织的运行以及网络军备控制的可实施性至关重要。第一，本文介绍了一个新的概念框架——人员—行为—工具—基础设施—组织（PETIO）框架——以了解进攻性网络能力的要素。第二，本文解释了网络武器转让的动机在 PETIO 框架的不同元素中有何差异。尽管可以毫不费力地复制这类行为和工具，但它们转瞬即逝的特性和运行跟踪的可能性意味着实际上转让这些资产的动机很小。如果说国家间转让(武器)存在任何动机，那就是促进其他国家行为体发展自己的进攻能力——即通过提供专业知识、基础设施和组织能力来适应和创新——因为这不会减少自己国家武器的效能。第三，本文认为，与网络间谍能力相比，网络武器转让能力的动机较弱，并且归因动态为这些转移动态增加了额外的复杂性。
What are the motivations and opportunities for arms transfer in the cyber realm? Although scholarship has failed to systematically address this question, having an accurate answer is crucial for understanding the operationalization of cyber commands and intelligence alliances, the functioning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the twenty-first century, and the viability of cyber arms controls. First, this article introduces a new conceptual framework—the people-exploits-tools-infrastructure-organization (PETIO) framework—to understand the elements of an offensive cyber capability. Second, I explain how the incentives of cyber arms transfer differ across the different elements of the PETIO framework. Though exploits and tools can be effortlessly replicated, their transitory nature and potential for operational tracking means there is little incentive to actually transfer these assets. If any incentives exist for state-to-state transfer, it would be in facilitating other state actors to develop their own offensive capabilities—that is, by providing expertise, infrastructure, and organizational capacity to adapt and innovate—as this does not reduce the effectiveness of one’s own arsenal. Third, I argue that the incentives for transferring cyber effect capabilities are weaker compared to cyber espionage capabilities, and attribution dynamics add an additional layer of complexity to these transfer dynamics.
微不足道的前哨部队？：军事能力和联盟再保证
题目：Trivial Tripwires? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance
作者：Brian Blankenship，迈阿密大学助理教授、哥伦比亚大学政治学博士；Erik Lin-Greenberg，麻省理工学院政治科学系助理教授。
摘要：国家如何才能最有效地安抚盟友？现有的评估承诺信号的研究集中于决心在使保证可信方面的作用。这忽略了有关能力作用的重要问题。本文认为安抚的有效性是结合能力和决心的产物，并认为高决心不能抵消低能力。研究引入了一种基于军事能力和决心相互作用的安抚方式的新类型学，并使用一项关于欧洲外交政策专家的原始调查以及一项针对美国和北大西洋公约组织在波罗的海的保证倡议的案例研究，来测试哪种类型的安抚方式是最令人放心的。本文发现，高决心、低能力的信号如在盟国领土上的第一防线前哨部队并不比驻扎在离岸的部队这类高能力、低决心的信号更令人放心。研究对前哨部队的安抚价值提出了质疑，并对有关国家间信号的学术研究做出贡献。
How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Existing studies assessing signals of commitment focus on the role of resolve in making assurances credible. This sidelines important questions about the role of capability. We argue that reassurance effectiveness is the product of both capability and resolve, and suggest that high resolve cannot offset low capability. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of military capability and resolve, and test which types of measures are most reassuring using an original survey fielded on European foreign policy experts and a case study of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that high-resolve, low-capability signals such as tripwire forces in allied territory are not viewed as any more reassuring than high-capability, low-resolve signals such as forces stationed offshore. Our study casts doubt on the reassurance value of tripwires and contributes to scholarship on interstate signaling.
推翻领袖，保留政体？2011年阿拉伯之春期间突尼斯和埃及军方的专制政体军民关系和政变行为
题目：Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime? Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring
作者：Risa Brooks，马凯特大学政治学副教授、西点军校战略与国际研究中心国际安全项目非常驻高级研究员；Peter B. White，悉尼大学副教授。
摘要：本文提出这样一种理论，即专制军民关系的变化是如何影响独裁者较为脆弱的政变类型的。独裁者依赖于可供替代的控制策略，这些策略包括两个当务之急的紧张关系——治理方式和防止政变。在“大谈判”中，领导人将特权让渡给军方，并在治理紧急事物上妥协。这使他们免于遭受政体更迭类型的政变的影响，但仍然使他们容易受到由谈判失败造成的政府重新洗牌类型的政变的影响。或者，政治领导人可能依赖于“遏制”，将军队边缘化。尽管他们在治理紧急事务上做出的让步较少，但当军方有机会发动政变，而不仅仅是重新洗牌领导人时，军方更有可能推翻整个政体。本研究使用案例内过程跟踪工具以及突尼斯和埃及的配对案例研究来评估该理论，并进行描述性定量分析，以证明该理论的可推广性。
We present a theory for how variation in autocratic civil-military relations affects the type of coups to which autocratic leaders are vulnerable. Dictators rely on alternative strategies of control that involve tensions across two imperatives—governance and coup prevention. In a “grand bargain,” leaders cede prerogatives to the military and compromise on the governance imperative. This insulates them from regime-change coups but still renders them vulnerable to reshuffling coups that result from bargaining failures. Alternatively, political leaders may rely on “containment,” in which they marginalize the military. Although they make fewer concessions on the governance imperative, the military is more likely to oust the entire regime when the former has the opportunity to engage in a coup, not just reshuffle the leader. We evaluate this theory using within-case process tracing and paired case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, and conduct descriptive quantitative analyses to demonstrate the generalizability of our theory.
王冠不稳：针对宗教合法性和国家间争端军事化的外部威胁
题目：Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization
作者：Ariel Zellman，以色列巴伊兰大学政治学系讲师；Davis Brown，贝勒大学宗教研究所非常驻学者。
摘要：尽管人们常常认为宗教应该对国际冲突产生重大影响，但实证经验表明这种看法错对参半。对于每场反复发生的宗教间冲突，都有许多持续的宗教间合作的例子。宗教间冲突也频繁地破坏了在共享同种宗教的国家之间的那种经常被假定成的和平关系。本文提出这样一种假设，即宗教是国家间争端军事化的重要干预因素，尤其是在内部受到威胁的竞争对手之间。在混合宗教的二分体中，冲突往往伴随着对跨国界共同宗教主义者的压迫，而在共享同种宗教的二分体中，冲突则发生在一方不成比例地增加其对宗教的官方支持时。在上述两种情况下，争端军事化主要是一种为了削弱国内竞争对手的尝试，而这些竞争对手的挑战会因为针对领导人宗教合法性的外部威胁而升级。本研究使用关于宗教人口和国家宗教政策的新的、长期的数据来测试这些观点，通过先前的国家间领土争端来识别竞争对手。这些调查结果在很大程度上证实了该假设，大体上阐明了宗教导致国际军事化冲突发生的条件。
Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent interreligious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained interreligious cooperation. Conflict also frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, whereas in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders’ religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. The findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.
编译 | 崔育涞
审校 | 张曼娜
排版 | 邱意雯
文章来源于《安全研究》（Security Studies）。文章评译内容为公益分享，服务于学术科研教学工作，不代表国政学人观点。
