期刊簡介
《安全研究》（Security Studies）收錄並出版具有創新性的學術稿件——無論是理論研究、實踐經驗分享還是兩者兼而有之。安全研究包含廣泛的議題，涵蓋核擴散、核威懾、軍民關係、戰略文化、種族衝突、流行病與國家安全、民主政治、外交決策以及定性與多方法研究的發展。Journal Citation Reports顯示，其2020年的影響因子為2.464。
本期目錄
1 鷹壺：美國、英國、法國和以色列關於核禁忌和非戰鬥人員豁免的公眾輿論
Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel
2 網絡行動、調節信號和國際危機的降級
Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
3 網絡武器轉讓：意義、限制和影響
Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications
4 微不足道的前哨部隊？：軍事能力和聯盟再保證
Trivial Tripwires? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance
5 推翻領袖，保留政體？2011年阿拉伯之春期間突尼斯和埃及軍方的專制軍民關係和政變行為
Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime? Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring
6 王冠不穩：針對宗教合法性和國家間爭端軍事化的外部威脅
Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization
文章摘要
鷹壺：美國、英國、法國和以色列關於核禁忌和非戰鬥人員豁免的公眾輿論
題目：Kettles of Hawks: Public Opinion on the Nuclear Taboo and Noncombatant Immunity in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Israel
作者：Janina Dill, 牛津大學納菲爾德學院研究員；Scott D. Sagan, 斯坦福大學卡羅琳S. G. 芒羅政治學教授、國際安全與合作中心高級研究員；Benjamin A. Valentino, 美國達特茅斯學院副教授。
摘要：近來的學術研究已經證實當美國人自身受到威脅時，大多數美國人會支持使用核武器，並違反非戰鬥人員豁免原則。然而，一些學者認為，這些鷹派的觀點只是例外，其他西方民主人士已經將核禁忌和禁止故意殺害平民等理念充分的內在化。為了調查關於這些重要國際規範的跨國家看法，本文實施了一項在美國、英國、法國和以色列公民範圍內的民意調查實驗。研究發現美國式看法絕非特例。相反，以色列的受訪者表現出最鷹派的偏好，法國和美國的看法大致相同，英國公民則一直是最不支持核武器使用或針對平民的。絕對禁止核武器使用或針對平民的看法在上述四個國家中對於塑造公眾輿論影響不大。每個國家的公眾輿論都遵循了相同的結果論邏輯：當運用核武器比常規選擇更有效的時候，多數或接近多數的受訪者都願意支持使用核武器，但隨着附帶的平民死亡人數上升，使用核武器的意願會下降。相較之外國公民，受訪者對同胞的偏愛以及受訪者的對於報應的態度有助於解釋個人層面的態度差異。
Recent scholarship has established that a majority of Americans will support the use of nuclear weapons and violate the principle of noncombatant immunity when American lives are on the line. Some scholars contend, however, that these hawkish American attitudes are an outlier and that other Western democratic publics have more fully internalized the nuclear taboo, as well as the prohibition on deliberately killing civilians. To investigate cross-national attitudes on these important norms, we conducted a survey experiment of American, British, French, and Israeli citizens. We find that American attitudes are not exceptional. Rather, Israeli respondents display the most hawkish preferences; French and American citizens are roughly equally hawkish; and the British public is consistently the least supportive of nuclear use or targeting civilians. Categorical prohibitions—against nuclear use and targeting civilians—do little to shape public opinion in these four countries. Instead, public opinion in each state follows the same consequentialist logic: a majority or near majority of respondents are willing to support using nuclear weapons when they are more effective than conventional options, but support declines when collateral civilian deaths rise. Respondents’ preferences for compatriots over foreign civilians and respondents’ retributiveness help explain individual-level variation in attitudes.
網絡行動、調節信號和國際危機的降級
題目：Cyber Operations, Accommodative Signaling, and the De-Escalation of International Crises
作者：Erica D. Lonergan，美國西點軍校網絡研究所助理教授、哥倫比亞大學索爾茲曼戰爭與和平研究所研究員；Shawn W. Lonergan，美國陸軍預備役軍官、普華永道網絡風險監管部門高級主管。
摘要：信號是國際危機談判和強制外交的核心要素。為了在危機中取得成功，一個國家必須向其敵對國傳達出其擁有施加有利結果的能力並且付諸行動的決心，同時還要控制無意識升級的風險和戰爭。然而，有關信號的文獻中研究較少的是：國家如何利用信號來管理風險的升級，乃至使危機降級。本文闡述了一種網絡空間中的信號理論。研究認為，儘管網絡行動在強制外交的背景下並不特別適合作為代價高昂的決心或能力的信號，但其對於控制升級風險的信號具有獨特的效用。本文圍繞網絡空間中調節信號的因果機制構建了一個框架，並通過比較案例研究構建了一個框架。研究發現，在某些情況下，網絡行動可以起到調節信號的作用，特別是當決策者面臨同時調節向國內受眾和敵對政府發出信號之間的緊張關係時。
Signaling is a core element of international crisis bargaining and coercive diplomacy. To succeed in crises, a state must convey to its opponent that it possesses the capability to impose an advantageous outcome and that it is resolved to do so, while also managing the risks of unintended escalation and war. However, less studied in signaling literature is how states can use signals for the purposes of managing escalation risks or even de-escalating crises. In this article, we develop a theory of signaling in cyberspace. We argue that, although cyber operations are not particularly well suited as costly signals of resolve or capabilities in the context of coercive diplomacy, they have a distinct utility for signaling to manage escalation risks. We build a framework organized around the causal mechanisms of accommodative signaling in cyberspace and test it against a set of comparative case studies. We find that cyber operations can act as accommodative signaling under some conditions, particularly when decision makers are faced with managing tensions between simultaneously signaling to domestic audiences and adversary governments.
網絡武器轉讓：意義、限制和影響
題目：Cyber Arms Transfer: Meaning, Limits, and Implications
作者：Max Smeets，斯坦福大學網絡安全研究員G。
摘要：網絡領域武器轉讓的動機和機會是什麼？儘管學術界未能系統地解決這個問題，但準確的答案對於理解網絡指揮和情報聯盟的運作、二十一世紀北大西洋公約組織的運行以及網絡軍備控制的可實施性至關重要。第一，本文介紹了一個新的概念框架——人員—行為—工具—基礎設施—組織（PETIO）框架——以了解進攻性網絡能力的要素。第二，本文解釋了網絡武器轉讓的動機在 PETIO 框架的不同元素中有何差異。儘管可以毫不費力地複製這類行為和工具，但它們轉瞬即逝的特性和運行跟蹤的可能性意味着實際上轉讓這些資產的動機很小。如果說國家間轉讓(武器)存在任何動機，那就是促進其他國家行為體發展自己的進攻能力——即通過提供專業知識、基礎設施和組織能力來適應和創新——因為這不會減少自己國家武器的效能。第三，本文認為，與網絡間諜能力相比，網絡武器轉讓能力的動機較弱，並且歸因動態為這些轉移動態增加了額外的複雜性。
What are the motivations and opportunities for arms transfer in the cyber realm? Although scholarship has failed to systematically address this question, having an accurate answer is crucial for understanding the operationalization of cyber commands and intelligence alliances, the functioning of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the twenty-first century, and the viability of cyber arms controls. First, this article introduces a new conceptual framework—the people-exploits-tools-infrastructure-organization (PETIO) framework—to understand the elements of an offensive cyber capability. Second, I explain how the incentives of cyber arms transfer differ across the different elements of the PETIO framework. Though exploits and tools can be effortlessly replicated, their transitory nature and potential for operational tracking means there is little incentive to actually transfer these assets. If any incentives exist for state-to-state transfer, it would be in facilitating other state actors to develop their own offensive capabilities—that is, by providing expertise, infrastructure, and organizational capacity to adapt and innovate—as this does not reduce the effectiveness of one’s own arsenal. Third, I argue that the incentives for transferring cyber effect capabilities are weaker compared to cyber espionage capabilities, and attribution dynamics add an additional layer of complexity to these transfer dynamics.
微不足道的前哨部隊？：軍事能力和聯盟再保證
題目：Trivial Tripwires? : Military Capabilities and Alliance Reassurance
作者：Brian Blankenship，邁阿密大學助理教授、哥倫比亞大學政治學博士；Erik Lin-Greenberg，麻省理工學院政治科學系助理教授。
摘要：國家如何才能最有效地安撫盟友？現有的評估承諾信號的研究集中於決心在使保證可信方面的作用。這忽略了有關能力作用的重要問題。本文認為安撫的有效性是結合能力和決心的產物，並認為高決心不能抵消低能力。研究引入了一種基於軍事能力和決心相互作用的安撫方式的新類型學，並使用一項關於歐洲外交政策專家的原始調查以及一項針對美國和北大西洋公約組織在波羅的海的保證倡議的案例研究，來測試哪種類型的安撫方式是最令人放心的。本文發現，高決心、低能力的信號如在盟國領土上的第一防線前哨部隊並不比駐紮在離岸的部隊這類高能力、低決心的信號更令人放心。研究對前哨部隊的安撫價值提出了質疑，並對有關國家間信號的學術研究做出貢獻。
How can states most effectively reassure their allies? Existing studies assessing signals of commitment focus on the role of resolve in making assurances credible. This sidelines important questions about the role of capability. We argue that reassurance effectiveness is the product of both capability and resolve, and suggest that high resolve cannot offset low capability. We introduce a new typology of reassurance measures based on the interaction of military capability and resolve, and test which types of measures are most reassuring using an original survey fielded on European foreign policy experts and a case study of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization reassurance initiatives in the Baltics. We find that high-resolve, low-capability signals such as tripwire forces in allied territory are not viewed as any more reassuring than high-capability, low-resolve signals such as forces stationed offshore. Our study casts doubt on the reassurance value of tripwires and contributes to scholarship on interstate signaling.
推翻領袖，保留政體？2011年阿拉伯之春期間突尼斯和埃及軍方的專制政體軍民關係和政變行為
題目：Oust the Leader, Keep the Regime? Autocratic Civil-Military Relations and Coup Behavior in the Tunisian and Egyptian Militaries during the 2011 Arab Spring
作者：Risa Brooks，馬凱特大學政治學副教授、西點軍校戰略與國際研究中心國際安全項目非常駐高級研究員；Peter B. White，悉尼大學副教授。
摘要：本文提出這樣一種理論，即專制軍民關係的變化是如何影響獨裁者較為脆弱的政變類型的。獨裁者依賴於可供替代的控制策略，這些策略包括兩個當務之急的緊張關係——治理方式和防止政變。在“大談判”中，領導人將特權讓渡給軍方，並在治理緊急事物上妥協。這使他們免於遭受政體更迭類型的政變的影響，但仍然使他們容易受到由談判失敗造成的政府重新洗牌類型的政變的影響。或者，政治領導人可能依賴於“遏制”，將軍隊邊緣化。儘管他們在治理緊急事務上做出的讓步較少，但當軍方有機會發動政變，而不僅僅是重新洗牌領導人時，軍方更有可能推翻整個政體。本研究使用案例內過程跟蹤工具以及突尼斯和埃及的配對案例研究來評估該理論，並進行描述性定量分析，以證明該理論的可推廣性。
We present a theory for how variation in autocratic civil-military relations affects the type of coups to which autocratic leaders are vulnerable. Dictators rely on alternative strategies of control that involve tensions across two imperatives—governance and coup prevention. In a “grand bargain,” leaders cede prerogatives to the military and compromise on the governance imperative. This insulates them from regime-change coups but still renders them vulnerable to reshuffling coups that result from bargaining failures. Alternatively, political leaders may rely on “containment,” in which they marginalize the military. Although they make fewer concessions on the governance imperative, the military is more likely to oust the entire regime when the former has the opportunity to engage in a coup, not just reshuffle the leader. We evaluate this theory using within-case process tracing and paired case studies of Tunisia and Egypt, and conduct descriptive quantitative analyses to demonstrate the generalizability of our theory.
王冠不穩：針對宗教合法性和國家間爭端軍事化的外部威脅
題目：Uneasy Lies the Crown: External Threats to Religious Legitimacy and Interstate Dispute Militarization
作者：Ariel Zellman，以色列巴伊蘭大學政治學系講師；Davis Brown，貝勒大學宗教研究所非常駐學者。
摘要：儘管人們常常認為宗教應該對國際衝突產生重大影響，但實證經驗表明這種看法錯對參半。對於每場反覆發生的宗教間衝突，都有許多持續的宗教間合作的例子。宗教間衝突也頻繁地破壞了在共享同種宗教的國家之間的那種經常被假定成的和平關係。本文提出這樣一種假設，即宗教是國家間爭端軍事化的重要干預因素，尤其是在內部受到威脅的競爭對手之間。在混合宗教的二分體中，衝突往往伴隨着對跨國界共同宗教主義者的壓迫，而在共享同種宗教的二分體中，衝突則發生在一方不成比例地增加其對宗教的官方支持時。在上述兩種情況下，爭端軍事化主要是一種為了削弱國內競爭對手的嘗試，而這些競爭對手的挑戰會因為針對領導人宗教合法性的外部威脅而升級。本研究使用關於宗教人口和國家宗教政策的新的、長期的數據來測試這些觀點，通過先前的國家間領土爭端來識別競爭對手。這些調查結果在很大程度上證實了該假設，大體上闡明了宗教導致國際軍事化衝突發生的條件。
Although often argued that religion should significantly influence international conflict, the empirical record is mixed. For every recurrent interreligious conflict, there are numerous examples of sustained interreligious cooperation. Conflict also frequently mars the oft-assumed peaceful relations between shared-religion states. We argue that religion is an important intervening factor in interstate dispute militarization, especially between internally threatened rivals. In mixed-religion dyads, conflict often follows oppression of cross-border coreligionists, whereas in shared-religion dyads, conflict occurs as one side disproportionately increases its official support for that religion. In both instances, dispute militarization is primarily an effort to undercut domestic competitors, whose challenge is augmented by external threats to leaders’ religious legitimacy. We test these propositions using new, long-term data on religious demography and state-religion policy, identifying rivalries via antecedent interstate territorial disputes. The findings largely confirm our hypotheses, substantially clarifying the conditions under which religion contributes to international militarized conflict.
編譯 | 崔育淶
審校 | 張曼娜
排版 | 邱意雯
文章來源於《安全研究》（Security Studies）。文章評譯內容為公益分享，服務於學術科研教學工作，不代表國政學人觀點。
